The Letort Papers In the early 18th century, James Letort, an explorer and fur trader, was instrumental in opening up the Cumberland Valley to settlement. By 1752, there was a garrison on Letort Creek at what is today Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. In those days, Carlisle Barracks lay at the western edge of the American colonies. It was a bastion for the protection of settlers and a departure point for further exploration. Today, as was the case over two centuries ago, Carlisle Barracks, as the home of the U.S. Army War College, is a place of transition and transformation. In the same spirit of bold curiosity that compelled the men and women who, like Letort, settled the American west, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) presents The Letort Papers. This series allows SSI to publish papers, retrospectives, speeches, or essays of interest to the defense academic community which may not correspond with our mainstream policy-oriented publications. If you think you may have a subject amenable to publication in our Letort Paper series, or if you wish to comment on a particular paper, please contact Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II, Director of Research, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. The phone number is (717) 245-4058; e-mail address is [email protected]. We look forward to hearing from you. ENDGAME FOR THE WEST IN AFGHANISTAN? EXPLAINING THE DECLINE IN SUPPORT FOR THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN IN THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, FRANCE AND GERMANY Charles A. Miller June 2010 Visit our website for other free publication downloads http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ To rate this publication click here. The views expressed in this report are those of the au- thor and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified informa- tion, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent offi- cial U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This re- port is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sec- tions 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copy- righted. ***** Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. ***** The author would like to thank the following individuals who have helped with the Endgame for the West in Afghanistan: Professors Peter Feaver and Chris Gelpi of Duke University, Professor Janice Stein of the University of Toronto, and Professor Christopher Dandeker of King’s College, London. ***** All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications may be downloaded free of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of this report may also be obtained free of charge by placing an order on the SSI website. The SSI website address is: www. StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil. ***** The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the re- search of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newslet- ter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute. army.mil/newsletter/. ISBN 1-58487-447-3 ii FOREWORD This piece was mostly written over the summer of 2009, with some modifications designed to take into account the initial reaction to President Barack Obama’s announcement of a new strategy for Afghanistan in the winter of that year. However, more time will be required to gauge the true effect of the new strategy and the rhetorical campaign accompanying it. Readers should seek to use this work to investigate the linkages between various theories of public opinion and foreign policy with respect to the war in Afghanistan up to and including August 2009. DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. Director Strategic Studies Institute iii ABOUT THE AUTHOR CHARLES A. MILLER worked for a number of years in the business world in companies such as Coors Brewing Company and Barclays Wealth Management. In 2008 he joined the Political Science Department at Duke University as a Ph.D. student. Mr. Miller holds a B.A. in modern languages from the University of Cambridge and an M.A. in international relations from the University of Chicago. iv SUMMARY Domestic support for the war is often mentioned as one of the key battlegrounds of the Afghan conflict. A variety of explanations have been put forward in the media and in the political realm to explain why this war, which once commanded overwhelming popular support in almost all participating countries, is now opposed by a majority, even in the United States itself. Casualties, lack of equitable multilateral burden shar- ing, confused and shifting rationales on the part of the political leadership for the war and a “contagion” effect from the unpopularity of the Iraq war have all been cited at one time or another. This monograph contends that while most of these factors have played a role to some extent, the main reason why the Afghan war has lost support among the public of the main participating countries is the combination of mounting casualties along with the increasing perception that the effort on the ground is failing. This conclusion is drawn from in-depth case studies of the United States and five of its key allies— the United Kingdom (UK), France, Germany, Canada, and Australia. These countries include the top three troop contributing nations to the Allied effort in Af- ghanistan (the United States, the UK, and Germany), and the three who have suffered the heaviest casual- ties (the United States, the UK, and Canada). More- over, these nations vary greatly in terms of their pre- September 11, 2001 (9/11) relations with the United States, historical tradition of, and public tolerance to- wards the use of force overseas, level of commitment to the Afghan war, and rhetorical strategies chosen by their political leadership to justify the deployment v to their peoples. The fact that a common thread—do- mestic support falls as the course of the war deterio- rates—is still discernible is remarkable in light of the diversity of the cases studied. vi ENDGAME FOR THE WEST IN AFGHANISTAN? EXPLAINING THE DECLINE IN SUPPORT FOR THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN IN THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, FRANCE AND GERMANY INTRODUCTION In contrast to the war in Iraq, the war in Afghani- stan enjoyed widespread domestic U.S. and inter- national support. Widely perceived in the wake of September 11, 2001 (9/11) as a just and legal war to prevent future terrorist atrocities, the U.S.-led war had the active support of many allies from Europe and elsewhere. However, at the time of writing, this sup- port has dropped off dramatically among the public in all six countries under study. In the United States, support levels as high as 91 percent in early 20021 have declined to approximately 50-60 percent in 2008,2 with many polls showing a majority now opposed to the war.3 In the United Kingdom (UK), support fell from over 70 percent in early 2002 to just over 30 percent in the summer of 2008.4 In Canada, previous high sup- port levels of 60-70 percent5 have been transformed into a current support rate a little above 35 percent.6 In Australia, the war in Afghanistan, an electoral asset for John Howard’s Liberals in the 2001 election,7 now enjoys minority support of around 42 percent, accord- ing to the latest polls.8 In France, support fell from 67 percent shortly after 9/119 to a mere 34 percent10 by September 2008. Finally, Germany has seen a similar drop in support from a comfortable majority of 61 per- cent in favor of action11 to a small minority of 27 per- cent12 by December 2009. From a policy perspective, this drop in support is concerning. 1 As is outlined shortly, the main finding of this monograph is that, although other factors such as con- fusing and inconsistent rhetoric from political leaders have been important, the key driver of the fall in sup- port for the war in Afghanistan is a combination of casualties with an increasing perception that the war on the ground is being lost. If policymakers wish to halt this decline in public support, the single most im- portant thing they can do is to consistently articulate a clear and credible plan to achieve success in Afghani- stan. Other options, such as tightening the rhetorical justification for the war or inducing greater multilat- eral cooperation, may have some effect at the margins, but if publics do not believe the war can be won, then Afghanistan will be a lost cause in the court of public opinion. This monograph will address the reasons behind this universal fall in support by looking at each coun- try on a case-by-case basis. While it may be supposed that all of the countries in this monograph share cer- tain generic similarities as highly developed democ- racies, each public’s attitude is also presumed to be shaped by country-specific historical and cultural fac- tors, and by the differing experiences of their militar- ies in Afghanistan. Each country will form a separate case study. In turn, each case study will be prefaced with a short outline of the given country’s recent historical experi- ence with, and public attitudes towards the U.S. and towards the use of force overseas. Any assertion that a given country is “pacifist-inclined” or “pro-inter- ventionist” must be backed up by historical facts and hard data, because in some cases—for example France or Canada—many stereotypes, which are popular even among well-informed policymakers, turn out on closer inspection to be poorly founded. Along with 2 opinion polls on public attitudes both of the United States and of the use of force in international affairs, this short introductory section will include informa- tion on whether the country in question imposes par- liamentary caveats on its forces in Afghanistan. Un- fortunately, for secrecy reasons, we are not aware of the actual content of most of these caveats. However, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has made public information on which countries do and do not have caveats. This will be used, as it provides a good indication of a given country’s preexisting at- titudes to the use of force. In seeking to explain the fall in support in each case, the author draws on both the academic literature on casualty sensitivity developed from the study of public opinion in previous conflicts and on theories that are popular in policy circles and the news media with respect to Afghanistan. The remainder of this introductory section will outline these theories. Aca- demic theories are not important because they hold some kind of intrinsic, aesthetic value but because they provide policymakers with some guidance on where to look for the causes of an important phenomenon such as the decline in support for the war in Afghani- stan. Academic debates are ultimately important only in so far as they are capable of yielding actionable and accurate advice to policymakers. At the same time, the academic literature does have some advantages over the news media debate in its ability to clearly and rig- orously to spell out the mechanisms by which causes are linked to effects. With some news media-driven theories—such as the theory that the Afghanistan war has contracted illegitimacy from the war in Iraq—the precise way in which this process plays out in the minds of individual voters is somewhat nebulous. 3