Cadernos de Estudos Africanos 27 | 2014 Varia e Memória a Patrick Chabal EPRDF’s Nation-Building: Tinkering with convictions and pragmatism A EPRDF e a construção da nação: Ajustes nas convicções e pragmatismo Jean-Nicolas Bach Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/cea/1501 DOI: 10.4000/cea.1501 ISSN: 2182-7400 Publisher Centro de Estudos Internacionais Electronic reference Jean-Nicolas Bach, « EPRDF’s Nation-Building: Tinkering with convictions and pragmatism », Cadernos de Estudos Africanos [Online], 27 | 2014, Online since 17 June 2014, connection on 30 April 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/cea/1501 ; DOI : 10.4000/cea.1501 O trabalho Cadernos de Estudos Africanos está licenciado com uma Licença Creative Commons - Atribuição-NãoComercial-CompartilhaIgual 4.0 Internacional. Cadernos de Estudos Africanos (2014) 27, 103-126 © 2014 Centro de Estudos Internacionais do Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL) EPRDF’(cid:1120) Na(cid:1121)(cid:1110)(cid:1116)(cid:1115)-”(cid:1122)(cid:1110)(cid:1113)(cid:1105)(cid:1110)(cid:1115)(cid:1108): T(cid:1110)(cid:1115)(cid:1112)(cid:1106)(cid:1119)(cid:1110)(cid:1115)(cid:1108) (cid:1124)(cid:1110)(cid:1121)(cid:1109) (cid:1104)(cid:1116)(cid:1115)(cid:1123)(cid:1110)(cid:1104)(cid:1121)(cid:1110)(cid:1116)(cid:1115)(cid:1120) a(cid:1115)(cid:1105) (cid:1117)(cid:1119)a(cid:1108)(cid:1114)a(cid:1121)(cid:1110)(cid:1120)(cid:1114) Jean-Nicolas Bach Les Afriques dans le Monde Centre de recherches pluridisciplinaires et comparatistes 11 allée Ausone Domaine universitaire Institut d’études politiques, Bordeaux, France [email protected] 104 EPRDF’s nation-building: Tinkering convictions and pragmatism EPRDF’s nation-building: Tinkering with convictions and pragmatism1 The Ethio-Eritrean war (cid:507)(cid:343)(cid:351)(cid:351)(cid:350)-(cid:344)(cid:342)(cid:342)(cid:342)(cid:508) is often considered a turning point in the na- tionalist discourse of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the main cause of the reactivation of a strong Pan-Ethiopian nationalism (here taken as synonymous with Ethiopianness(cid:508), after the introduction of (cid:515)ethnic federalism(cid:516) in (cid:343)(cid:351)(cid:351)(cid:347). This paper argues that Pan-Ethiopian and (cid:515)ethnic(cid:516) nationalism coexisted in TPLF- EPRDF’s nationalism before the (cid:343)(cid:351)(cid:351)(cid:350)-(cid:344)(cid:342)(cid:342)(cid:342) war. “s a political and pragmatic tool to grasp and keep power, the (cid:515)multifaceted(cid:516) nationalism of the EPRDF was adapted and adjusted to new circumstances. This explains the ease with which Pan-Ethiopianism was reacti- vated and reinvented from (cid:343)(cid:351)(cid:351)(cid:350) onwards. In this process, the (cid:344)(cid:342)(cid:342)(cid:347) general elections and the rise of opposition groups defending a Pan-Ethiopian nationalism also represented an important inluence in EPRDF’s nationalist adjustment. Keywords: Ethiopia, Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), Ethiopianness, opposition A EPRDF e a construção da nação: Ajustes nas convicções e pragmatismo “ guerra Etiópia-Eritreia (cid:507)(cid:343)(cid:351)(cid:351)(cid:350)-(cid:344)(cid:342)(cid:342)(cid:342)(cid:508) é frequentemente considerada um ponto de viragem no discurso nacionalista da Frente Democrática Revolucionária do Povo Etíope (EPRDF) e a principal causa da reativação de um forte nacionalismo pan-etíope (conside- rado aqui como sinónimo de etiopianidade(cid:508), após a introdução do (cid:515)federalismo étnico(cid:516) em (cid:343)(cid:351)(cid:351)(cid:347). Este artigo argumenta que o nacionalismo pan-etíope e (cid:515)étnico(cid:516) coexistiram no nacionalismo da TPLF-EPRDF antes da guerra de (cid:343)(cid:351)(cid:351)(cid:350)-(cid:344)(cid:342)(cid:342)(cid:342). Como ferramenta política e pragmática para conquistar e manter o poder, o nacionalismo (cid:515)multifacetado(cid:516) da EPRDF foi adaptado e ajustado às novas circunstâncias. Isso explica a fácil reativação e reinven- ção do pan-etiopianismo a partir de (cid:343)(cid:351)(cid:351)(cid:350). Neste processo, as eleições gerais de (cid:344)(cid:342)(cid:342)(cid:347) e o surgimento de grupos de oposição que defendem um nacionalismo pan-etíope também representaram uma importante inluência no ajuste nacionalista da EPRDF. Palavras-chave: Etiópia, Frente de Libertação do Povo do Tigré (TPLF), Frente Democrática Revolucionária do Povo Etíope (EPRDF), etiopianidade, oposição Recebido (cid:343)(cid:350) de junho de (cid:344)(cid:342)(cid:343)(cid:345)(cid:498) “ceite (cid:349) de abril de (cid:344)(cid:342)(cid:343)(cid:346) 1 A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the VIIIth Congreso Ibérico de Estudios Africanos, Madrid, 15th of June 2011. I’m grateful to the panelists, Alexandra Magnólia Dias and Elsa González Aimé, to the partici- pants, to Ndubueze O. Nkume-Okorie and the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of the paper. Naturally, I bear responsibility for any remaining shortfall. Cadernos de Estudos “fricanos • janeiro-junho de (cid:344)(cid:342)(cid:343)(cid:346) • (cid:344)(cid:349), (cid:343)(cid:342)(cid:345)-(cid:343)(cid:344)(cid:348) Jean-Nicolas Bach 105 The fall of the military regime of the derg in May 1991 and the coming to pow- er of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)2, not only meant the military victory of the later, but also the imposition of a certain conception of Ethiopian statehood. As a “byproduct of the Ethiopian student movement” (ESM) (Gebru, 2009, p. 82) the TPLF had forged its nationalist discourse in terms of the “national oppression thesis”, derived from the Stalinist theory of nationalities, as opposed to other competing interpretations of Ethiopia’s imperial period, i.e. the “nation-building thesis” (defended by the Ethiopian Democratic Union, EDU), the “colonial the- sis” (notably defended by the Oromo Liberation Front), or the ”multinational Marxist thesis” (defended by other branches of the ESM like the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party, EPRP)3. The new 1995 constitution recognized the “Rights of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples” (NNPs)4, supported decentralization policies from which autonomous NNPs should beneit, while the new leadership violently condemned the preceding imperial and derg conceptions of Ethiopian nation- hood, as the following extract of EPRDF program clearly shows: The chauvinist ruling classes adhere to the principle of “Itiopiawinnet” (Ethiopianness) which kills identity based on nationality. So they do not follow the principle of forming a nation-wide organization through a union of nation- ality-based organizations. They aspire to form a dominant multi-nation organi- zation composed of individuals from various nationalities and ethnic organiza- tions that have betrayed the causes of their people and bowed to these chauvinists. Secessionists and narrow nationalist organizations do not want the fulilment of the peoples’ common interests. So, they, too, do not want to form a nation-wide organization together with other nationality-based organizations5. As Clapham notes, the EPRDF “(…) therefore conceived Ethiopia in terms very diferent from those of previous regimes(cid:516) (cid:507)Clapham, (cid:344)(cid:342)(cid:342)(cid:344)b, p. (cid:344)(cid:347)(cid:508). Imperial symbols and heroes were in fact denigrated and new ones were made founding myths. For instance, the imperial lag was presented as a mere (cid:515)piece of cloth(cid:516) 2 The EPRDF is a coalition formed under the auspice of the TPLF at the end of the (cid:343)(cid:351)(cid:350)(cid:342). It took its deinitive form at the beginning of the 1990s and comprises four political parties: the TPLF, the Amhara National Democratic Movement, the Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation and the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front. 3 See Merera (2003). On the origins of the TPLF, see Young (1997); and for the view of a former founding member of the Front, see Aregawi (2009). 4 Article 39 of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. The preceding derg regime had already started to organize a federal Ethiopian state under the Stalinist theory (creation of the Institute for Ethiopian Nationalities, and the national Shengo which oicially represented these nationalities according to the 1989 constitution). But in practice, the derg continued to defend a centralized, violent and unitary conception of the Ethiopian nationhood (Clapham, 1989; Dias, 2008, pp. 175-176). 5 EPRDF (1993). Our Revolutionary Democratic Goals and the Next Step (1985 EC). Ethiopian Register, June 1996. Cadernos de Estudos “fricanos • janeiro-junho de (cid:344)(cid:342)(cid:343)(cid:346) • (cid:344)(cid:349), (cid:343)(cid:342)(cid:345)-(cid:343)(cid:344)(cid:348) 106 EPRDF’s nation-building: Tinkering convictions and pragmatism and King of Kings Menilek II (r. 1889-1913), until then celebrated as a national hero and symbol of resistance against European colonialism, was condemned for his “genocidal campaigns” within its Ethiopian empire. The EPRDF thus revisited Ethiopian history from 1991 onward, considered the Aksum Empire as the his- torical core of Ethiopia and dated the modern Ethiopian state back to Menilek II’s conquests in the nineteenth century (Tronvoll, 2009, p. 58; Gascon, 2009; Clapham, 2002a). However, less than a decade later, the batle of “dwa (cid:507)(cid:343)(cid:350)(cid:351)(cid:348)(cid:508) was celebrated again as a national victory against colonialism, and giant pictures of the former emperors (including the derg’s leader Mengistu Haile Mariam) reappeared in Meskel Square, in Addis Ababa, at the occasion of the Festival of the Ethiopian Millennium (September 2007 - September 2008). The Festival celebrating “two thousand years of Ethiopian history” (according to the Ethiopian calendar) was also the occasion to give a tribute to the Ethiopian lag, since then presented as one of the strongest national symbols of Ethiopian “unity in diversity” and cel- ebrated every year (Bach, 2013)6. The 1998-2000 war which opposed Ethiopia and Eritrea is most often pre- sented as the decisive reason for this change in EPRDF’s nationalist discourse7. Ethiopianness8 would have been, since the war, surprisingly reactivated (Jacquin- Berdal & Plaut, 2005, p. 109). Logically and interestingly, the question raised by observers has revolved around (cid:515)how the war afected the EPRDF project of remak- ing the state along ethnic lines” (Dias, 2008, p. 208). Clearly, the 1998-2000 context of the war reactivated the resort to a national historiography inherited from the preceding regimes. On the one hand, as Tronvoll brilliantly demonstrated, “the discourses on identity in Ethiopia changed radically with the outbreak of the war. Suddenly, Ethiopianness rose like a phoenix from the revolutionary ashes, posi- tioning itself at the centre of the political discourse on identity” (Tronvoll, 2009, p. 58). And on the other, in the aftermath of war “the emphasis on diversity and decentralization (…) was increasingly substituted by the focus on unity and on a revived and more salient centralizing trend” (Dias, 2008, p. 208). Assefa Fisseha went even further in describing the EPRDF’s nationalist “shift” after the war, and 6 Since the irst Flag day in (cid:344)(cid:342)(cid:342)(cid:350), the national Ethiopian lag has been celebrated every year, on diferent dates. 7 On the war, its causes and its aftermaths, see among others Tekeste & Tronvoll (2000); Jacquin-Berdal & Plaut (2005); Dias (2008). 8 I shall deine Ethiopianness as a nationalist discourse based on a conception of the Ethiopian national identity as transcending people’s particular identities, inherited from the imperial times (Bureau, 1987) and aiming at legitimizing a “great” or “utopian Ethiopia” (Gascon, 1995). Cadernos de Estudos “fricanos • janeiro-junho de (cid:344)(cid:342)(cid:343)(cid:346) • (cid:344)(cid:349), (cid:343)(cid:342)(cid:345)-(cid:343)(cid:344)(cid:348) Jean-Nicolas Bach 107 more precisely after the 2001 split within the TPLF-EPRDF9, when he noted that “(…) the tone of discussion seems to have shifted toward the dangers of ‘narrow nationalism’ and the ‘manipulation of ethnic identity for parochial purposes’” (Assefa, 2006, p. 147). But this way of considering the pre-war and the post-war periods as coincid- ing with two radically diverging and opposing discourses (ethnic-based before the war, and Pan-Ethiopian after the war) of the EPRDF leadership seems ques- tionable when we focus on TPLF’s discourses before the war, and even before 1991. In fact, except a very initial period during which the Tigrayan Front claimed independence for Tigray (the famous 1976 Manifesto), the TPLF fast reoriented its claims for a unitary and democratic Ethiopia within which the “nationalities” would be freed from oppression (Gebru, 2009, p. 86), and harshly condemned “narrow nationalism” (EPRDF, 1993). Further, in the early 1990s, Ethiopianness appeared as second-zone identity but still compatible with “primordial” ones. In Meles Zenawi’s own terms: “Ethiopianness” was then considered “a right, not an obligation” (Meles Zenawi, 1994). And after the 1998-2000 war, the annual celebrations of NNPs (festival of the NNPs) have shown that Ethiopianness has not replaced “primordial” identities in EPRDF’s nationalism. Thus, the role played by the war must be tempered, for EPRDF’s centralized practice of power and the resilience of Ethiopianness in the early 1990s indicate that “ethnic federalism” was not such a radical turn as it could initially appear (Barnes & Osmond, 2005; Abbink, 2009). Beyond the formal discourses and ideo- logical views inherited from the ESM, “ethnic federalism” has to be considered above all as a concrete political strategy in order to deal with diversity within the country on the one hand, and to deal with – or exclude – political opponents on the other. In fact, the great challenge facing the EPRDF at the beginning of the 1990s consisted in transforming an inherited empire into a “new” state. That meant proposing a regime capable of absorbing the inherent tension of (empire or) state-building resulting from the simultaneous process of “integrating and diferentiating(cid:516) diferent groups (cid:507)”urbank & Cooper, (cid:344)(cid:342)(cid:342)(cid:350), p. (cid:346)(cid:351)(cid:349)(cid:508). The ques- tion raised by Burbank & Cooper is still very relevant in the Ethiopian case, in the imperial or current periods: “After the rapid expansion of the empire, how to build a lasting power?” (Burbank & Cooper, 2009, p. 15). Concerning politi- cal opponents, (cid:515)ethnic-federalism(cid:516) appeared to be an eicient way of excluding every group (and sometimes former enemies fought during the struggle, like 9 The war exacerbated internal tensions irst within the TPLF and then in the other parties of the coalition. Meles Zenawi eventually imposed his views and TPLF “strong nationalist” members were expelled (like Gebru Asrate, former president of Tigray Region). See Medhane & Young (2003). Cadernos de Estudos “fricanos • janeiro-junho de (cid:344)(cid:342)(cid:343)(cid:346) • (cid:344)(cid:349), (cid:343)(cid:342)(cid:345)-(cid:343)(cid:344)(cid:348) 108 EPRDF’s nation-building: Tinkering convictions and pragmatism EDU or EPRP former members) defending another conception of the Ethiopian nationhood or ethnic representation (Vaughan, 1994). Ethiopianness and ethnic- federalism shall not be considered incompatible nationalisms that would have replaced each other alternatively, but rather two levels of EPRDF’s nationalism whose articulations have been determined by speciic circumstances. Tronvoll argued that “Ethiopian nationalism today (…) comes in the plural” in the war aftermaths (Tronvoll, 2009, p. 207). Here, I would like to show that TPLF-EPRDF nationalism was already plural before the 1998-2000 war. ”ased on oicial sources (cid:507)TPLF-EPRDF discourses, interviews) collected dur- ing about twelve months of ieldwork conducted between (cid:344)(cid:342)(cid:342)(cid:349) and (cid:344)(cid:342)(cid:343)(cid:343), this article argues that a closer look at TPLF’s discourses and policies before and af- ter 1991 suggests that “ethnic federalism” did not fundamentally call into ques- tion Ethiopia’s unity even before the 1998-2000 war (except for the recognition of Eritrea’s independence in 1993). EPRDF leadership’s ideology has remained a lexible political tool for pragmatic and concrete control of the state, explaining why the resort to Ethiopianness and the myth of unity during the war was so eas- ily reappropriated by the Ethiopian leadership. Further, I shall argue that the rise of a Pan-Ethiopian discourse after the war and during the 2005 general elections among opposition groups also explains this nationalist “shift”, showing that op- position discourses also mater and inluence EPRDF’s discursive strategy. The article is organised into two parts, in order to distinguish two distinct peri- ods during which both a Pan-Ethiopian and a primordial conception of Ethiopian nationhood were articulated by TPLF-EPRDF. First, a focus on the struggle period against the derg and the beginning of the 1990s until the 1998-2000 war will show that the myth of Ethiopian unity was not rejected by the TPLF-EPRDF. The second shall demonstrate that not only the war but also the 2005 general election and its aftermaths played a very signiicant role in adjusting these two levels of national- ism, i.e. “primordial” nationalism and Ethiopianness. From rebellion to government: playing with a multifaceted nationalism (cid:507)1(cid:351)(cid:349)(cid:348)-1(cid:351)(cid:351)(cid:350)(cid:508) Following the fall of the derg regime and the coming of the TPLF/EPRDF to pow- er, one can observe that the nation-building strategy as elaborated by this front stressed the “primordial” belonging to “Nations, Nationalities and Peoples” as the basis of Ethiopians’ identity. Nevertheless, Ethiopianness soon reappeared in EPRDF’s discourses in the early 1990s. This multifaceted nationalism is to be explained by particular circumstances and also by the inheritance of a certain Cadernos de Estudos “fricanos • janeiro-junho de (cid:344)(cid:342)(cid:343)(cid:346) • (cid:344)(cid:349), (cid:343)(cid:342)(cid:345)-(cid:343)(cid:344)(cid:348) Jean-Nicolas Bach 109 perception of the state by the TPLF leadership, related to their ambition to reshape the Ethiopian state and nation, rather than destroying it. Rethinking Ethiopian nationhood: the inheritance of the “national oppression thesis” After the fall of Mengistu’s regime, the Ethiopian “nationalities” became the core of a renewed conception of the Ethiopian nation derived from the ”national oppression thesis” defended by the TPLF rebellion during the strug- gle (1970s-1980s). The TPLF leadership thus remained devoted to their interpre- tation of Ethiopian people and to their opposition against preceding regimes’ Ethiopianness considered the root cause of Ethiopia’s troubles. For instance, the batle of “dwa (cid:507)(cid:343) March (cid:343)(cid:350)(cid:351)(cid:348)(cid:508), symbolising the success of Ethiopia’s resistance against European colonisation, was still celebrated10. But its hero, emperor Menilek II, was not celebrated as a national hero anymore. Tribute was rather given to the Ethiopian “Nations, Nationalities and Peoples” (NNPs) who fought Italian claims, while Menilek was condemned for the “genocides” he commited against Ethiopian NNPs. An imperial hero in the former regimes, Menilek II appeared as a criminal, responsible for many massacres during his military campaigns towards the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th cen- turies. Oromo and Tigrayan martyrs were on the contrary celebrated as victims of these imperial expansions: the commemoration of the batle of Chelenqo (cid:507)(cid:343)(cid:350)(cid:350)(cid:349)(cid:508) which allowed Menilek to control the eastern commercial road to Harar gave tribute to “Oromo martyrs”. The “massacre of Annolee” during which, accord- ing to the new oicial sources, (cid:349)(cid:347) (cid:342)(cid:342)(cid:342) Oromo ighters were then said to have lost their lives11, was also commemorated every year from 1992 on, and the violent repression of Tigrayan uprising in 1943 (Weyane) by Haile Selassie’s regime after the Second World War were denounced for being “expansionist”, “violent” and “tyrannical”12. In fact, Haile Selassie’s and the derg regimes were both presented as imperial criminals, heirs of Menilek’s policies: 10 The batle occurred in the night and morning of the (cid:343)st of March, 1896. It opposed the Italian army and its locally recruited soldiers (askari) going south from their colony in Eritrea (about 10 000 men) to the huge Ethiopian impe- rial army led by Menilek II and its generals (Ras) coming from all the Ethiopian empire (about 100 000 men). The Italian army was eventually defeated. See Maimire (1997); McClellan (1996, p. 63); see also Getachew & Paulos (2005). 11 This number, as exaggerated as it appears, is quoted by Berhanu Legesse, “In memory of Oromos martyrs at Chelenko”, The Ethiopian Herald, 2nd April 1996. 12 Berhanu Legesse, “In memory of Oromos martyrs at Chelenko”, op. cit.; Getachew Kejela, “Annolee Martyrs Day commemorated”, The Ethiopian Herald, 7 January 1992. On the Weyane uprising, see Tareke (1996, pp. 89-124). Cadernos de Estudos “fricanos • janeiro-junho de (cid:344)(cid:342)(cid:343)(cid:346) • (cid:344)(cid:349), (cid:343)(cid:342)(cid:345)-(cid:343)(cid:344)(cid:348) 110 EPRDF’s nation-building: Tinkering convictions and pragmatism Menilek’s genocidal campaign against the Oromos has not so far been exposed since his successors (…) both the Haile Selassie and Derg regimes (…) sympathized with Menilek’s causes (…). Menilek took all inhuman measures to eliminate the Oromos from the face of the world13. At the occasion of a press conference given in September 1992, Meles Zenawi, then President of the Transitional government (1991-1995) and leader of the TPLF/ EPRDF, exposed his vision of the new Ethiopian nation which was to be built. He explained how the new government aimed at building a new Ethiopian identity (cid:515)from below(cid:516), which would emerge from (cid:515)irst(cid:516) and (cid:515)real(cid:516) identities of Ethiopian peoples, i.e. their “ethnic” belonging14. Meles Zenawi moreover stressed the fact that every Oromo, Tigrean or Kembata would consider himself irst as an Oromo, a Tigrean or a Kembata and only then as an Ethiopian. An Oromo would prefer being an Oromo rather than loose his identity: “People should be proud of their identity and ethnic identity” (…). “What incites disintegration is the view that we are all one”15. These recurrent discourses from the beginning of the 1990s represent a quite radical turning point compared to the previous regimes which used the Adwa victory in order to unify the Ethiopian people in a context of civil (against the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, and then the TPLF/EPRDF and ailiates(cid:508) and international wars (against Somalia at the beginning of the 1960s under Haile Selassie and later at the end of the 1970 under the derg). One can atribute this relative deconstruction of Ethiopianness by the new TPLF/EPRDF leadership and its reconstruction on the basis of NNPs to three main factors. First, the conception of the Ethiopian nation of the new leadership re- mained strongly inluenced by their ideological background, i.e. the “national op- pression thesis” inherited from the 1960s and 1970s (Merera, 2003). New regimes need renewed myths and mythologies in order to stress the contrast with past re- gimes and build their power and legitimacy16. It is about demarcating themselves from the previous fallen regimes against which they fought. Second, one can say 13 “Menilek’s genocidal campaign”, The Ethiopian Herald, 5 January 1992. 14 “President Meles Zenawi replies to questions posed by journalists”, The Ethiopian Herald, 23, 24, and 25 September (cid:343)(cid:351)(cid:351)(cid:344). These ideas were conirmed in an interview of Meles Zenawi by Donald Levine published the same month. See Levine (1992). 15 “President Meles Zenawi replies to questions posed by journalists”, The Ethiopian Herald, 23, 24, 25 September 1992. 16 The derg also defended the idea of “unity in diversity” and promoted, during the very last years of the regime, a federal reconiguration of Ethiopian state based on the recognition of the diferent nations. ”ut although it created the Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities in (cid:343)(cid:351)(cid:350)(cid:345) in order to list the diferent nationalities that had to be represented in the national Assembly (Shengo(cid:508) from (cid:343)(cid:351)(cid:350)(cid:349) on, the groups so identiied had no real power and the Shengo remained an appendix of the derg. As Clapham writes, in post-1991, “the Stalinist theory of nationalities had life only after death” (Clapham, 2002b, p. 25). Cadernos de Estudos “fricanos • janeiro-junho de (cid:344)(cid:342)(cid:343)(cid:346) • (cid:344)(cid:349), (cid:343)(cid:342)(cid:345)-(cid:343)(cid:344)(cid:348) Jean-Nicolas Bach 111 that TPLF/EPRDF’s leadership had to satisfy other national groups (Oromos, Afar, etc.(cid:508) with whom they had been ighting during the struggle and who were now expecting a reward for such alliances (autonomy, independence). Finally, the relatively peaceful regional context did not necessitate a broad Ethiopian mobili- sation against an “external” enemy. National “enemies” were at the moment just those who opposed such a deconstruction of Ethiopianness within Ethiopia17. In fact, this new strategy of state- and nation-building implied an ethnic interpre- tation of all Ethiopian conlicts, as the new leadership ideologically considered economic, social and political marginalization of NNPs (here synonymous of eth- nic, even if this term is barely used by the former guerrillas) as the main source of conlicts under previous regimes. For them, the eradication of any national “oppression” through “multinational federalism” and the rethinking of the no- tions of state and nation in terms of NNPs had to respect Ethiopian diversities and preserve the country from any future conlict18. (cid:515)Ethiopianness: a right, not an obligation(cid:516) (cid:507)Meles Zenawi, 1(cid:351)(cid:351)4(cid:508) But the idea of Ethiopianness, while strongly rejected in internal EPRDF papers, was not that radically condemned publicly, and even progressively increased again from the middle of the 1990s. In fact, it would be excessive to conclude from these irst observations that Ethiopianness purely and simply disappeared as from 1991 in EPRDF’s discourses. Indeed, the Ethiopia-scale national discourse was not totally abandoned at the beginning of the 1990s, although it then ap- peared like a “second class identity”, beyond the “Rights of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples”. It is also worth noting the ambiguity created by the coexistence of a dual identity after (cid:343)(cid:351)(cid:351)(cid:343): while the domestic citizenship was deined in terms of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, it had to coexist with a remaining interna- tional Ethiopian identity (Dias, 2008, pp. 144-152)19. During the transitional period (1991-1995), rather than a complete rejection of Ethiopianness, one could observe a complex articulation of these two conceptions of Ethiopian nation. While primordial identities got a legal and constitutional sta- tus (Transition Charter and then the Art. 39 of the 1995 Constitution), Ethiopianness 17 Opposing such a new vision of the Ethiopian nation and defending an Ethiopia-broad identity, the All-Amhara People’s Organization was thus tendentiously accused of sponsoring “war” and was erased from the political scene. 18 See “No alternative to peace and democracy”, The Ethiopian Herald, 21 January, 1992; and “President Meles briefs local, foreign journalists on current Ethiopia situation”, The Ethiopian Herald, 2 February 1993. On the consequences of such an externally deined and imposed identity in terms of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, see Abbink (1998). 19 For a stimulating development on the implications of such an ambiguous identity and the consequences of the 2003 Proclamation No. 378 on Ethiopian (and Eritrean) nationality after the 1998-2000 war, see Dias (2008), especially chapter 4. Cadernos de Estudos “fricanos • janeiro-junho de (cid:344)(cid:342)(cid:343)(cid:346) • (cid:344)(cid:349), (cid:343)(cid:342)(cid:345)-(cid:343)(cid:344)(cid:348)