Egypt after Mubarak PRINCETON STUDIES IN MUSLIM POLITICS DaleF.EickelmanandAugustusRichardNorton,Editors Egypt after Mubarak LIBERALISM, ISLAM, AND DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB WORLD Bruce K. Rutherford with a new introduction by the author PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON AND OXFORD Copyright©2008byPrincetonUniversityPress PublishedbyPrincetonUniversityPress,41WilliamStreet,Princeton,NewJersey08540 IntheUnitedKingdom:PrincetonUniversityPress,6OxfordStreet,Woodstock, OxfordshireOX201TW press.princeton.edu AllRightsReserved Sixth printing, and first paperback printing, with a new introduction by the author, 2013 Paperback ISBN 978-0-691-15804-4 The LibraryofCongresshas cataloged the cloth edition of this book as follows Rutherford,BruceK. EgyptafterMubarak:liberalism,Islam,anddemocracyintheArabworld/ BruceK.Rutherford. p. cm.—(PrincetonstudiesinMuslimpolitics) Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex. ISBN978-0-691-13665-3(hardcover:alk.paper) 1.Egypt—Politicsandgovernment—21stcentury—Forecasting. 2.Islamandpolitics—Egypt—Forecasting.3.Democracy—Egypt. 4.Liberalism—Egypt.5.Jam’iyatal-Ikhwanal-Muslimin(Egypt)— Politicalactivity.6.Lawyers—Egypt—Politicalactivity.7.Egypt— Economicpolicy.I.Title. JQ3881.R872008 320.962—dc22 2008019455 BritishLibraryCataloging-in-PublicationDataisavailable ThisbookhasbeencomposedinPostscriptGalliardTypeface Printedonacid-freepaper.∞ PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica 10 9 8 7 6 To the Memory of My Parents Contents Introduction to t he Paperback Edition ix Acknowledgments CHAPTERONE HybridRegimesandArabDemocracy 1 CHAPTERTWO LiberalConstitutionalism:PreservingandAdaptingEgypt’s LiberalTradition 32 CHAPTERTHREE IslamicConstitutionalism:ThePoliticalGoalsofModerateIslam 77 CHAPTERFOUR TheDeclineofStatismandtheConvergenceofPolitical Alternatives 131 CHAPTERFIVE EconomicRestructuringandtheRiseofMarketLiberalism 197 CHAPTERSIX Liberalism,Islam,andEgypt’sPoliticalFuture 231 Bibliography 261 Index 279 Introduction to the Paperback Edition When Egypt aftEr Mubarak appeared in 2008, the country seemed to have a stable authoritarian regime. The book argued that this stability was illusory and that the economic and ideological foundations of the statist order of Mubarak were eroding. However, it was unclear when or how a new order would emerge. The book speculated that change would unfold gradually rather than through dramatic transformation of the political and social systems. This prediction was both right and wrong. The rapid re- moval of Husni Mubarak after eighteen days of massive demonstrations was completely unexpected. However, the pace of reform has been far less rapid and less dramatic than participants in those demonstrations hoped. Change is under way in Egypt. But, its end is not clear and the road ahead is likely to be long and difficult.1 The Fall oF Pharaoh As Egypt after Mubarak discusses in chapters 4 and 5, Mubarak’s Egypt faced a fundamental contradiction. Since the 1960s, the regime had made a commitment to provide citizens with a wide range of services including jobs in the public sector and the civil service as well as substantial subsi- dies on food, electricity, gasoline, public transportation, education, and medical care. The regime’s legitimacy was grounded in providing these benefits. However, the economy simply did not generate sufficient wealth or state revenue to sustain these services, particularly as Egypt’s popula- tion grew dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s. The regime began to cut back in 1991 as part of a broad market-o riented reform plan. Mubarak and his international supporters hoped that a restructuring of the econ- omy to focus on market forces would generate economic growth, satisfy the public’s expectations of government, and revive the legitimacy of the regime. However, as explained below, these reforms were implemented imperfectly. The rate of job creation was inadequate and the gains from economic restructuring flowed mostly to a small elite. The privatization plan at the heart of the reform program was plagued by corruption in which state assets were sold at fire sale prices to businessmen with close ties to the regime. In addition, the country suffered from high rates of 1 I am grateful to Nathan Brown for comments on an earlier draft of this essay and to Mark Robson for excellent research assistance.