Free Will As an advanced introduction to the challenging topic of free will, this book is designed for upper- level undergraduates interested in a comprehensive first stop into the field’s issues and debates. It is written by two of the leading participants in those debates—a compatibilist on the issue of free will and determinism (Michael McKenna) and an incompatibilist (Derk Pereboom). These two authors achieve an admirable objectivity and clarity while still illuminating the field’s complexity and key advances. Each chapter is structured to work as one week’s primary reading in a course on free will, while more advanced courses can dip into the annotated further readings, suggested at the end of each chapter. A com- prehensive bibliography and a detailed author index are included at the back of the book. Michael McKenna is the Keith Lehrer Chair and Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy and the Center for the Philosophy of Freedom at the University of Arizona. He is the author of Conversation and Responsibility (2012) and numerous articles on the topics of free will and moral responsibility. Derk Pereboom is Stanford H. Taylor ’50 Chair and Susan Linn Sage Professor in the Philosophy Department at Cornell University. He is the author of Living without Free Will (2001), Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism (2011), Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life (2014), and articles on free will and moral responsibility, philosophy of mind, and the history of modern philosophy. Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy Series editor: Paul K Moser, Loyola University of Chicago This innovative, well- structured series is for students who have already done an introductory course in philosophy. Each book introduces a core general subject in contemporary philosophy and offers students an accessible but substantial transition from introductory to higher- level college work in that subject. The series is accessible to non- specialists and each book clearly motivates and expounds the problems and positions introduced. An orientating chapter briefly introduces its topic and reminds readers of any crucial material they need to have retained from a typical introductory course. Considerable attention is given to explaining the central philosophical problems of a subject and the main com- peting solutions and arguments for those solutions. The primary aim is to educate students in the main problems, positions, and arguments of con- temporary philosophy rather than to convince students of a single position. Epistemology Metaphysics 3rd Edition 3rd Edition Robert Audi Michael J. Loux Philosophy of Mind Ethics 3rd Edition 2nd Edition John Heil Harry J. Gensler Philosophy of Science Metaethics 3rd Edition Mark van Roojen Alex Rosenberg Forthcoming: Bioethics Philosophy of Film Jason Scott Robert Aaron Smuts Feminist Philosophy Philosophy of Literature Heidi Grasswick John Gibson Metaphysics Social and Political Philosophy 4th Edition 2nd Edition Michael J. Loux and Thomas M. Crisp John Christman Free Will A Contemporary Introduction Michael McKenna and Derk Pereboom First published 2016 by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 and by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2016 Taylor & Francis The right of Michael McKenna and Derk Pereboom to be identified as authors of this work have been asserted by them in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging- in-Publication Data Names: McKenna, Michael, 1963– author. | Pereboom, Derk, 1957– author. Title: Free will: a contemporary introduction/Michael McKenna and Derk Pereboom. Description: New York, NY: Routledge, 2016. | Series: Routledge contemporary introductions to philosophy | Includes bibliographical references. Identifiers: LCCN 2015044024| ISBN 9780415996860 (hbk) | ISBN 9780415996877 (pbk) | ISBN 9781315621548 (ebk) Subjects: LCSH: Free will and determinism. Classification: LCC BJ1461.M3885 2016 | DDC 123/.5–dc23 LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015044024 ISBN: 978-0-415-99686-0 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-415-99687-7 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-62154-8 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman and Gill Sans by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear We dedicate this book to our most memorable undergraduate professors. John R. Phillips II Alvin Plantinga Nicholas Wolterstorff This page intentionally left blank Contents Preface xi Acknowledgments xiii Introduction 1 1 Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Determinism 6 1.1. Free Will 6 1.2. The Will in Free Will 9 1.3. Moral Responsibility 11 1.4. Determinism 16 1.5. Metaphysical, Physical, and Nomic Impossibility 19 1.6. Indeterminism, Mechanism, and Naturalism 23 Suggestions for Further Reading 24 2 The Free Will Problem 29 2.1. Compatibilism and Incompatibilism 30 2.2. Motivating the Problem: The Appeal of Free Will and Determinism 33 2.3. Free Will Problems 37 2.4. Situating Compatibilism and Incompatibilism 43 Suggestions for Further Reading 45 3 Classical Compatibilism and Classical Incompatibilism 49 3.1. The Case for Classical Compatibilism 50 3.2. The Dispute over the Analysis of “Could Have Done Otherwise” 56 3.3. The Case for Classical Incompatibilism 62 3.4. Classical Incompatibilism and Agent Causation 64 3.5. Reflections on the Classical Debate 66 Suggestions for Further Reading 68 viii Contents 4 The Debate over the Consequence Argument 72 4.1. Reflecting on the Classical Controversy over the Ability to Do Otherwise 73 4.2. A Formulation of the Consequence Argument 75 4.3. Strategies for Resisting the Consequence Argument 79 4.4. The Consequence Argument: A More Precise Formulation 85 4.5. Questioning Rule β and Seeking an Improved Version 88 4.6. Assessments 90 Appendix I: What is a Modal Proposition? 91 Appendix II: Ginet’s Challenge to Compatibilist- Friendly Semantics for Ability 93 Suggestions for Further Reading 97 5 Alternative Possibilities and Frankfurt Cases 102 5.1. Compatibilist and Incompatibilist Source Views 105 5.2. The Flicker of Freedom Defense 106 5.3. The Dilemma Defense 108 5.4. The Timing Defense 116 5.5. General Abilities to Do Otherwise 120 5.6. Final Words 121 Suggestions for Further Reading 122 6 Strawsonian Compatibilism 124 6.1. Strawson’s Audience: Optimists, Pessimists, and Skeptics 126 6.2. Strawson’s Assumptions about Moral Psychology 129 6.3. Strawson’s Theory of Moral Responsibility 130 6.4. Strawson’s Arguments for Compatibilism 132 6.5. Assessing Strawson’s Arguments for Compatibilism 135 6.6. Reflecting on Strawsonian Compatibilism 141 Suggestions for Further Reading 143 7 Three Source Incompatibilist Arguments 146 7.1. The Emergence of Source Theories 146 7.2. The Ultimacy Argument for Incompatibilism 149 7.3. The Direct Argument for Incompatibilism 154 7.4. The Manipulation Argument for Incompatibilism 162 7.5. Closing Remarks on Arguments for Source Incompatibilism 172 Suggestions for Further Reading 173 8 Contemporary Compatibilism: Seven Recent Views 178 8.1. The Dispute between Historical and Nonhistorical Compatibilists 178 8.2. The Influences of Strawson on the Justification of our Blaming Practices 180 Contents ix 8.3. The Proliferation of Senses of Moral Responsibility 181 8.4. Dennett’s Multiple- Viewpoints Compatibilism 182 8.5. Wolf ’s Reason View and Nelkin’s Rational Abilities View 185 8.6. Mele’s Action- Theory Theory 189 8.7. Scanlon’s Contractualist Compatibilism 192 8.8. Wallace’s Fairness- Based Compatibilism 196 8.9. Russell’s Strawsonian- Inspired Critical Compatibilism 199 8.10. Bok’s Practical- Standpoint Compatibilism 202 8.11. A Continuum Ranging from Normative to Metaphysical Approaches 204 Suggestions for Further Reading 204 9 Contemporary Compatibilism: Mesh Theories, Reasons-R esponsive Theories, and Leeway Theories 207 9.1. Mesh Theories: An Initial Characterization 207 9.2. Frankfurt’s Hierarchical Mesh Theory 208 9.3. Three Challenges to Frankfurt’s Hierarchical Theory 210 9.4. Watson’s Structural Mesh Theory 214 9.5. Bratman’s Planning Theory 215 9.6. Reasons-R esponsive Theories: An Initial Characterization 216 9.7. Fischer and Ravizza’s Reasons-R esponsive Theory 217 9.8. Three Challenges to Fischer and Ravizza’s Theory 219 9.9. McKenna’s and Sartorio’s Agent-B ased Reasons-R esponsive Source Theories 223 9.10. Contemporary Leeway Theories 224 9.11. Vihvelin’s New Dispositionalism 225 Suggestions for Further Reading 228 10 Contemporary Incompatibilism: Libertarianism 232 10.1. Three Kinds of Libertarianism 232 10.2. Two Event- Causal Libertarian Accounts 233 10.3. Luck Objections to Event- Causal Libertarianism 236 10.4. Applying the Objections 239 10.5. Adding in Higher- Order States 242 10.6. Agent- Causal Libertarianism 243 10.7. Agent- Causal Libertarianism and Luck Objections 244 10.8. Agent Causation and Rationality 246 10.9. Contrastive Explanations and an Expanding Agent- Causal Power 249 10.10. Is Agent- Causation Reconcilable with the Physical Laws? 251 10.11. Is Libertarian Agent Causation Required for Agency? 252 10.12. Non- Causal Theories 255