speed and transparency of information have increased dramatically. Events that only a few years ago could have remained state secrets indefinitely are being reported around the world in minutes. The traditional roles of the media are changing with the ubiquitous nature of data transmitting technology. Citi- zens with cell phone cameras can transmit damning images to the world, unfiltered, in the time it takes to make a phone call. People can use social networking to mobilize groups in support of a cause without having to expose themselves to the risks and costs formerly associated with activism. In response, govern- nn) ments and institutions can do little to effec- hi S er tively stop it. The aftermath of the June 2009 Walt Coastguardsman uses social media elections in Iran provides an example of how avy ( monitoring system to assist in rescues social media may be changing the nature of N S. and medical evacuations political discourse and conflict in the world. U. tehran, June 20, 2009 A Commander’s Strategy for Neda Agha-Soltan was sitting in her Peugeot 206 in traffic on Kargar Avenue. She Social Media was accompanied by her music teacher and close friend, Hamid Panahi, and two others. The four were on their way to participate in the protests against the outcome of the 2009 By T h o m a s D . m a y f i e l D i i i Iranian presidential election. The car’s air conditioner was not working well, so Neda stopped her car some distance from the main We must hold our minds alert and receptive to the application of protests and got out on foot to escape the heat. unglimpsed methods and weapons. The next war will be won in the She was standing and observing the sporadic protests in the area when she was shot in the future, not the past. We must go on, or we will go under. chest (reportedly by a member of the Basij, the —General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, 1931 pro-government Iranian militia). As captured on amateur video, she collapsed to the ground I n 1931, General MacArthur could from social media. There are already examples and was tended to by a doctor and others from not have imagined many of the forms of militaries that have ignored the realities the crowd. Someone in the crowd shouted, of warfare that would be used just a and have suffered. The effective use of social “She has been shot! Someone, come and take few years later during World War II. media may have the potential to help the her!” The video spread across the Internet He understood, however, that changes in Armed Forces better understand the envi- virally, quickly gaining the attention of methods and weapons could alter the nature ronment in which it operates. Social media international media and viewers. Discussions of conflict. Just as machineguns, tanks, and may allow more agile use of information in about the incident on Twitter became one of aircraft changed the nature of conflicts, so did support of operations. Moreover, they may be the most viewed topics worldwide by the end the telegraph, radio, television, and eventually harnessed to help achieve unity of effort with of the day.1 the Internet. The advances today in the infor- partners in conflict. Finding clever and inno- What happened next reveals the poten- mation world, specifically with the advent of vative ways to help achieve the desired ends tial power of social media. Within hours, social media and new media, may prove as may be the key to success in a continuously several versions of the video were posted on profound as any of these inventions. We must evolving social media environment. YouTube and linked to various other Web therefore observe and adjust our information Social media are changing the way that sites. Millions saw the gruesome photos of strategies in order not to “go under.” information is passed across societies and Neda’s death when they were posted. The One of the challenges that commanders around the world. The rapid spread of blogs, images highlighted the harsh response from now face is to develop strategies that recognize social networking sites, and media-sharing the Iranian government and added fuel to the shifts in the nature of warfare resulting technology (such as YouTube), aided by the the next 10 days of violent protests in Tehran. proliferation of mobile technology, is also Many people around the world began posting Colonel Thomas D. Mayfield III, USA, is Chief, Plans changing the conditions in which the United editorials about the protests and the Iranian Division (G3), Headquarters U.S. Army Europe. States conducts military operations. The government’s oppressive reactions. 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THIS PAGE Same as 6 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 COMMENTARY | A Commander’s Strategy for Social Media forces and Hizballah in 2006.4 The article ing trends and patterns. Blogs and social contrasted that with Operation Cast Lead, networking sites could provide insight to any when Israeli forces attacked the Gaza Strip society where there is a significant online in December 2008 and January 2009. The community, particularly in societies with a differing approaches taken by Israeli forces in relatively young population. The Department the two operations highlight how an effective of State has effectively used social networking e Tub new media strategy can impact the strategic sites to gauge the sentiments within societies. u Yo outcomes. U.S. Embassies in many nations are effectively ges/ In the summer of 2006, Hizballah using Facebook and other social media tools a m P I effectively integrated information operations, in places such as Podgorica, Damascus, A including social media, into their tactical Phnom Penh, and Panama to maintain rela- Frame from amateur video on YouTube purporting to show Iranian opposition supporters operations to fight the Israelis. Hizballah tionships with the local cultures, particularly demonstrating outside Ghoba Mosque in Tehran embedded photos and videos into blogs and with the youth who are more likely to engage YouTube to promote a positive self-image and using social media.7 reported millions of tweets, most condemning to highlight negative perceptions of Israeli Maintaining a social media presence in the Iranian government and its supporters. operations. Hizballah used information effec- deployed locations also allows commanders Iranian students began using Twitter and tively to limit Israel’s strategic options. After to understand potential threats and emerg- Facebook, as well as Flickr, the social site that 33 days of fighting, a ceasefire was declared ing trends within their AORs. The online allows users to post and share photos, to com- and Hizballah claimed victory. The organiza- community can provide a good indicator of municate to the Iranian audience information tion was able to create a “perception of failure” prevailing moods and emerging issues. Many about when and where the next protest would for Israel, which ignored the realities of the of the vocal opposition groups will likely use take place, and which streets to avoid because new media and relied instead on traditional social media to air grievances publicly. In the of police or militia checkpoints.2 information policies. It was less agile than fall of 2008, General David Petraeus wrote The case of Neda demonstrates that Hizballah and was unable to match the group an article for Military Review entitled “Multi- social media are not easily contained. Even in the information war. In contrast, in Opera- National Force–Iraq Commander’s Counter- with all the measures taken by the Iranian tion Cast Lead, Israeli forces devised a more insurgency Guidance” in which he lists key government, the images of the protests and effective strategy for the use of social and new tasks for his commanders in Iraq.8 While the reports of the government’s abuses continued media. They developed a proactive informa- tasks listed are intended for fighting the insur- to make it to the Internet. The protestors tion strategy, incorporating social media tools, gency in Iraq, many of them are universally quickly devised ways to get around the gov- along with enlisting the support of the Israeli applicable. For example, he asserts that it is ernment efforts to impose blocks on their online communities, to set the agenda in the important for commanders to “[u]nderstand networking. The Iranian government eventu- media and control perceptions of the fighting. the neighborhood” and “[l]ive among the ally managed to control much of the online The result was that the Israelis used informa- people.” An online social media presence traffic, but it was too late to stop the effects of tion effectively to preserve strategic options can be an integral part of understanding the the social media. Tehran received massive dip- enabling them to achieve their objectives.5 issues and attitudes in a neighborhood or lomatic pressure from other governments and community. An online presence can play a condemnation from media around the world the Ends major role in living among the people in a to put an end to the post-election violence. The strategic framework used by the society that has a significant online commu- Around the world, social media are U.S. Army War College defines a strategy nity. Social media would certainly not be the becoming commonplace tools for political and as the relationship among ends, ways, and only tool used by commanders; however, they social activism. If military leaders do not fully means. To develop a strategy, we must first could enable the commanders to understand understand these tools, they may miss their have objectives or ends in mind. The ends are environments and allow them to have better significant impact on the nature of future goals sought by the commander devising the situational awareness of these environments. conflicts. America’s potential enemies are strategy.6 With respect to social media, what A second desired end for social media using these technologies now to enhance their are some of the ends a commander might have in a theater of operations may be to assist the efforts. The U.S. military can either engage in mind? command in providing better, more agile, in the social media environment seriously or Perhaps the first end that command- and more credible public information in the cede this ground to the enemy.3 The develop- ers should have in mind when determining AOR (both strategic communications and ment of strategies to account for the impact of their strategy is a better understanding of the local/tactical information). As demonstrated social media will be one of the keys to success environment, or better situational awareness in the example above of the Israel Defense in future operations. through an effective use of social media. By Forces, aggressive engagement in the social The germane question to ask is: How systematically observing the online commu- media environment can aid a commander can an effective social media strategy have nity in the area of responsibility (AOR), com- in winning the information fight. General an impact on the outcomes of military manders may be able to develop an ongoing Petraeus’s guidance emphasizes the impor- operations? A recent Military Review article understanding of the society in question, as tance of several related tasks. He directs us to described the use of new media tools in well as its concerns and interests, and the “fight the information war relentlessly” and the second Lebanon War involving Israeli commanders may be able to identify emerg- to “be first with the truth.”9 Clearly, a social 80 JFQ / issue 60, 1st quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu MAYfIELD media program can play a key role in accom- plishing these tasks. Understanding that social media have altered the way and the speed with which news is reported, commanders will be best served if they are actively engaged and immersed in this new environment. With an aggressive online presence, commanders can be better prepared to counter false and negative reporting as events occur. They can better interdict and react to bad news if they are already engaged and understand the way reporting in the AOR is likely to proceed as events occur. Finally, by being proactive, com- manders can avoid letting enemy elements set the agenda by being there first with the truth. As demonstrated in Operation Cast Lead, commanders can use social media to help set ko the agenda in a strategically beneficial way. ob uusniintyg Tosofh ceeif atfhol rmirtd.e G daineand ie nfri analna P lA eetOnrdaRe f uiossr e icnno hmhainms cgaeundidd e-rs ecaF FIaDcFe Obpoeorka ptiaogne C sauspt pLoeratding ook b e ance argues that commanders should strive ac F for unity of effort with the U.S. Embassy, view social media as an asset rather than interagency partners, local governmental a threat. Social media planning should be ISAF–NATO Facebook page leaders, and nongovernmental organizations incorporated across the spectrum of conflict. (NGOs) to make sure all are working to The commander should state his intent for achieve a common purpose.10 The character- information effects, explicitly noting the role istics discussed earlier relating to the ability social media should play. That allows his staff ■■tasking an existing staff leader/section of social media to aid in organizing can be to generate options much the same way as is ■■integrating a direct planning team used to enhance unity of effort with partner done for other combat multipliers. A proactive ■■centralizing control of all SC-related organizations in the theater of operations. The engagement with social media incorporated activities under a separate directorate (most Israel Defense Force used new media methods into the commander’s operational planning costly) to enlist the support of the Israeli “blogo- would likely provide the best results. ■■having an SC director with a small coor- sphere” to help achieve a common purpose There will certainly be skeptics about dinating staff and supporting working group. during Operation Cast Lead. A proactive and the need for a command social media innovative social media strategy using social program. In an article linked to the Depart- The final option has gained the most networking, blogs, and Twitter-like capa- ment of State’s Social Media Hub, entitled traction in the field, with several combatant bilities can aid commanders in ensuring all “Eight Ways to Ruin Your Social Media commands adopting a similar structure.13 concerned entities in the theater of operations Strategy,” mistake number one is to “Pretend That option provides the ability to incorporate are sharing the necessary information to work you can do without it.”12 As seen in the case of the best attributes of the other options and toward a common goal. the Israel Defense Forces’ experience, ignoring maintain an appropriate level of command new media is done at our own peril. emphasis on the SC program. While com- the Ways A second way to take advantage of social manders may choose to employ a similar The second element in developing a media is to organize the social media program methodology for social media, integration strategy is to identify the ways, or how one for success. The U.S. military has experi- of social media planning into an existing organizes and applies the resources.11 What mented with ways of organizing for success SC structure may also be an effective way to are the organizational schemes and methods in strategic communication (SC) for the last ensure success. Commanders will have to required to achieve the ends that the com- few years. The experience gained in organiz- weigh the costs with the potential benefits in mander has stated? ing for strategic communication may provide their particular situation. The first way is that social media use some insight into organizing for social media The natural reaction of many com- must be in the form of a Commander’s Social success as well. The Joint Warfighting Center manders may be to assign one staff section as Media Program. That is to say, social media Commander’s Handbook for Strategic Com- the proponent for social media, leaving the should have the support and interest of the munication lays out five models that have been responsibility for integration to them. While commander and key members of his staff and used for organizing SC. The options include: that approach may be easier to implement should be formalized into a program with than some of the other options, the risk is the responsibilities assigned to members of the ■■increasing command emphasis (least social media program will become viewed as a commander’s staff. The commander should costly) niche program and will not get the attention it ndupress.ndu.edu issue 60, 1st quarter 2011 / JFQ 81 COMMENTARY | A Commander’s Strategy for Social Media might deserve. Furthermore, the social media Services have significant disagreement on but a cumbersome and highly centralized program would assume the natural biases of the right level of access to allow, balanced process for releasing information prevented the assigned staff element, decreasing its broad against the need for security. The DOD the correct story from reaching the media for effectiveness. For example, if J6 (Command, policy released on February 25, 2010, directs nearly 3 days. By the time U.S. forces released Control, Communications, and Computer that “the NIPRNET [unclassified networks] the correct version of Operation Valhalla, the Systems staff section) were the proponent, shall be configured to provide access to strategic damage was done.17 The inability it might input a technical bias, and likewise Internet-based capabilities across all DoD to react immediately to the enemy claims in the Public Affairs (PA) section might tend Components.”15 The policy goes on to give the the previous example was largely for policy to approach social media as an outreach tool components significant latitude to limit access reasons. To promote agility, the U.S. military’s only. Thus, broad integration may provide the to defend against malicious activity when policies must allow for decentralized execu- best opportunity to achieve the results desired. needed. There may be ways of using firewalls tion of operations involving new media. Decentralization of execution, however, may force commanders to accept levels of the information security concerns over experimentation of social risk with which they may not be comfortable. software on Department of Defense computers are not trivial The commander will essentially delegate the control of information releasing authority to low levels. Clear rules of engagement distrib- The third way to benefit from social or separated networks to ensure security of uted to all the potential social media operators media is to create a social media monitoring information while still benefiting from the may be able to mitigate the risks. The need team to act as the eyes and ears of the strat- use of social media. Each command will have for agility will often conflict with the need to egy team. Team members may be viewed as to weigh this balance and make the decision carefully control the strategic message.18 “social media scouts,” observing, monitoring, based on its needs. One of the key elements for command- and collecting information on the state of the Since speed and agility are key elements ers to enhance agility in their social media online community in the AOR. The monitor- of successful social media strategy, the fifth program is to allow and encourage social ing team represents a systematic way to take way to enhance success in a strategy is to enact media operations to be executed even at the advantage of the content and trends in the policies to allow the social media campaign lowest unit level. Many of the closest relation- social media. Without a systematic approach, to be agile. Restrictive and cumbersome ships established in an AOR are formed at there may be little chance of making accurate approval chains may inhibit the ability of the battalion level and below. Local government observations and drawing the correct conclu- operators to achieve results. Perhaps the best leaders, tribal leaders, police, and militias are sions from the online traffic in the AOR. If approach is to allow for centralized planning all developing relationships at the very lowest every staff section were to independently and decentralized execution.16 The enemy will levels. The leaders at these units will know monitor Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, or the not be constrained from posting information how best to interface with the population. local language versions of social networks and to the Internet by a cumbersome approval Web sites, blogs, and links to Facebook pages blogs, without lateral coordination within the process and thus has the ability to act very can be used for nearby activities. In Africa, staff, there will likely be significant gaps in the quickly. Operation Valhalla in Iraq in 2006 there are examples of local groups reporting monitoring of the social media environment. provides an illustrative example. tactical information such as roadblocks and The monitoring team should contain During a successful firefight against ambushes to Web sites set up by State Depart- broad staff representation to be effective. the Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) forces, U.S. Special ment teams. The site then consolidates them The team will require members with local Forces and Iraqi forces killed a number onto a map for locals to check when they language skills, cultural understanding, and of enemy fighters, rescued a hostage, and are traveling.19 Commanders may be able to a high degree of familiarity with the social destroyed a weapons cache—by all measures, enhance local relationships with the positive media tools and protocols. To be effective, a very successful operation. By the time use of social media at the unit level. they will need to conduct field research in U.S. and Iraqi forces returned to their base, The sixth and final way in which a the AOR. They will also need to observe the someone had repositioned the bodies and commander can take advantage of social Internet cafes and local habits in the AOR and removed the weapons of the JAM fighters media is to set up social networking sites as become familiar with the social media plat- so it looked like they were murdered while an outreach tool to enhance unity of effort. As forms popular in the culture. at prayer. They photographed the bodies in General Petraeus mentioned in his guidance, The fourth way to ensure success in these new poses and uploaded the images there are a number of key partners in theater a social media strategy is to find a balance onto the Internet, along with a press release with whom units must cooperate. Seemingly between security and sharing. The informa- explaining that American Soldiers killed the simple efforts such as establishing a Facebook tion security concerns over experimentation men while they were in a mosque. All this page could allow partner organizations a of social software on Department of Defense took the enemy less than an hour. The public better understanding of the commander’s (DOD) computers are not trivial. Security reaction was predictably negative. The U.S. intent. Joint Task Force–Haiti, supporting officers will be inclined to say no to extensive forces had a combat camera crew with them relief operations in the aftermath of the use of social media on networks that are used during the operation, and some of the Soldiers January 2010 earthquake, has effectively used for official purposes.14 There is considerable wore helmet cameras. U.S. forces were in pos- social media as a tool for outreach to other discussion within DOD on this issue. The session of the evidence to disprove the claims, organizations engaged in the effort. 82 JFQ / issue 60, 1st quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu MAYfIELD There are numerous key relationships match the strategic intent of the commander. Media: The Israeli Defense Forces in Recent Con- in the AOR relative to social media strategy. For the relationship between the leaders and flicts,” Military Review (May–June 2009), 2–10. 5 Ibid. The obvious ones are local governments, the operators to work, senior leaders must 6 Robert H. Dorff, “A Primer in Strategy press, civic organizations, and the populace in have an understanding of the capabilities and Development,” in U.S. Army War College Guide general, as well as NGOs operating in the area. limitations of social media. Social media may to Strategy, ed. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Commanders should also consider outreach be one case where the senior leaders must Holcomb (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, to the blogger community (if there is one), be trained to have an understanding of what 2001), 11–18. businesses, Internet service providers, and cel- the soldiers and junior officers already know. 7 The Social Media Hub, Department of lular network providers. These relationships Inclusion of an introduction to social media State Office of Innovative Engagement, available would better enable the social media program into commanders’ courses may be an appro- at <https://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/ to be effective and adaptable to changes. priate initiative. smp/>. Finally, the military’s ties with academia 8 David H. Petraeus, “Multi-National Force the Means and industry will be more important than Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance,” Mili- tary Review (September–October 2008), 210–212. The final component in the develop- ever. These relationships have already been 9 Ibid. ment of a strategy is the identification of the established. DOD has some effective ties 10 Ibid. means. The means are the resources available with the blogger community and with many 11 Dorff, 11. to pursue the objectives. Fortunately, in the companies engaged throughout the social 12 Catharine P. Taylor, “Eight Ways to U.S. military today, the means to conduct media community. The relationships DOD Ruin Your Social-Media Strategy,” available an effective social media strategy are readily enjoys today will have to continue to grow in at <www.bnet.com/2403-13237_23-366324. available. To employ the strategy listed above, order to ensure the success of any social media html?tag=content;btmTier>. there may be a requirement to reorganize and strategy. 13 Commander’s Handbook for Strategic reprioritize resources within deployed head- Social media and new media are chang- Communication (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces quarters as described in the discussion of the ing the ways information moves around the Command, Joint Warfighting Center, 2008), III–4. ways, but there will be no wholly new skills or world. Speed and transparency of information 14 Mark Drapeau and Linton Wells II, Social equipment required. have increased, the roles of traditional and Software and National Security: An Initial Net Assessment, Defense and Technology Paper 61 Some of the key means are the indi- new media are changing, and social network- (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and vidual talents and skills of Servicemembers. ing tools allow collaboration as never seen National Security Policy, 2009). Skilled information operators, PA specialists, before. There will no doubt be changes to 15 Department of Defense, “Directive-Type and intelligence collectors and analysts are the nature of conflicts as a result. A key to Memorandum (DTM) 09–026—Responsible and already conducting operations at all levels successfully adapting to the changes will be Effective Use of Internet-based Capabilities,” Wash- and in all Services. Language and cultural commanders’ ability to develop strategies that ington, DC, Februrary 25, 2010. skills will continue to be a critical factor in take advantage of the changes and deny the 16 Rafal Rohozinski and Dierdre Collings, our ability to conduct operations around the enemy exclusive rights to the same. The U.S. Bullets and Blogs: The New Media and the world. When engaging with social media, military has the tools available to perform the Warfighter (Carlisle, PA: Center for Strategic operators trained to function effectively in tasks inherent in a strategy that will allow it to Leadership, U.S. Army War College, 2008). the cultures in which we are operating will be capitalize on the emerging trends in informa- 17 Cori E. Dauber, “The Truth is Out There: Responding to Insurgent Disinformation and vital assets. The “digital natives” will be criti- tion. An innovative strategy that incorporates Deception Operations,” Military Review (January– cal to success in the social media environment the lessons already learned in the social media February 2009), 13–24. as well. The authors of a report from the “New environment will allow the Armed Forces 18 Rohozinski and Collings. Media and the Warfighter” workshop held to improve their ability to understand the 19 Kimberly Harrington, Department of State, at the U.S. Army War College define digital environment, communicate more effectively, Office of Innovative Engagement, interview by natives as “those young service members who and generate unity of effort throughout the author, Washington, DC, November 19, 2009. are savvy in the use of new media devices, battlefield. JFQ 20 Rohozinski and Collings. platforms, networks, and possibilities—and are underexploited assets in the information- NOtEs led wars against new adversaries.”20 Employ- 1 “‘Neda’ Becomes Rallying Cry for Iranian ing these younger and more tech-savvy opera- Protests,” CNN.com/World, June 22, 2009. tors in roles that will have strategic impact 2 “16 Azar Green Routes,” UnitedForIran, requires some change to the traditional December 6, 2009, available at <www.flickr.com/ hierarchical mindset. The bright and talented photos/united4iran/4165827330/>. This site pro- personnel will continue to be the foundation vides an example of social media tools used to share for success. information among the Iranian protestors. These digital natives, however, may lack 3 Huda al Saleh, “Al-Qaeda Continues Using the strategic insight and understanding of Modern Technology to Recruit Youth,” January 5, more senior strategists and planners, who will 2010, accessed at <http://aawsat.com/english>. have to provide clear guidance and oversight 4 William B. Caldwell, Denis M. Murphy, and Anton Menning, “Learning to Leverage New to ensure the actions of the digital natives ndupress.ndu.edu issue 60, 1st quarter 2011 / JFQ 83 JOINT DOCTRINE | Evidentiary Validation of FM 3–24 and that civilian casualties are minimized. to support his criticisms or his own claims. For After all, COIN is complex and not a zero- examples of these arguments, see Gian P. Gentile, From NDU Press “A (Slightly) Better War: A Narrative and Its sum game. Combined arms prowess and Defects,” World Affairs (Summer 2008), available effective restraint both belong in the doctrinal at <www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008- toolbox. for the Summer/full-Gentile.html>; “Our COIN Doctrine So the principles in FM 3–24 showed Africa Center for Strategic Studies Removes the Enemy from the Essence of War,” strongly in insurgencies worldwide over the Armed Forces Journal (January 2008), available at past 30 years, not just ambiguously in wars <www.armedforcesjournal.com/2008/01/3207722>; ACSS Research Paper No. 1 of independence more than 40 years ago, as “Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Army’s Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace Colonel Gentile argued. While the details of Conventional Capabilities,” World Politics Review Operations: Insights from Africa FM 3–24, like all doctrine, should be subjected (March 4, 2008); “Not So Big of a Tent,” March 4, by Paul D. Williams to continuing scrutiny and refinement based 2008, available at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/ on operational experience, there appear to be blog/2008/03/not-so-big-of-a-tent/>; “The Death Protection of civilians, which is “the very no grounds in the past 30 years of insurgency of the Armor Corps,” April 17, 2010, available essence of peacekeeping,” poses huge worldwide for any attack on the core princi- at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/ challenges in African security. Paul D. ples of FM 3–24. Similarly, firepower need not docs-temp/416-gentile.pdf>; “Gaining the Initia- Williams first examines empirical cases in tive in Afghanistan,” September 2, 2009, available Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, be wholly eschewed in COIN, but the record at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/ and Sudan to both define the problem and of history suggests that victory over the long docs-temp/288-gentile.pdf>; “A Strategy of Tactics: find innovative solutions. He then summarizes term is much more likely to go to those who Population-Centric COIN and the Army,” Param- the interrelated streams of thought and are judicious in their application of force. JFQ eters (Autumn 2009), 5–17. developments in law and humanitarian 8 Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth agencies, including the United Nations, NotEs Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources that helped create the universally endorsed of Success in Counterinsurgency, MG–964–OSD “responsibility to protect” principle. After 1 See Gian P. Gentile, “Time for the Decon- (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010). discussing the challenges that civilian struction of Field Manual 3–24,” Joint Force 9 Based on a list developed by Martin C. protection presents for peacekeepers Quarterly 58 (3d Quarter, 2010); John A. Nagl, Libicki, “Eighty-Nine Insurgencies: Outcomes and on the ground, he examines how civilian “Constructing the Legacy of Field Manual 3–24,” Endings,” in War by Other Means: Building Com- protection policies might be enhanced. He Joint Force Quarterly 58 (3d Quarter, 2010); Gian P. plete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsur- concludes with 10 policy recommendations, Gentile, “Freeing the Army from the Counterinsur- gency, ed. David C. Gompert et al., MG–595/2–OSD such as strengthening deterrence, devising gency Straightjacket,” Joint Force Quarterly 58 (3d (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 373–396. The clear operational concepts, investing in Quarter, 2010); John A. Nagl, “Learning and Adapt- initial case list with which Libicki began was drawn quality peacekeepers and leaders, being ing to Win,” Joint Force Quarterly 58 (3d Quarter, from James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnic- prepared to coerce perpetrators, and keeping 2010). ity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political humanitarian military intervention on the table. 2 Thomas X. Hammes, “Why Study Small Science Review 97, no. 1 (February 2003). Wars?” Small Wars Journal 1, no. 1 (April 2005). 10 For details on the factors, their scoring, and 3 Michael T. Klare notes that of the 50 armed how the phases were identified, see Paul, Clarke, conflicts that broke out in the 1990s, only 4 entailed and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources combat between 2 or more states, and only 1, the of Success in Counterinsurgency. For a detailed nar- Persian Gulf War, involved all-out fighting among rative of the case and the scores of the 77 factors for large numbers of ground, sea, and air forces. See all phases of each case, see Christopher Paul, Colin Michael T. Klare, “The New Face of Combat: Ter- P. Clarke, and Beth Grill, Victory Has a Thousand rorism and Irregular Warfare in the 21st Century,” Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies, in The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, MG–964/1–OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010). Causes, Controls, ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (Upper 11 For a detailed discussion of and evidence Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 29. for all 20 approaches to COIN considered in 4 Gentile, “Time,” 116. the research, see Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory 5 Ibid., 117. Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in 6 Gentile, “Freeing,” 121. Counterinsurgency. 7 Colonel Gentile has written repeatedly on 12 Gentile, “Freeing,” 122. the topic of COIN doctrine. All of his articles on 13 See chapter five in Paul, Clarke, and Grill, the subject follow the same basic themes: He attacks Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success the creators and proponents of population-centric in Counterinsurgency. COIN or FM 3–24 as conspirators of some kind, argues that the doctrine they have promoted is not only wrong but also actually dangerous, and advances the view that more firepower, not less, is the real solution to an insurgency. However, beyond some case detail from Vietnam and Iraq Visit the NDU Press Web site and general references to the American Civil War for more information on publications and World War II, he offers virtually no evidence at ndupress.ndu.edu 128 JFQ / issue 60, 1st quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu