Trustees of Princeton University Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies Author(s): Kenneth A. Oye Source: World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Oct., 1985), pp. 1-24 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010349 . Accessed: 20/09/2011 21:10 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Cambridge University Press and Trustees of Princeton University are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to World Politics. http://www.jstor.org EXPLAINING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY: Hypotheseasn d Strategies By KENNETH A. OYE* I. INTRODUCTION N ATIONS dwell in perpetuala narchy,f or no centrala uthority imposes limitso n the pursuito f sovereigni nterestsT. his common condition gives rise to diverse outcomes. Relations among states are marked by war and concert,a rms races and arms control,t rade wars and tarifft ruces,f inancial panics and rescues,c ompetitived evaluation and monetarys tabilization.A t times, the absence of centralized inter- national authorityp recludes attainmento f common goals. Because as states,t heyc annot cede ultimatec ontrolo ver theirc onduct to an supra- national sovereign, they cannot guarantee that they will adhere to their promises. The possibilityo f a breach of promise can impede co- operatione ven when cooperationw ould leave all bettero ff.Y et, at other times, states do realize common goals through cooperation under an- archy.D espite the absence of any ultimatei nternationala uthorityg, ov- ernmentso ften bind themselves to mutually advantageous courses of action. And, though no internationals overeigns tands ready to enforce the terms of agreement,s tates can realize common interestst hrough tacit cooperation,f ormalb ilateral and multilateraln egotiation,a nd the creation of internationalr egimes. The question is: If internationalr e- lations can approximateb oth a Hobbesian stateo f naturea nd a Lockean civil society,w hy does cooperation emerge in some cases and not in others?' The contributorst o this symposium address both explanatorya nd prescriptivea spects of this perennial question. First,w hat circumstances favor the emergenceo f cooperationu ndera narchy?G iven the lack of a * I am gratefulf or commentsb y JeffF rieden, Ralph Ginsberg,J oanneG owa, Stephen Krasner,D avid Lake, Timothy McKeown, Paul Quirk, ArthurS tein, and the other con- tributorst o this volume. The essays presentedh ere focus on nation-statesa s primarya ctors in world politics, treat national preferencesa s sovereign,a nd assume that any ultimatee scape from inter- nationala narchyi s unlikely.O ur focusi s on non-altruisticco operationa mong statesd welling in internationaal narchy. 2 WORLD POLITICS centrala uthorityto guaranteea dherencet o agreementsw, hat features of situationesn courageo r permits tatest o bind themselvetso mutually beneficiacl ourseso f action?W hat featureso f situationsp recludec o- operation?S econd,w hats trategiecsa n statesa doptt of ostert hee mergence of cooperatiobny a lteringth ec ircumstanctehse yc onfrontG?o vernments need not necessarilyac ceptc ircumstanceass given.T o whate xtenta re situationailm pedimenttso cooperationsu bjectt o willfulm odification? Throughw hath ighero rders trategiecsa n statesc reatet hep reconditions forc ooperation? The problemo f explaininga nd promotingin ternationaclo operation encompassems anyo ft hep rincipaql uestionsin thed isciplineosf p olitical economya nd securityst udies.H owever,d ivergentte rminologicaclo n- ventionsa nd substantivaep plicationhs ave impededt he comparisono f answers.I n the essaysp resentedh ere,a unifieda nalyticf ramework, derivedf rome lementaryg ame theorya nd microeconomichs,a s been superimposedo n cases in internationasle curityan d economica ffairs. This use of thea usterea bstractionosf g ame theoryan d microeconomics offerss everal advantages.2F irst,s uperficiald ifferenceos fteno bscure the parallelismo f questions,e xplanations,a nd prescriptionisn the two fields. By reducing concepts to fundamentals,t he use of elements of game theory and microeconomics permits ready identificationo f parallels. Second, intrinsicd ifferencesb etween the politicso f war and the politics of wealth and welfare may give rise to divergent explanations and prescriptionsA. unified analytic frameworkf acilitatese xplicit recogni- tion of differencesi n the extent and causes of, and prospects for, co- operation in securitya nd economic affairs.F inally, uneven intellectual developmentm ay give rise to divergente xplanationsa nd prescriptions. A unified analytic framework fosterst ransferenceo f useful concepts between the fields.3 In this introductorye ssay, I submit that three circumstantiald imen- sions serve both as proximatee xplanationso f cooperationa nd as targets 2 In this essay, I use elementaryg ame theoryi n a purely instrumentalf ashion. First, although some referencest o the formall iteraturea re provided,t he text does not furnish formalp roofso n the existenceo r location of equilibrium points in differentc ategorieso f games. As Thomas Schelling notes, the equilibrium solutions identifiedb y formal game theoristsm ay stabilizec onvergente xpectationsa mong mathematiciansb, ut unless equilibria can also be reached through" alternativel ess sophisticatedr outes,"s uch solutionsm ay have littlei nfluenceo n internationaol utcomes.S ee Schelling,T he Strategyo f Conflict( London: Oxford UniversityP ress, i963), II3-I4. Accordinglyt, he contributorsse archf or" alternative less sophisticatedr outes" to reach mutuallyb eneficiale quilibrium points and for simple strategiest o restructursei tuationst o create mutuallyb eneficiale quilibriump oints. 3 For an extendedd iscussiono f the uses and abuses of game theoryi n the empiricals tudy of internationalp olitics,s ee Duncan Snidal, "The Game Theoryo f InternationalP olitics," in this collection. EXPLAINING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 3 of longer-terms trategiest o promotec ooperation.E ach of the threem ajor sectionso f this piece definesa dimension,e xplains how that dimension accounts for the incidence of cooperationa nd conflicti n the absence of centralized authority,a nd examines associated strategiesf or enhancing the prospectsf or cooperation. In the section entitled "Payoff Structure: Mutual and Conflicting Preferences,"I discuss how payoffsa ffectt he prospectsf or cooperation and present strategiest o improve the prospectsf or cooperation by al- teringp ayoffsO. rthodox game theoristsi dentifyo ptimal strategiegs iven ordinally defined classes of games, and their familiar insightsp rovide the startingp oint for the discussion.4R ecent works in securitys tudies, institutionalm icroeconomics,a nd internationalp olitical economy sug- gest strategiest oa lterp ayoffs tructureasn d therebyim provet he prospects for cooperation.5 In the next section,e ntitled" Shadow of the Future: Single-playa nd Iterated Games," I discuss how the prospecto f continuingi nteraction affectst he likelihood of cooperation;6e xamine how strategieso f rec- iprocityc an provide directp aths to cooperativeo utcomes under iterated conditions;7a nd suggests trategiest o lengthent he shadow of the future.8 In addition,t hiss ections hows thatr ecognitiona nd controlc apabilities- the ability to distinguishb etween cooperation and defectionb y others 4For the definitivec lassificationo f ordinallyd efined games, see Anatol Rapoport and Melvin Guyer, "A Taxonomy of 2 X 2 Games," GeneralS ystemsii (i966), 203-I4. For an extended reinterpretatioonf crisis bargaining in light of payoffs tructuress, ee Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, ConflictA mongN ations: BargainingD, ecisionmakinga,n d System Structurein InternationaCl rises( Princeton:P rincetonU niversityP ress, I977). 5 For examples, see Robert Jervis," Cooperation under the SecurityD ilemma," World Politics3 0 (JanuaryI 978), i67-214; Oliver E. Williamson, "Credible Commitments:U sing Hostages to SupportE xchange,"A mericanE conomicR eview (Septemberi 983), 5I9-40; John Gerard Ruggie, "InternationalR egimes,T ransactions,a nd Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," in Stephen D. Krasner,e d., InternationaRl egimes( Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityP,r ess, i983). 6For orthodox game-theoretica nalyses of the importanceo f iteration,s ee R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa,G amesa nd Decisions( New York: Wiley, I957), Appendix 8, and David M. Kreps, Paul Milgram,J ohnR oberts,a nd RobertW ilson, "Rational Cooperation in Finitely-RepeatedP risoner's Dilemma," Journalo f Economic Theory2 7 (August i982, 245-52. For the resultso f laboratorye xperiments,s ee Robert Radlow, "An Experimental Study of Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game," Journalo f ConflictR esolution9 (Junei 965), 22I-27. On the importanceo f indefinitiet erationt o thee mergenceo f cooperation in business transactions,s ee Robert Telsor, "A Theory of Self-EnforcingA greements," Journalo f Business5 3 (Januaryi 980), 27-44. 7On how iteratedP risoners'D ilemmas environmentlsi terallys electf orT it-for-Tats trat- egies, see Robert Axelrod, The Evolutiono f Cooperation( New York: Basic Books, i984). For a formal statemento n the effectso f reciprocityo n equilibrium outcomes in iterated games, see Drew Fudenberg and Eric Maskin, "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting and with IncompleteI nformation,"E conometricaf, orthcoming. 8 On enhancing iterativenesst hroughd ecompositiono f payoffso ver time, see Schelling (fn. 2), 43-46, and Axelrod (fn. 7), I26-32. 4 WORLD POLITICS and to respondin kind-can affectth ep owero fr eciprocitayn, d suggests strategiest o improve recognitionc apabilities.9 In the thirds ection," Number of Players: Two-Person and N-Person Games," I explain why cooperationb ecomes more difficulats the number of actors increases; present strategiesf or promotingc ooperation in N- actor situations; and offers trategiesf or promotingc ooperation by re- ducing the number of actors necessary to the realization of common interests.G ame theoristsa nd oligopoly theoristsh ave long noted that cooperation becomes more difficulta s numbers increase, and their in- sightsp rovide a startingp oint for discussions Recent work in political economy focuseso n two strategiesf or promotingc ooperationi n thorny N-person situations:f unctionalista nalystso f regimes suggest strategies for increasing the likelihood and robustnesso f cooperationg iven large numbers of actors;" analystso f ad hoc bargaining in internationalp o- liticale conomys uggests trategieso f bilaterala nd regionald ecomposition to reducet he numbero f actorsn ecessaryt o the realizationo f some mutual interests,a t the expense of the magnitude of gains from cooperation.12 Each of the three circumstantiald imensionss erves both as an expla- nationo f cooperationa nd as a targeto f strategiest o promotec ooperation. The concluding section of this essay provides a roadmap to our efforts to test these preliminarye xplanations and strategies.B y applying this common analytic frameworkt o cases in economic and securitya ffairs and by searching for explicit parallels and differencesin the incidence, causes, and prospectsf or cooperation,t he authors hope to contributet o a deeper understandingo f internationalc ooperation. II. PAYOFF STRUCTURE: MUTUAL AND CONFLICTING PREFERENCES The structureo f payoffsi n a given round of play-the benefitso f mutual cooperation (CC) relative to mutual defection (DD) and the benefitso f unilateral defection( DC) relativet o unrequited cooperation (CD)-is fundamental to the analysis of cooperation. The argument 9Ibid., I39-4I- 10S ee Martin Shubik, Gamesf or Society,B usinessa nd War: TowardsA Theoryo f Gaming (New York: Elsevier, I975). For a formals tatemento n the importanceo f the number of playerst o cooperationi n iteratedg ames, see Fudenberg and Maskin (fn. 7). 11S ee Robert 0. Keohane, AfterH egemony:C ooperationan d Discordi n the WorldP olitical Economy( Princeton:P rincetonU niversityP ress, i984), and Krasner (fn. 5). See John A. C. Conybeare," InternationalO rganization and the Theory of Property 12 Rights,"I nternationaOl rganization3 4 (Summer i980), 307-34, and Kenneth A. Oye, "Belief Systems,B argaining,a nd Breakdown: InternationalP olitical Economy I929-I936," Ph.D. diss. (Harvard University,i9 83), chap. 3. EXPLAINING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 5 proceedsi n threes tages.F irst,h ow does payoffs tructuraef fectt he significancoef c ooperationM? oren arrowlyw, heni s cooperationd,e fined in termso f consciousp olicyc oordinationn,e cessaryt o the realization of mutuali nterestsS?e cond,h ow does payoffst ructuraef fectt he like- lihood and robustnesosf cooperation?T hird,t hroughw hat strategies can statesi ncreaset he long-termp rospectfs orc ooperationb y altering payoffst ructures? Beforet urningt o theseq uestionsc, onsiderb rieflyso met angiblea nd intangiblde eterminantosf payoffst ructureTs.h e securityan d political economyl iteratureesx aminet hee ffectosf militaryf orces tructuraen d doctrine,e conomic ideology,t he size of currencyr eserves,m acro- economicc ircumstancea,n d a hosto f otherf actorso n nationala ssess- mentso f nationali nterestsI.n "Cooperationu nder the SecurityD i- lemma," RobertJ ervish as explainedh ow the diffusiono f offensive militaryte chnologyan d strategiecsa n increaser ewardsf romd efection and therebyr educet hep rospectfs orc ooperationI.n "InternationaRl e- gimes,T ransactionsa,n d Chance:E mbeddedL iberalismin theP ostwar EconomicO rder,"J ohnR uggieh as demonstratehdo w thed iffusionof liberale conomici deas increasedt he perceivedb enefitosf mutuale co- nomic opennesso ver mutual closure( CC-DD), and diminishedt he perceivedr ewardsf roma symmetridce fectionr elativet o asymmetric cooperation(D C-CD). In "Firmsa nd TariffR egimeC hange,"T imothy McKeownh as shownh ow downturnisn theb usinessc yclea ltern ational tastesf orp rotectioann d therebyd ecreaset hep erceivedb enefitosf mu- tual opennessr elativet o mutual closurea nd increaset he perceived rewardso f asymmetridce fection.'3 In thep resents ymposiumid, eologicaal nd cognitived eterminantosf nationalp referenceasr e emphasizedi n StephenV an Evera's essayo n the originso f the First World War and KennethO ye's chaptero n monetaryco nflicdt uringt he 1930s. RobertJ ervis'ess sayo n the emer- genceo f concertf ollowingsy stemiwc arse lucidatesin ternationsatl ruc- turald eterminantosf payoffsJ. ohnC onybeare'sc omparativset udyo f tradew ars,K ennethO ye's studyo f monetaryco nflicitn the 1930S, and CharlesL ipson's studyo f bankers'd ilemmase xaminem acroeconomic determinantosf payoffs tructureG. eorge Downs, David Rocke, and RandolphS iversonin vestigatdeo mestics tructuradle terminantosf pay- offs tructurien theire ssayo n cooperationin armsr aces.P ayoffst ructure 3 See Jervis( fn. 5); Ruggie (fn. 5); Timothy J. McKeown, "Firms and Tariff Regime Change: Explaining the Demand for Protection,"W orldP olitics3 6 (January1 984), 215-33. On the effectso fa mbiguityo f preferenceos n the prospectso f cooperation,s ee the concluding sectionso f Jervis( fn. 5). 6 WORLD POLITICS serves as an interveningv ariable between cognitive,d omestic,a nd in- ternationals tructuralf actorsa nd internationalc ooperation. A. PAYOFF STRUCTURE AND COOPERATION How does payoffs tructured eterminet he significanceo f cooperation? More narrowly,w hen is cooperationd, efinedi n termso f conscious policy coordination,n ecessaryt o the realizationo f mutualb enefitsF? or a mutual benefitt o exist, actors must preferm utual cooperation (CC) to mutual defection( DD). For coordinationt o be necessaryto the realization of the mutual benefit,a ctors must preferu nilateral defection( DC) to unre- quited cooperation( CD). These preferenceo rderingsa re consistentw ith the familiar games of Prisoners' Dilemma, Stag Hunt, and Chicken. Indeed, these games have attracteda disproportionates hare of scholarly attentionp reciselyb ecause cooperation is desirable but not automatic. In these cases, the capacityo f statest o cooperate under anarchy,t o bind themselvest o mutuallyb eneficialc ourses of action withoutr esortt o any ultimatec entrala uthority,is vital to the realization of a common good. Many internationals ituationsd o not fall within this class of games. First, consider cases in which cooperation will not be necessaryt o the realization of mutual interests.I f actors preferu nrequited cooperation (CD) to unilateral defection (DC), no incentive to cheat exists. The pursuit of self-interestw, ithout regard to the action of others, will automaticallyl ead to mutual gains. For example, pure economic liber- als-more common on economics facultiest han in trade ministries- believe that unrequited openness is preferablet o unilateral protection. Irrespectiveo f the actions of others,a liberal believes that openness is best. In a world of pure liberals,p olicyc oordinationw ill not be necessary to the realization of openness. In such situations,w here interestsa re in full harmony,t he capacity of states to cooperate under anarchy is ir- relevantt o the realization of mutual benefits.'4 Second, consider cases where no mutual benefit can be realized through cooperation. If at least one actor prefersn ominal mutual de- fection( DD) to nominal mutual cooperation( CC), "policyc oordination" cannotl ead to mutual gain; the term" cooperation"b ecomes inapplicable. Symmetrica nd asymmetricg ames of Deadlock fall into this category. For example, if both the Soviet Union and the United States prefera rms racingt o arms control,c onflicti s inevitable.O r considera trade example: a believer in autarkyw ill preferm utual protectiont o mutual openness. To speak of cooperationb etween a pure liberala nd a believeri n autarky I4For an extended discussion of the distinctionb etween cooperationa nd harmony,s ee Keohane (fn. II), 5I-55. EXPLAINING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 7 is nonsense. Where harmonyp revails,c ooperationi s unnecessaryt o the realization of mutual interests.W here deadlocks exist, the term "co- operation" is devoid of meaning, and conflicti s inevitable. Neither harmony nor deadlock has attracteds ubstantiala ttentionf rom game theorists-preciselyb ecause cooperativea nd conflictualo utcomes follow so directlya nd simply from the payoffs tructure. What functiond o games of Harmony and Deadlock serve in this collection? In courses on diagnosis,m edical studentsa re taught," When you hear hoofbeats,t hinkh orse beforey ou thinkz ebra." Harrison Wag- ner has offereds imilar advice to analystso f internationalr elations.1H5 e warned that Stag Hunt, Chicken, and Prisoners' Dilemma are often inappropriatem odels of internationals ituations.W hen you observec on- flict,t hink Deadlock-the absence of mutual interest-before puzzling over why a mutual interestw as not realized. When you observe co- operation,t hinkH armony-the absence of gains fromd efection-before puzzling over how states were able to transcend the temptationso f defection.B y devotings ubstantiala ttentiont o the specificationo f payoff structurest, he contributorss eek to heed these warnings. In the class of games-including Prisoners'D ilemma, Stag Hunt, and Chicken-where cooperation is necessaryt o the realization of mutual benefits,h ow does payoffs tructurea ffectt he likelihood and robustness of cooperation in these situations? Cooperation will be less likely in Prisoners'D ilemma than in Stag Hunt or Chicken. To understandw hy, consider each of these games in conjunctionw ith the illustratives tories fromw hich they derive their names. PrisonersD' ilemma: Two prisonersa re suspected of a major crime. The authoritiesp ossess evidence to secure convictiono n only a minor charge. If neitherp risoner squeals, both will draw a light sentence on the minor charge (CC). If one prisoners queals and the others tonewalls, the rat will go free( DC) and the sucker will draw a veryh eavy sentence (CD). If both squeal, both will draw a moderate sentence (DD). Each prisoner'sp referenceo rderingi s: DC > CC > DD > CD. If thep risoners expect to "play" only one time,e ach prisonerw ill be bettero ffs quealing than stonewalling,n o matterw hat his partnerc hooses to do (DC > CC and DD > CD). The temptationo f the rat payoffa nd fearo f the sucker payoffw ill drive single-play Prisoners' Dilemmas toward mutual de- fection.U nfortunatelyi,f both prisonersa ct on this reasoning,t heyw ill draw a moderate sentenceo n the major charge,w hile cooperationc ould have led to a light sentenceo n the minor charge (CC > DD). In single- I5Wagner, "The Theory of Games and the Problem of InternationalC ooperation," AmericanP oliticalS cience Review 70 (June i983), 330-46. 8 WORLD POLITICS play Prisoners' Dilemmas, individuallyr ational actions produce a col- lectivelys uboptimal outcome. Stag Hunt: A group of hunters surround a stag. If all cooperate to trap the stag, all will eat well (CC). If one person defects to chase a passing rabbit,t he stag will escape. The defectorw ill eat lightly( DC) and none of the others will eat at all (CD). If all chase rabbits,a ll will have some chance of catching a rabbit and eating lightly( DD). Each hunter'sp referenceo rdering is: CC > DC > DD > CD. The mutual interesti n plentifulv enison (CC) relativet o all othero utcomes militates stronglya gainst defection.H owever, because a rabbiti n the hand (DC) is bettert han a stag in the bush (CD), cooperationw ill be assured only if each hunter believes that all hunters will cooperate. In single-play Stag Hunt, the temptationt o defectt o protecta gainst the defectiono f othersi s balanced by the strongu niversalp referencef ors tag over rabbit.'6 Chicken: Two drivers race down the centero f a road from opposite directions. If one swerves and the other does not, then the firstw ill suffert he stigma of being known as a chicken (CD) while the second will enjoy being known as a hero (DC). If neither swerves,b oth will sufferg rievouslyi n the ensuing collision (DD). If both swerve,d amage to the reputationo f each will be limited (CC). Each driver'sp reference orderingi s: DC > CC > CD > DD. If each believes thatt he otherw ill swerve, then each will be tempted to defect by continuingd own the centero f the road. Bettert o be a live hero than a live chicken. If both succumb to this temptation,h owever, defectionw ill result in collision. The fear that the other driver may not swerve decreases the appeal of continuing down the center of the road. In single-playC hicken, the temptationso f unilateral defectiona re balanced by fear of mutual de- fection.17 In games that are not repeated, only ordinally defined preferences matter.U nder single-playc onditions,i nterval-levepl ayoffsi n ordinally defined categories of games cannot (in theory)a ffectt he likelihood of cooperation.I n the illustrationsa bove, discussionso f dominants trategies i6 KennethW altz borrowedR ousseau's parableo f thes taghuntt o illustratet he infeasibility of realizing mutual interestsu nder internationaal narchy.R ousseau used the staghuntt o illustratet he possibilityo f cooperationd uring his firstp eriod of primatives ocial interde- pendence. He argued that individualsc ould cooperateo n "mutual undertakings"t o realize "presenta nd perceptiblei nterest"t hrough" some kind of freea ssociationt hat obligated no one and lasted only so long as the passing need that formed it." This essay returnst o Rousseau's use of the staghunt.S ee Waltz, Man, the State,a nd War (New York: Columbia UniversityP ress, 1959), and JeanJ acquesR ousseau: The Firsta nd Second Discourses,t rans. Roger D. and JudithR . Masters( New York: St. Martins,i 964), 165-67. I The illustrativep referenceo rderings strike most mature observersa s perverse: the driversn eed not place themselvesi n the game. EXPLAINING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 9 do not hingeo n the magnitudeo f differenceasm ongt he payoffsY. et the magnitudeo f differencebse tweenC C and DD and betweenD C and CD can be large or small,i f not preciselym easurablea, nd can increaseo r decrease.C hanges in the magnitudeo f differenceisn the value placed on outcomesc an influencet he prospectfs orc ooperation throught wo paths. First,c hangesi n the value attachedt o outcomesc an transformsi t- uations fromo ne ordinallyd efinedc lass of game into another.F or example,i n "Cooperationu ndert he SecurityD ilemma" RobertJ ervis describedh ow difficulPtr isonersD' ilemmasm aye volvei ntol ess chal- lengingS tag Hunts if theg ainsf romm utualc ooperation(C C) increase relativet o theg ainsf rome xploitatio(nD C). He relatedt hes tructuroef payoffst o traditionacl onceptso f offensivaen d defensived ominance, and offensivaen d defensived ominancet o technologicaaln d doctrinal shiftsE. rnstH aas, MaryP at Williamsa, nd Don Babai havee mphasized thei mportancoef c ognitivceo ngruencaes a determinanotf t echnological cooperationT. he diffusionof commonc onceptionos f the naturea nd effectos f technologyen hancedp erceivedg ains fromc ooperationa nd diminishedp erceivedg ains fromd efectiona,n d mayh ave transformed some PrisonersD' ilemmasi ntoH armony.'8 Second, under iteratedc onditions,t he magnitudeo f differences among payoffws ithina givenc lass of games can be an importandt e- terminanotf cooperationT. he mores ubstantiatlh eg ains fromm utual cooperation(C C-DD) and thel ess substantiatlh eg ainsf romu nilateral defection(D C-CD), theg reatert hel ikelihoodo fc ooperationIn. iterated situationst,h e magnitudeo f the differencbee tweenC C and DD and betweenD C and CD in presenta nd futurer oundso f playa ffecttsh e likelihoodo fc ooperationin thep resentT. his pointi s developeda t length in the sectiono n the shadowo f thef uture. B. STRATEGIES TO ALTER PAYOFF STRUCTURE If payoffst ructuraef fecttsh el ikelihoodo fc ooperationt,o whate xtent can statesa lters ituationbs y modifyinpga yoffs tructureas,n d thereby increaset hel ong-termli kelihoodo f cooperationM? anyo f thet angible and intangiblde eterminantosf payoffst ructured,i scusseda t theo utset of this section,a re subjectt o willfulm odificatiotnh roughu nilateral, bilaterala,n d multilateraslt rategieIsn. "Cooperationu ndert heS ecurity Dilemma," RobertJ ervish as offereds pecifics uggestionfs or altering payoffs tructuretsh roughu nilaterasl trategiesP.r ocuremenpto licyc an i8 Haas, Williams, and Babai, Scientistasn d WorldO rder:T he Useso f TechnicalK nowledge in InternationaOl rganization(sB erkeley:U niversityo f CaliforniaP ress, I977).