Environmental Threats to Security, Stability, and U.S. Interests in Southern Africa: Opportunity Knocks – Time for a Comprehensive Region Defense Environmental International Cooperation and Environmental Security Assistance Strategy* Christopher Jasparro, Ph.D.† 2009 Significant strides have been made in much of southern Africa in terms of economic development, conflict resolution, and political development and democratization. „Traditional‟ security challenges in the region are largely on the wane but, environmental trends and stresses which significantly threaten human security and state stability in the region could slow or undermine the area‟s progress. Environ mental security threats in the region overlap with U.S. regional and global security interests including: terrorism and violent extremism, epidemic and pandemic disease, climate change, and transnational organized crime. An organizing strategic construct, agreeable to regional countries, around which security cooperation can be conceptualized and military to military relations build has been lacking. Environmental security provides such a rubric and offers tremendous opportunities for the United States and its regional partners. Defense Environmental International Cooperation (DEIC) and other environmental related security assistance can significantly enhance regional security and further U.S. regional strategic ends. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S Africa Command (AFRICOM) should devise, implement, and fund a regional DEIC and environmental security assistance strategy that integrates with and supports broader U.S., regional, and international environmental efforts. Such as strategy should be centered upon three pillars: 1. Geography (anchor state and ink spot approach) 2. Environmental Crime and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HADR) 3. Sustainability Introduction Southern Africa is a critical and strategically important region to the U.S. However, southern Africa1 is at a crossroads. Significant strides have been made in much of the region in terms of economic and political development, governance, and security. The region (as a whole as well as individual countries such as Botswana) is frequently held up as an example of good news and hope from a continent usually portrayed as the world‟s most benighted. Nevertheless southern Africa still faces formidable challenges including water scarcity, loss of biodiversity, land degradation, environmental crime, natural disasters, and climate change that could undermine, if not reverse, future progress, stability, and security. * Funding for fieldwork in southern Africa (Botswana) was provided by a grant from the U.S. Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). † The views and opinions presented in this report are those of the author and do not represent those of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, or Naval War College. 1 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2009 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2009 to 00-00-2009 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Environmental Threats to Security, Stability, and U.S. Interests in Southern Africa: Opportunitiy Knocks - Time for a Comprehensive 5b. GRANT NUMBER Region Defense Environmental International Cooperation and Environmental Security Assistance Strategy 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION U.S. Air Force Academy,Institute for National Security REPORT NUMBER Studies,USAFA,CO,80840 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 29 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 Such environmental challenges threaten U.S. and southern African goals and interests for the region such as peace and stability, food security, and sustainable economic development. Because environmental security issues lie at the intersection between „human‟ and „traditional‟ security, promoting environmental security offers significant potential for building and sustaining regional security and stability on fronts where U.S. and African interests converge. Defense Environmental International Cooperation (DEIC) and environmental security assistance are important means through which these ends can be pursued. Furthermore, southern African governments have publically committed themselves to environmental stewardship and regional cooperation while civil society has a relatively vigorous environmentalist component (Henk 2006a, 110).2 U.S. government environmental aid programs (State Department, USAID, etc.) in the region are also well developed and fairly robust. Thus there is forward momentum and a foundation of success upon which effective environmental security activities can be built. A concerted DEIC and environmental security cooperation strategy could help buffer the region against looming environmental challenges thereby enhancing regional (and by extension continental) security while protecting and advancing the progress being made on various fronts related directly to stated U.S. and AFRICOM strategic goals and priorities including: confronting transnational security threats (including organized crime, narcotics trafficking, and violent extremism); promoting peace, stability, and economic development; conflict prevention; respect for rule of law, civilian control over the military and security sector reform. DEIC offers an approach whereby U.S. and African interests can be mutually addressed in turn generating win-win situations and building needed confidence and trust in the security sector. The potential and precedence for this has been already established in the promising but limited and stillborn DEIC and environmental security activities conducted during the late 1980‟s into the early 21st century including: military to military cooperation on biodiversity protection and anti-poaching with Botswana and Namibia, demining with Namibia, and military environmental management with South Africa.3 Despite some on-going good work by Offices of Defense Cooperation and Security Assistance Offices as well as the small community of DoD and AFRICOM environmental security specialists, the strategic potential of environmental security assistance and DEIC will not be realized unless a systematic, comprehensive approach is developed, resourced, and sustained. Therefore, it is high-time that a comprehensive and robust regional DEIC and environmental security strategy be crafted and implemented. Such a strategy should focus on three areas (the rationale for which will be discussed in detail later): sustainability, humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HADR), and environmental crime with the correlating objectives of supporting and enhancing broader international, regional, national, and U.S. 2 environmental and sustainable development programs; increasing southern African capacity to mitigate and respond to environmental crises; and promoting security and stability by countering environmental criminal threats. Development of an effective regional DEIC/environmental strategy will require the following: ● conduct of a comprehensive environmental security assessment (risk, vulnerability, threats, opportunities) ● inventorying and mapping relevant existing international, regional, national, and U.S. environmental and sustainable development programs; identify gaps and areas where DEIC and environmental related security assistance may have the most impact ● conceive, coordinate, and prioritize DEIC areas and programs ● procure additional resources/funding for DEIC and environmental security ● incorporate sustainability and mechanisms for eventual local sustainment and ownership of environmental security programs This report will begin with an overview of key environmental security challenges and their strategic importance in the region. Then opportunities and rationale for DEIC and security assistance in various areas will be discussed. The report will conclude by presenting a concept on which a regional DEIC/environmental security strategy can be developed. Regional Environmental Security Overview An extensive literature and debate over environment-security linkages exist which does not need to be reviewed here. For purposes of this report it is sufficient to point out that there is general (though not universal) agreement that environmental factors can produce or exacerbate security threats under certain circumstances in particular contexts. These can include: conflict and competition (sub-state or interstate) over access and control of valuable natural resources; human insecurity and political instability caused (or intensified by) the inability of socioeconomic and cultural systems to cope with degrading renewable resource systems, ecosystem changes, natural disasters, or (re)emerging infectious diseases; environmental crime (and potential use of such crimes as funding sources by terrorists or insurgents). Equally importantly, historical and contemporary evidence suggests societies and states also cooperate in the face of environmental challenges. This duality presents both opportunities and challenges. Threat and Opportunity in Southern Africa The extent to which environmental factors may morph into security concerns is a function of physical and human variables including the vulnerability and resilience of both natural and human 3 systems to various stresses and impacts. In this sense, significant opportunities and dangers are present in southern Africa. Observers generally agree the region is a bright spot in terms of recent political and economic development as well in terms of environmental activity and awareness amongst international and local civil society and national governments. However, the region faces formidable environmental challenges while the capacity and political will to surmount them is still insufficient or of uncertain depth. Consequently, significant opportunity exists to further promote and spread security and stability via environmental security means while simultaneously preventing future insecurity and instability. Southern African countries‟ Environmental Sustainability Index4 scores illustrate the region‟s straddling position between environmental promise and vulnerability. Southern African states show a mix of low to moderate environmental stresses, above average to high levels of environmental stewardship (regional and international environmental assistance and cooperation) and institutional concern, but medium to high levels of vulnerability and moderate to low levels of capacity.5 The average ESI score for the region is 48.6; slightly higher than the 46.4 average for all NEPAD countries.6 For example, the region has made significant strides in trans-border environmental cooperation with nearly 20 Trans-frontier Conservation Areas (TFCA) in existence or on the drawing board, the establishment of the Okavango Permanent River Basin Commission (OKACOM), and the proposed (and highly ambitious) Kavango-Zambezi (KAZA) TFCA project. However, as of 2008 the future of KAZA was not guaranteed.7 OKACOM has been lauded as a model for international environmental cooperation and river basin management. Yet it has taken 14 years for a secretariat to be created while sustained political will has been uncertain.8 As interstate water cooperation ploddingly develops, southern Africa continues to suffer from “second order water scarcity” (the “lack of social and political adaptive capacity to manage water successfully to the satisfaction of all stakeholders”).9 The 2000 Mozambique floods, for instance, originated in cross-border shared basins where poor disaster risk reduction strategies regarding dam design and management and poor communications networks were at play.10 Likewise in terms of combating illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing (IUU) SADC members have made significant strides in monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) and have agreed to prepare a SADC Marine Fisheries Ministerial Declaration to Stop Illegal Fishing. However regional MCS capacity remains limited and “inadequate formal or diplomatic mechanisms or frameworks are in place between SADC states to allow for exchanges of data.”11 This regional environmental duality is echoed in a recent analysis of security risks related to climate change produced by the German Advisory Council on Global Change. Through an analysis of ecological, socio-economic, and demographic factors the Council identified southern Africa as a potential climate change hotspot where climate change will present major challenges.12 The council concludes that significant vulnerabilities to environmental stresses exist but that notable economic and political progress 4 is also being made. Furthermore, it is uncertain whether sufficient capacity and recognition amongst governments and civil society to respond and adapt to climate change induced stresses actually exists.13 A similar pattern is also revealed in a Population Action International (PAI) analysis of “demographic stress” that examined the potential for an interplay of population (i.e. urbanization rates, youth bulges) and environmental factors (i.e. water scarcity, availability of cropland) to produce conflict and instability. PAI‟s analysis characterizes all southern African countries, with the exceptions of Namibia and Zambia (elevated risk) and Malawi (very high risk), as being in a state of elevated risk (which basically means things could go either way).14 Natural Hazards (drought, flood, fire) Natural disasters are a significant environmental security concern in southern Africa. According to the UN Center for Research on Epidemiology and Disasters, southern Africa suffered 73 disasters (mainly droughts and floods) between 1991 and 2005.15 The year 2005 was a particularly bad year for the region. Three countries ranked in the top 10 worldwide for victims killed or affected per 100,000 inhabitants: Malawi 37,376; Zambia 10,666; Mozambique 7,461.16 Mozambique has also been hit with serious floods in 2000, 2008, and 2008. Southern Madagascar has been afflicted by persistent drought in recent years, in 2007 the country was hit by 6 cyclones (the worst year on record), and in 2008 340,000 persons were affected by three cyclones. Five million persons in Malawi were affected by drought in 2005.17 Botswana was struck by massive wildfires in 2008 and by a series of floods between March and June of 2009, the worst since 1965.18 Both sets of disasters exceeded civilian capacities and required Botswana Defence Force (BDF) participation in multi-agency response efforts.19 Climate and Resource Issues Freshwater Resources Freshwater resource issues pose major obstacles to sustained economic and political development in southern Africa. Average annual rainfall for the SADC countries is 948mm; however most of the region‟s area including all of Botswana, Namibia and nearly all of South Africa, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe receive less than the world average of 860mm. Namibia, Malawi and South Africa are currently considered water stressed. Botswana is classified as facing chronic scarcity. By 2025 Malawi, South Africa and Namibia are projected to face chronic scarcity while Lesotho, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe will be water stressed.20 Even without climate change, the number of individual southern Africans exposed to „water stress‟ (less than 1000 m3 of water per person per year) will grow from 3.1 million in 1995 to between 33 and 38 million by 2025.21 5 Water supply problems are compounded by issues of water quality. Freshwater is often of poor quality contributing to a range of health problems including diarrhea, intestinal worms, and trachoma.22 Thirty-five million people in the region still rely on “unimproved water sources; the largest proportion being in Mozambique, followed by Angola, South Africa, Zambia and Malawi.”23 Southern Africa has also been hit by acute energy shortages as economic growth has outstripped energy production. The past three years have witnessed blackouts, mine shutdowns, electricity shortfalls and loss of millions of dollars in mining and industrial production.24 A survey of BDF officers attending the BDF Staff College in 2009 revealed that they consider unreliability of energy a significant security concern.25 Hydroelectricity will become increasingly important as the region struggles to expand energy supplies. This in turn will both complicate and increase the need for effective interstate water management regarding hydroelectric resources. Regional water supply and quality problems will be exacerbated by climate change (see following section on climate change) which will in turn compound the previously discussed lack of social and political adaptive capacities. Freshwater issues can thus be expected to challenge food security, energy supply, economic development, social, and even political stability. Land Issues Unlike in semi-arid parts of northern and eastern Africa, socio-economic and cultural factors that help spur conflicts amongst and between pastoralists and farmers over access to land are less intense in southern Africa.26 Land-related conflicts more frequently reflect the legacy of colonial policies that have spawned ownership and access disputes such as those between white and black farmers or like those between local communities and aboriginal hunter-gatherer groups against national and/or outside interests such as conservation, mining, and tourism According to Botswana‟s Vision 2016 Council report the potential for general land use conflicts exists between competing interests such as “large-scale farming, small-scale subsistence and traditional farming, hunting, mining, tourism, wildlife management, population growth and urbanization”.27 Perhaps the most well known regional example is the aboriginal-state dispute between the San (i.e. “Bushmen”) of the Kalahari and the governments of South Africa, Namibia, and Botswana. This has pitted the San plus local and international NGOs (most notably Survival International) against national governments over issues such access/ownership of land, resettlement, basic services, political representation, mineral claims, and hunting rights. While there is little likelihood of violent rebellion in the near-term, increased protests and political action are possible.28 Most present land-related disputes are localized and small in scale. In 2009, for instance, a dispute erupted between villages in the Botswana‟s Nata Bird Trust Sanctuary (and potential corporate 6 development partners) with cattle farmers who claimed the sanctuary has encroached upon their grazing area. The Minister of Lands and Housing is currently mediating the dispute.29 Land conflicts exemplify how the duality of environmental security issues in the region poses both risk and threat. On one hand, judicial systems have been proven able to peacefully adjudicate environmental disputes while30, on the other, the persistence and frequency of these controversies suggests a lingering potential for environmental conflicts to undermine stability and governmental legitimacy31. Terrestrial Biodiversity and Renewable Resources Deforestation, soil erosion, other human impacts, and increasingly climatic changes are stressing biodiversity throughout the region.32 For example, satellite imagery shows the total area of natural forest in Madagascar declined from 9.4 million hectares in 1993 to 8.5 million ha in 2000.33 Furthermore, human induced soil erosion and degradation - driven by tree cutting for firewood and charcoal production, commercial afforestation and logging, unsustainable agricultural practices, and overgrazing are serious and expanding problems in southern Africa.34 The movement of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) has been demonstrated to intensify soil erosion as persons “forced by their desperate positions to seek shelter and energy have removed trees.”35 Thus there is a potential for future population displacement and environmental degradation to produce expanding negative vicious cycles whereby deforestation and soil erosion interact with political instability and violence plus climate change and food insecurity (see next section). Climate change and Food Security Ascertaining the security impacts of climate change is difficult because state and societal vulnerability and resilience to climatic shifts are functions of complex interactions between physical, cultural, economic, technological, and political variables. In the case of Africa, it is particularly problematic because of a relative dearth of regional and sub-regional scientific assessments. Nonetheless, macro-level studies and existing sub-regional research strongly suggest that climate change will pose significant challenges to southern Africa by compounding existing environmental security challenges and generating new ones such as the spread of malaria into previously unaffected areas. Climate change poses a particular challenge for management of freshwater resources. Increased flooding, drought, increasing temperatures and desertification and could intensify water-related interstate disputes. Declining quantity and quality may compound socio-economic and development challenges particularly in regard to food security.36 Significant increases in heavy rainfall events have already been observed since 1970 in Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Malawi, and Zambia.37 According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), approximately half of the sub-humid and semi-arid parts of the southern African region 7 are at moderate to high risk of desertification under various climate change scenarios38 and almost all countries in southern Africa (South Africa excepted) “will probably experience a significant reduction in stream flow.”39 Grain harvests are likely to fall throughout the region. By 2080 11% of the region‟s arable land could be unsuitable for agriculture40 and wheat farming could disappear completely.41 Negative impacts on animal and livestock populations from drought, heat stress and shifts in patterns and prevalence disease patterns should be anticipated under predicted conditions of climate change. An assessment of species‟ sensitivity in 141 sub-Saharan national parks in sub-Saharan Africa under several climate change scenarios projects that 10-15% of mammal species could fall within the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) critically “endangered” or “extinct” categories by 2050 with up to 40% by 2080.42 A Kruger National Park study furthermore estimated that, under various scenarios, 66% of parks species could be lost including Zebra.43 Recent extreme weather events illustrate what climate change may portend for animal populations. Atypical sub-freezing weather killed antelope in South Africa‟s Mdikwe reserve in the winter of 2008, while several years earlier, elephants in Kruger National Park succumbed to sub-freezing temperatures.44 Such losses of animal biodiversity and livestock would have considerable negative impacts on countries and populations dependent upon livestock rearing and wildlife tourism. Cattle raiding and the effects of poaching would likely intensify as well. Fisheries may be adversely impacted due to climatic effects on coral reefs, estuaries, and water and wind conditions. With a doubling of atmospheric CO2, simulations show that South Africa‟s fisheries could experience decreases in productivity of 50-60% from extreme wind and turbulence.45 Climatic related impacts on infrastructure and fisheries are likely to negatively affect economic growth and development and may generate increases in maritime crimes such as piracy, sea robbery, illegal migration, and human smuggling/trafficking in coastal zones. Climate change will almost certainly intensify disease risk and burdens in southern Africa. Multiple scenarios indicate that more of southern Africa is likely to become suitable for Malaria transmission.46 Exposure to waterborne illness should also increase if flooding events become more frequent or intense. Floods, for instance, can trigger malaria epidemics in arid and semi-arid areas.47 Migration has been correlated with the spread of HIV/AIDS and other diseases in southern Africa, thus climate induced migration is likely to mean increased diffusion of various infectious diseases. Environmental Crime Environmental crimes such as poaching, illegal and unreported (IUU) fishing, illicit logging, natural resource smuggling, and illegal dumping of wastes pose significant and direct threats to the region‟s people, environment, development, and security. 8 Illegal Natural Resource Extraction Smuggling Illegal extraction and smuggling of natural resources such as timber and minerals directly threaten human security, national economic development, and governance in southern Africa. Forests, for instance, provide goods and services critical for economic development and human security. These include: fuel wood, grazing, food, medicines, woodcrafts, timber, biodiversity, water catchment, soil conservation, and eco-tourism.48 In the 11 dry-zone countries of SADC, more than 50% of households rely on wood for fuel. In 2002, the forestry sector employed 14,500 in Zimbabwe and accounted for 3% of the country‟s GDP, while in Swaziland forestry provided 25% of GDP.49 Illegal and unregulated extraction and transport of gems and minerals has links to international organized crime, corruption, and undermines local economies while depriving national governments of needed revenues. Smuggled diamonds from Zimbabwe have recently been reported as far afield as in Canada.50 Reportedly, 15 tons of gold (historically a major source of government revenue) “leak” from the country‟s economy each year and that over half of its annual gold output for the past seven years has been lost.51 Likewise, smuggling of gemstones such as tourmaline, garnets, and emeralds have resulted in “massive revenue losses” and hindered economic growth in Zambia.52 Namibia, South Africa, Malawi, and Zambia are all uranium producers with Botswana set to join their ranks.53 Zimbabwe is believed to have uranium deposits as well.54 Yet across the region and continent, mechanisms and capacity for safe mining and preventing illicit trafficking are uneven. Africa also lacks a “regulatory framework to protect African uranium resources from being exploited by foreign companies at the expense of local communities, and to ensure that uranium does not fall into the wrong hands”.55 The on-going problems with timber and mineral smuggling from Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe should be reason for concern over the safety and security of uranium mining. Improper uranium mining damages ecosystems and threatens human health causing conflicts between communities, companies, and national governments. Lack of safeguards may also pose a proliferation risk. In Malawi for example, community groups have questioned the environmental impact assessment (EIA) conducted by Paladin Energy Limited for mining in Kayalekera. One International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) official, in fact, has denied that the IAEA has even authorized production in Malawi.56 Forest fires, illegal logging, and invasive alien species (along with conversion of forestland to cropland and high dependence of wood as an energy source) have been identified by the UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) as the primary threats to forest resources in 11 dry-zone SADC countries.57 For example, Zambia currently loses K80 billion in revenues to do clandestine logging and timber export, mainly conducted by Chinese and South African companies with the connivance of corrupt officials.58 9