Redress of Professional Military Education The Clarion Call I n 1908, the American short story writer educational program that seeks to provide the For the officer corps, this PME program O. Henry penned “The Clarion Call.” right Soldier with the right education at the is ingrained from precommissioning through This title has become synonymous right time. Without doubt, even as we have promotion to general officer. Unfortunately, with a powerful request for action or fought two wars, there have been laudable even with the advances mentioned above, an irresistible mandate. As the Nation looks to advances to include an expanded gradu- what is presented in official policy as an the institution of the U.S. Army during an era ate school program, increased numbers of espoused value does not always translate into of persistent conflict and after 9 years of war, international fellows at our schools, and an what is valued within the Army in the real it is time to recapture professional military effort led by the Chief of Staff of the Army to world. More importantly, the gap between education (PME) as part of our profession. broaden the experiences of the officer corps espoused and enacted values is significant and The Army is arguably the largest and with more opportunities to serve in think growing. Without action to arrest this trend, best educational and training institution in tanks, interagency positions, and world-class the Army risks the professional development the United States. It has a strong, established universities. of its senior leaders as well as its competency By Charles D. allen y) e el e N c M Chairman addresses faculty and students at U.S.  d J. Army Command and General Staff College a h C D ( O D 94    JFQ / issue 59, 4th quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2010 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2010 to 00-00-2010 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Redress of Professional Military Education: The Clarion Call 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National Defense University,260 Fifth Ave., Bldg. 64, Fort REPORT NUMBER McNair,Washington,DC, 20319-506 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 7 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 ALLEN as a force to meet the Nation’s needs in the than the captains and majors, respectively, After experiencing another crisis of years ahead. authorized to fill these critical company- and professional identity during the drawdown Developing promising senior and stra- battalion-level positions. Those officers, following Operation Desert Storm in the tegic leaders is an obligation of the military though talented and motivated to lead, did 1990s, Chief of Staff General Gordon Sul- profession. At a recent Military Education not have the full benefit of what has become livan sounded the clarion call of “No More Coordination Council meeting in Washing- known as the pillars of leader development: Task Force Smiths!” Task Force Smith was ton, DC, several uniformed members asked experience, training, and education. the first Army unit to engage in combat in questions about the types of conflict that we In those difficult days, company, troop, the Korean War. As part of the constabulary should prepare our senior officers for. In the and battery commanders routinely assumed force in Japan, it was woefully unprepared for contemporary operating environment, the the responsibilities of command without combat with its minimal levels of equipment, focus has understandably been on the cur- attending the officers’ advanced courses. S3s manning, and training. General Sullivan was riculum within the colleges: what is taught, did so before attending the Command and concerned that complacency and lack of focus how it is delivered, and by whom (faculty) in General Staff College, where they were to would jeopardize the Army’s ability to accom- order to provide relevant education to senior learn and develop such competencies. One of plish its mission: to fight and win the Nation’s officers. Two essays from the National War the great lessons of this period was that this wars. Without a clearly defined threat and College and Naval War College, respectively, formal process better prepared future leaders with great uncertainty regarding military captured the discussion of the joint PME and was worth the investment in time, money, capabilities required for the 21st century, and Service-specific senior PME content and and infrastructure. Service leaders undertook several initiatives to methodology in a recent issue of this journal.1 develop programs for the Army of the future. As important as curriculum and faculty are, In 1998, Army Chief of Staff General officers did not have the full they are moot issues if those officers who Dennis Reimer implemented Officer Person- benefit of what has become have the greatest potential to serve as strategic nel Management System (OPMS) XXI (now known as the pillars of leader leaders deem attendance at one of our war col- referred to as OPMS) to balance the needs of leges unnecessary and are allowed to bypass it. development: experience, the force in the 21st century with the aspira- training, and education tions and developmental requirements of Cautions from the Past the officer corps. A critical subsystem of Ironically, today’s period of persistent OPMS was officer development. Each branch, conflict loosely parallels that of another time, It was the clarion call of the “Hollow functional area, and officer skill proponent when the Army was under a different kind of Army” that Army Chief of Staff General E.C. defined the appropriate mix of education, stress. The post-Vietnam era found the Army Myers testified about to Congress in 1980. training, and sequential, progressive assign- searching for identity within not only itself but That phrase brought attention to an over- ments needed by the officer corps for their also the Nation. With the end of the draft in structured force that exhibited the symptoms branch at each grade.2 This has been the 1973 and the transition to the Volunteer Army, of being inadequately equipped, under- essence of talent management for a force the Service faced a still formidable Soviet threat manned, and lacking trained and educated required to identify, develop, properly utilize, during the Cold War. As an integral part of the leaders. To address the leader development and retain its best and brightest officers. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United problem, the Army instituted a program of States was required to provide competent and professional military education and a specific Current Challenges credible land forces for the defense of Western subcomponent for its officers within the The Army of 2010 finds itself with Europe. While not a “shooting war,” the atten- Officer Education System (OES). The goal of similar challenges: how to provide units and dant risk and consequences of conflict were these initiatives was to prepare officers for organizations with knowledgeable leaders extraordinarily high. future assignments by providing knowledge, who are capable of ensuring success. This is Having insufficient numbers of officers developing essential skills and competencies, especially difficult when faced with the require- to fill company and field grade positions, the and motivating lifelong learning. Army policy ments to support the Army Force Generation Army accelerated promotions. Commanders shaped practice to ensure that officers met (ARFORGEN) model in the current operat- accepted risk and pressed on to accomplish OES requirements before assuming company- ing environment. It is critical that the Army missions with existing personnel. It was not level command or branch-qualifying posi- balance the immediate need for officers in the uncommon to have lieutenants in command tions as field grade officers. operational force with the longer term impera- of companies, cavalry troops, and artillery Perhaps most importantly, the Army tive to develop the senior officers who will lead batteries as well as captains serving as bat- set clear guidance and established specific and shape the future Army. Those senior offi- talion S3 (responsible for planning, training, policy regarding the management of talent cers should necessarily be a product of a senior and executing tactical plans at the battalion in its ranks. Those officers with the potential level college (SLC) experience. To do otherwise and brigade levels) operations officers rather to advance were required to attend school, harkens to the assignment and education prac- encouraged in their studies, and allowed the tices with junior officers of the Hollow Army. Colonel Charles D. Allen, USA (Ret.), is Professor of  necessary time. Put another way, those who Some may challenge the assertion that Cultural Science in the Department of Command,  attended school were those who should be the current process is not providing officers Leadership, and Management at the U.S. Army War  attending, not merely those who were capable of succeeding at the strategic level. College. available to attend. Clearly, some defense analysts and advisors as ndupress.ndu.edu  issue 59, 4th quarter 2010 / JFQ    95 COMMENTARY | Redress of Professional Military Education GEN Martin E. Dempsey, commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command,  delivers comments at College of the American Soldier conference o) n a d n oli G a c eli g n A my ( Ar S. U. well as Members of Congress in their oversight (96%). Further, they were prepared to address develops the faculty for judgment in ambigu- role have made that assessment.3 Such are and plan for the future while executing in ous environments. the findings of a recent congressional House the present (96%) and prepared to address We have learned from the experiences Armed Services Committee study of profes- problems with no clear-cut solutions (96%). of the 1970s, 1980s, and now in the 21st sional military education. The Oversight and Respondents thought USAWC graduates were century that education is essential for devel- Investigations Subcommittee conveyed that well prepared for senior officer assignments oping officers and that timing the delivery “officers are serving in joint and service staff (97%). . . . The overwhelming majority of of education assists in the development of assignments without adequate educational respondents (99%) said they would recom- competencies that ensure better performance preparation” and that “some operational mend attending the USAWC to officers in in assignments requiring those abilities. It is commanders, including the Combatant Com- their commands.5 important then to examine how these lessons manders, reportedly consider their staff officers are reflected in the current practices and lacking in certain critical abilities necessary to While it may be the case that high per- culture of the Army. Much has been written perform their jobs effectively.”4 forming officers could be successful regardless about culture in recent studies. Organization An expected challenge would be to ques- of whether they attend a senior level college, theorist Edgar Schein’s definition of culture tion the value of senior level colleges as well as intermediate schools for those officers identi- if officers are obviously talented and proven under the stresses fied as high performers and possessing excep- of demanding assignments, it is worth asking what evidence tional potential. If these officers are obviously exists that our schools would make them better talented and proven under the stresses of demanding assignments, it is worth asking what evidence exists that our schools would it is difficult to dismiss the value of education seems appropriate: “A pattern of shared basic make them better. To answer such questions, in preparing for strategic level responsibilities. assumptions that the group learned as it the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) con- As additional evidence to support this claim, solved its problems . . . that has worked well ducts a biennial survey of general officers who it is useful to remind ourselves of the role of enough to be considered valid and, therefore, receive its graduates. According to the 2008 continuing education in a myriad of profes- to be taught to new members as the correct survey: sions—medicine, law, education, science, and way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to public administration. It is therefore compel- those problems.”6 Almost overwhelmingly, respondents indi- ling that military professionals would benefit Following the Army’s participation in cated that USAWC graduates were well from advanced education, which places exten- nearly a decade of simultaneous and continu- prepared to work in the strategic environment sive training and experience in context and ous operations, the policies of OPMS were 96    JFQ / issue 59, 4th quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu ALLEN revised, and its implementation dramatically The “New Normal” and above) today are assuming duties and altered the demographics of SLC selectees Further examination reveals a subtle responsibilities for which the Army has failed and student body. Previously, the majority of but significant shift in the demographics of to provide them the requisite education for selectees were from the combat arms branch, Active component Army students attending professional development. Remembering the many having already served successfully as SLC in the years since 2001. While one former contemporary survey of general officers, the battalion commanders. To meet the intent of Army War College commandant noted that author contends that officers with SLC experi- OPMS, Army policy modified this composi- the Army was “too busy to learn,” the issue is ence are better prepared to face the challenges tion of SLC cohorts to provide a broader mix more insidious.8 Today, promising leaders have of senior and strategic leadership. of officers from various career fields (for learned through professional observation that It is conventional wisdom among Army example, operations, operational support, SLC attendance is considered a luxury for high officers that it is more important to have made and institutional support). Hence, traditional performing officers. Battalion commanders the “quality cut” evidenced by selection for combat arms battalion commanders (now the are routinely serving in excess of 30 months a senior level college than to actually attend. minority attendees) share the SLC educational in command of deploying and deployed units. This belief has become part of the culture, experience with other highly qualified officers The most successful commanders are then and it is now common practice that officers from varied disciplines. In its latest policy for “rewarded” with key billet assignments and will defer attendance during the designated officer development, the Army directs senior positions in a combatant command, joint task year of selection for senior level PME. Unless Service college education for those who: force, or Army Service Component Command the officers do attend or have completed the headquarters that they are wont to accept. 10-week Joint Professional Military Education occup[y] a leadership position (both Understandably, these officers are counseled command and staff) that requires a thor- by leaders and mentors to stay in the fight and it is conventional wisdom ough knowledge of strategy and the art and seek assignments that will prepare them for among Army officers that science of developing and using instruments future promotion and command—to go for it is more important to have of national power (diplomatic, economic, “the brass ring.” made the “quality cut” for military, and informational) during peace Similar to the Volunteer Army of the and war. This knowledge is necessary in order 1970s when inexperienced junior officers were a senior level college than to perform Army, Joint, or Defense Agency company commanders and battalion staff to actually attend operations at the strategic level.7 members, senior officers (lieutenant colonels ey) el e N c M d J. a ROTC members of class of 2010 take oath of office  Ch at Florida A&M University commencement D ( O D ndupress.ndu.edu  issue 59, 4th quarter 2010 / JFQ    97 COMMENTARY | Redress of Professional Military Education II course at Joint Forces Staff College, these the old standard of 24 months to see units officers changed by 33 percent from May high performers will not be legally eligible for through the preparation and deployment for 2009 until the class arrived in mid-July 2009. flag ranks. The Army, therefore, will further operational missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, 41 of the 155 Active Component restrict the bench from which its most senior An unintended consequence of “rewarding” students (26 percent) of AY10 were alternates. leaders are drawn. The trend over the past 5 officers with extended command time and While this number has improved from 44 years shows that 50 percent of the principals key assignments is that a number choose to percent in 2009, the trend is consistent for will choose to defer, delaying an officer’s decline SLC attendance and consideration for May 2010 with over 60 of 185 (32 percent) attendance by an average of 2 years. The Fiscal command. While these numbers are relatively student changes in the USAWC AY11 slate. Year (FY) 2010 Senior Level College selection low, we should rightly consider this a har- These last-minute slating changes and the list included officers with 4 and 5 years of binger of things to come when the “best and scramble to identify replacement students deferrals, and the average age of Active-duty brightest” no longer compete. continue to create considerable turbulence. selectees exceeded 46 years of age in 2009. Demographics of USAWC students The impact is especially significant for the Given that the average SLC officer will gradu- reflect that more than 25 percent of the resi- USAWC, where Active Component officer ate with 23 years of service and the majority dent attendees are “geographical bachelors”— alternates, Army Reserve, Army National of colonels will retire at the 26-year mark, this students who do not bring their families with Guard officers, and government civilians fill allows only 3 years, or one assignment, to use them so as to lessen impact on spouses and vacant seats. the strategic education gained from the SLC children. Given the pace of deployments, it is The last-minute slating of officers also experience. reasonable that officers do not want another dramatically affects the branch representa- year of separation from their families. This tion in the USAWC seminars. Under current Culture of Deferral is especially salient when the likelihood of policy, Active Component deferrals are The office that manages Army senior additional deployment within 2 years of replaced not by an alternate from the same officer assignments categorizes the reasons graduation is relatively high. There is further branch or functional area, but by the next for deferral as either policy or discretionary. anecdotal evidence to suggest that officers officer on the order of merit list. For AY10, Policy deferrals are accepted by the institution request discretionary deferrals while waiting out of a class of 338 students, there were only as the cost of doing business for a nation and to see if they are selected for promotion to 3 armor officers and 13 infantry officers. an Army at war. Operational requirements colonel or, for those with the highest poten- These numbers mean that there were not to support joint and operational staffs or tial, selection for colonel-level command. enough ground maneuver officers to allocate to meet Department of the Army priorities Once selected, there are limited incentives to one for each of the 20 seminars. This absence make up the preponderance of these defer- attend SLC, given the belief that officers have of a ground maneuver perspective may have rals. By-name deferral requests from general already “made it.” This is another indicator an adverse effect on seminar learning in the officers in tactical, operational, and strategic that officer attitudes related to deferments are topic areas of land power development and level organizations are approved to support reinforced as the practice has “worked well employment. the “warfighters.” What the military resisted enough to be considered valid and therefore, in 2005 during Defense Secretary Donald [is] to be taught . . . as the correct way”9 and PME Is Out of Balance Rumsfeld’s “snowflake” query about curtail- inculcated as part of the culture. In a number of forums over the past 2 ing PME during a time of demand on the years, Army Chief of Staff General George Armed Forces has become the “new normal” Class Composition: Canary in the Mine Casey has used the term out of balance to for many of our best officers. Army policies Trends during past years are informa- communicate his concern for the well-being designed to support force generation require- tive. There were approximately 240 defer- of a force that is deploying frequently with ments have the consequence of delaying the ments granted for the 641 FY09 SLC selectees little dwell time between operational missions. education of officers whose contributions across the various colleges and fellowships, While this metaphor aptly describes General would be most valuable at the strategic level. with 27 officers declining attendance or Casey’s assessment of the condition of Soldiers While the majority of deferrals are choosing to retire. With 50 percent of the and their families, it also serves to highlight routinely approved in accordance with policy principal selectees deferring over the past 5 that professional military education is out of decisions, about 10 percent are discretionary years, a recurring backlog of more than 250 balance with the experience and training that for either personal or extenuating circum- officers exists. This has a significant impact our officers have garnered from numerous stances. Before we decry personal desires, it is on the composition of the USAWC student deployments. With the expectation of important to understand the impact of 9 years body. Alternates activated for senior level persistent conflict for the foreseeable future, it of war and the attendant deployments on the college cannot defer. They either attend the is now time to regain the balance between the officer corps. Since 2001, the operational force USAWC or decline with prejudice. In rare educational development of senior leaders and has maintained a grueling pace, with many cases, an alternate selectee may attend another the requirement of operational deployments. Soldiers having a minimum of two combat SLC venue, but the current policy assigns It is imperative to recapture that part of our deployments—some have more. Operational them to the USAWC to fill vacant seats. profession so important to the growth of commanders naturally seek to build and In recent years, the final slate for the leaders who, in 6 to 10 years, will be charged maintain effective units with leaders whom USAWC continued to adjust until late June. with leading the military and advising senior they know and trust. This has resulted in For the 2009–2010 academic year (AY10), the government officials. A more appropriate officers remaining in command well beyond USAWC slate for Active Component Army balance of the two provides a greater 98    JFQ / issue 59, 4th quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu ALLEN opportunity to prepare our leaders for service In practice, however, Army personnel (officer reminds us that culture is neither right nor at the strategic level. and enlisted) are not attending PME as pro- wrong, but may be misaligned with the envi- We should continue to examine whether grammed, with an increasingly significant ronment. At every level, decisions are made the Army is meeting the challenge and backlog of selectees. without malice in an attempt to resolve the responsibility of ensuring that the right officers Who bears responsibility? Is it the problem or address the conditions at hand. But receive the right education at the right time in officer (and prospective student) who has such decisions, as history often reminds, result their careers. Clearly, there is a pervasive con- figured out what really is important in an in unintended consequences. flict between our espoused and enacted values for attending PME institutions. Senior leaders it is time to regain the balance between the educational need to understand the nature and magnitude development of senior leaders and the requirement of of the problem. I have attempted to provide operational deployments illumination and caution about the long-term consequences of this imbalance by observing what is published and what is actually happen- Army career? Or is it the senior leader who Realign the Culture ing within the Army. requests a specific officer, rather than trusting Just as many are involved and bear In various policy documents and offi- the personnel system, to provide a qualified some responsibility for current conditions, cial statements, the Army’s senior leaders officer (top 20 percent of the cohort) to a key many must play key parts in resolving this are saying the right things. Field Manual position on the Army or joint requirement dilemma—it is part of the Army culture (FM) 6–22, Leader Development Strategy, document? Or could it be the institution that we have to acknowledge while making and the Army Capstone Concept clearly responsible for balancing the long-term invest- change a priority. SLC students and senior emphasize the need for high-performing ment in people with the short-term demand officers alike view the current condition as a leaders who can effectively lead their organi- for commanders and leaders? Perhaps there major challenge for the Service. Changing the zations, develop themselves and others, and is no particular person or organization to culture requires the application of Schein’s achieve organizational goals and missions. hold responsible. Once again, Edgar Schein concepts that have demonstrated efficacy.10 Secretary Gates speaks to students at U.S. Army War College U.S. Air Force (Jerry Morrison) ndupress.ndu.edu  issue 59, 4th quarter 2010 / JFQ    99 COMMENTARY | Redress of Professional Military Education It is important to consider methods that strongest lever to change the culture. To para- Cook, “Developing Strategists: Translating National establish the cultural assumptions of what phrase one general officer, “once the path to Strategy into Theater Strategy,” Joint Force Quar- is important for the Army while reinforcing success passes through [SLC] and not around terly 55 (4th Quarter, 2009), 21–28. those assumptions.11 Selection and application it, the system will fix itself.” 2 Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600–3, Commissioned Officer Professional of these methods are the responsibility of the Development and Career Management (Washing- Service as the institution, and when properly A variety of factors contributed to ton, DC: Department of the Army, November 1, applied they will modify the behavior and PME and, in particular, SLC becoming out 1998). expectations of members of the profession. of balance. The Army, however, is at a criti- 3 See Andrew F. Krepinevich and Barry D. Appropriately, the first imperative of Army cal point where it needs to acknowledge this Watts, Regaining Strategic Competence (Wash- Leader Development Strategy is to “encour- imbalance. It needs to make the required ington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary age an equal commitment by the institution, changes to be successful in rebalancing the Assessments, 2009); and John A. Nagl and Brian by leaders, and by individual members of emphasis placed on education to comple- M. Burton, Keeping the Edge: Revitalizing America’s the profession to life-long learning and ment the experience and training required Military Officer Corps (Washington, DC: Center for development.”12 of leaders in the modern era. If it fails to a New American Security, 2010). The existing Army culture toward PME do so, it risks allowing the current status of 4 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight (that is, it is more important to be selected PME to become permanently embedded in and Investigations, Another Crossroads? Profes- than to attend) is a direct result of the policies the Army culture. sional Military Education Two Decades After the emplaced to support force generation require- Once again, a look to history provides Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel, Wash- ments for a brigade-based force. The culture is context. During mobilization for World ington, DC, April 2010, xii, xiv. reinforced by organizational design and struc- War II, the U.S. Army War College and the 5 “2008 U.S. Army War College General ture (brigade combat team–centric); organiza- Army Industrial College were discontinued. Officer Survey,” Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army tional systems and procedures (ARFORGEN); The analysis of that action seems hauntingly War College, Executive Summary. and formal statements of organizational familiar: 6 Edgar Schein, “Organizational Culture and philosophy (to provide support to warfighters Leadership,” in Classics of Organization Theory, through ARFORGEN). The current effort The shortage of officers trained for high staff ed. Jay Shafritz and J. Steven Ott (Fort Worth, TX: to realign the culture toward PME has only and command assignment became acute Harcourt College Publishers, 2001), 373–374. employed reinforcing methods, which on before the first year of the war was over. . . . 7 DA PAM 600–3, 29. 8 Robert H. Scales, “Too Busy to Learn,” Pro- their own are insufficient to change culture. Corps, armies, theaters, and the War Depart- ceedings 136, no. 2/1 (February 2010), 284, available While senior officer statements claim that ment were to suffer increasingly from the at <www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/story. leader development is first priority and that shortage of staff officers trained for higher asp?STORY_ID=2195>. the backlog of PME will be reduced, the day- levels. It is difficult to state positively that the 9 Again from the organizational culture defi- to-day practice, unfortunately, does not reflect products of the Army War College and the nition by Schein, 373–374. those pronouncements.13 PME attendance is, Army Industrial College would have had a 10 The concepts are reinforcing and embedding across all levels of the officer corps, not reflec- beneficial effect on high level planning during mechanisms. See Schein, 228–253. tive of the espoused value of education. and following the war, but on the basis of the 11 Stephen J. Gerras, Leonard Wong, and Specific application of targeted leader influences of those two schools . . . it is rea- Charles D. Allen, “Organizational Culture: Apply- actions is needed to convey to the officer sonable to infer that their sudden elimination ing a Hybrid Model to the U.S. Army,” in Strategic corps that education is a necessary and valued in 1940 was an error of judgment in which Leadership: Selected Readings AY2010 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, November component of leader development. To effec- the current need for officers was allowed to 2009), 130. tively change the culture, the Army’s behav- outweigh the eventual greater need for offi- 12 A Leader Development Strategy for a 21st iors should demonstrate to its members what cers trained for higher staff levels.14 Century Army (Washington, DC: Department of is important. Key actions are what leaders the Army, November 25, 2009), 10. pay attention to, measure, and control on a While opportunities for senior PME 13 See Martin E. Dempsey, “Building Balance regular basis. They are also observed criteria and attendance at the various SLC venues and Versatility for a Campaign-Quality, Expedi- by which leaders allocate scarce resources and remain, the parallels of World War II are tionary Army,” Army 59, no. 10 (October 2009), 88; select and promote organizational members. clear. The clarion may not have sounded yet and James D. Thurman, “A Balanced Army for the Accordingly, Army leaders should track atten- for the Army of the 21st century, but we know Future Strategic Environment,” Army 59, no. 10 dance at PME and focus attention to ensure the tune that it will play; it is professionally (October 2009), 191. that leaders are receiving relevant education imprudent to wait for its mournful notes. JFQ 14 Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States for their professional development. PME Army, 1775–1945 (Washington, DC: Center of Mili- venues need to receive resources—scheduled NOTEs tary History, 1955), 613–614. time in an officer’s career, adequate funding and facilities, and most important, quality 1 See Janet Breslin-Smith and Cliff Krieger, faculty to provide the best educational “Strategic Drift? The Future of the National War experience to students. Finally, the reward of College,” Joint Force Quarterly 55 (4th Quarter, promotion and key billet assignment based 2009), 14–20; and Derek S. Reveron and James L. on completion of required PME may be the 100    JFQ / issue 59, 4th quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu