ARBITRATION UNDER THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR CONCERNING THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND RECIPROCAL PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS AND THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES (1976) PCA CASE N° 2012-5 1. I, the undersigned, Professor at the University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, former Chairman of the International Law Commission of the United Nations and Associate Member of the Institut de Droit International, have been asked to write a short expert opinion1 on the following question: 1. Does a dispute, within the usual meaning of the word in international law, presupposes in all cases a "positive opposition"? If yes, what is the precise meaning of this expression? 2. Can a dispute concerning the interpretation of a treaty be submitted to an international tribunal, absent any dispute on the application of the treaty? In particular, when a compromissory clause allows for arbitration of disputes “concerning the interpretation or application” of a treaty, may a tribunal exercise jurisdiction in circumstances where the dispute at issue concerns only the interpretation of the treaty and does not include an allegation that the respondent State breached the treaty? 3. The US are under an obligation to enter into consultation on the interpretation of the BIT (under Article V). If they refuse to do so, is there a dispute between the Parties? Can such a dispute be submitted to an interstate arbitration in application of Article VII? 4. In the circumstances presented here, is the Tribunal warranted in finding that a dispute exists between Ecuador and the United States regarding the interpretation of Article II (7) of the Treaty? In particular, does a dispute concerning the interpretation of a treaty satisfy the requirement of concreteness under international law notwithstanding the absence of an allegation that the treaty was breached?                                                              1 I have had to write the present opinion under very tight time constrains. However, it represents my sincere opinion, even though in some respects I have not been able to develop the reasons for my position with all the details I would have deemed useful. 2    In addition, I have been invited to express my views on any issues raised by Professor Reisman and Professor Tomuschat in their legal opinions joined to the Defendant’s Memorial on Objections to Jurisdiction, that I think should be addressed. 2. These questions have been asked in the context of the Arbitral Proceedings initiated by the Republic of Ecuador v. the United States of America concerning the encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 3. For the preparation of the present Opinion, I have been given: - the Diplomatic Note of the Republic of Ecuador, entitled ‘Misinterpretation of Article II (7) of the Treaty for Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, by the Arbitral Tribunal in the Case Chevron’, No. 13528-GM/2010, Quito, June 8, 2010; - the Request of the Republic of Ecuador to the United States of America pursuant to Article VII of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, June 28, 2011; - the Expert Opinion of Professor W. Michael Reisman, ‘Opinion with Respect to Jurisdiction in the Interstate Arbitration initiated by Ecuador against the United States’, April 24, 2012; - the Expert Opinion of Professor Christian Tomuschat, ‘The Construction of Article VII of the Bilateral Investment Treaty between the United States and Ecuador’, April 24, 2012; - the Memorial of Respondent United States of America on Objections to Jurisdiction, April 25, 2012; and - the Transcript of the Preparatory Hearing before the Tribunal, PCA Case No. 2012-5, March 21, 2012. 3    4. Although it is not easy to clearly appreciate the scope of the above questions, which partly overlap, I have come to the conclusion that it was convenient to answer them in the order in which they are asked, at the risk of some overlaps. I will include some specific remarks on Professors Reisman and Tomuschat’s legal opinions in each of the corresponding answers; however, I will abstain from expressing general academic and/or ideological views on the “dangers” they attribute to the Ecuadorean request on the “system” of protection of investments; from my point of view, these considerations tend to blur legal issues, rather than clarifying them. 1. Does a dispute, within the usual meaning of the word in international law, presupposes in all cases a "positive opposition"? If yes, what is the precise meaning of this expression? 5. In a celebrated dictum, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) defined a dispute as “a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two persons”.2 As rightly noted by Professor Tomuschat, “this proposition has continually been referred to also by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the successor of the PCIJ…”3 It can be added that it has become the standard-definition very commonly accepted by arbitral tribunals4, including in matters of investment5.                                                              2 PCIJ, Judgment, 30 August 1924, Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Great Britain), P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 11. 3 C. Tomuschat, Expert Opinion, 24 Apr 2010 (hereinafter C. Tomuschat), para. 6. See e.g. : ICJ, Judgment, 2 December 1963, Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 27 ; ICJ, Advisory Opinion, 26 April 1988, Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 27, para. 35 ; ICJ, Judgment, 30 juin 1995, East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), , I.C.J. Reports 1995, pp. 99-100, para 22 ; ICJ, Judgment, 10 February 2005, Certain Property (Liechtenstein v. Germany), Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 18, para. 24 ; ICJ, Judgment, 1 April 2011, Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 16, para. 30. 4 See e.g. : Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 4 August 2000, Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Australia and New Zealand v. Japan), RIIA, vol. XXIII, para. 44. 5 See e.g. : Preliminary Award, 27 November 1975, Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. Libyan Arab Republic, ILR, vol. 53, p. 389, para. 41; Siemens A.G. v. Argentina, ICSID No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 August 2004, para. 159; Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. and Luccghetti Peru S.A. v. Peru, ICSID No ARB/03/4, Award of 7 February 2005, para. 48; Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID, ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction of 25 January 2000, paras. 93-94; Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, ICSID ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction of 29 April 2004, at paras. 106-107; Impreglio v. Pakistan, ICSID ARB/03/3, Decision on Jurisdiction of 22 April 2005, at paras. 302-303; AES v. Argentina, ICSID ARB/02/17, Decision on Jurisdiction of 26 April 2005, at para. 43; El Paso Energy Intl. Co. v. Argentina, ICSID ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction of 27 April 2006, at para. 61; Pan American Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration Company v. Argentina, ICSID ARB/04/8, Decision on Preliminary Objections, 27 July 2006, paras. 76 and 80 ; 4    6. However, the distinguished author adds that: “in practice, the ICJ applies the term dispute more narrowly. … In particular, it has emphasized that the claim by one party must be positively opposed by the other.”6 And the Respondent’s Memorial on Objections to Jurisdiction makes a strong case of that supposed narrowing of the definition of the term dispute.7 However such an evolution is quite uncertain. 7. There can, indeed, be no doubt that a dispute can stem from a “positive opposition”. But this has never been considered as a pre-requisite for the existence of a dispute whether by the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) or by arbitral tribunals. As early as 1927, the PCIJ observed that: “‘In so far as concerns the word “dispute”, … according to the tenor of Article 60 of the Statute, the manifestation of the existence of the dispute in a specific manner, as for instance by diplomatic negotiations, is not required.”8 8. Moreover, the present Court made clear, in Georgia v. Russia, that the expression “positive opposition” must not be taken literally: “30. […] Whether there is a dispute in a given case is a matter for “objective determination” by the Court (Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 74). ‘It must be shown that the claim of one party is positively opposed by the other’ (South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 328). The Court’s determination must turn on an examination of the facts. The matter is one of substance, not of form. As the Court has recognized (for example, Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 315, para. 89), the existence of a dispute may be inferred from the failure of a                                                                                                                                                                                            M.C.I. Power Group L.C. and New Turbine, Inc. v. Ecuador, ICSID ARB/03/6, Award of 31 July 2007, para. 63 ; ATA Construction, Industrial And Trading Company v. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID ARB/08/2, Award, 18 May 2010, para. 99; AES v. Hungary, ICSID ARB/07/22, Award, 23 September 2010, para. 6.2 6 C. Tomuschat, citing ICJ, Judgment, 21 December 1962, South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 319, para. 328; ICJ, Judgment, 3 February 2006, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICJ. Reports 2006, p. 40, para. 90; ICJ, Judgment, 5 December 2011, Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 16, para. 30. 7 Cf. Memorial of Respondent United States of America on Objections to Jurisdiction, April 25, 2012, (hereinafter: Memorial), pp. 34-36. 8 PCIJ, Judgment, 16 December 1927, Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (The Chorzow Factory), P.C.I.J. Series A, N° 13, pp. 10-11. 5    State to respond to a claim in circumstances where a response is called for. While the existence of a dispute and the undertaking of negotiations are distinct as a matter of principle, the negotiations may help demonstrate the existence of the dispute and delineate its subject-matter.”9 9. The ICJ Advisory Opinion of 26 April 1988, on the Obligation to Arbitrate confirms that a “positive opposition”, in the strict sense of the word, is not required for ascertaining the existence of a dispute. In that case, the United States had passed legislation designed to lead to the closure of the PLO Mission to the United Nations, but had not actually taken action to close the Mission. The United States took the position that there was no dispute, since the legislation had not yet been implemented; also, pending litigation in the domestic courts, no other action to close the Mission would be taken.10 The ICJ dismissed the US argument: “The Court cannot accept such an argument. While the existence of a dispute does presuppose a claim arising out of the behavior of or a decision by one of the parties, it in no way requires that any contested decision must already have been carried into effect. What is more, a dispute may arise even if the party in question gives an assurance that no measure of execution will be taken until ordered by decision of the domestic courts. … [T]he Court is obliged to find that the opposing attitudes of the United Nations and the United States show the existence of a dispute between the two parties to the Headquarters Agreement.”11 10. Moreover, while, to my knowledge, the issue never expressly occurred before the ICJ, the principle according to which silence kept during a reasonable period of time amounts to a rejection a request is received in international law. Thus, the Conciliation Commission between France and Italy noted in its Decision n° 175 of 15 November 1954 that: “l’absence de réponse au fond, de la part du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, doit être retenue comme constituant une décision implicite de rejet et fait naître le litige soumis par la présente requête à la Commission de Conciliation.”12                                                              9 ICJ, Judgment, 1 April 2011, Application of the International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 16, para. 30 – italics added. 10 26 April 1988, on Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, I.C.J. Reports 1988, pp. 29-30, paras. 39-43. 11 Ibid., p. 30, paras. 42-43. 12 “The absence of response on the merits, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has to be regarded as constituting an implied rejection and is at the origin of the case submitted by this request to the Conciliation Commission” (my translation) (Commission de Conciliation franco-italienne, Déc. N° 175 du 15 novembre 1954 et N° 192 du 15 septembre 1955, Società Anonima Michelin Italiana, RIIA, vol. XIII, p. 615). See also: Commission de Conciliation franco-italienne, Déc. N° 108 du 15 septembre 1951, Société des explosifs et des 6    Similarly, in AAPL v. Sri Lanka, an ICSID Tribunal decided that: “The claim submitted on March 9, 1987, remained outstanding without reply for more than the three months period provided for in Article 8.(3) of the Bilateral Investment Treaty to reach an amicable settlement, and hence AAPL became entitled to institute the ICSID arbitration proceedings.”13 2. Can a dispute concerning the interpretation of a treaty be submitted to an international tribunal, absent any dispute on the application of the treaty? In particular, when a compromissory clause allows for arbitration of disputes “concerning the interpretation or application” of a treaty, may a tribunal exercise jurisdiction in circumstances where the dispute at issue concerns only the interpretation of the treaty and does not include an allegation that the respondent State breached the treaty? 11. The answer to this question is clearly given in the PCJI Judgment of 25 May 1926 in the case concerning Certain German interests in Polish Upper Silesia, a precedent on which the Memorial as well as Professors Reisman and Tomuschat’s Expert Opinions keep silence: “There are numerous clauses giving the Court compulsory jurisdiction in questions of the interpretation and application of a treaty, and these clauses, amongst which is included Article 23 of the Geneva Convention, appear also to cover interpretations unconnected with concrete cases of application. Moreover, there is no lack of clauses which refer solely to the interpretation of a treaty; for example, letter a of paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Court’s Statute. There seems to be no reason why States should not be able to ask the Court to give an abstract interpretation of a treaty; rather would it appear that is one of the most important functions which it can fulfill. It has, in fact, already had occasion to do so in Judgment No. 3.”14                                                                                                                                                                                            produits chimiques: “La demande doit être déclarée recevable. Elle a été précédée, en effet, non seulement par des pourparlers entre les parties intéressées, mais aussi par la présentation au Gouvernement italien de la note verbale du 17 juin 1949 du Gouvernement français. Aucune réponse n’ayant été donnée à cette note, le Gouvernement français était autorisé à croire, le 13 novembre 1949, que sa réclamation n’était pas admise et qu’il y avait dès lors différend; l’existence du différend a été confirmée d’ailleurs au cours de la procédure” (“The application must be declared admissible. It was preceded, indeed, not only by talks between the parties, but also by the presentation to the Italian Government of the verbale note of 17 June 1949 of the French Government. No reply having been given to the note, the French Government was entitled to believe, on November 13, 1949, that its claim was not accepted and there was therefore a dispute; the existence of the dispute has been confirmed moreover during the proceeduings.” - my translation) (RIIA, vol. XIII, p. 283). 13 Award, 27 June 1990, AAPL v. Sri Lanka, ICSID ARB/87/3, para. 3; see also: Award, 3 August 2004, Siemens AG v. Argentina, ICSID ARB/02/8, para. 159. 14 PCJI, Judgment, 25 May 1926, Certain German interests in Polish Upper Silesia, Merits, P.C.I.J. 1926, Series A, N° 7, p. 18. In its Judgment N° 3, the PCIJ, had to “determine the prescise meaning of the last sentence of the first sub-paragraph [French text] of paragraph 4 of the Annex to Section IV, Part IX” of the Treaty of Neuilly (PCIJ, Judgment, 12 September 1924, Treaty of Neuilly, Article 179, Annex, Paragraph 4, Interpretation, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 3, p. 5. 7    12. For its part, the present Court too15 was called to answer purely interpretive questions – for example in the case concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, where France, without allegation of treaty breaches, asked the Court to adjudge and declare: “That the privileges of the nationals of the United States of America in Morocco are only those which result from the text of Articles 20 and 21 of the Treaty of September 16th, 1836, and that since the most-favoured-nation clause contained in Article 24 of the said treaty can no longer be invoked by the United States in the present state of the international obligations of the Shereefian Empire, there is nothing to justify the granting to the nationals of the United States of preferential treatment which would be contrary to the provisions of the treaties; … That no treaty has conferred on the United States fiscal immunity for its nationals in Morocco, either directly or through the effect of the most-favoured-nation clause.”16 The Court had no difficulties in answering these questions and gave the requested interpretation. It agreed with France’s interpretation of MFN clauses and held that the US could not relied on them to expand its consular jurisdiction beyond the scope established in the 1836 Treaty and it also interpreted another Article of the General Act of Algeciras of 1906 following a counter-claim by the United States.17 13. More recently in its 2009 Judgment relating to Navigational and Related Rights on the San Juan River, the Court devoted the most important of the dispositif to settling general interpretative differences between the Parties, which I copy hereafter since it constitutes a clear illustration that interpretation of a treaty can be the subject matter of a dispute before a judicial or arbitral body: “THE COURT,                                                              15 Besides, the ICJ has also been seized of a number of requests in interpretation of its previous judgments (see: ICJ, Judgment, 27 November 1950, Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of November 20th 1950, in the Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), I.C.J. Reports 1950; ICJ, Judgment, 27 February 1998, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom and United States of America), I.C.J. Reports 1988; ICJ, Judgment, 10 December 1985, Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), I.C.J. Reports 1985; ICJ, Judgment, 25 March 1999, Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 11 June 1998 in the Case concerning the Land Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1999; ICJ, Judgment, 19 January 2009, Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), I.C.J. Reports 2009 – see also : (PCIJ, Judgment, 16 December 1927, Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (The Chorzow Factory), P.C.I.J. Serie A No 13). 16 ICJ, Judgment, 27 August 1952, Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France v. United States of America), I.C.J. Reports 1952, p. 179. 17 Ibid., pp. 212-213. 8    (1) As regards Costa Rica’s navigational rights on the San Juan River under the 1858 Treaty, in that part where navigation is common, (a) Unanimously, Finds that Costa Rica has the right of free navigation on the San Juan River for purpose of commerce; (b) Unanimously, Finds that the right of navigation for purposes of commerce enjoyed by Costa Rica includes the transport of passenger; (c) Unanimously, Finds that the right of navigation for purposes of commerce enjoyed by Costa Rica includes the transport of tourists; (d) By nine vote to five, Finds that persons travelling on the San Juan River on board Costa Rican vessels exercising Costat Rica’s right of free navigation are not required to obtain Nicaraguan visas; (e) Unanimously, Finds that persons travelling on the San Juan River on board Costa Rican vessels exercising Costat Rica’s right of free navigation are not required to purchase Nicaraguan tourist cards; (f) By thirteen votes to one, Finds that the inhabitants of the Costa Rican bank of the San Juan River have the right to navigate on the river between the riparian communities for the purposes of the essential needs of everyday life which require expeditious transportation; (g) By twelve vote to two, Finds that Costa Rica has the right of navigation of the San Juan River with official vessels used solely, in specific situations, to provide essential services for the inhabitants of the riparian areas where expeditious transportation is a condition for meeting the inhabitants’ requirements; (h) Unanimously, Finds that Costa Rica does not have the right of navigation on the San Juan River with vessels carrying out police functions; (i) Unanimously, 9    Finds that Costa Rica does not have the right of navigation on the San Juan River for the purposes of the exchange of personnel of the police border posts along the right bank of the river and of the re-supply of these posts, with official equipment, including service arms and ammunition; (2) As regards Nicaragua’s right to regulate navigation on the San Juan River, in that part where navigation is common, (a) Unanimously, Finds that Nicaragua has the right to require Costa Rican vessels and their passengers to stop at the first and last Nicaraguan post on their route along the San Juan River; (b) Unanimously, Finds that Nicaragua has the right to require persons travelling on the San Juan River to carry a passport or an identity document; (c) Unanimously, Finds that Nicaragua has the right to issue departure clearance certificates to Costa Rican vessels exercising Costa Rica’s right of free navigation but does not have the right to request the payment of a charge for the issuance of such certificates; (d) Unanimously, Finds that Nicaragua has the right to impose timetables for navigation on vessels navigating on the San Juan River; (e) Unanimously, Finds that Nicaragua has the right to require Costa Rican vessels fitted with masts or turrets to display the Nicaraguan flag; (3) As regards subsistence fishing, By thirteen votes to one, Finds that fishing by the inhabitants of the Costa Rican bank of the San Juan River for subsistence purposes from that bank is to be respected by Nicaragua as a customary right.”18 14. Moreover, it is far from unusual to call arbitration tribunals to decide disputes bearing exclusively on matters of interpretation. Thus:                                                              18 ICJ, Judgment, 13 July 2009, Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), I.C.J. Reports 2009, pp. 270-271, par. 156. See also: ICJ, Judgment, 25 September 1997, Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), I.C.J. Reports 1997, pp. 75-76, paras. 130-131 quoted below, para. 37. 10    - by their Special Agreement (Compromis d’arbitrage) of 22 November 1900, Italy and Peru instituted an arbitral tribunal in order to “mettre fin amiablement au différend qui a surgi entre eux au sujet de l’interprétation de l’Article 18 du Traité d’amitié et de commerce, en date du 23 décembre 1874, en vigueur entre les Pays... ”19 Consequently, “L’arbitre croit, en formulant le dispositif de son jugement, devoir s’en tenir strictement à la question litigieuse, conçue d’une manière abstraite ; mais il rend sa Sentence en ayant égard spécialement au cas concret, tout en reconnaissant que les Autorités judiciaires de l’État où l’exequatur est demandé seraient aussi compétentes …”20 ; - similarly, in 1951, in a case concerning the interpretation of Article 79, para. 6, letter C, of the Peace Treaty with Italy, the Conciliation Commission between France and Italy noted: “Le litige porte, en premier lieu, sur l’interprétation de l’article 79, par. 6 litt. c, du Traité, et plus spécialement sur l’interprétation de l’expression «autorisés à résider».”21 ; - and, more recently, in the case concerning the Question of the re-evaluation of the German mark, the Arbitral Tribunal constituted in accordance with the 1953 Agreement on German External Debt considered that: 9. The Applicant’s right to an authoritative interpretation of the clause in dispute … is grounded on the bedrock of the considerations which the Applicants gave and the concessions which they made in exchange for the disputed claude. They have a right to know what is the legal effect of the language used. The Tribunal in the exercise of its judicial functions is obliged to inform them.”22                                                              19 “resolve amicably the dispute which has arisen between them concerning the interpretation of Article 18 of the Friendship and Commerce Treaty, dated December 23, 1874, in force between the Countries” (my translation) (Arbitral Award, 19 September 1903, Interprétation de l’article 18 du Traité d’amitié et de commerce conclu entre l’Italie et le Pérou le 23 décembre 1874 (Italie c. Pérou), RIAA, vol. IX, p. 85). 20 “The arbitrator believes, that in formulating the dispositive part of his judgment, he must adhere strictly to the question at issue, designed in an abstract way; but he delivers his award by having special regard to the concrete case, while recognizing that the judicial authorities of the State where enforcement is sought would also be competent”(my translation) (ibid., p. 97). 21 “ The dispute concerns, first, the interpretation of Article 79, para. 6 litt. c, of the Treaty, and especially the interpretation of the phrase ‘permitted to reside’” (my translation) (Différend concernant l’Interprétation de l’article 79, par. 6, lettre C, du Traité de Paix (Biens italiens en Tunisie – Échange de lettres du 2 février 1951) – Décisions n° 136, p. 395. 22 , 16 May 1980, The Question whether the re-evaluation of the German Mark in 1961 and 1969 constitutes a case for application of the clause in article 2 (e) of Annex I A of the 1953 Agreement on German External Debts, RIAA, vol. XIX, p. 84.