FAITH AND REASON by Dick Sztanyo, M.A. Copyright © 1996 All rights reserved. This document may be printed or stored on computer media, on the condition that it will not be republished in print, on-line (including reposting on any personal Web sites, cor­ porate Web sites, organizational Web sites, electronic bulletin boards, etc.), or on computer media, and will not be used for any commercial purposes. Further, it must be copied with source statements (publisher, author, title, bibliographic references, etc.), and must include this paragraph granting limited rights for copying and reproduction, along with the name and address of the publisher and owner of these rights, as listed below. Except for those exclusions mentioned above, and brief quotations in articles or critical reviews, or distribution for educational purposes (including students in classes), no part of this book may be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher. Apologetics Press, Inc. 230 Landmark Drive Montgomery, AL 36117 U.S.A. 334/272-8558 800/234-8558 www.ApologeticsPress.org TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER ONE Introduction................................................................................................. 1 CHAPTER TWO The Concept of “Rational Belief”............................................................... 2 Biblical Faith.........................................................................................2 Arriving at Knowledge ......................................................................... 3 CHAPTER THREE Modern Notions of Faith............................................................................. 5 CHAPTER FOUR The Philosophic Position on “Rational Belief” .......................................... 7 CHAPTER FIVE The Biblical Position on “Rational Belief”................................................. 8 Fideism.................................................................................................. 9 CHAPTER SIX Faith and Reason......................................................................................... 11 CHAPTER SEVEN Conclusion .................................................................................................. 13 REFERENCES .................................................................................................................... 15 FAITH AND REASON by Dick Sztanyo, M.A. CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION T he exact relationship between faith and reason has consistently been a battleground within Christendom. From near the beginning of Christianity, there have been serious reflections on this topic. Why then, one may ask, is yet another essay being offered on the subject? I would like to offer at least three reasons for the present volume. First, there always is a need for a study of biblical faith. Many of the studies on this subject, I be­ lieve, have ignored important biblical evidence—evidence that will be presented and discussed in this book. Since ultimately the question is, “What does the Bible teach about faith and reason?,” one must not divorce his reflections from a biblical foundation. Unfortunately, this has occurred in far too many cases. Second, there is a need for this study, if for no other reason, because of the increasing prevalence of agnosticism within the confines of Christendom. Admittedly, this is a serious charge, yet it is one that can be documented in literally hundreds of cases—some of which will be mentioned in the body of this work. There are those who simplistically assert, “Where there is knowledge, there is no longer any room for faith.” Such a statement is a perversion of plain biblical teaching. Still others have surrendered any claim to a foundation of evidence for faith. Some years ago, a seminar was conducted in Dallas, Texas, in which a “debate” occurred between world-renowned atheists and theists trained in the empirical sciences, social sciences, and philosophy. The philosophy panel was represented by Paul Kurtz, Antony Flew, Wallace I. Matson, and Kai Nielsen on the atheists’ side, and Alvin Plantinga, W.P. Alston, George Mavrodes, and Ralph McInerny on the theists’ side. The theists were to defend God’s existence against the challenge of the atheists. I listened in shocked amazement as theists Plantinga and Alston actually urged rejection of the law of rationality, which states that “one should draw only such conclusions as are warranted by the evidence” (cf. 1 Thes­ salonians 5:21 and Isaiah 41:21). The astonishing thing was that these men spent an inordinate amount of time giving evidence for their conclusion that one should reject the law of rationality—a position that is hopelessly self-contradictory. They “reasoned” that one should reject reason with reference to the ques­ tion of God! And this was how they hoped to defend God against the attacks of those who challenged His existence? Since these men are some of the heavyweights in the academic community, this was disheart­ ening, to say the least. Third, of course, there is a need to study and understand biblical faith because of the consistent challenge to Christianity from the atheistic camp. In his book, Atheism: The Case Against God, George Smith wrote: “The conflict between Christian theism and atheism is fundamentally a conflict between faith and reason. This, in epistemological terms, is the essence of the controversy. Reason and faith are opposites, two mutually exclusive terms: there is no reconciliation or common ground” (1979, p. 5). Smith summarized his claim by saying: “It is logically impossible to reconcile reason and faith” (p. 101). At least one of my motives for publishing this treatise is to demonstrate that Smith’s position is com­ pletely false. We are not required to flee into the land of irrationality in order to escape the challenge of the skeptic. My desire is that the reader will come to this same conclusion through a study of the material made available in this volume. The conclusions drawn from the various arguments presented here become our shared responsibility. I am traveling the road of reflection regarding the faith/reason controversy; I now bid you to accompany me on the journey. [NOTE: For additional information on this subject, see Sztanyo, 1983, pp. 472-483; 1983, 14[4]:41-44; 1985, pp. 164-171; 1986, pp. 197-216.] - 2 ­ CHAPTER 2 THE CONCEPT OF “RATIONAL BELIEF” T here are two extremes that must be avoided, whether in a study and presentation of Christian apologetics or in a Christian’s daily life: (1) the use of reason alone; and (2) the use of reve­ lation alone. In practical terms, this is not a situation of “either/or” but “both/and.” The proper relationship should be that of reason and revelation. Though many religionists posit some sort of separation between faith and reason, I argue that such is not the case. Faith and reason are to be distin­ guished, but never separated. To illustrate this, consider the relationship of the mind and body. The body is not the mind, nor is the mind the body. Yet they are inseparably joined in this present mode of exis­ tence. Therefore, the mind and the body can be, and ought to be, distinguished, but not separated. In a similar way, faith and reason are distinct, but not separate. Both are essential to Christianity, though each must function within its proper sphere. Faith is primarily an act of both the intellect and the will, whereas reason is essentially an act of the intellect. BIBLICAL FAITH The word family of pistis and pisteuo in Scripture is related to the term peitho. These three words are used 244, 248, and 55 times, respectively, in the Bible. The verb pisteuo primarily has reference to the act of faith, while the noun form more clearly depicts what faith means. Liddell and Scott define the noun as follows: “a means of persuasion, an argument, proof ” (1869, pp. 1272-1273). Peitho, in the active voice, means “to be fully persuaded, believe, trust: of things, to be believed” (1869, p. 1220). At the very least, the terms imply a prior understanding (i.e., knowledge) of what is to be believed or trusted. In other words, faith is based upon a foundation of knowledge. Moreover, faith can lead to a greater expression of knowledge. Faith is used in Scripture in a general way to refer to those things both supernaturally and naturally revealed by God (cf. Hebrews 11:1,3,6, Psalm 19:1-14, Romans 1:18-22, and 10:9-17). Scripture records at least seven different ways in which the term “faith” is used, five of which (the first five in my listing) play an indispensable role in man’s salvation. First, faith is used to designate “belief ” (John l2:42; He­ brews 11:6). Second, faith sometimes means “trust” (John 14:1; Romans 4:17-20; Luke 7). Third, faith often refers to “obedience” (Numbers 20:12; John 3:36, ASV; Hebrews 10:39; Romans 1:5,8; 16:25-26). Fourth, faith frequently refers to steadfastness, loyalty, or “faithfulness” (Habakkuk 2:4; Galatians 3:9; Hebrews 10: 23,38; Revelation 2:10). Fifth, the word is used objectively to refer to the content of faith, hence, “the faith” (Romans 10:9; Jude 3; Galatians 1:11,23). Sixth, at times faith is used of strong per­ sonal conviction (Romans 14:2,23). Seventh, faith also is used on occasion to speak of a spiritual gift (1 Corinthians 12:8-9; Matthew 17:20, 1 Corinthians 13:2). While faith sometimes is contrasted with sight (2 Corinthians 5:7; Hebrews 11:1; cf. John 20:29 for an exception), doubt (James 1:6; cf. also Matthew 14:3 and 21:21), and deeds of the law (Romans 3:28; Galatians 3:2-5), it never is contrasted with knowl­ edge so as to imply a separation. In John’s Gospel, pisteuo with the dative is employed frequently (John 2:22; 5:46; 8:31-47). With regard to the nature, mission, and role of Jesus, John utilized pisteuo with a hoti clause, as in John 8:24 (“be convinced that I am”), John 20:31 (“be convinced that Jesus is the Christ”), as well as several other passages (see John 13:19, 14:11, and 17:8). Pistis (belief) here is close to gnosis (knowledge), as in John 6:69: “...we have believed and have known that you are the holy one of God.” Both faith and knowledge are concerned with the fact that the Father sent Jesus (faith—John 11:42; 17:8,21; knowledge—John 17:3). Both faith (John 16:27-30) and knowledge (John 7:17) realize that He and His teaching are from the Father. If knowledge relates to the truth (John 8:32), faith relates no less to Him who is the Truth (John 14:1,6). The fact that He is the Christ is an object of faith (John 11:27; 20:31), but it is also an ob­ ject of both faith and knowledge together (John 6:69). Scripture refers to itself as having been written to produce both faith (John 20:30-31) and knowledge (1 John 5:13). Furthermore, there are numerous passages in which faith and knowledge materially pertain to the same object at the same time and under the same aspect (see 1 Timothy 4:3, 2 Timothy 1:12, John - 3 - 4:42, 6:69, 17:8, 1 John 4:6,16, and 5:13). Moreover, the apostles used a variety of types of evidence to lead men to a commitment to Christ. For instance, in Acts 2:14-40, Peter used eyewitness testimony (see John 4:39), the miracles of Christ (see John 20:30-31), and predictive prophecy (see Isaiah 41:21ff.). Indi­ rect credible testimony is also a predominant line of evidence leading to faith (see Luke 1:1-4, Acts 1:3, 2.36, 9:22, and 13:38). Thus, faith often is portrayed biblically as knowledge based upon testimony. Though this issue will be addressed more thoroughly later in this study, I already have said enough to advance the following thesis: Any concept of faith that severs it from its objective, epistemological base (foundation of knowledge) is at variance with biblical teaching. Biblically speaking, one does not believe that God is (or any other item to be accepted “by faith”): (1) against the evidence; (2) without evi­ dence; or (3) beyond the evidence. Rather, one believes on the basis of evidence sufficient to establish the conclusion (1 Thessalonians 5:21; Isaiah 41:21). Biblical faith is built upon a prior understanding (knowledge) of what is to be believed. Information regarding “saving faith” (i.e., what one must do to be saved) comes only from special revelation (i.e., Scripture—Romans 10:17; John 6:44-45). But there is another type of faith that is derived from general revelation (i.e., nature—Psalm 19:1-6; Romans 1:19-22; Hebrews 11:3,6; et al.). Later in this book, when I speak of proving the existence of God, I shall be speaking primarily about this second type of faith. I hope to make clear that such a faith is built and based upon evidence—that is, it is “rational belief.” I in­ tend to make clear that I am opposed to every notion of faith that is irrational. ARRIVING AT KNOWLEDGE I cannot survey in this limited space the various words from the Greek text translated “know” in the Scriptures (there are several). I will, however, examine numerous ways of coming to knowledge as re­ vealed in the Bible. In short, I will be examining the types of evidence that can be used to prove one’s case. I argue that the term “proof ” cannot be limited to what is seen, felt, heard, tasted, or smelled (i.e., concerning only empirical evidence). What, then, are legitimate means of coming to knowledge? 1. There is induction, which is simply a “gathering together” of available evidence. 2. There is deduction (Scripture abounds with examples), which is the marshaling of evidence in such a way that conclusive results can be obtained (see Mark 3:4, et al.). 3. There is the use of empirical data (see Luke 12:54-56), which is simply a direct experiencing of an object (for instance, a door) or an event (such as the weather outside). 4. There is credible testimony (see John 20:25-31, 1 Peter 1:8-11, 1 Corinthians 15:1-8, et al.), which is testimony from witnesses who either are known to be trustworthy, or whose testimony cannot be justifiably doubted. 5. There is intuition (see Matthew 12:24-28), which must be distinguished from a mere hunch or guess (the usual modern understanding of this word). By intuition, I mean a knowledge that does not de­ pend in any way on sense perception or empirical experience. It is evident immediately, even though it may require some effort to grasp. The passage alluded to above is an example in Scripture of such. It is intuitively absurd to suppose that Jesus would cast out Satan’s coworkers by using Satanic power. Other examples include the metaphysical principle of non-contradiction (“a thing cannot both exist and not exist at the same time and in the same sense”), and the logical law of contradiction (derived from the metaphysical principle) which states that “contradictory statements cannot both be true.” These principles are known immediately and with absolute certainty. Any attempt to deny them, in fact, presupposes them (i.e., if you deny either principle, then your denial is either true or false; it cannot be both true and false). And this knowledge does not depend upon even a single empirical observation. For instance, these princi­ ples hold true for the Universe as a whole, and even for God Himself. I know with certainty that God can­ not both exist and not exist at the same time and in the same sense. He either exists or He does not. Em­ pirical observation is worthless here. Yet this is a legitimate pathway to knowledge. 6. There is metaphysical deduction, a term that I have coined to refer to a deduction made from things that can be observed to things that potentially may never be seen (see Luke 17: 20-21 and Hebrews 11:3). Robinson Crusoe (so the story goes) was marooned on an island. While walking on a beach, he dis­ covered a footprint in the sand that clearly was not his own. He deduced accurately: (1) that there was another being on the island; and (2) that this other being was a human being. If he had never seen “Fri­ - 4 ­ day” face to face, the certainty of his knowledge nevertheless was not jeopardized. This same concept relates to the arguments for God’s existence. God has left His “footprints,” as it were, throughout the Universe (note Acts 14:17: “Yet he left not himself without witness...”). Naturally, each person is respon­ sible for reasoning properly and for drawing correct conclusions from the available evidence (Romans 1:19-22; Psalm 19:1-6; Hebrews 3:4; et al.). There is nothing, in or out of Scripture, to suggest that only one of these ways of arriving at truth re­ sults in “proof,” while every other means is denied such a status. One may prove his case using any, or all, of these legitimate means of coming to knowledge (so long as the limits of each method are under­ stood). It has become apparent that many today hold that “knowledge” or “proof” is restricted to scien­ tific investigation alone, and that whatever is not “scientific” then is designated as “faith.” Such a dichot­ omy accounts for the strange things one reads on the subject of faith and knowledge. One author sug­ gested, for example: “Scientific knowledge we know, and things seen we know, but faith is the assurance of what we accept that we do not yet know but are hoping for” (Thomas, 1974, p. 137). This position agrees with that of philosopher Bertrand Russell, who said: “Whatever knowledge is attainable, must be attained by scientific methods; and what science cannot discover, mankind cannot know” (1935, p. 243). Such a position is patently false, because it disregards other important means of arriving at a knowledge of the truth. - 5 ­ CHAPTER 3 MODERN NOTIONS OF FAITH I n the previous chapter, we surveyed several ways of arriving at a knowledge of the truth, none of which can be called the sole measure of “proof” (i.e., one may prove his case using any or all such approaches). It is unfortunate that legitimate means of arriving at knowledge often are not recognized by many who speak or write on Christian apologetics. Antony Flew, though an atheist, cor­ rectly observed that for the average person today, “ ‘ You cannot prove the existence of God’ has become a catch-phrase” (1966, p. 19). If one asks, “What difference does all this make anyway?,” Flew answers: “For the committed Christian what is at issue is the rationality of the commitment” (1966, p. 19, emp. added). In other words, the difference is the believability and defensibility of the gospel, as well as the rationality of a Christian’s personal convictions. In short, it makes all the difference in the world. In this chapter, I shall attempt to document two things: (1) the philosophic background of modern concepts of faith and reason; and (2) how these concepts have affected, and are affecting, the church. Numerous influences contributed to the modern concept of “faith.” For example, Immanuel Kant prefaced the second edition of his famous Critique of Pure Reason with these words: “I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith” (1965, B:XXX). The Danish phi­ losopher and theologian, Søren Kierkegaard, maintained that the absolute limit to which our reason re­ peatedly is drawn, but cannot penetrate, is the Unknown, which he suggested we call “God” (1936, Chapter 2). In other words, human reason has reached its limit. Therefore, one must let go of his rational­ ity in order to make a “passionate commitment” to God through faith (i.e., one must take a “leap of faith” beyond all categories of knowledge and reason). Faith in God (for Kierkegaard) was grounded neither rationally nor empirically; so the existence of God is neither rationally certain nor empirically evident. In his book, The Will to Believe (1903), William James held that men must believe something out of psychological necessity. Something offered for our belief is a hypothesis. If we label a decision made from various hypotheses an option, then our options may be of several kinds: (1) living or dead; (2) forced or avoidable; and (3) momentous or trivial. James suggested that a genuine option is of the forced, living, and momentous kind. The “religious hypothesis” is chosen on the basis of the greatest “cash value” (a term he used often in his essays), in spite of the fact that such questions cannot be decided in­ tellectually at all. Rather than remaining agnostic, James proposed that one choose to believe in God, since it seems to be the better risk (see also Pascal’s Pensées). In his essay, The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life (1903), James argued that one should live “as if ” God exists because this forces one to live a more strenuous moral life. No one can know that God exists, said James, but in order to live the best type of moral life, we must live as though we do know that He exists. After Kant, many thinkers not only distinguished faith and reason, but also separated them. Faith and reason were thought to occupy two entirely different spheres. One could speak of faith in terms of probability, mystical experience, suprarationality, irrationality, being “beyond knowledge,” etc., but cer­ tainly not as a form of knowledge. This assumption became so influential and prominent that members of the body of Christ began to advocate it as being the truth. This no doubt helps explain the following as­ tonishing statements. “In all matters of religious epistemology we come to the question of distinguishing between absolutely provable knowledge and that which is faith-dependent to some degree or other.... In other words, men of strong faith ‘act like’ they have absolute knowledge, even though in this life they can never have more than a strong faith” (Thomas, 1974, pp. 131-132). “Absolute, final knowledge beyond which there can be no greater, would not leave room for faith. One of Webster’s definitions of faith is, ‘firm belief in something for which there is no proof.’ ...We act as though we have as much certainty as the apostles had. This is real faith” (Thomas, 1982). “If you ask me, ‘Can you absolutely prove the exis­ tence of God?,’ I have to answer, ‘No.’ No one can positively prove God.... He cannot be positively and scientifically proved in the same way more ordinary things are proved” (Barnett, 1980). “...[T]he exis­ tence of God...cannot be proved in a final absolute sense. After all, there must be room for faith if we are free beings. The choice between belief and unbelief hinges on the strength of evidence for and against.... We confidently believe the weight of evidence lies firmly with belief ” (Gilbert, 1971, pp. 8-9). - 6 ­ The positions espoused by these writers regarding “rational belief ” more closely resemble the posi­ tions maintained by Kant, James, Kierkegaard, and Russell than the position maintained by Peter, Paul, and John. It may be that some have espoused an agnostic position inadvertently, but the position is ag­ nostic nevertheless. To admit that Christianity is “only probable” is to admit the possibility that, in fact, it might be a hoax! Could you—in your most irrational moment—imagine even the slightest possibility of an apostle preaching the “God of probability” or the “God who may be”? I would like to close this chap­ ter with a challenge from the pen of Clark Pinnock: We must give reasons for our belief that the gospel is a revelation from God and not a human construc­ tion or people will not take it seriously if not disposed to do so already.... Loud rhetorical assertions that God is “really” out there are not going to substitute for an intellectually solid theology that backs up its faith with works. Evidence has to be forthcoming to validate the confidence that God is not made in man’s image but is the Lord and Savior of mankind (1982, emp. added). - 7 ­ CHAPTER 4 THE PHILOSOPHIC POSITION ON “RATIONAL BELIEF” I n his book, Critique of Religion and Philosophy, Walter Kaufmann, who certainly is no friend of Christianity, attempted to answer the question, “Why do men believe as they do?,” and suggested at least seven distinct causes of belief (1961, pp. 132-134). In spite of his hostility to Christianity, his list is quite comprehensive. I would like to summarize it here, without making lengthy remarks. Any statement (such as “God exists,” or “Jesus established only one church,” or “baptism is essential for the salvation of one’s soul”) may be believed because: (1) arguments have been (or can be) offered in its support; (2) it was encountered (in a book, paper, etc.) and nothing was spoken against it; (3) numer­ ous factors may be working in its behalf (it may be a common belief in one’s cultural environment and thereby be accepted by a sort of “osmosis”); (4) the new belief fits well with our prior beliefs; (5) there may be penalties for not accepting a belief (e.g., social ostracism, disappointment to our parents, torture, etc.); (6) there may be positive rewards for accepting such a belief; and (7) the belief may be accepted because it gratifies us or answers a psychological need. There is a distinct difference between the first belief and the other six. Given the totality of biblical teaching, it is clear that God accepts only the first (1 Thessalonians 5:21; 1 Peter 3:15). Beliefs may be divided into two categories, based upon the nature of their causes. There are rational beliefs and irra­ tional beliefs. Rational belief is reasoned belief based upon evidence. Irrational beliefs may be divided into two subcategories: (1) beliefs not produced by a “reason,” as such, but by some non-rational cause such as emotion, prejudice, vested interest, authority, habit, and the tendency to merely accept what one is told; and (2) beliefs produced by inadequate or insufficient reasons. In this treatise, I am defending what has come to be known as the “law of rationality,” which was formulated quite accurately by Lionel Ruby in his text, Logic: An Introduction: Every person who is interested in logical thinking accepts what we shall call the “law of rationality,” which may be stated as follows: We ought to justify our conclusions by adequate evidence.... By “adequate evidence” we mean evidence which is good and sufficient in terms of the kind of proof which is required. There are occasions when we require conclusive proof, as in mathematics, and there are occa­ sions when it is sufficient to establish the probability of a given conclusion, as in weather prediction. But in all cases the evidence must be adequate to its purpose (1960, p. 131, emp. added). Before I enter into a discussion of the biblical position, I want to insist that there is not a single item in Christianity, upon which our souls’ salvation depends, that is only “probably” true. In each case, the evidence supplied is sufficient to establish conclusive proof regarding the truth of the Christian faith. This is not to say, however, that such a case is psychologically compelling, so that one could not reject the evi­ dence. That would be an abuse of free will. I do argue, however, that one can be absolutely certain (intel­ lectually) of such matters as the existence of God, the deity of Christ, the inspiration of the Bible, etc. That this also is the biblical position is the subject of the remainder of this investigation