Enemies in Agreement: Domestic Politics, Uncertainty, and Cooperation between Adversaries Citation Vaynman, Jane Eugenia. 2014. Enemies in Agreement: Domestic Politics, Uncertainty, and Cooperation between Adversaries. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University. Permanent link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13070027 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA Share Your Story The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Submit a story . Accessibility Enemies in Agreement: Domestic Politics, Uncertainty, and Cooperation between Adversaries A dissertation presented by Jane Eugenia Vaynman to The Department of Government in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of Political Science Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts July 2014 c 2014 – Jane Eugenia Vaynman � All rights reserved. Dissertation Advisor: Professor Beth Simmons Jane Eugenia Vaynman Enemies in Agreement: Domestic Politics, Uncertainty, and Cooperation between Adversaries Abstract Adversarial agreements, such as the nuclear weapons treaties, disarmament zones, or conventional weapons limitations, vary considerably in the information sharing provisions they include. This dissertation investigates why adversarial states sometimes choose to cooperate by creating restraining institutions, and how their choices for the form of that cooperation are constrained and motivated. I argue that uncertainties arising out of domestic political volatility, which includes leadership changes or public unrest, make arms control agreements more likely because these moments create the possibility of foreign policy change. When states consider one another as relatively cooperative, increasing uncertainty about the adversarys security incentives leads them to hedge and pursue low monitoring agreements instead of relying on informal cooper- ation. Conversely, under highly competitive conditions, increased uncertainty makes states more willing risk cooperation and form agreements with intrusive information provisions where no agreements were previously possible. Ishowsupportforthetheorythroughtestsusinganoriginaldatasetofalladversarial cooperation agreements (1816-2007) and their provisions. Controlling for other determinants of arms control, I show that both types of domestic political volatility contribute to a higher likelihood of an agreement. As expected, the e↵ect of volatility on types of information provisions is conditional on the prior relationship between the states. A detailed study of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (US-Soviet Union, 1987) traces how shifts created by Gorbachevs new leadership contributed to greater uncertainty among US policymakers iii about Soviet intentions, giving both sides the negotiating space to design an intrusively monitored treaty. I then demonstrate the generalizability of the theory across a wider range of cases by looking at the e↵ects of domestic volatility on agreement outcomes for adversaries experiencing dtente; for those engaged in post-conflict competition, and for asymmetric powers negotiating new weapons limitation. iv Contents 1 Adversarial Security Institutions in International Relations 1 1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2 Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.3 Between Security and Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 1.4 Explaining Agreement Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 1.5 The Approach in this Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 2 Treaties Under Uncertainty: A Theory of the Domestic Political Determi- nants of Agreement Design 45 2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 2.2 A Model of Treaty Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 2.3 Sources of Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 2.4 Alternative Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 3 Testing the E↵ects of Political Volatility: A Quantitative Analysis of Treaty Provisions 96 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 3.2 Hypothesis Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 3.3 New Data on Arms Control Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 3.4 Research Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 3.5 Hypothesis 3: E↵ects of Domestic Political Volatility on Treaty Signature . . 130 3.6 Hypotheses 1 and 2: E↵ects of Domestic Political Volatility on Information Provisions in Treaty Forms . . . . . . . . 133 3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 4 Soviet Leadership Change and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty 151 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 4.2 Case study analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 4.3 Early negotiations: 1981-1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 4.4 Domestic Political Volatility in the USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182 4.5 Late negotiations: 1985-1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 v 4.6 Considering the alternative explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235 5 Theory Applications: Uncertainty and Adversarial Cooperation in South Asia and the Middle East 242 5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242 5.2 Generalizability of the Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246 5.3 India, Pakistan, and the Lahore Declaration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249 5.4 Egypt, Israel, and the 1979 Peace Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270 5.5 A contemporary case: US-Iran negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285 5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302 6 Conclusion 306 6.1 Summarizing the Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306 6.2 Future Research on E↵ects of Arms Control Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312 6.3 Implications for Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316 6.4 Arms Control Without Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320 Appendices 322 A Appendix for Chapter 2 – Formal Theory 323 A.1 Appendix for Chapter 2: Formal Theory Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323 B Appendix for Chapter 3 – Quantitative Analysis 350 B.1 Appendix I – Control Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350 B.2 Appendix II – Full Statistical Results and Robustness Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357 Bibliography 368 vi List of Tables 2.1 Beliefs and Treaty Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 3.1 Number of Treaties by Information Provision Types (Detail) . . . . . . . . . 108 3.2 Treaties Information Provision Types and Members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 3.3 Percent of Observed Dyads by Treaty Type [Volatility] . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 3.4 Percent of Observed Dyads by Treaty Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 5.1 Theory predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247 B.1 Logit Results – E↵ects on Probability of a Treaty (odds ratios reported) . . . 359 B.2 Logit Results – E↵ects on Probability of a Treaty (odds ratios reported) . . . 360 B.3 GOLogit – Cabinet or Executive Change Top Down Volatility E↵ects on Probability of Treaty Types (generalized ordered logit, odds ratios reported) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362 B.4 GOLogit – Demonstrations, Riots or Strikes Bottom Up Volatility E↵ects on Probability of Treaty Types (generalized ordered logit, odds ratios reported) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363 B.5 MLogit – Cabinet or Executive Change Top Down Volatility E↵ects on Probability of Treaty Types (multinomial logit, relative risk ratios reported) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366 B.6 MLogit – Demonstrations, Riots or Strikes Bottom Up Volatility E↵ects on Probability of Treaty Types (multinomial logit, relative risk ratios reported) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367 vii List of Figures 1.1 Beliefs about State Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 2.1 Theory outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 2.2 Comparative Statics Plot – optimal monitoring selected . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 2.3 Comparative Statics Plot – minimal monitoring for an agreement . . . . . . 69 3.1 State Participants in Arms Control Treaties by Provision Type . . . . . . . . 110 3.2 Arms Control Treaties over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 3.3 Dependent Variable Treaty Coding, Dyadic View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 3.4 E↵ect Domestic Political Volatility Probability of a Treaty . . . . . . . . . . 132 3.5 E↵ects of Cabinet or Executive Change on Treaties (Gen. Ordered Logit) . . 142 3.6 E↵ects of Demonstrations, Riots and Strikes on Treaties (Gen. Ordered Logit)143 3.7 Percent Change in the Probability of a Treaty with Cabinet or Executive Change vs Stable Conditions (Gen. Ordered Logit) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 B.1 E↵ects of Cabinet or Executive Change on Treaty Types (Multinomial Logit) 364 B.2 E↵ects of Demonstrations, Riots and Strikes on Treaty Types (Multinomial Logit) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365 viii Acknowledgments Like any project that required many hours and many turns in the road, this disserta- tion would not have been possible without the support of people who have given me advice and inspiration. I am grateful for the thoughtful and multifaceted guidance of my advising committee. Beth Simmons inspired me to focus the project on the questions about which I was most curiousand Iam gratefulfor herencouragementtocross-pollinateideasandapproachesfrom international relations subfields. Scott Sagan has continuously challenged me to look for the puzzle in any research question, which has been a source of inspiration for me for more than a decade. Iain Johnston has broadened my thinking about security studies from both theory and regional perspectives and his creativity has motivated me to investigate questions from new directions. A number of other professors have helped me to make this project a blend of re- search approaches. Alex Montgomery was incredibly generous with his support of my work, discussing ideas and guiding me on methods and data. The dissertation has also benefited from discussions with Timothy Colton, Arthur Spirling, and Greg Koblentz. I am grateful to Frank Gavin for his commitment to promoting the work of young scholars; I have found tremendous support from him and the community he has built. My years in Cambridge would not have been the same without the encouragement and positivity of my friends, Andrea Tivig, Serene Hung, Didi Kuo, Shahrzad Sabet and Chika Ogawa. Our dinners were the moments to celebrate successes, the spaces to vent, and ultimately a place for real help on all the elements of life that make research and writing possible. Didi Kuo and Serene Hung also read multiple chapters of this dissertation and I am grateful for their comments and countless edits. Friends and colleagues have motivated new ideas for this project and helped me talk ix