Failure in Vietnam and Afghanistan A comparative analysis of the U.S. and Soviet Interventions Rossan den Ouden 3188957 Comparative History 2009-2011 Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Maarten Prak Contents Introduction 1  Subject of the thesis 1  Why a comparison between these two conflicts? 2  Why is this interesting for the observer to know? 4  What is the comparative method? 4 Chapter 1 The United States (1954-1973) 8 Introduction 8 How did the United States end up in Vietnam? 9 U.S. failure in Vietnam 10 Economy 11 Foreign Politics and Strategic Significance (geopolitics) 13  Containment, the Geneva Accords, and the Domino Theory 13  The Truman Doctrine: Containment 14  Military support for the French 15  Eisenhower and the Domino Theory 15  Anti-Sovietism 16  Anxiousness toward China 16  Johnson and the escalation of the Vietnam War 17  Nixon and Kissinger 21  “Peace with Honor” 22  Failing negotiations 25 Domestic Politics 26 Prestige 28 Ideology 30 Détente 31 Military Objectives 33  Johnson‟s war: 1965-1968 34  The Gulf of Tonkin, August 1964 34  Americanization 35  Operation Rolling Thunder, 1956-1967 36  Search and Destroy 37  The Tet Offensive, 1968 38  Nixon and Kissinger‟s war: 1968-1973 41  Vietnamization 41  Cambodia and Laos 42  Concluding words 43 Media Coverage and the First Televised War 44 Conclusion: the United States 47  Epilogue 51 Statistics 53 Chapter 2 The Soviet-Union (1964-1989) 55 Introduction 55 How did the Soviet Union end up in Afghanistan? 56  The coup and a communist regime in Afghanistan 59  Moscow‟s dissatisfaction with Afghan politics and the road toward invasion 60  Soviet objectives during the Brezhnev era 62 Soviet failure in Afghanistan 63 Economy 64 Foreign Politics and strategic significance (geopolitics) 66  Expansionism 66  Brezhnev Doctrine 67  Fear of Americanism 67  Fundamentalism 67  Prancing Proconsuls 68  Defensive aggressiveness 68  The „Tar Baby‟ syndrome 68  Debilitation of Détente 69  Fear of China 69 Domestic Politics 70 Prestige 72 Ideology 73 Détente 74 Military Objectives 75  Brezhnev‟s war: tactical innovation, policy stagnation. 77  Andropov‟s war: willing spirit, weak flesh 77  Chernenko‟s war: limited Armageddon 78  Gorbachev‟s war: bringing the boy‟s back home 78 Media Coverage and Glasnost 80 Conclusion: the Soviet Union 83  Epilogue 86 Statistics 89 Chapter 3 91 Conclusion: the Boolean Method Bibliography 97 Failure in Vietnam and Afghanistan 1 A comparative analysis of the U.S. and Soviet Interventions Introduction Failure in Vietnam and Afghanistan A comparative analysis of the U.S. and Soviet Interventions Over the last years personal interest attached to the prolonged animosity between the United States and Soviet Union between 1945-1991 made clear the best thing to do was to write a thesis on a Cold War subject. When starting this project it was not quite sure whether this thesis would elaborate a conflict, politics or maybe a technological issue. However, it was evident this thesis would include involvement of both U.S. and Soviet interest. As the thesis also had to contain a comparative analysis, it seemed best to set a U.S. conflict opposite a Soviet. The choice for an American conflict was quickly made. Without any doubt this meant a deeper examination of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. To choose a Soviet conflict was more complex because it had to be suitable for a fair comparison with the events in Vietnam. Research on Cold War literature and articles led to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan between 1979-1989. Especially the denotation “the Soviet Union‟s Vietnam War”, a term widely used when referring to the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan made conjunction with the American participation in Southeast Asia and created an opportunity for further examination. A next tool was the addition of the role of U.S. and Soviet politics. Thus conflict and politics became the main ingredients to forge a comparative analysis. As an addition to the ongoing debate on subject matter in Cold War historiography this thesis may place the examined conflicts and politics in a different perspective. Subject of the thesis This thesis consists of a comparative analysis of two conflicts that originated during the Cold War period; U.S. participation in the Vietnam War (1954-1973) en the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1989). It discusses similar and comparable economic, political and military behavioral patterns of the U.S. and Soviet governments and explains why both nations eventually failed to achieve their strategic objectives in Vietnam and Afghanistan. To elaborate the analysis eight aspects are used which can be applied to both the United States and the Soviet Union. The following aspects are discussed: Failure in Vietnam and Afghanistan 2 A comparative analysis of the U.S. and Soviet Interventions  Economy  Foreign Politics and Strategic Significance (geopolitics)  Domestic Politics  Prestige  Ideology  Détente  Military Objectives  Media Coverage For the United States the year 1964 can be considered the starting point of the war. Yet, the analysis about Vietnam begins with 1954 because from this moment U.S. political attention shifted to events occurring in Southeast Asia which eventually led to the escalation. The year 1973 is selected as a concluding year because disengagement from Southeast Asia of U.S. troops and officials was already in advanced stages, although complete withdrawal was not reached before 1975. The starting point for the analysis about the Soviet Union is 1964, when the Kremlin for the first time drew political attention towards Central Asia. The Soviet part ends with the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989. Why a comparison between these two conflicts? A comparison between these two conflicts emerged from a deep interest in the Cold War period since the conclusion of the Second World War, especially the position therein of the two mightiest powers, the Unites States and the Soviet Union. During this restless period both powers dealt with many political and military conflicts in domestic spheres, but foremost abroad. After rapid decolonization halfway during the 1950s there slowly emerged a hierarchical classification of divided worlds. Thereby the Third World became a synonym for the total of all developing countries, most of which were located in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Although most of these Third World countries were not associated with alliances such as NATO or the Warsaw Pact they chose to side with either the United States or the Soviet Union. For the fragile Third World countries a neutral position in the greater conflict was almost impossible as they remained too dependent on American or Soviet economic/military aid. Since the total collapse of the Soviet Failure in Vietnam and Afghanistan 3 A comparative analysis of the U.S. and Soviet Interventions Union in 1991, the Cold War period may be considered as ended. A historical revision of this period can be used to think about the role the two mightiest powers have played in the Third World for many years. Why could both powers not win in the Third World and attached themselves with their long term political and military conflicts? Even more important became the question why both powers enmeshed into a conflict which proved to be inescapable without causing and incurring serious damage. What had two Third World countries in Central Asia and Southeast Asia to offer the most powerful political powers in the world? Was there an opportunity for economic gain? Or did they both want to show each other and the outside world simply which proved to be more powerful in geopolitical terms? Anyhow, the fact is that both the United States and the Soviet Union used behavioral patterns in their Third World conflict which can be put beside and against each other in a comparable manner. This comparative approach of structuring behavorial patterns gets a peculiar character because in its historiography, the Soviet-Russian conflict in Afghanistan is sometimes referred to as “the Soviet Union‟s Vietnam War”. Here conjunction with the American conflict in Vietnam is made. The reason why both the U.S. and Soviet conflict can be regarded a “Vietnam-type conflict” can be found in the fact that both powers got involved in a conflict they could hardly escape. They sank further away into a quagmire of self-created problems. Within the Vietnam historiography this phenomenon is known as the Quagmire-theory.1 This theory is widely accepted by orthodox Vietnam historians. The theory‟s logic consists of the assumption each next political or military step taken in conflict can be considered escalatory without escaping opportunities. Thus adepts of the Quagmire-Theory believe escalation of conflict is caused by failure of the previous step taken which inexorably will worsen the conflict‟s situation with each (possible) subsequent step. Strikingly, this theory cannot only be attributed to events happened in Vietnam. Events in Afghanistan between 1979-1989 could equally serve as a theory‟s example. Yet, it must be emphasized this thesis does not demonstrate to what extent the term “the Soviet Union‟s Vietnam War‟‟ and the Quagmire-theory can be applied to the situation in Afghanistan and although both powers mutually participated in an indirect manner in each other‟s conflict this analysis nor focuses on this crosswise involvement which faltered Détente, a political policy conducted by the Americans and Russians in the 1960s to relax their mutual hostile relationship. This thesis simply 1 David Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire, (Mass Market Paperback, 1988), 7. Failure in Vietnam and Afghanistan 4 A comparative analysis of the U.S. and Soviet Interventions tries to explain why both superpowers failed to achieve their strategic objectives in Vietnam and Afghanistan using eight comparable aspects. Why is this interesting for the observer to know? First, this is the first time the role of both the United States and the Soviet Union in Vietnam and Afghanistan are compared in the same thesis which tries to answer why both powers failed to achieve their strategic objectives in a Third World country. Second, the analysis focuses on U.S. and Soviet political behavior in a Cold War conflict. Thus no reference or comparison is made to post-Cold War conflicts of both nations. Thirdly, a comparative method known as the Boolean method is added to the analysis to explain the failing outcome for both nations. Also a deeper examination of certain behavorial patterns can be helpful to understand certain decisions taken in the past and the impact they had on the developing course of the Vietnamese and Afghan conflict. For those with above average interest in these conflicts this analysis could also offer more insight in American and Soviet Cold War politics. What is the comparative method? The comparative method used for this analysis is derived from the account of Charles Ragin - The comparative method - Moving beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies.2 Most common for this method is the use of the Boolean method, a way to tally several variables that have affected the examined conflicts. The analyzed variables can be forged into a Boolean table. This table determines whether a variable attributes to the failure or not. The Boolean table directly shows the influential variables. To keep everything well-ordered only three digits are used. (1) = significant, (0,5) = important or influential, and (0) = non influential or unimportant. Though it is desirable to only use 1 and 0, this is rather too abstract because the analyzed variables may overlap and are all in some way responsible for the failure. Nonetheless, a distinction has been made between the variables, otherwise it would be impossible to distinguish the important from the non-important variables. 2 Charles C. Ragin, The Comparative Method –Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies, (University of California Press, 1987) Failure in Vietnam and Afghanistan 5 A comparative analysis of the U.S. and Soviet Interventions Example. Hypothetical Boolean table showing three causes of regime failure Country 1. Country 2. Similar variables A. Conflict between 0 1 older and younger military officers B. Death of a 1 1 Politics powerful dictator C. CIA dissatisfaction 0,5 0 with the regime Outcome Failure (F) Country 1. O = aBc Country 2. O = ABc When a letter is depicted as a capital letter this means the events attached to this letter were significant for the final outcome. When a letter is depicted as a small letter the events attached to this letter may have been influential, but not significant for the final outcome. The following equation can be derived from putting together the combination of both countries. A, has no significant influence on the final outcome as well as the equation. Because 1 is attributed to B for both countries, the latter can be considered as a present variable. 0,5 and 0 are attributed to C which means CIA dissatisfaction with the regime was an absent variable for both countries. Failure in Vietnam and Afghanistan 6 A comparative analysis of the U.S. and Soviet Interventions (1.) (2.) aBc + ABc Bc Present = B Absent = c As noticeable country 1. and 2. only have one similar present variable, B. Apparently the Death of a powerful dictator was a similar feature for both countries which caused a regime failure. Both countries also have one similar absent variable, c. Thus Bc is the final outcome of the combined equation. For both U.S. and Soviet behavorial patterns I have worked with evident comparable material, thus provable political or military decisions verified by secondary literature or scientific or journalistic articles. Furthermore, some statistical overviews and graphs include this thesis. The choice for this method is made due to its ability to structuralize behavioral patterns. The thesis is split into three parts. The first part consists of the analysis of the United States between 1954 and 1973. The U.S. part starts with an introduction and then explain how the Americans got involved in the Vietnam War. Subsequently the U.S. failure is examined by using the eight aspects. The American part ends with a conclusion and an overview of statistics. The second and Soviet part also starts with an introduction followed by an explanation why the Kremlin choose to intervene in Afghan politics between 1979 and 1989. The next section elaborates the eight aspects which were responsible for the Soviet failure in Afghanistan. Like the American part, the Soviet part ends with a conclusion and gives statistics at the end. The description of events in Vietnam comes first because they serve as a mirror for Soviet behavior prior and during its occupation of Afghanistan. The third and final part elaborates the conclusive comparative analysis based on the Boolean method. This thesis concentrates exclusively on U.S. and Soviet interests. Thus no extensive conflict-related attention is drawn to (South)Vietnamese or Afghan perspectives. Some observers may note U.S. comparison between “Vietnam” and “Iraq” would have been much easier to digest. In this case it could be very interesting to inquire whether Failure in Vietnam and Afghanistan 7 A comparative analysis of the U.S. and Soviet Interventions the United States learnt from its mistakes in the past (Vietnam) when it chose invading Iraq. Although this was a very tempting idea it would also impede the realization of a fair comparison. First because this thesis is about the Cold War and after 1989 the international situation changed radically. Another problem is that the Iraq conflict‟s outcome is yet unknown, thus not a suitable case to compare to the events in Vietnam.