The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies The George C. Marshall Center, a leading transatlantic defense educational institution, bilaterally supported by the U.S. and German governments, is dedicated to the creation of a more stable security environment by advancing democratic defense institutions and relationships; promoting active, peaceful engagement; and enhancing enduring partnerships among the nations of North America, Europe, and Eurasia. The Marshall Center Papers The Marshall Center Papersseek to further the legacy of the Center’s namesake, General George C. Marshall, by disseminating scholarly monographs that contribute to his ideal of ensuring that Europe and Eurasia are democratic, free, undivided, and at peace in the 21st Century. Papers selected for this series are meant to identify, discuss, and influence significant defense–related security issues. The Marshall Center Papers’ focus is on comparative and interdisciplinary topics to include international security and democratic defense management, civil military relations, strategy formulation, defense planning, arms control, peacekeeping, crisis management, and cooperative security. The Marshall Center Papersare authored by Marshall Center faculty and staff, Marshall Center alumni, or by individual, invited contributors. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the United States Department of Defense, the German Ministry of Defense, or the United States and German Governments. This report is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. We invite comments and ask that you address them to: International Address: U.S. Address: Director Director George C. Marshall Center George C. Marshall Center ECMC-CL-O-MCP ECMC-CL-O-MCP Gernackerstrasse 2 Unit 24502 82467 Garmisch-Partenkirchen APO AE 09053 Deutschland Address Changes and Requests for Copies of Marshall Center Papers:Please write to the above address, or TEL 49-(0)8821-750310, FAX 49-(0)8821-750688, or via the internet at [email protected]. ISBN 1-930831-00-5 Europe’s New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia By Peter van Ham Dr. Peter van Ham is a professor of West European Politics at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch–Partenkirchen, Germany. He recently published A Critical Approach to European Security (London: Pinter, 1999). A new book on European integration theory (European Integration and the Postmodern Condition) is forthcoming from Routledge (2001). Foreword The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies is proud to issue this inaugural edition of the Marshall Center Papers. Dr. Peter van Ham’s paper, “Europe’s New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia,” sets the tone for our new monograph series. The Marshall Center Papers are specifically created to disseminate scholarly monographs that explore and influence the resolution of Atlantic-European-Eurasian security issues. Dr. van Ham’s paper provides an articulate analysis of the most vital of current international defense issues: the future of cooperative security in Europe. The search for a European security identity periodically opens major debates that push policy makers in new, sometimes revolutionary directions. The war in Kosovo and the American-dominated air campaign have rekindled an old debate on the future of European defense capabilities. At issue is how to resolve the potential contradictions between a “Common European Security and Defense Policy” and the maintenance of a strong transatlantic alliance. At the same time, the European Union has set itself the remarkable task of rapidly absorbing the Western European Union and creating a European rapid reaction corps. Both the speed and the scope of these reforms are impressive. They may alter the strategic landscape quite fundamentally. The United States has officially endorsed the European goals, although warning against the three “D”s— Duplication, Decoupling, and Discrimination. Peter van Ham has devoted this study to exploring the impact of the Common European Security and Defense Policy upon NATO, the United States, and Russia. He laments the lack of frankness in recent debates and poses a number of sensitive questions. Will Russia turn hostile to European ambitions, as the European Union acquires military muscle? Will the United States have to accept the duplication of some NATO assets? Will the Central Europeans first suffer from discrimination (because few of them will soon join the European Union) and then worry about the decoupling of the Atlantic Alliance? His answers are provocative but scholarly, and his prediction of growing tensions in the Atlantic Alliance deserves a wide readership. Robert Kennedy, PhD Director George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies iii Executive Summary At the European Union’s Helsinki summit of December 1999, European leaders took a decisive step toward the development of a new Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) aimed at giving the European Union (EU) a stronger role in international affairs backed by a credible military force. At Helsinki, EU Member States committed themselves to a number of military “headline goals”: by the year 2003, the EU should be able to deploy up to 60,000 troops for so–called “Petersberg” (i.e., humanitarian, rescue, and peacekeeping) missions. This new EU–led rapid reaction force should be deployable within 60 days and be able to sustain deployment for at least one year. This Marshall Center Paper analyzes the processes leading to Helsinki by examining why and how this new European consensus on defense issues came about. It takes the pulse of the EU’s emerging defense policy and touches upon the main controversies and challenges that still lie ahead. What are the national interests and driving forces behind it, and what steps still need to be taken to realize Europe’s ambitions to achieve a workable European crisis management capability? Particular attention is paid to the implications of an emerging European defense capability for the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the transatlantic relationship, and the role of Russia in Europe. The paper argues that the political and strategic consequences of injecting defense issues into the structures of the EU remain unclear. Although Europe’s defense ambitions are not designed to undermine NATO, they do place into question NATO’s future role in the management of European security. Transatlantic tensions over the relationship between v the “New EU” (i.e., an EU with its own military capabilities) and NATO are already evident. The Kosovo air war of Spring 1999 was a turning point for Europeans, in that the war highlighted the superiority of American military resources and infrastructures. The war demonstrated that, despite years of talk and paperwork, Europeans were still unable to back up their economic and diplomatic prowess with military means. “Kosovo” made it painfully clear that Europe depends upon American military capabilities. It also accentuated the fact that US leadership in Europe is problematic and that Washington is unwilling to incur casualties in European conflicts where US national interests are not clearly at stake. The paper looks at three policy issues that remain unresolved and that are bound to cause transatlantic problems over the next few years. The first is how closely should the EU’s CESDP duplicate NATO’s existing capabilities and institutional structures? The second concerns how to “sequence” the decision making processes in case of wars or crises and in the real military challenges the EU is likely to face in the decade ahead. The third involves the impact of a new strategic balance within the Atlantic Alliance on Europe’s defense industrial base, and vice versa. However, the EU’s recent foray into things military has wider implications. For example, how will Moscow come to see the prospective enlargement of the EU in the direction of Central Europe—possibly including the Baltic states—when such an expansion would extend Europe’s “sphere of influence” toward the territory of the former Soviet Union? Will Russia alter its now rather positive attitude toward EU enlargement and adopt a more hostile approach when the EU takes on a more military guise? The general trend in governmental circles in Moscow is to welcome the EU’s vi military plans as a step to rid Europe of American hegemony and NATO–centrism. From this perspective, a European CESDP is looked upon as a means to preclude a unipolar world led by the United States. Not very surprisingly, this may also be one of the main reasons why many Central European countries are cautious about dealing with defense issues outside the well–known and tested NATO framework. Countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland fear that Europe’s defense plans may undermine the relevance of NATO. The EU’s new defense ambitions are also of concern to western allies outside the EU who are anxious to keep NATO as the ultimate center for the organization of European security. Although neither Russia nor Central Europe is part of the EU, their worries and concerns are going to have an impact on how Europe’s defense plans develop. Although Russia’s reactions to the EU’s new defense ambitions remain ambivalent, it is unlikely that its position will pose serious difficulties for the EU’s overall strategy to integrate Russia into Europe. The paper concludes that the EU’s new defense moves illustrate that EU Member States now consider the risk that a new European military force might undermine NATO is less significant than the threat posed by the status quo. Without a rebalanced transatlantic relationship, NATO would certainly fall into decay. However, if Europe’s CESDP is injudiciously managed, Europe may end up with the worst of both worlds: a weak EU and a weakened NATO. n vii Europe’s New Defense Ambitions Europe’s New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia Introduction1 At the European Union’s Helsinki summit on December 10–11, 1999, European leaders took a decisive step toward the development of a new Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) aimed at giving the European Union (EU) a stronger role in international affairs backed by credible military force. After many years of talking about a possible European Common Defense Policy (CDP), European governments finally defined the military dimension of their economic and political union. This remarkable expression of collective political will to build a European defense capability is a defining moment in the process of European integration, giving the EU for the first time since 1954—when the attempt to set up a European Defense Community (EDC) failed—a distinct military component. This paper analyzes the processes that led to Helsinki by examining why and how this new European consensus on defense issues came about. What are the national interests and driving forces behind it, and what steps still need to be taken to realize Europe’s ambitions to achieve a workable European crisis management capability? Obviously a lot needs to be done to provide the EU with a powerful military force capable of acting autonomously in and around Europe. Particular attention will be paid to the implications of an emerging European defense capability for the futures of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the transatlantic relationship, as well as its impact on the role of Russia in Europe. 1 Peter van Ham Although Europe’s defense ambitions are not designed to undermine NATO, the EU’s new plans do raise questions about the role NATO is to play in the management of European security in the decade to come. Transatlantic tensions over the relationship between the “New EU” (i.e., an EU with its own military capabilities) and NATO are already evident. NATO’s Secretary General Lord Robertson captured this unease well, by arguing that “[t]here has always been a bit of schizophrenia about America, on the one hand saying ‘You Europeans have got to carry more of the burden,’ and then when the Europeans say ‘OK, we’ll carry more of the burden,’ they say ‘Well, wait a minute, are you trying to tell us to go home?’”2 The transatlantic strain over the organization of European defense also testifies to significant differences in strategic vision, as well as in the practicalities of force planning and military capabilities. Whereas the United States has a global vision, the EU’s emerging defense strategy and military planning will focus almost entirely on the European region. This global/regional dichotomy is bound to increase US–EU tensions over security strategy. This, in turn, may exacerbate American concern over Europe’s latest defense ambitions. What is more, given the process of European integration, a distinct military character will alter the EU’s relationship with Russia. The EU has now initiated accession negotiations with the majority of Central European countries who want to join the European integration process primarily for economic and political reasons, and who still look to NATO as the principal source of their “hard” (i.e., military) security. But, how will Moscow come to see the prospective enlargement of the EU in the direction of Central Europe, possibly including the Baltic states, when such an expansion would extend Europe’s “sphere of influence” toward the territory of the former Soviet Union? Perhaps Russia will alter its now rather positive attitude 2 Europe’s New Defense Ambitions toward EU enlargement and adopt a more hostile approach when the EU takes on a more military guise? Europe’s recent foray into things military is also of concern to western allies outside the EU who are anxious to keep NATO as the ultimate center for the organization of European security. Although neither Russia nor Central Europe is part of the EU, their worries and concerns are going to have an impact on the further development of Europe’s new defense plans. This Marshall Center Paper takes the pulse of the EU’s emerging defense policy and touches upon the main controversies and challenges that still exist between good intentions and the creation of rapidly deployable expeditionary forces that would give Europe’s diplomacy a military backbone. The paper will argue that the implications of injecting defense issues into the structures of the EU remain unclear and that the practical organization of the CESDP will pose a serious challenge to both Europe and the United States to maintain NATO’s leading role in European security. Although Russia’s reactions remain ambivalent to the EU’s new defense ambitions, it is unlikely that its position will pose serious difficulties in the EU’s overall strategy to integrate Russia into Europe. The Road Toward a Common European Defense Policy Two events have stimulated European governments to rethink their commitment to define a common European defense policy and capability. The first took place in 1997 when the Labour government of Prime Minister Tony Blair, determined to demonstrate the United Kingdom’s central role in Europe, took the initiative on the restructuring of European defense cooperation. This was done in part to compensate for the United Kingdom’s self–chosen exclusion from other 3