15 UNCLASSIFIED 15 IL S.A rmy MilWtary U635 Nis~ Iysl l~ rio. 21 c.3 SPECIAL SERIES, NO. 21 29 FEBRUARY 1944 ERMAN 4 MOUNTAIN WARFARE, UNCLASSFIED ' ' RE&FD(r ' emD 2?Z..0 9', _R A PREPARED BY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION WAR DEPARTMENT, PRUIOEiR CF US ARMY UNWSSII FED RESTRICTED MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION SPECIAL SERIES WAR DEPARTMENT No. 21 WASHIINGTON 25, 1). C.. 29 February 1944 MID 461 NOTICE 1. Special Series is published for the purpose of providing officers with reasonably confirmed information from official and other reliable sources. 2. IBy arrangement with The Adjutant General the following three publi- cations of the Military Intelligence Division are distributed in the same manner as is prescribed for field manuals (see FM 21-6, List of Publications lot Tro ining, pars. 6-9, 23a): Intelligence Bulletin (commencing with March 1944 issue); Special Series (commencing with No. 20); Tactical and Technical Trends (commencing with March 1944 issue). RIequests for copies of these publications should be made to the appropriate distributing agency of The Adjutant General. Requests for issues prior to those listed above should be forwarded through channels to the MID address below. 3. Distribution of this issue of Special Series is being made on the basis of two copies to each division and higher units, one copy to each brigade, and one copy to each regiment. Every command should circulate available copies among its officers. 4. Reproduction within the military service is permitted provided that (1) the source is stated, (2) the classification is maintained, and (3) one copy of the pablication in which the material is reprotluced is forwarded to the Dissemination Unit, Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington 25, D. C. RESTRICTED LI i . lY / US ARMY/WJR COLI. CARULSIE-3ARRACi:, PROPERTY OF U.S, A.lY CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION ......... v.i Section I. GERMAN DOCTRINE OF MOUNTAIN WARFARE 1I 1. COMBAT IN HIGH MOUNTAINS 1I.......... a. General .-....- - 1 b. Command-- -.-.. 3 c. Effect on Firing-- . 4 2. RECONNAISSANCE_ ...- - - 4 3. MARCHING; SECURITY; SHELTER-_--_- ---------- 6 a. Marches . .. ....... .---. 6 (1) General-- .................. 6 (2) Order of march . .-....... 6 (3) Time factors .-........... 8 (4) Mlarch discipline .-..... 9 b. Security ............-- ....... 10 c. Shelter __ ...............-- ..... 10 4. COMBAT -._ ...................-- - -- - 12 a. General . .............-- ........ 12 b. Attack - _ ..............--. .... 12 (1) Advance and deployment .----------1 2 (2) Effect of terrain--. _.... _. - ... 13 (3) Types of attack- .-. ..............1 6 e. Defense and Withdrawal ------------ _ - 17 5. JMOTORIZED AND MECHANIZED OPERATIONS_- .----- _ 20 6. AlH OPERATIONS--- ------ _ -- - 23 7. MOUNTAIN INFANTRY__-- ------------- 26 a. Mountain Rifle Company - -. 26 (1) Squad - 26 (2) Platoon- -- 27 (3) Company- .................. 28 b. Mountain Machine-gun Company- - _ 30 (1) General .-...... 830 (2) Mlarches and reconnaissance .-. .... 32 (3) Employment in combat- ------------- 33 c. Mountain Infantry Battalion ------------- 35 d. Mountain Antitank Company -------- - 37 8. MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY -------- - ----- 39 a. General ..........--... 39 b. Reconnaissance and Observation --------- _ 40 c. Marches -----------_- --------------- - 40 d. Employment in Combat -_ ...--.. 43 9. MOUNTAIN ENGINEERS._... .. _..----- 48 a. Missions .............- - . ...... 48 b. Employment in Combat _-_---- - 48 10. MOUNTAIN SIGNAL AND COMMUNICATION TROOPS-- 51 a. Missions __ 51 b. Marches -51 c. Employment in Combat . .-........ 52 III IV CONTENTS Section I. GERMAN DOCTRINE OF MOUNTAIN WARFARE-Con. 10. MOUNTAIN SIGNAL AND COMMUNICATION TROOPS- Continued. Page d. Technical Considerations …....... 54 (1) 'ire communication… … 54 (2) Radio communication --- 56 (3) Visual signal communica.-ti-o-n- ---- 56 11. MOUNTAIN SERVICES --..--------- -- 57 a. Mountain Medical Service --. .--.- 57 b. Mountain Vcterinarv Service - ----- 60 c. Mountain Supply .......------ 61 II. TRAINING ------- ................... 63 . 12. GENERAL _ .-------- --------- 63 13. INDIVIDUAL AND UNIT TRAINING -----. ---- 65. 14. MOUNTAINEERING --- --.--- 66 a. General .....-------- 66 b. Scale of Requirements ----..----- 66 c. Technique ..----- 68 (I) Marching- ----- - -- 68 (2) Climbing- .- ------------- _--- - 68 (3) Special climbing equipment --- -- 69 d. Bivouacs ------ -------------- 74 e. Self-preservation; Orientation - ------- 76 III. ARMY MOUNTAIN GUIDES----- ------- - 79 1.5. GENERAL ...-_---- ------ ----- 79 16. GUIDE TRAINING- - -- --- 79 17. MISSIONS OF GUIDES -------- - 82 IV. CLOTHING, IDENTIFICATION, INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT 84 18. CLOTHING -.-.. .. --- -..... 84 19. IDENTIFICATION ---... .... 87 20. INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT ........... 89 21. FooD ..-............ 90 V. ORGANIZATION; ARMAMENT; EQUIPMENT -------- 91 22. GENERAL ..- -- ---...... 91 23. MOUNTAIN INFANTRY REGCIMENT ----.-.._ _ 96 24. MOUNTAIN INFANTRY BATTALION.-- - --- 97 25. HEAVY-WEAPONS COMPANY - -..--- ----- 98 26. REINFORCED RIFLE COMPANY -...--------- - 101 27. M'OUNTAIN ANTITANK BATTALION - -- -- 101 28. RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION .-------- --- -- 103 29. MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY REGIMENT ..-----.-- 104 30. MOUNTAIN ENGINEER BATTALION -------- 108 31. MOUNTAIN SPIrNAL BATTALION ------ ----- 108 32. MOUNTAIN SERVICES ----- ....... 108 . 33. REPLACEMENT BATTALION ----- 1I.1---0-- Appendix. FIRING IN MOUNTAINS ............-------. 111 34. PECULIARITIES OF FIRING -- --------.---- 11i 35. GRAPHIC FIRING TABLEs -----------.--- 115 36. USE or THE GRAPHIC FIRING TABLE - ------ 118 a. Determining Trajectory Values - ------ 118 (1) Charge and elevation ----------- 118 (2) Masks ..........---.-- 119 b. Angle of Fall; Angle of Impact-- ------ _- 119 c. Time of Flight; Drift; Fuze-setting -- _ -- 120 CONTENTS V Appendix. FIRING IN MOUNTAINS-Continued. 36. USE OF GRAPHIC FIRING TABLES Continued. Page d. Dispersion -............... 120 e. Metro Data and Mas.k- s . 121 f. Location of a Gun Position -122 g. Special Firing Precautions ..-- _--_ 123 ILLUSTRATIONS Figure 1. Mountain patrol . _---------------------- 5 2. Mountain troops resting in a snow shelter. -. …..... 11 3. Machine gun (M.G. 84) emplaced in snow -- 15 4. Light tank (Pz.Kw. I) accompanying infantry in the Norwegian mountains (April 1940) - . 21 5. Captured German half-track vehicle (Kettenkrad) frequently used for transport by mountain troops .-.. _ 22 6. 88-mm heavy antiaircraft gun (8.8 crn Flak) in position to cover Italian mountain communications ---- ---------- 25 7. Machine gun (M.G. 84) on antiaircraft tripod 31 8. Mountain artillerv on the march. 42 9. Medium artillery (Skoda 150-mm howitzer) firing in the valley below Mount Olympus during the Greek Campaign (1941) 43 10. 150-mm howitzer (s.F.H. 18) on a mountain road .-.. ........ 44 11. Rloping an artillery piece down a cliff 46 12. Bridging a mountain stream during the Norwegian Campaign (1940) 49 13. Mountain troops with a messenger dog . 54 14. Roping down a casualty -.. ........ 58 15. Use of an aerial railway to move supplies. -. .........- 62 16. Mountain riflemen firing under simulated combat conditionss -- 64 17. Basic knots used by German mountain troops __ 70 18. Double overhand noose -....................-.. 71 19. Roping down a rock face - . 72 20. German piton and snaplink 0, and ways of inserting pitons (i) 74 21. Rock climbing ..................--- -... 75 22. Badge of Army mountain guides 82 23. Mountain cap with edelweiss badge ......................_.. ... 84 24. Mountain soldier -.......................... 85 . 25. German ski-mountain boot and ankle-wrap puttees - 86 26. Edelweiss badge worn on the right sleeves of mountain troops' coats and overcoats -.. _............ ....... 87 27. Right-hand collar patches of SS units . . ... 88 28. Organization of the regular mountain division -.------------ -- 92 29. Strength of units in the regular mountain division … 93 VI CONTENTS Figure Page 30. Organization of the regular mountain infantry regiment .---- 94 31. Strength of units in the regular mountain infantry regiment 95 32. 75-mm mountain infantry howitzer (7.5 cm l.Geb.I.G. 18) . ..9. 8 33. Group of captured Russian 120-mm mortars awaiting modifica- tion for German use -............................... 100 34. 20-mm mountain antiaircraft gun (2 cm Geb.Flak 38) ---. . 103 35. 75-mm mountain howitzer (7.5 cm eb.G. S6).withouttrailspades. 105 36. Effect of equal increases of elevation on range at various points on the trajectory_ _-------------------------- 112 37. Effect of terrain on range for equal changes in elevation-descend- ing branch of the trajectory -........................ 113 38. Effect of terrain on range for equal changes in elevation-ascend- ing branch of the trajectory -.-................. 113 39. Effect of change of deflection on range in terrain sloping across the line of fire -.............................. 114 40. Example of a German graphic firing table - . ..._.. follows 124 INTRODUCTION The Germans believe that specially trained mountain troops (Gebirgystruppen) may influence decisively tile outcome of a campaign, for mass armies must rely on specially trained small forces to secure their advance through the broader mountain valleys in order to reach the flat,' where the decision usually is sought. Small forces of mountain troops can prevent, impede, harass, or channel the movements of the main enemy force through the valleys, so that when the decisive battle takes place in the flat, the enemy's power is spent and he is compelled to fight under the most unfavorable conditions. When on the offensive, moun- tain troops can cover and protect the advance of their own main force, enabling it to reach terrain of its own choice in the highest state of readiness for combat. Thus their mission on the offensive is to secure the route for the advance of large units through the valleys, whereas their mission on the defensive is to deny the valleys to the mass of the enemy forces. In either case, moun- tain troops must gain control of the mountains. The Germans hold that the basic tactics of warfare in moun- tains are the same as in the flat, but that the application of the principles must be modified to fit the high and rugged terrain. In mountainous terrain the movement of troops and the employ- ment of heavy equipment are limited, and deployment is re- stricted to such an extent that only comparatively small forces can operate. Soldiers must be prepared to advance over narrow roads, tortuous paths, trackless terrain, steep and slippery slopes, ravines, precipices, and glaciers. Movement frequently is threat- ened by avalanches, rockfalls, landslides, and cornice fractures. Besides these special terrain factors, the weather also exerts a 'The "flat" (Flachland) does not necessarily mean plains. This term also denotes low, rolling conntry or any terraiin ln which troops may nor- mally he employed without special training or equipment and without modification of general tactical principles. vii VIII INTRODUCTION great influence on mountain fighting. Meteorological phenomena, such as burning sun, heavy rain, and blinding snow coupled with intense cold, miay occur in swift sequences. In mountains, the Germans believe, the infantry-artillery team retains the ascendancy which on other fields of battle it yields in part to armor and air power. Relatively unimportant roles are played in mountain warfare by the tank and the airplane. The employment of heavy infantry weapons and artillery is hampered by their bulk and weight, by the considerable (lead space, and by the difficulties of observation due to weather and intervening terrain features. It is the infantry, above all, that must bear the brunt of the battle. Consequently, the Germalns stress the principle that the importance of shock action and close combat increases as the efficiency of other methods of fighting decreases, and that in some respects mountain fighting resembles guerrilla warfare. Because of the narrow terrain compartments in mountains, unified control is possible only over small units. The Germans believe that the reinforced battalion is ordinarily the largest tactical unit whose movements a commander can effectively con- trol during combat. In unusually rugged terrain the task unit must be even smaller. Therefore, greater responsibility is placed on officers of lower rank. The focal points of mountain combat are the heights. Gun em- placements and observation posts on commanding heights can dominate the foreground and valley, making the task of the advancing infantry relatively easy. But of all mountain opera- tions the seizure of heights is the most difficult. A well-defended height must be taken by surprise to avoid great losses. Only men skilled in mountaineering, who have developed stamina through long conditioning, who have the ability to maintain direction, and who have been thoroughly trained for combat, can effectively carry through an attack on a height in high mountains. This is a cardinal principle of mountain warfare which the Germans emphasize. INTRODUCTION IX The following is a summary of basic characteristics of mountain warfare which are stressed in training by the Germans: (1) Movement is much slower than in the flat, for it takes a long time to bring troops into position. Artillery and heavy weapons, particularly, move slowly. The deployment of in- fantry, especially units with heavy weapons, requires much time. The attack itself proceeds slowly, and the terrain prevents it from gaining the momentum that is possible in the flat; on the other hand, the large number of good defensive positions and the scarcity of roads facilitate delaying actions. Reserves have to be held very close to the front lines; otherwise, mlpredictable con- ditions of terrain and weather may delay their arrival for the crucial phase of battle. (2) Signal conmmnication is less reliable than in the flat. The weather sometimes weakens the audibility of messages transmitted by wire or radio. Radio is faster than wire communication, but even less reliable. Reception may be affected by the weather and by the configuration of the mountains. Laying lines is a slow, arduous process. and maintenance and servicing of wire are dif- ficult. Control of the battle by the higher commander is limited largely to a preconceived and thorough plan, since the uncertain channels of signal communication usually prevent him fron intervening effectively in operations once the battle has begun. Consequently, the responsibility of subordinate commanders for independent action is greater than in the flat. Rarely can they expect aid from reserves, as the full force is likely to be committed all at once. (3) The problem of supply becomes extremely acute in moun- tains, and the proportion of supply troops to combat troops in- creases. Supply routes are few; food, forage, and ammunition must be carried over narrow roads and mountain trails as far as possible by motor transport, then onR mules and mountain horses, and finally on the backs of the soldiers. Economy of supplies is necessary because the danger of extending a unit beyond reach of its supply columnn is great, and, furthermore, it is impossible for an over-extended unit to live off the country in mountains.