From Individual to Collective Intentionality From Individual to Collective Intentionality New Essays E S r c , F h , ditEd by ara achEl hant rank indrikS G  P and Erhard rEyEr 1 1 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 © Oxford University Press 2014 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data From individual to collective intentionality : new essays : / edited by Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks, and Gerhard Preyer. pages cm ISBN 978–0–19–993650–2 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Intentionality (Philosophy) 2. Intentionality (Philosophy)—Social aspects. I. Chant, Sara Rachel, editor of compilation. B105.I56F76 2014 128’.2—dc23 2013031120 1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper CONTENTS Contributors vii Introduction 1 Beyond the Big Four and the Big Five Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks, and Gerhard Preyer PART ONE Collective Attitudes and Actions 1. A Dynamic Theory of Shared Intention and the Phenomenology of Joint Action 13 Deborah Tollefsen 2. Collective Goals Analyzed 34 Kaarlo Miller and Raimo Tuomela 3. Group Belief and Acceptance 61 Frederick F. Schmitt 4. Against Group Cognitive States 97 Robert D. Rupert 5. The Ontology of Collective Action 112 Kirk Ludwig PART TWO Collective Rationality 6. Indispensability, the Discursive Dilemma, and Groups with Minds of Their Own 137 Abraham Sesshu Roth 7. Do Groups Have Scientific Knowledge? 163 Melinda Bonnie Fagan 8. Collective Rationality’s Roots 187 Paul Weirich 9. Structural Rationality and Collective Intentions 207 Julian Nida-Rümelin Index 223 CONTribuTOrS Melinda Bonnie Fagan, Rice University Sara Rachel Chant, University of Missouri Frank Hindriks, University of Groningen Kaarlo Miller, University of Helsinki Kirk Ludwig, Indiana University–Bloomington Julian Nida-Rumelin, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich Gerhard Preyer, Goethe-University Frankfurt am Main Abe Roth, Ohio State University Robert D. Rupert, University of Colorado–Boulder and University of Edinburgh Frederick F. Schmitt, Indiana University–Bloomington Deborah Tollefsen, University of Memphis Raimo Tuomela, University of Helsinki Paul Weirich, University of Missouri–Columbia From Individual to Collective Intentionality