Research Brief NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE Results from the Congressionally Mandated Study of U.S. Combat and Tactical Wheeled Vehicles RAND ReseARch AReAs The process of research, development, and ChiLDREN AND FAMiLiES acquisition to procure military vehicles has Key findings: EDUCAtiON AND thE ARtS ENERgy AND ENviRONMENt historically been challenging for a variety • The analysis found no fundamental flaws  hEALth AND hEALth CARE of reasons. Sometimes, the difficulty lies in iNFRAStRUCtURE AND in the requirements development processes.  tRANSPORtAtiON translating the threat (such as an enemy antitank however, choices must be made and risk  iNtERNAtiONAL AFFAiRS guided missile) into a design criterion (such as LAW AND BUSiNESS accepted due to the impossibility of designing  a protection requirement of so many inches of NAtiONAL SECURity vehicles that are optimal for all future threats. POPULAtiON AND AgiNg armor plating). In other instances, problems have PUBLiC SAFEty included a mismatch between cost estimates and • There are four key technical challenges:   SCiENCE AND tEChNOLOgy actual costs, creeping or changing requirements, protection, electrical power generation, fuel  tERRORiSM AND hOMELAND SECURity unrecognized risks from immature technologies, cost and availability, and sensors, network- or overly ambitious designs. ing, and complexity. In Section 222 of the National Defense • The study identified several areas in which  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public business practices, processes, and policy  Law 111-84), Congress directed the Secretary of changes could enhance the acquisition  Defense to contract with an independent body process, including the cost of vehicle surviv- to assess activities for modernizing the technol- ability, cost-estimating procedures, and align- ogy of the ground combat vehicle and armored ment of modeling and simulation tools to  tactical wheeled vehicle fleets. RAND’s National support decisionmaking.  Defense Research Institute was asked to conduct the study and, specifically, to provide a detailed discussion of requirements and capability needs, identify capability gaps for vehicles, identify Requirements-Related Issues critical technology elements or integration risks The researchers found no fundamental flaws in this product is part of the associated with particular categories of vehicles the requirements development processes for the RAND Corporation research brief series. RAND research and specific missions, and recommend actions to vehicles considered. However, predicting future briefs present policy-oriented address the identified capability gaps. threats over the expected life spans of vehicles summaries of published, peer-reviewed documents. The research focused on a selected group now in production is very difficult, and choices of ground combat and tactical wheeled vehicles must be made and risk accepted due to the Corporate headquarters that are representative of different classes of impossibility of designing vehicles that are opti- 1776 Main Street P.O. Box 2138 vehicles (e.g., heavy truck, main battle tank) mal for all future threats. Santa Monica, California and that were at different stages of development. Inevitably, the U.S. Department of Defense 90407-2138 tEL 310.393.0411 These include the Army’s ground combat vehicle (DoD) will have vehicles in its fleets that were FAx 310.393.4818 (GCV); the joint light tactical vehicle (JLTV), designed and built for requirements that differ © RAND 2011 which is sponsored by the Army, Marine Corps, somewhat from those it will face in the future. This other services, and foreign partners; the Marine fact is driven by the wide spectrum of potential Corps’ expeditionary fighting vehicle (EFV) and threats and scenarios in the 21st century and the medium tactical vehicle replacement (MTVR); fundamentally different physics and engineer- and the Army’s Heavy Expanded Mobility Tacti- ing problems presented by these threats. There www.rand.org cal Truck (HEMTT). are constraints on the trade-offs (i.e., power Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2011 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2011 to 00-00-2011 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Results from the Congressionally Mandated Study of U.S. Combat and 5b. GRANT NUMBER Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Rand Corporation,National Defense Research Institute,1776 Main Street, REPORT NUMBER PO Box 2138,Santa Monica,CA,90407-2138 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 5 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 – 2 – versus protection versus performance) that can be made in The Funding Implications of the Survivability of Tac- developing vehicle requirements, which means that vehicles tical Wheeled Vehicles. As a result of current operations, are unlikely to deliver 100-percent performance against all tactical vehicles are acquiring more situational awareness and desired design criteria. protection capabilities; these trends mean more expensive The “iron triangle” of trade-offs is permanent. In par- vehicles in most fleets and, due to the large number of tacti- ticular, DoD will always want vehicles that provide better cal wheeled vehicles, much more expensive fleets. protection, have more power (electrical and mechanical), Stable Funding and Vehicle Requirements. Many and perform better or are more capable (in terms of weight, acquisition officials believe that funding instability and mobility, and so on). Investments in these areas will always creeping vehicle requirements are among the biggest threats be beneficial. to their programs. Thus, the vehicles resulting from this process may fail to Cost-Estimating Procedures. Among the officials inter- meet all requirements but may nevertheless be satisfactory. viewed for this research who commented on cost estimating, most believed that estimating life-cycle costs is superior to Technology-Related Issues estimating unit cost alone. In particular, there was general The analysis identified four classes of technical challenges that consensus among the acquisition personnel interviewed that currently affect—and for the foreseeable future will continue different acquisition decisions would be made and net life- to affect—the ability of the defense research, development, cycle costs reduced if cost estimates included life-cycle cost and acquisition communities to field cutting-edge vehicles that considerations. meet the operational requirements of fielded forces. Aligning the Proper Modeling and Simulation Protection. Improving protection will be a permanent (M&S) Tools to Support Decisions and Decisionmakers. task to which technology and engineering will need to con- M&S efforts need to be better aligned with the decisions tribute (along with tactics, unit designs, and other factors); they are meant to support and the information needs of the protection will never be “good enough.” officials who will make those decisions. This will require Electrical Power Generation. The advent of tactical continual adjustment of scenarios and vignettes, greater networks, computer-based battle command systems, and transparency in the modeling process, and improved deci- expectations of battle command on the move, situational sionmaker understanding of the choice of M&S tools. awareness, and various protection devices drive demand for Acquisition Category (ACAT) Decisions That electrical power upward. Vehicles must be able not only to Emphasize Risk Rather Than Just Cost. Risk should be provide the electricity but also to accommodate the space, the dominant factor in ACAT decisions. Risk is not currently weight, and cooling requirements associated with additional explicitly considered, except to the extent that cost is used equipment. as a proxy for risk. As a result, mature, well-understood, but Fuels and Fuel Consumption. Fuel cost and availabil- expensive programs contemplating changes and modifica- ity are major factors in ongoing and possible future opera- tions that pose little risk are nevertheless subjected to strin- tions. Future conflicts could pose even more challenges with gent requirements meant to manage risk. respect to fuel, such as if U.S. forces were unable to secure Adequately Resourcing Programs from the Beginning. enough fuel from international supply routes, forcing them to The consensus among the experts interviewed in this study depend on local fuels. emphasized the need to ensure that programs are appropriately Sensors, Networking, and Complexity. Sensors and resourced from the outset. Doing so is challenging but is also networking contribute to vehicle complexity. Complexity particularly important for large, complex programs. adds a greater chance of schedule slippage and cost growth More Fully Integrated Test and Evaluation. A number for the vehicles currently under development than was the of experts interviewed for this research noted that indepen- case with their simpler predecessors. Complexity cannot be dent tests and evaluations sometimes led to new performance done away with, so it must be well managed. requirements for vehicles at the end of a system’s develop- ment, potentially causing delays in final certification for the Acquisition Policy and Business Process–Related vehicle and adding to program cost and schedule slippage. Issues The study identified seven areas in which business practices, Trends processes, and policy changes could significantly enhance the Equipping the armed services with ground combat and tacti- military services’ ability to field vehicles that are appropriate cal wheeled vehicles will remain a challenging endeavor. This for the anticipated operating circumstances. research identifies both positive and negative trends. – 3 – Positive Trends. The preference among program manag- Congress should consider requiring DoD to present the stra- ers for relatively mature technologies at the beginning of a tegic rationale for vehicle fleet development choices fleet wide, as program’s technology development phase is clearly positive. well as explain how each proposed vehicle fits within this ratio- Another positive development is the services’ appreciation of nale. DoD leadership should clearly articulate what rationale systems engineering expertise (e.g., both the Army and the it is using in vehicle fleet development (e.g., optimizing Marine Corps have renewed their efforts to improve manage- vehicles against a specific threat, as in the Cold War, or ment practices and risk management). A third positive sign lies creating vehicles that are adequate for a spectrum of threats). in the responsiveness of the research, development, and acqui- Given the joint nature of conflict, this rationale should be sition communities, which have shown an improved ability considered by, if not standard across, each armed service. to produce needed vehicles in a hurry and have demonstrated In its oversight role, Congress should consider taking steps to responsiveness to addressing urgent operational needs. ensure that defense programs addressing each of the key techni- Negative Trends. New vehicles will almost certainly be cal challenges (i.e., improved protection, power generation, fuel significantly more expensive than the ones they replace. If consumption, and sensors and networking) are adequate. These necessity continues to drive tactical wheeled vehicle require- are classes of problems that affect almost every vehicle (and ments closer to those of their combat vehicle cousins, that will many other systems) that DoD fields. Congress should con- surely afford crews greater protection and situational aware- sider making all four of these areas focal points of its interac- ness, but it will also increase complexity and cost growth. tions with DoD on research and development, new systems, Also, there is the persistent vulnerability of the vehicle fleets and modifications to existing systems. to adaptive threats. Technology-based solutions to mitigate Congress should consider a range of actions to address acqui- vulnerability are expensive, whereas the enemy’s countermea- sition policy and business process–related issues. Some of these sures are relatively cheap. It is impossible to protect the vehicle challenges can be addressed—and may be in the process of fleets from all threats solely with onboard armor, situational being addressed or readdressed—by DoD (e.g., how cost awareness, and active protection systems; solutions will require estimation is done; how programs are staffed and supported consideration of how forces cooperate on the battlefield. for success; how modeling, testing, and evaluation are done). Uncertain Trends. The potential of robotics and Some may require congressional action in the form of guid- autonomous systems, on its face, seems significant, but until ance, changes to laws, or clarification of congressional intent the services advance these technologies and develop concepts with a focus on regulations (e.g., adopting ACAT decision for their application in roles that would reduce the threat to practices that more realistically address risk rather than using ground combat and tactical wheeled vehicles, their future cost as a proxy for risk). And some, if not all, have cost impli- utility remains unclear. The effects of the network on vehicles cations that Congress should factor into the way it oversees are another question mark. The key question is whether on- vehicle fleet development (e.g., the rising costs of tactical and off-vehicle capabilities can be integrated so that com- wheeled vehicles). In all seven cases considered in the study, munication, situational awareness, protection, and power- Congress may decide that the changes required to make generation requirements can be reduced without significant progress will demand that it play some role. Furthermore, in increases in complexity and cost. all seven cases, Congress should consider asking for updates and challenging DoD to make or recommend changes. What Congress Can Do Finally, a more comprehensive M&S capability—and lead- The study identified a number of strategic, technical, and ers who are empowered to use it well—will be essential tools in business practice and process considerations that affect everything from establishing future requirements to research and DoD’s ability to field ground combat and tactical wheeled development to engineering, program design, and manufactur- vehicle fleets that meet the country’s needs. Some take the ing. DoD and the services should consider improvements to form of things that Congress should pay attention to or do, their already substantial capabilities along the lines presented whereas others frame and in some cases constrain DoD’s in the study, which will require support and guidance from ability to field these vehicle fleets. Congress. ■ This research brief describes work done for the RAND National Defense Research Institute documented in The U.S. Combat and Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Fleets: Issues and Suggestions for Congress, by Terrence K. Kelly, John E. Peters, Eric Landree, Louis R. Moore, Randall Steeb, and Aaron Martin, MG-1093-OSD (available from http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1093.html), 2011, 180 pp., $24, ISBN: 978-0-8330-5173-8. This research brief was written by Kristin Leuschner. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. 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