Food and Freedom Amartya Sen Sir John Crawford Memorial Lecture Washington, D.C. October 29, 1987 FOOD AND FREEDOM Amartya Sen* I feel deeply honored to have this opportunity of paying tribute to the memory of Sir John Crawford and to his many contributions to agricultural research and economic development. Sir John was a powerful practitioner, but he was also involved in bridging theory and practice, and keen on investigating connections that may not be straightforward. The links between food and freedom may at first sight appear to be rather remote to policymaking and far from central to practical concerns. I shall argue against that view, trying to discuss the various important connections that have to be recognized more fully as background to practical food policy. I shall not, of course, deny the fact that these connections are not typically taken to be straightfor- ward preludes to practical policymaking, but I will argue that we have to probe deeper for an adequate background to policymaking. Food for freedom and freedom for food “Grub first, then ethics,” thus runs a much quoted aphorism of Bertolt Brecht. There is undoubtedly some sense in this phased gradation. Ethics may seem like a much more remote and much less immediate subject than the command over food that we need to survive. Freedom too-as an important concept in ethics-may seem to be far less immediate than the compelling demands of grabbing grub. But this contrast is quite artificial. The provision of food is indeed a central issue in general social ethics, since so much in human life does depend on the ability to find enough to eat. In particular, the freedom that people enjoy to lead a decent life, including freedom from hunger, from avoidable morbidity, from premature mortality, etc., is quite centrally connected with the provision of food and related necessities. Also, the compulsion to acquire enough food may force vulnerable people to do things which they resent doing, and may make them accept lives with little freedom. The role of food in fostering freedom can be an extremely important one. *Amartya Sen is Lament University Professor at Harvard University. 1 On the other side, freedom may also causally influence the success of the pursuit of food for all. One consideration that has received a great deal of attention recently relates to the role of freedom to make profits in providing incentives for the expansion of food production, thus helping to solve the food problem. This consideration has often cropped up in the critical evaluation of agricultural policies pursued in many countries in Africa and Asia. For example, the rapid expan- sion of agricultural output in China in the economic reforms carried out from 1979 onwards has, with much justice, been seen to be closely related to the freeing of markets and the unleashing of productive opportunities connected with profit incentives. These experiences invite attention and scrutiny. Other types of freedom may also have important instrumental roles to play in the guaranteeing of food for all. Insofar as public policy to combat hunger and starvation-including rapid intervention against threatening famines-may depend on the existence and efficiency of political pressure groups to induce governments to act, political freedom too may have a close connection with the distribution of relief and food to vulnerable groups. There are other possible causal connections-operating in both directions-which may be worth investigating, and some of these I will indeed try to examine and assess in this lecture. Freedom to make profits is not the only freedom the causal influence of which would have to be considered. Thus, what may superficially appear to be rather remote connec- tions between food and freedom can be seen to be, in fact, central in importance and extremely rich in the variety of influences involved, operating in the two respective directions, viz., from food to freedom, and from freedom to food. I shall try to supplement the conceptual and theoretical discussions with illustrations from practical problems with empirical content. Freedom and ethics are indeed very practical matters in the determination of food policy. Four concepts of freedom In a justly famous essay called “Two Concepts of Liberty”, Isaiah Berlin’ made an important distinction between “negative” and “posi- tive” theories of freedom. The negative view sees freedom exclusively in terms of the independence of the individual from interference by others, including governments, institutions and other persons. The 2 positive view, which can be characterized in many different ways, sees freedom not in terms of the presence or absence of interference by others, but in terms of what a person is actually able to do or to be. The distinction may be quite central to different approaches to the idea of freedom and its implications.2 If a person is not free from hunger and lacks the means and the practical opportunities to feed himself or herself adequately, then that person’s positive freedom must be seen as having been thoroughly compromised. On the other hand, his or her negative freedom may be completely unviolated, if this failure to acquire enough food is not a result of his or her having been stopped by interference from others. There is another distinction which is quite central to the content and role of freedom, and this concerns the issue of intrinsic im- portance of freedom as such, in addition to its instrumental roles. That freedom must have instrumental importance as a means to other ends is obvious enough. Our freedom to choose one bundle of commodities rather than another may have an important effect on the living standards we can have, the happiness we can enjoy, the well-being we can achieve, and the various objectives of our lives we can fulfill. Similarly, the absence of interference by others may have important causal influence on various things that we can do and value doing. In the “instrumental” view, freedom is taken to be important precisely because of its being a means to other ends, rather than being valuable in itself. In contrast, the “intrinsic” view of the importance of freedom asserts that freedom is valuable in itself, and not only because of what it permits us to achieve or do. The good life may be seen to be a life of freedom, and in that context freedom is not just a way of achieving a good life, it is constitutive of the good life itself. The “intrinsic” view does not deny that freedom may also be instrumentally important, but does reject the view that its importance lies entirely on its instrumen- tal function. It is easy to see that the two ways of categorizing different approaches to freedom can be combined with each other, yielding four distinct categories. It is indeed possible to look through the history of ideas to see how different thinkers sharing a regard for freedom fall into different categories, related to the positive-negative distinc- tion and to the intrinsic-instrumental classification. At the risk of over simplification I might illustrate the distinctions involved by referring to some particular examples. For example, Milton Friedman and James Buchanan have both tended to put considerable emphasis-indeed priority-n the nega- tive view of freedom, related to non-interference by the state, institu- tions and other individuals3 This contrasts with the emphasis on the positive view of freedom that can be found in the writings of, say, Bentham or Marx. On the other hand, within the negative perspective, Friedman is much more concerned with the instrumental role of freedom rather than its intrinsic importance, while Buchanan con- structs a “non-instrumental” normative case in favor of giving priority to liberties and democratic rights. Whereas Friedman concentrates primarily on what he calls “the fecundity of freedom”, Buchanan goes largely beyond this role of freedom as a means to other ends. Attaching intrinsic importance to negative freedom is seen also in the writings of John Rawls, Robert Nozick and other contemporary moral philosophers, and it is a position that was broadly shared also by John Stuart Mill4 Similarly, among the various theories concentrating on positive freedom, some have seen freedom to be intrinsically important, such as Adam Smith and Karl Marx, following a line of reasoning that goes back to Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics and Politics. In fact, Aristotle had direct influence on Marx’s writings on this subject. Marx’s philosophical focus included giving a foundational role to bringing “the conditions for the free development and activity of individuals under their own control”, with a vision of a liberated society in the future that would make “it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have in mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic.“5 While his urban middle-class origins may have influenced Marx’s evident belief that evening is a good time to rear cattle (he was obviously on more familiar ground with “criticize after dinner”), the placing of this general perspective of freedom in Marx’s entire approach to eco- nomics, politics and society was altogether foundational. While John Rawls’ case for the “priority of liberty” attaches overriding importance to negative freedom, his advocacy of the importance of “primary goods” commanded by people reflects his basic concern for positive freedom as well. Primary goods include “rights, liberties and opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect”. Possessing these things adequately makes a 4 person positively more free to pursue his or her objectives and ends, and Rawls develops his political concept of social justice based on the efficiency and equity in the distributions of these freedoms. In contrast, Jeremy Bentham’s ultimate concern is with utility only, and positive freedom is regarded as important in the Benthamite system only because that freedom may be conducive to more happi- ness. This is, of course, an instrumental view. The Benthamite instrumental-positive view of freedom contrasts with Marx’s intrinsic-positive view. And each in turn contrasts with the instrumental-negative view of Friedman, on the one hand, and the intrinsic-negative view of Buchanan and Nozick on the other. It is easy to find other examples to illustrate the contrasts, but perhaps the ones already mentioned will do. I ought to warn that these categories are often not very pure, and the same writers may have a certain amount of plurality within their overall theories (this was, of course, clearly seen in the case of Rawls in the preceding discussion). Food policy and alternative approaches to freedom This categorization is of crucial relevance even in understanding various demands on food policy, arising from different views of freedom. For example, the advocacy of greater freedom to earn profit in agriculture and of greater use of free market without much interference by the state and other public institutions [an advocacy that can, incidentally, be found in many documents of the host for this lecture, the World Bank] usually reflects an instrumental- negative view of freedom, applied to food policy. Freedom to earn profits without interference is advocated not because it is typically taken to be foundationally important on its own, but because it is seen to be conducive to such things as greater productivity, larger income and enhanced food output. In general, the perspective of incentives constitutes an instrumental focus, related to what Milton Friedman calls “the fecundity of freedom”, and in this particular case this is applied primarily to the negative view of freedom, seen in terms of non-interference. In contrast, the writings of some authors, such as Peter Bauer, have tended to go beyond the instrumental view even in the context of agricultural development, emphasizing the importance of people having the right to enjoy the fruits of their own creation, without interference by the state or by other institutions or individuals.6 Bauer has seen this as a central feature of a good agricultural policy. The instrumental consideration of incentives is not denied in this perspec- tive (far from it), but the ethical argument goes well beyond that, to intrinsic importance as well. On the other hand, economic approaches emphasizing the need to fulfill “basic needs” for food and other essentials, or to pursue public policy to guarantee “freedom from hunger”, and so on, take a positive view of freedom, concentrating on what people are able actually to do or be, rather than what they are prevented by others from doing or being.7 The focus of this literature has often tended to be on pragmatic rather than foundational issues. Concentration on “free- dom from hunger” and related objectives can indeed be defended either on grounds of their supposed intrinsic importance, or be- cause of their instrumental role in serving other-allegedly more basic-goals, such as enhancement of happiness or welfare of indi- viduals. The instrumental view can be seen clearly in the analysis presented by one of the earliest writers on “basic needs” (though he did not use that expression), viz. A.C. Pigou, in The Economics of WeJfare.8 For an example on the other side, Paul Streeten’s approach is perhaps best seen in terms of intrinsic value being attached to these respective freedoms to fulfill the various “basic needs”.g The instrumental-intrinsic distinction relates to the foundational question as to what is regarded as valuable in itself, and what must be seen as important only as a contributor to other more basic goals. This is a question of deep philosophical interest, but it has pragmatic importance too, since instrumental arguments turn ultimately on the correctness of the cause-effect relationships postulated. For example, if it emerges that free markets and profit earnings do not provide much incentive for the expansion of production, or do not contribute to bettering living standards, the instrumental defense of these free market policies may well collapse, but this need not disestablish at all the view (e.g., Bauer’sl that would see the right to earn these profits to be intrinsically important. In this sense, the intrinsic view is less vulnerable to empirical counter-argument, but it has, of course, greater need of foundational ethical defense. The position is a little different as far as positive freedom is concerned. A policy of state intervention, e.g., in the distribution of food, is scarcely ever regarded as being of fundamental value of its 6 own. The possibility of foundational valuation arises at a somewhat later stage (in this respect its contrast with the valuing of right-based procedures, as in the systems of Robert Nozick or Peter Bauer, is quite sharp], and valuing positive freedom has to be based on a good deal of instrumental analysis in moving from the means of state interven- tion to the realization of positive freedom. The difference between the “intrinsic” and “instrumental” views of positive freedom lies, in this context, in the length to which the instrumental analysis has to be carried. In the broadly Aristotelian view, which sees the capability to achieve important functionings as being valuable in itself, the instrumental analysis can end at that point, but in those views in which positive freedom happens to be no more than means to other ends, e.g., in the pursuit of utility, the instrumental analyses have to go further into the translation of freedom into the fulfillment of other goals. In each case there is need to examine the effects of policies such as public distribution of food on the positive freedoms that individuals can actually obtain, and the difference arises only at a later stage, in moving from freedom to achievement. In this respect the positive freedom view is basically more instrument-dependent than the negative freedom approach is. These considerations may, at first glance, appear to be rather distant from the nitty-gritty of practical policymaking in the field of food and hunger. But foundational questions are ultimately quite central to the acceptability of particular policy analyses. While the tendency to avoid facing these foundational questions is quite com- mon, it is more a reflection of escapism than a demonstration of uncanny wisdom. Ultimately policies have to be justified in terms of what is valuable and how various policies may respectively enhance these valuable things. There is no escape, therefore, from considering both the question of what is fundamentally valuable and the question of what instruments enhance these things best. It is indeed the combination of the intrinsic considerations and instrumental analy- ses that can lead the way to an adequate examination of what should be done and why. While these conceptual and theoretical discussions can be carried further-I have tried to discuss some of these further issues else- wherelO- shall devote the rest of this lecture to rather practical matters, dealing with actual policy disputes in the field of food and hunger. 7 Opulence and living standard A preliminary point first. The process of economic development is often seen in terms of the expansion of the material basis of well- being and freedom that people can enjoy. This approach has a rationale that is easy to understand, since the positive freedoms that we can enjoy and the well-being levels that we can achieve are both dependent on the commodity bundles over which we can establish command. This clearly is the sense behind assessing economic development in terms of the progress of real gross national product per head. On the other hand, freedom and well-being depend also on the use that is made of the opulence of the nation. Income distribu- tions can vary. No less importantly, the command that people enjoy over essential food, health services, medical attention, etc., depends crucially on the delivery system for these commodities. A public distribution system geared to the needs of the vulnerable sections of the community can bring the essentials of livelihood within easy reach of people whose lives may remain otherwise relatively un- touched by the progress of real national income. Table 1 illustrates the point. Oman or South Africa may have a gross national product per head that is a great many times higher than that of China or Sri Lanka, but each of the former has under-five mortality rates (covering infants and children) that is two or three times higher than those prevailing in the poorer economies. The life expectancy at birth in Oman and South Africa lingers around the mid-fifties, while China and Sri Lanka have achieved longevity rates reasonably close to those prevailing in Europe and America. Table 1. Opulence, Life and Death GNP Per Head Life Expectancy Under-8 Mortality [Dollars) at Birth Rate (Per Thousand) 1985 1985 1985 Oman 6,730 54 172 South Africa 2,010 55 104 Brazil 1,640 65 91 Sri Lanka 380 70 50 China 310 69 48 Sources: World Development Report, 1987; The State of the World’s Children, 1987. This is, of course, a well-known point, but it is worth emphasizing in the present context, since the demands of agricultural policy in general and food policy in particular are often seen primarily in terms of expanding the material bases of well-being and freedom. Indeed, as we shah presently see, there is an important policy issue related to this question even in terms of the recent economic reforms in China. The point to note here is that the positive freedom to lead a long life may well be typically enhanced by expansion of material prosperity, but the relationship is far from a tight one, and indeed it is quite possible for the freedom to live long to go down, while the level of economic opulence goes up. The shift of focus from the national product to the freedom enjoyed by members of the nation can bring about a major reexamination of the requirements of economic policy. The freedom to live long is, of course, only one of the positive freedoms that may be thought to be important. It is a freedom that is particularly valued since our ability to do other things is, obviously, conditional on our being here, and it is not surprising that the option of living longer is very rarely refused. This is, of course, the reason why longevity, which is an achievement, can also be seen as an important indicator of the freedom to live long (we tend to exercise this freedom, in most cases, to the maximum extent we can), and the metric of life expectancy is, thus, a fairly basic indicator of a foundational positive freedom. There are, however, other important positive freedoms as well, e.g., freedom from hunger and undernutri- tion, freedom from escapable morbidity, freedom to read and write and communicate. Indeed, the list of important freedoms must be seen to be a long one in any accounting that aims at some degree of comprehensiveness. While any practical analysis may have to confine attention to only a few indicators, the need to have a wider informa- tional base for a more definitive analysis has to be borne in mind. Often these indicators move in the same direction (e.g., life expect- ancy, avoidance of morbidity, and literacy frequently tend to be highly correlated), but this is not invariably the case. For example, in the contrast between different states in India, Kerala comes out as having very much higher life expectancy and literacy than any other Indian state, but in terms of morbidity rates, Kerala does not seem to have this advantage. Indeed, measured in the metric of reported illnesses, Kerala’s morbidity rate is much higher than that of many other Indian 9