Since 2011 the Libyan crisis has moved from being a domestic A KARIM MEZRAN dispute to assuming increasing importance on the internation- . P al level, to the point that it currently represents a crucial issue le Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s b capable of affecting global security. The intervention of exter- a Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. n i HEofae As ti sds vataulsndoci eeasdn a IAnt tdtehjruenn aJctoito hPnnrasol fHSestouspodkrie inoss f( SMSAcihdISod)ol.el nttoha eld iriar ceotcwotr nsth pieno tlrtihatinec saLilt iibaonynda tn oe wccohanardoossm owicua tiscn omtmeraeeisns tltsyh. adAtr cwivcoeounrdl dbin ybg ealsy t,d meesaeicrehet A TPohlei tIitcaalli aSnt uIdnisetist u(IteS PfoI)r iIsn taenr ninadtieopneanl dent F think tank dedicated to being a resource external player tried to support one specific faction,, favoring T for government officials, business E either the Parliament in Tobruk, upheld by Khalifa Haftar, or R executives, journalists, civil servants the Presidential Council headed by Fayez al-Sarraj in Tripoli, M students and the public at large wishing ARTURO VARVELLI O to better understand international issues. the latter being legitimized by the UN as well as by local mi- S It monitors geopolitical areas as well as litias in both Misrata and Tripoli. This report, edited by Karim U IoSf PNI oSrtehn iAorf riRceas eParrocghr aFme.l loHwe iasn dle cHtueraedr Mezran (Atlantic Council) and Arturo Varvelli (ISPI), explains L, R mFoaujonrd etrde nind sM inil ainnt einrn 1a9ti3o4n,a IlS aPffIa iisr st.he and analyzes the difficult reconsolidation phase in Libya, fo- E only Italian Institute – and one of the few of History and Institution of the Middle East at IULM University in Milan and cusing on the roles played by external actors (neighboring and -IN in Europe – to place research activities side by side to training, organization coordinator of the training course on the Gulf countries, European nations, Russia and the US) in shap- V E of international conferences, and the new forms of terrorism at ISPI. ing the Libyan crisis and in making it more of an international N analysis of the international environment rather than a domestic issue. T for businesses. Comprehensive I N interdisciplinary analysis is achieved G I through close collaboration with experts R (academics and non-academics alike) A Edited by Karim Mezran, Arturo Varvelli in political, economic, legal, historical Q and strategic studies and through an evergrowing network of think tanks, research centers, and Universities in FOREIGN ACTORS Europe and beyond. IN LIBYA’S CRISIS Euro 12,00 F A oreign ctors L ’ c in ibyA s risis Edited by Karim Mezran, Arturo Varvelli The Atlantic Council is a nonpartisan organization that promotes constructive US leadership and engagement in international af- fairs based on the central role of the Atlantic community in meet- ing today’s global challenges. © 2017 Ledizioni LediPublishing Via Alamanni, 11 – 20141 Milano – Italy www.ledizioni.it [email protected] Foreign Actors in Libya’s Crisis Edited by Karim Mezran, Arturo Varvelli First edition: July 2017 Editorial Review by Elissa Miller Print ISBN 9788867056439 ePub ISBN 9788867056446 Pdf ISBN 9788867056453 ISPI. Via Clerici, 5 20121, Milano www.ispionline.it Catalogue and reprints information: www.ledizioni.it Contents Introduction Frederic C. Hof, Paolo Magri............................................. 7 1. Libyan Crisis: International Actors at Play 13 Karim Mezran, Arturo Varvelli...................................... 2. Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia. Neighboring States - Diverging Approaches Tarek Megerisi............................................................... 23 3. The Gulf States: Channeling Regional Ambitions in Different Directions Saskia Van Genugten.................................................... 41 4. Europe: Carving Out a New Role Mattia Toaldo............................................................... 57 5. Russia: Looking for a Warm Sea Andrea Beccaro............................................................. 73 6. United States: Reluctant Engagement Ben Fishman................................................................ 91 Conclusions Karim Mezran, Arturo Varvelli..........................................111 Appendix Nicola Missaglia................................................................1 1 9 The Authors.....................................................................135 Introduction Libya is going through a phase of political and institutional un- certainty with repercussions on a number of levels. This uncer- tainty is preventing the establishment of a security framework in the country, which has allowed militias to rule unchallenged. The absence of a single, functional central government has left borders porous and allowed transnational trafficking to thrive, including migration flows in the Mediterranean. The House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk in the east and the interna- tionally recognized Presidential Council and Government of National Accord (PC/GNA) led by Fayez al-Serraj in Tripoli are at an impasse. A meeting in Abu Dhabi on May 2 between Serraj and General Khalifa Haftar, the military leader of the Libyan National Army (LNA), may have brought negotiations closer to a turning point. However, the meeting’s political outcomes are far from clear and the situation remains worrisome. The UN-led political reconciliation process, launched in December 2015 by an agreement in Skhirat, Morocco, appears to have lost momentum and to have been de facto side-lined by negotiations held in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Thus, the PC/GNA is still in a juridical limbo, waiting to be fully legiti- mized by the HoR. The HoR itself is split: part of it has set up a “legitimate” headquarters in Tripoli, while a minority remains in Tobruk and recently sanctioned to suspend the UN-led polit- ical process. Most of the country is still at the mercy of militias and the precarious alliances between them. A new UN envoy, Ghassan Salamé, should renew previous UN efforts by relaunch- ing mediation efforts and working to contain external interfer- ence in Libyan affairs. 8 Foreign Actors in Libya’s Crisis Still, describing the Libyan situation as a fight between the PC/GNA and the HoR would be an oversimplification. The two factions are themselves divided, so much so that it is be- coming increasingly likely that none of them will be able to bring the country under its sole military control. Moreover, as of late, loyalties among the various factions or groups in Libya have considerably shifted. Divisions and bickering among local and international actors are likely destined to worsen, even as the Islamic State (ISIS) is less and less able to exert control on swathes of Libyan territory. The presence of ISIS in Sirte had attracted the attention of many local and international actors, pushing many to set aside their differences, albeit temporarily, in the fight against the terrorist group that concluded in late 2016. From its start, the Libyan crisis has been shaped by external actors, so much so that foreign influences were crucial in fos- tering and channelling the revolt against Muammar Qaddafi’s regime in 2011. Most of the regional and international actors involved deluded themselves into thinking they would be able to direct the revolution towards their respective preferred polit- ical outcomes. Over the last few years, there has been an utter disconnect in the actions of external powers and international aid and development policies agreed upon with the Libyan gov- ernment, with external actors supporting different factions over others for personal gain. This disconnect has had a disruptive effect on Libya, greatly hampering the functioning of a central government while bolstering territorial and ideological loyalties. External pressures have further strengthened over the last few months due to growing political and military activism from Russia, Egypt, and the UAE. Diplomatic actions by these coun- tries achieved two conflicting results: on the one hand, they contributed to restarting negotiations that had reached a dead end; on the other hand, they strengthened Haftar vis-à-vis Serraj, bolstering his leading role in any future political scenario for the country. It is not surprising that these external actors carved out a key role for themselves following Western powers’ abdi- cation of a larger role in Libya. The US presidential transition, Introduction 9 President Trump’s rhetoric, and elections in France and the United Kingdom contribute to explaining decreased diplomatic Western involvement in Libya. To understand the process of “internationalization” of the Libyan crisis and its possible outputs, this report examines the role of international actors in the country and in the regional context. The analysis attempts to address the balance of power among the main local actors (militias, parties, municipalities, etc.) as mirroring the interests of global and regional powers. Against this background, the volume puts the Libyan crisis in a broader perspective and aims to contribute to the public de- bate on an issue that has become a priority on the international agenda. The report also aims to outline policy recommendations, particularly for the United States and the European Union. The report is the outcome of a joint effort by ISPI and the Atlantic Council and draws from some of the most prominent international experts on Libya. In the first chapter, the report’s editors, Karim Mezran and Arturo Varvelli, outline and sum- marize the most recent events in Libya. They analyze the deep political rifts and their causes in the country, both at the domes- tic and the international levels, and highlight the role of interna- tional actors in exacerbating, rather than scaling down, domestic animosity. The second chapter delves deeper into the posture towards Libya of three of its neighboring countries: Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria. Tarek Megerisi argues that Cairo has developed in- creased influence in Libya over time. While Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s interests are mainly rooted in economic and security issues, Haftar’s pre-eminence in Libya has allowed Cairo to foster an ideological channel to direct such interests. For their parts, Tunisia and Algeria have, at times, attempted to present a united front to address common concerns stemming from the need to monitor their long desert borders with Libya and from the presence of jihadist groups. All three countries appear to lean towards a security-centric approach that, however, does not ap- pear to be paying off. 10 Foreign Actors in Libya’s Crisis Gulf countries have played crucial and conflicting roles in Libya as well. To some extent, Libya has been an internation- al stage for the current crisis between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Supporting diverging political goals, the two countries have attempted to export the developmental model typical of Gulf countries based on a rentier economy to Libya. However, as Saskia Van Genugten focuses in the third chapter of this volume, the two Gulf powers have radically different views of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist forces, which have further fanned the flames of the domestic conflict. Mattia Toaldo examines Europe’s role in the Libyan conflict in the fourth chapter. Beginning with the 2011 military interven- tion against Qaddafi, European actors were divided over Europe, with France and the United Kingdom supporting the interven- tion and Italy and Germany less so. European actors have been more divided since the regime’s fall. Despite this, since 2014, European countries have been able to coordinate their agendas by kick-starting and supporting the political process that result- ed in the Skhirat agreement. Many open questions still plague political and diplomatic action in Libya by the European Union. But European leadership is needed if the international commu- nity seeks to stabilize Libya and address the issues that led to the conflict. In the fifth chapter Andrea Beccaro highlights some of the reasons for Russia’s increased involvement in Libya. Haftar’s an- ti-Islamist agenda is LIKE Russia’s, and his role as a “strongman” leading a divided country appeals to Moscow. Nevertheless, Russia has adopted a pragmatic approach and kept diplomatic channels open with al-Serraj and the internationally-recognized government in Tripoli. All this signals A preference for a dip- lomatic rather than military solution, which is tied to Russia’s economic interests. Most likely, Russia hopes to be recognized as the guarantor of any political agreement with Haftar. Meanwhile, the United States appears to be sitting on the fence. It may appear that the Donald Trump’s administration is simply carrying out former President Barack Obama’s policies by