Eugene N. Anderson \\·olfgt ug B. Kraus \ Gabriel A. Almond Fred D. Sumlerson Hans 1Ueyerhoff Vera 1''. Eliusberg Cluru lU.-nek Jft. S COMMUNIST expansionism pro ..t\1. gressively menaces a peaceful Euro pean settlement, concerned people. are look ing at Germany as ,the.last dike against the Red flood. The authors of this book assert that in spite ·of th~ Soviet-Western ~ension, the first duty of the Am~ican ~cc_,\1pation is still to make Germany into a~ working. democracy. But this objective must be won against two threats: the first, historic Ger man authoritarianism and nationalism; and the second, Communist infiltration and Soviet expansionism. The Struggle for Democracy in Germany emphasizes the twofold natur~ 'of the occu pation problem-the reconstruction of Ger man ideology and the rebuilding of sound institutional routines of living. Part I is con cerned with the uphill struggle of liberalism against traditional Junker authoritarianism, as exemplified in the Bismarck era, and the. fate of liberal tendencies under Nazi repres sion and terror. This includes a graphic ac count of the anti-Nazi underground before and during the war, culminating in the July 20, I 944 attempt on Hitler's life. Part U • discusses the most significant phases of' occupation policy=-economic, governmental, ·political, cultural, and psy chological-and their impact on the future · of Germany and its political potential. This involves problems . ranging· from the im provement of the housing situation and em ployment conditions to the execution of a program for denazification. These problems are placed in the context of the East-West struggle. Each of the seven contributors. to this volume is a specialist in the particular aspect of the German problem for which he as sumed responsibility. THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN GERMANY THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMO~RA~Y IN GERMANY Edited by GABRIEL A. ALMOND Eugene N. Anderson \\'o lfgang D. Kraus Gabriel A. Almond Fred D. Sanderson Dans Meyerhoff Vera F. EUasberg Clara lUenck 1949 The University of North Carolina Press CHAPEL DILL Copyright, 1!}4!}, by THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS Manufactured in the United States of America by THE WILLIAM BYRD PREss, INCORPORATED RICHMOND, VIRGINIA Preface JN THE FIRST MONTHS after the defeat of Germany it appeared, at least on the surface, that the primary criterion for the solution of the German question was the elimination of Germany's physical and psychological capacity to make war. This was the spirit of the Potsdam Agreement, concluded in the flush of victory, and in the mood of Allied amity which followed. Western opinion has ex perienced a profound disillusionment ~ the three years which have followed this era of sanguine expectations. Each phase of the peace settlement and each step in the program of bringing international politics within the framework of effective law and organization has been assimilated to the over-all struggle between East and West. The collapse of the Conference of Foreign Ministers at London in November, 1947 put an end to hopes that a peaceful and stable German settlement could be reached in the present state of inter national relations. Subsequent developments indicate that the divi sion of Germany has become a practical if not a juridical reality. The solution to the German question contemplated in the Pots dam accords and earlier agreements, rested on the expectation of a stable "concen of power'' in the postwar period. It was assumed that the German problem could be settled largely in its own terms that of destroying once and for all Germany's capacity to make war and laying the basis for a peaceful and democratic polity. Three years after Potsdam finds us subordinating these problems to the more urgent question of whether German power is to be included in the So.viet orbit or integrated with the surviving democratic strength of Western Europe. This shift in emphasis in the German question confronts us with a. very real danger. In the atmosphere of tension between the Soviet Union and the Western powers there is an obvious temptation to attempt to maximize anti-Soviet strength regardless of its character and consequences.- Thus, a reactionary and nationalist Western Germany would be more anti-Communist than a moderate demo- v Preface VI cratic one and might therefore seem more desirable from a security point of view. But the development of such a Western Germany would endanger the American interest in Europe in at least three ways: (I) such a. Germany might be provocatively hostile to the Soviet Union and might force the hand of American policy; ( 2) the emergence of a new German nationalism would create disunity in the Western camp by raising the spectre of German aggression and expansionism; ( 3) a reactionary and nationalist Western Germany would be opposed by a substantial proportion of the German popu lation and consequently would be vulnerable to Communist infiltra tion and Soviet propaganda. These considerations suggest that the general change in the inter national situation should not be permitted to suppress the original aims of the German occupation. Our primary concern ought still to be German "democratization." But it is necessary to face the threat to democracy in Germany on two fronts: (I) the threat of historic German authoritarianism and nationalism; ( 2) the threat of Communist infiltration and Soviet expansionism. To counteract this twofold threat the earlier primarily negative approach to the German problem has had to give way to a positive and constructive emphasis in which the key concept is "integra tion." If the larger part of German strength is to be employed _in the interest of the democratic and liberal world the postwar status of Germany and Germans will have to be revised. Perhaps the main objective of such a policy would be to give the Germans a sense of participation in the values and programs of the Western com munity of nations. The main problem of German politics is that most of the Germans, and particularly the youth, are "hold-outs." The present strength of the moderate Socialist and Christian parties is largely a surface manifestation. To the historic political indif ference of the German masses there has been added a widespread mood of bitterness and futility, a mood which deprives the existing party elites of any right to speak with full authority for Germany, and which provides extremists and authoritarians of a right or left coloration with the kind of spiritual vacuum which has always facilitated their success. Preface Vll The United States has a very real security interest in integrating that part of Germany which we can influence into the Western community of effort. This is not merely the economic question of utilizing German resources, equipment, and manpower in the European Recovery Program, although that is an important part of it. American policy should add social, cultural, and psychological reintegration, to its present economic emphasis. Two objectives are suggested here: ( 1) the elimination of the moral cordon sanitaire; and (z) the initiation of steps that will hasten the processes of social integration. In connection with the first objective, German representation in the various Western European organizations will constitute a symbolic modification of the pariah status to which postwar Germans have been con demned. Equally important, a substantial program of cultural inter change and exchange of personnel, might be undertaken on a collaborative basis between the interested Western powers. Such measures, if applied to university youth, and the emergent political, intellectual, and cultural elites, may go far toward "sparking" the regeneration of Western cultural and spiritual values in Germany. The second objective requires a broad set of means, ranging all the way from the improvement of the housing situation and employ ment conditions in order to make a satisfactory family life possible, to the rapid execution and termination of the program of denazifica tion. These and similar measures, which will have the effect of stabilizing and normalizing the institutional routines of living, may give content to the present "formal'' democracy of Western Ger many, and thereby give Western policy strong roots in a most critical area. The present book makes a contribution toward understanding the twofold nature of the German problem. Part I is concerned with the strength and composition of liberal and democratic tendencies in German history and with the extent of their survival in the anti Nazi resistance. This part of the book represents an effort to correct the erroneous history of the war period which placed Germany entirely outside the pale of Western historical and politico-moral development. It is suggested here that this policy was based on an Preface VIU exaggeration of historical trends, and that it is now the task of policy-makers .to discover and strengthen that part of the German heritage which inclines toward liberalism and democracy. Part II discusses the most significant phases of occupation policy-eco nomic, governmental, political, cultural, and psychological-and their impact on the future of Germany. Each functional problem is placed in the context of the East-West struggle, and the various issues are evaluated in terms of their implications for the outcome. A symposium always presents problems of consistency and coherence. The participants in this symposium in most cases had the advantage of having shared in common or related work during the war years, and of having discussed their general approach with one another as the project developed. While it is possible to speak, therefore, of a common approach to the German problem as under lying the various contributions, each writer has assumed respon sibility only for his own section. Those contributors now in government service wish to express their gratitude to the State Department for its clearance of their ~ontributions. Needless to say, the opinions expressed are those of the writers. The authors of the chapters on the German resistance wish to record their appreciation to the many officials of the Amer ican, British, and French military governments in Germany for the courtesy and helpfulness shown them in their studies of the German resistance. Special thanks are due Professor Waldemar Gurian of Notre Dame University for his .~houghtful reading and criticism of a part of the manuscript and Professor C. B. Robson of the University of North Carolina to whose original suggestion this book owes its inception and whose subsequent sponsorship brought the project to fruition. Contents L TilE DISTOBIC POY.ENTIAL Chapter Page FREEDOM AND AUTHORITARIANISM IN 1 GERMAN HISTORY 3 EuGENE N. ANDERSON, Professor of History, University of Nebraska z RESISTANCE AND REPRESSION UNDER THE NAZIS 33 WoLFGANG H. KRAus, George Washington University, and GABRIEL A. ALMoND, Research Associate, Institute of • International Studies, Yale University THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE GER- 3 MAN RESISTANCE . GABRIEL A. ALMoND and WoLFGANG H. KRAus D. OC(;IJPA TION POLICY GERMANY'S ECONOMIC SITUATION AND 4 PROSPECTS . 111 FRED H. SANDERSON, Chief, Western European Economic Branch, Division of Research for Europe, Department of State s THE RECONSTRUCTION OF GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 185 HANs MEYERHOFF, University of California at Los Angeles 6 POLITICAL PARTY DEVELOPMENTS u1 VERA F. ELIASBERG, Research Director, American Associa- tion for a Democratic Germany 7 THE PROBLEM OF REORIENTATION z81 CLARA MENCK, Die Neue Zeitung, U. ~ Zpne, Germany NOTES INDEX JH