444 Philosophy of Religion and Kalam * Ghasem Kakaie Ghasem Kakaie (Shiraz University, Iran) IBN ‘ARABI’S GOD, ECKHART’S GOD: GOD OF PHILOSOPHERS OR GOD OF RELIGION? 1. Prelude It is difficult to provide such a definition of God in which all various views are included and all schools agree upon. The dominant view is that Religion’s God is the Origin of the universe and enjoys some kind of transcendence and sacredness. In philosophy, however, there are various images for God: the Gods of ancient Greece, the unmoved mover of Aristotle, the necessary Being of Avicenna, the God of Aquinas’s theism, the God of Spinoza’s the pantheistic, panentheism God in some mystical philosophies, the One in Neoplatonism, the God of process philosophy, the God of existential philosophies, ultimate concern of Tillich, God as the impersonal ground of Being, and aspects of Heidegger’s 1 Dasein are different concepts of deity. The God of philosophy is often an object, not a person; something, not some- one, unchangeable, absolute and unlimited. But the God which is worshiped in ordinary religion “is a person and to be a person, an entity must think, feel, and will. In spite of being called unchangeable, he is angry with us today, pleased 2 with us tomorrow.” The meaning of God, of course, is to some extent different in the ordinary versions of various religions and even between Abrahamic religions. The God who has no son according to Islam, for example, may differ from the God who has a son as is believed in Christianity. Various Divine religions in general, and Abrahamic religions in particular, have many commonalities concerning God. We consider them the attributes of Religion’s God, and deem theism from among philosophical views, to be closer to the Religion’s God. There are fundamental differences between the God in a view that is well- known in the West as Pantheism and the God in theism. Some people have tried to present Eckhart and Ibn ‘Arabi’s “Unity of Being” (waḥdat-i wujūd) as a sort 1 Levine M. Pantheism. London: Routledge, 1994. P. 12. 2 Stace W.T. Mysticism and Philosophy. London: McMillan, 1961. P. 179. Ibn ‘Arabi’s God, Eckhart’s God 445 of pantheism. But there are great gaps between the Unity of Being and Panthe- ism. If we are to make a comparison between the Doctrine of Unity of Being and some Western attitude, it may be closer to panentheism rather than pantheism. The important point is, however, that Ibn ‘Arabi, and to some extent Eckhart, have managed to look from the point view of the unity of Being, while keeping the aspects of the Religion’s God; and in other words, they have managed to identify the Religion’s God and the God of the Unity of Being. In this article, we try to provide a picture of the Religion’s God in theistic reading, then we will mention the God of pantheism and panentheism; and finally we will discuss God in Eckhart and Ibn ‘Arabi’s theory of Unity of Being. 2. God of Theism As is said, the God introduced by Revelation is more consistent with theism’s God than with the other philosophical gods. Theism’s God is a sacred power which dominates the universe and influences it. He is in a mysterious way pre- sent in our very being, and has special effects such as revelation or miracles in 3 some occasions in special historical events. This God is personal; that is, He is Aware and Willing. It means that some qualities, such as knowing, believing, and willing, may be attributed to Him, 4 although he is free from sentiments and wishes. He is a person who is eternally free, Omnipotent, Omniscient. He is a spirit which is present everywhere. He is 5 absolute good. He is the origin of moral obligations. He has some sort of deity which makes Him prayable. While He undertakes the creation of the Universe, 6 he is needless of, and independent from it. The necessary condition for His di- vinity is to be free from constraints as well as personality, and at the same time 7 to be unchangeable and impassive. According to Macquarrie, among all creatures’ qualities, personality is the most suitable attribute to simile God, for a thing which is impersonal does not deserve to be called God. Though traditional theism suffers somehow from an- 8 thropomorphism, God may be better to be called Supra-Personal. In this way, His transcendence also may be kept. For in this view, God is beyond the world of creatures and is not similar to anything. Thus, theism is able to keep the main attributes of the Religion’s God, which are as follows: unity, personality, tran- 9 scendence, creativity, holiness and being the origin of moral values. 3 Levine. Pantheism. P. 107–8. 4 Ibid. P. 159. 5 Ibid. P. 53. 6 Ibid. P. 158. 7 Owen H.P. Concepts of Deity. London: McMillan, 1971. P. 142–3. 8 Levine. Pantheism. P. 150. 9 Owen. Concepts of Deity. P. 150. 446 Philosophy of Religion and Kalam * Ghasem Kakaie Despite all this, because of accepting these religious elements on the one hand, and commitment to rational justification on the other, theism confronts problems and difficulties, which have to be solved. Some of the problems and the difficulties faced by theism are as follows: Is the concept of the eternal and timeless God coherent and can one conceive of a “timeless” being? Did time begin when the universe did? Where was God before creation? How can some- thing be created out of nothing? Why did creation take place when it did and not before — and what was God doing in the meantime? Why did God create this world and not some other — better — world? Should God have created anything at all? How can an immutable being create? Are immutability, impossibility and simplicity compatible with the efficacy of prayer and God’s responsiveness to 10 human action? Is God’s timelessness compatible with biblical theology? 3. Pantheism’s God Pantheism is regarded as a philosophical approach to the problem of God. Though its origin may be mystical, in the last analysis, it is deemed to be a phi- losophical view. Many thinkers with various attitudes have been considered to be pantheist. To gather all of them under the same title is extremely difficult. What can be said in brief is, however, that “What all pantheists do have in common (by the very definition of pantheism) is that the totality of all that is does not divide into two 11 great components, a creator God, and a created world.” In other words, theism’s God is transcendent and personal; while pantheism accepts neither existential transcendence of God nor His personality. Now, if theism’s God is transcendent and that of pantheism is immanent in things, one cannot say that the two views differ in the number and quality of God’s attrib- 12 utes, but their debate is that whether theism’s God exists or not. For, according to theism, a God which is immanent in things is not God. Concerning personality, the debate between the two is over God’s attributes. Most versions of pantheism deny that God is a person. Pre-Socratic philosophers, Spinoza, Bruno, and even Plotinus and Lao Tzu do not regard God as a person. One of the researchers claims: “I know of no prominent versions of pantheism 13 that conceive of God as a person.” Thus, two main aspects of pantheism are as follows: it does not regard God to be transcendent beyond the world and makes no distinction between the Creating God and the created world; and the other is that it does not regard God to be per- 10 Levine. Pantheism. P. 177. 11 Sprigge T.L.S. Pantheism // The Monist, 80 (1997). 12 Levine. Pantheism. P. 94. 13 Levine. Pantheism. P. 11. Ibn ‘Arabi’s God, Eckhart’s God 447 sonal. Some pantheists even deny consciousness for God, we do not mention 14 other personal attributes. Pantheism is able to solve some problems faced by theism. “For example by rejecting the principle of creation and interpreting it as the disclosure of the abso- lute, it solves some difficulties related to the theory of the creation from nothing- ness. But by denying the personality of God and also by denying his transcen- dence, it distances itself from the religious viewpoint. Because, firstly, it does not know God as the creator of the world, and, secondly, it is unable to justify the anthropomorphic characters attributed to God in sacred scriptures. Espe- cially, it cannot justify consciousness of God in all religions, and incarnation in 15 Christianity.” On the other hand, since pantheism’s God is close to the absolute God of phi- losophers, some problems of theism become more difficult for pantheism. For example, if God is not personal and no change is admitted in Him, He cannot be loved. And the love felt by the believers in praying makes no sense for panthe- ists. In their school, there is no trace of the interaction that some like Ibn ‘Arabi have with their God. In general, the God worshipped by them is other than the God about Whom Ibn ‘Arabi speaks as follows: “Because of piety (taqwa), we are given Divine intuition, and God through theophany undertakes to teach us, and we understand what the reasons are not able to understand through thinking. I mean the things that are introduced in the sacred texts through transmitted evidence but the reason regards them to be im- possible. Thus, the believer’s reason goes on to interpret them, and the pure be- liever accepts them… [mystic, however, intuits them]. Then the people of un- veiling see God’s right hand, His hand, both of His hands, God’s eye, God’s eyes which have been attributed [in the sacred texts] to Him. They see His step and His face as well. They see attributes such as God’s delight, His surprise, and His transformation from one form to another… all and all. Thus, the God worshipped by the believers and the people of intuition is not the same as the 16 God which is worshipped by the people of thinking.” 3.1. Ibn ‘Arabi, Eckhart, and Pantheism Many authors called Eckhart a pantheist. Ibn ‘Arabi also is not free from such accusation. Some authors like Charles Adams claimed that Ibn ‘Arabi was teach- ing a sort of pantheism according to which only one reality exists, that is God, 17 with the interpretation that God is nothing other than the sum of all things. 14 Levine. Pantheism. P. 148. 15 Levine. Pantheism. P. 147. 16 Ibn al-‘Arabī. Al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya. Beirut: Dār al-Şādir. Vol. 2. P. 38. 17 See: Sells M. Mystical Languages of Unsaying. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994. P. 261, note 40. 448 Philosophy of Religion and Kalam * Ghasem Kakaie As seen from this phrase, “sum of things” is not more than the sum of its members. Beyond the apparent world, Ibn ‘Arabi and Eckhart, however, believe in an essence which is free from any relation and correlation and completely in- dependent from the universe. Thus, Ibn ‘Arabi and Eckhart’s God is not com- patible with the mentioned God. There is a deep gap between the one who be- lieves in the absolute hidden world and the one who sees nothing other than the visible world and regards God as the sum of the parts of this very world. Thus, as some researchers mentioned: “To attempt to categorize Ibn ‘Arabi’s teachings in different ways, such as pantheism or monism, impedes rather than assists in understanding his vi- sion of Reality. His doctrine of the Oneness of Being means that God is far 18 more than the sum of its parts or aspects.” It should be noted that some phrases of Ibn ‘Arabi and Eckhart, and in par- ticular the former, may point to some sort of pantheism. Even phrases similar to those of Spinoza may be found in Ibn ‘Arabi. That is, he may regard God as a single substance who receives various attributes: “Verily, God is All-Subtle. It is because of His Subtlety and Mercy, that in everything, which is called with some name or limited to some limitations, He is the same as that object… Though concerning the beings of the world it is said that this is the sky, this is the earth, this is rock, tree, animal, angel, sustenance or food; in every object there is the same essence. As Ash‘aris say, the entire world is one concreted substance. That is it is a single sub- stance. This is the same as what we say that [in all objects], the essence is the same. Ash‘aris also said that the substance comes into difference because of accidents. This is also the same as what we say that the essence comes into difference and plurality because of forms and relations so that making a dis- tinction may be possible. Thus, it can be said that this object differs in terms of form or accident or temperament — or whatever other name you like — 19 and it is the same in terms of existence”. Ibn ‘Arabi and Eckhart, and in particular Ibn ‘Arabi, regard God to be exis- tence non-conditioned as the source of a division (lā bi shart maqsamī). Panthe- ists’ God is conditioned by something (wujūd bi sharṭ-i shay’) and at the level of existents or, at most, existence non-conditioned as a division (lā bi sharṭ-i qismī). These two Gods are quite different. To explain the issue, existence can be classi- fied in terms of the levels of theophany, as follows: 18 Austin R.W. (trans.). Ibn al-‘Arabi. The Bezels of Wisdom. Lahore: Suhail Academy, 1988. 19 Ibn al-‘Arabī. Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam. Ed. Abū ’l-‘Alā ‘Afifī. 3rd ed. Tehran: al-Zahra Publica- tions, 1366 / 1987. Vol. 1. P. 88–9. Ibn ‘Arabi’s God, Eckhart’s God 449 1. negatively conditioned existence = oneness = hidden world 2. existence conditioned by names and attributes = unity The non-conditioned existence as a source 3. existence non-conditioned as of division a division = Divine breath (Truth by which the world is created) = visible world 4. existence conditioned by creatural determination = world For philosophers, God is the same as existence negatively-conditioned, that is, He is free from all conditions and independent from all things. Pantheists’ God is the same as the existence conditioned by creatural individuations. This existence, according to Ibn ‘Arabi and Eckhart, is not God but the universe. No mystic, but some of the unaware Sufis who believe in some kind of eminence and regard God to be eminent in the world, conditions God to the fourth level. The noble verse “And He is Who in the heaven is God, and in the earth God” (the Holy Quran 43:84) suggests that God is specified to no level. He is in the heaven God, and in the earth God. While pantheists say that He is in the heaven, heaven; and in the earth, earth. What Ibn ‘Arabi regards as the essence of the world and the same as all things is “divine breath,” that is existence conditioned as a division, and that is what has been manifested through the Holy Emanation; and according to the eternal rule “He / not He,” one can say that the universe is, at the same time, Him and not Him: “As regards the universe, say whatever you like. You are free to believe that it is creature or to maintain that it is the God, and if you like you can say that it is the God and the creature. And if you like, say that it is in all aspects 20 neither God nor creature. And if you like, believe in bewilderment”. Some pantheists may regard God to be associated with all existents, not in a conditioned way, but absolutely; Ibn ‘Arabi and Eckhart’s God, however, is free even from this absoluteness. It is “non-conditioned as a source of division” which is present at all four mentioned levels. Thus, Ibn ‘Arabi and Eckhart’s belief in the station of Oneness and station of Unity makes them distinct from pantheists and brings them closer to another view which is called panentheism. 4. Panentheism’s God Unlike pantheism, panentheism believes in some sort of God’s transcendence from the universe. That is, it believes in the hidden beyond the visible. 20 Ibn al-‘Arabī. Fuṣūṣ. P. 112. 450 Philosophy of Religion and Kalam * Ghasem Kakaie Those who believe in the Unity of Being speak sometimes of union “with” God and some other times they talk about union “within” God. The first is an indicative of some kind of becoming and suggests that the two essences of God and the creature “come into” union; and the second implies some kind of being. That is, it says that the two objects “are” in unity. According to Ibn ‘Arabi and 21 Eckhart and the like, this becoming and that being are the same; the second is, however, closer to what is called panentheism. Panentheism which has been coined by combining four words “pan” (= all), “en” (= in), “theo” (= God) and “ism” (= believe in), means belief in “all things in God.” Ibn ‘Arabi and Eckhart have been regarded to believe in panentheism because they believe in a transcendental existence for the objects in the Divine world. As Ibn ‘Arabi says: “No one of the beings of the world and no object is outside God. But, every quality which is manifest in the world, has an essence in the presenta- tion of the Truth… It is God’s dignity that existence of nothing be outside Him. Since if the existence of something is outside Him, then He has no 22 command on that thing.” That is, one who grants something cannot lack that thing. God’s encompass- ing of all things means that he contains all things. “Eckhart believes that the ob- jects have come out from God but they have remained inward. It means they are in God: ‘I yet remained in the father.’ ” One scholar says that this view is a sort of panentheism: “It means that all is in God and God is in all. Such a doctrine differs from heterodox pantheism, which means literally all is God and God is 23 all.” The following may confirm the claim that Eckhart believes in some sort of panentheism: “He created all things in such a way that they are not outside him- self, as ignorant people falsely imagine. Everything that God creates or does he does or creates in himself, sees or knows in himself, loves in himself. Outside himself he does nothing, knows or loves nothing; and this is peculiar to God 24 himself.” 5. Ibn ‘Arabi’s God and Eckhart’s God In defining the nature of mysticism it is common to affirm that mystical ex- perience is the experience of the immanence of the divine, and of unification and unity in essence with it, in contrast to the experience of the divine as transcen- 25 dent. But the religious thought emphasizes the transcendence of God. So when a religious mystic speaks about union with God, the union becomes one of con- 21 Sells M. Mystical Languages. P. 169. 22 Ibn al-‘Arabī. Futūḥāt. Vol. 2. P. 484. 23 Fox M. Breakthrough. New York: Image Books, 1991. P. 72. 24 Fox. Breakthrough. P. 73. 25 Otto R. Mysticism East and West. New York: McMillan, 1976. P. 158. Ibn ‘Arabi’s God, Eckhart’s God 451 templation, similarity, love, anything short of absorption. But the nonreligious mystics talk seriously of absorption and less of the self and real union with 26 God. Regardless of how much this concept is right, it is certain that Ibn ‘Arabi’s and Eckhart’s God is the same as the God of the two Abrahamic religions, i.e. Islam and Christianity. Ibn ‘Arabi’s God is the same as the God who manifests Himself with all his names and attributes of beauty and glory in the Holy Quran. God of Eckhart, who is a Christian preacher and a disciple of Aquinas, is the God of the Bible and very close to theism’s God. The most important aspects of theism’s God, which make it other than pan- theism’s God, are, first, His transcendence and, second, His personality. While preserving these two aspects, Ibn ‘Arabi and Eckhart try to establish their intel- lectual systems based on the unity of existence and seat the religion’s God at the top of it. In this regard, Muslim thinkers inspired by the Holy Quran and verses such as the verses of the sura of Ikhlāṣ, have put main emphasis on God’s transcen- dence from creatures and His Glory, and less emphasis on His personality. In contrast, in the Christian theology, since God has been personified and mani- fested as Jesus Christ, emphasis on God’s personality is unavoidable and more emphasis is put on His beauty than His glory to the extent that this God is either Himself a man and lives among us or, at least, He is that man’s father. That is why, in such a theology, love is emphasized more than fear. According to Eck- hart, this is why many prayers begin with “Our Father” and not “Our Lord,” be- 27 cause it shows more kindness and love. What is surprising is that, in spite of these two different kinds of emphasis put by Muslim and Christian theologians, Ibn ‘Arabi and Eckhart go in the oppo- site directions. That is, Ibn ‘Arabi puts more emphasis on God’s personality and Eckhart pays more attention to God’s transcendence. To explain, it should be noted that most philosophers regard God not as a person but as an object and mention Him as “that.” Ibn ‘Arabi, however, thinks that mystics regard God as a person and not as an object and their approach to God is of three sorts, which is manifest in three kinds of remembrance (dhikr). The highest remembrance of some mystics is “He” (huwa). That of some others is “Thou” (anta), and that of still some others such as Abu Yazid is “I” (anā).28 From Ibn ‘Arabi’s ideas as a whole, it is seen that he is concerned mostly with “He” or “Thou.” Eckhart, however, sometimes speaks of “He,” which is the same as the station of the essence of One and the absolute hidden, and some other times he talks about “I,” which is the station of annihilation, and he speaks less of “Thou.” 26 Levine. Pantheism. P. 135, note 14. 27 Fox. Breakthrough. P. 495. 28 Ibn al-‘Arabī. Futūḥāt. Vol. 2. P. 297. 452 Philosophy of Religion and Kalam * Ghasem Kakaie Thus, it can be inferred that Ibn ‘Arabi puts more emphasis on the servitude on the creatures’ side and on personality on God’s side; Eckhart, however, puts more emphasis on the Lordship on the creature’s side and the absolute transcen- dence on God’s side. Both mystics, however, may be regarded to be modifying the ideas of theologians and the cultures of their own times. And this modifica- tion causes the emphasis to be put on an aspect which had been ignored in that culture and at that time. None of the two, however, forgets the other side en- tirely. That is, both of them have discussed both God’s transcendence and His personality, though to different extents. 6. Sum up and Conclusion God of the “unity of Being,” as introduced by Ibn ‘Arabi and Eckhart, differs from philosophers’ God on the one hand, and from pantheists’ God on the other. Their God is God of the Holy Quran and God of the Bible. Philosophers’ God and pantheists’ God share in that they are not persons. Both of them are things, and not persons. The former is, however, existence negatively-conditioned and the latter is existence non-conditioned as a division. None of these two Gods are changeable and transformable. Even attributes, such as knowledge and will and freedom, can be hardly attributed to Him, we do not speak of attributes such as mercy, kindness, delight, disgust, doubt, and the like. In his Incoherence of Philosophers, while criticizing philosophers who have regarded God in His creation to be caused and not free, al-Ghazali says: “The agent must be willing, choosing, and knowing what he wills to be the agent of what he wills.” Averroes criticises him thus: “This is not self-evident … He who chooses and wills, lacks the things he wills, and God cannot lack anything he wills. And he who chooses makes a choice for himself of the better of two things, but God is in no need of a better condition. Further, when the willer has reached his object, his will ceases and, generally speaking, will is a passive qual- 29 ity and a change, but God is exempt from passivity and change.” As we can see, if we regard God so transcendent, there will be a deep gap be- tween this God and the religion’s God. How can we worship such a God of whom we have no knowledge? How can such a God become angry with us? How can we appease Him when He is angry? How can one repent in His pres- ence? How can a God who is not passive accept one’s repentance? And, above all, how can one love such a transcendent God? History of Paganism shows that mankind always avoids a God who is perfectly transcendent and cannot love Him. Man seeks for a God between whom and himself he can find some similar- ity. Paganism is an exaggeration in this similarity. 29 Sells M. Bewildered Tongue // Mystical Union in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. New York: Continuum, 1996. P. 222, note 21. Ibn ‘Arabi’s God, Eckhart’s God 453 Anyway, philosophers who believe in pure transcendence, can never call people toward God. As Ibn ‘Arabi puts it: “If there was no trace of religion which has brought Divine news, no one would know God; and if we contented with the intellectual evidence which rationalists think that lead one to Godhead, and if we stopped in stating that He is not such and such, then no creature would love God. When divine news came down through the language of religion, suggesting that God is so and so — news that are inconsistent with the appearance of rational evidence — we love God because of these affirmative attributes. … God has not intro- duced himself but only through the news about Himself, such as He is kind toward us, His mercy applies on us, He has kindness, mercy and love, and He comes down in limitations and conditions… [this is because] we simile Him and imagine Him in our heart, in our Qibla, and in our imagination as if we see Him. Nay, but we see Him in ourselves, for we know Him through His 30 own definition and not through our thought and idea.” Ibn ‘Arabi claims that Noah’s tribe did not accept his call since he called them toward pure transcendence. His call was discriminatory (furqānī). But if he had combined transcendence with analogy, and if his call had been like that of the Holy Prophet (Muhammad), which was combinative (qur’ānī) of transcen- 31 dence and assimilation, he would have been followed. Ibn ‘Arabi’s theology is the same as the theology of religion. In other words, it is the knowledge of names and not that of the essence; for religion calls people toward the names of God and not his essence (Godhead). Although Ibn ‘Arabi’s God has a single essence, he has many names and manifestations. He is One God and, at the same time, He is various. Every day, every moment, and for every one, He is of a new manifestation. He has not the same manifestation for two persons at the same moment and for the same one at two various moments. Not only in various religious creeds, but also for Muslims who follow the same Imam in congregation prayer and pray towards the same Qibla, God is different, though there is no more than One God: “In Congregation, every prayer in his privacy converses with his God and God encompases him… for the people of congregation, God manifests in the totality of oneness and not in the oneness of totality. For every person in the congregation converses with his Lord according to his intention and knowl- edge, as is required by His presence. That is why He becomes manifest for them in the totality of oneness. That is, they are preceded by totality. Then He relates that to oneness, so that, despite their various aims, ideas, qualities, temperaments and relations, they may not regard, in their worships, some- thing to be associated with God. That is why their questions and demands 30 Ibn al-‘Arabī. Futūḥāt. Vol. 2. P. 326. 31 Ibn al-‘Arabī. Fuṣūṣ. P. 70.