Spring 2008 In This Issue Volume 10 3 Joint Terrorism Task Number 1 Forces: Protecting DOD from Terrorist Attacks 7 Critical Infrastructure: Vital Incident Response and Reporting 11 USSOCOM Tiger Team Studies Battlefield Biometrics Technology The Guardian 14 Special Event Antiterrorism Risk Assessments: Leveraging Doctrine The Source for Antiterrorism Information 19 SMADS: Strategic Mission Assurance Data System 27 Role Playing in Today’s Training Environments 32 Defending Against the Unknown: Antiterrorism and the Terrorist Planning Cycle A Joint Staff, Deputy Directorate for Antiterrorism/Homeland Defense, Antiterrorism/Force Protection Division Publication The Pentagon, Room MB917 Washington, DC 20318 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2008 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2008 to 00-00-2008 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER The Guardian. Volume 10, Issue 1, Spring 2008 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Deputy Directorate for Antiterrorism/Homeland REPORT NUMBER Defense,Antiterrorism/Force Protection Division,The Pentagon, Room MB917,Washington,DC,20318 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 42 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 “We will prevail. We will prevail in this ideological struggle because liberty is powerful. Liberty is hopeful. The enemy we face can only convince people to join their cause when they find hopelessness. And so our strategy is threefold: one, protect the homeland; two, stay on the offense against these folks; and three, provide an alternative—a hopeful alternative to despair and doubt and hopelessness.” —President George W. Bush January 31, 2008 “We should also remember that terrorist cells in Europe are not purely homegrown or unconnected to events far away— or simply a matter of domestic law and order. Some are funded from abroad. Some hate all western democracies, not just the United States. Many who have been arrested have had direct connections to al Qaeda. Some have met with top leaders or attended training camps abroad. Some are connected to al Qaeda in Iraq. In the most recent case, the Barcelona cell appears to have ties to a terrorist training network run by Baitullah Mehsud, a Pakistan-based extremist commander affiliated with the Taliban and al Qaeda—who we believe was responsible for the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. What unites them is that they are all followers of the same movement—a movement that is no longer tethered to any strict hierarchy but one that has become an independent force of its own. Capable of animating a corps of devoted followers without direct contact. And capable of inspiring violence without direct orders. It is an ideological movement that has, over the years, been methodically built on the illusion of success. After all, about the only thing they have accomplished recently is the death of thousands of innocent Muslims while trying to create discord across the Middle East. So far they have failed. But they have twisted this reality into an aura of success in many parts of the world. It raises the question: What would happen if the false success they proclaim became real success? If they triumphed in Iraq or Afghanistan, or managed to topple the government of Pakistan? Or a major Middle Eastern government?” —Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates February 10, 2008 “We need partners, relationships, and it’s the strength of those relationships that I think is most vital in terms of how we’re going to engage the challenges that we have in the future. Front and center in that is the whole issue of terror tied to weapons of mass destruction, and one of the things I worry the most about is those two things coming together. And I know for a fact that there are those that are seeking to a significant extent to bring those two together. Clearly, right now, we have challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan. Broadly, quite frankly, we’ve got challenges in the Middle East, from what I call “Tehran to Beirut.” That ... is an incredibly important part of the world, and we’re a long way from a stable environment.” —Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ADM Mike Mullen February 22, 2008 Guardian FEEDBACk AnD COnTRIBUTIOnS The Guardian is soliciting input for the Summer 2008 edition. Please direct your comments, feedback, and articles to: [email protected] Editor’s note on “Lessons Learned: The Fort Dix Six” (Winter 2007 edition): The article’s opening paragraph should have said “arrested in May 2007,” not May 2006, as was printed. To update our readers, the trial of the Fort Dix conspirators has been moved to September 29, 2008. The Guardian • SPRInG 2008 I am asking you, the Guardian readership, for your feedback at www.guardianfeedback.xservices. com. Your input will help make the Guardian a more useful product to the Protection community. The inputs to the magazine we have had never cease to amaze me. To date, these thoughtful injects into the all-hazards approach stimulate good discussion and facilitate an important dialogue for the community. While many consider our most dangerous threat to be al Qaeda– affiliated groups, other terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah, should not be discounted. Just as troubling, the threats to our forces from criminal elements and random acts of violence remain the more probable threat. The force protection provisions implemented are to protect ourselves not just from transnational terror groups, but from the myriad individuals and groups that wish us harm. While the recent attack against the recruiting station in NYC was without an apparent terror nexus, it nonetheless was an attack. At a recent threat conference, I heard Mr. John Robb, author of Brave New War, speak about open-source warfare and what he terms “Global Guerrillas.” He points out that the future terror threat will morph into small, agile groups, operating toward independent ends without external guidance. They will use replication and learning from other groups to increase both their chances of success and their attempts to increase the carnage of their attack. This is a topic in which I am interested: future asymmetric and disruptive threats that our adversaries may employ. We should all be thinking of the future threat and how to prepare ourselves. As we see highlighted in Iraq and Afghanistan, the majority of missions undertaken by DOD are in conjunction with our interagency partners. The same is true of the Protection mission. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies must be leveraged while preparing the force The Guardian newsletter is published for the protection construct. Indeed, the civilian agencies will often have the lead Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the in the investigation, prosecution, and thwarting of an attack. Not being Antiterrorism/Force Protection Division of “in control” of the situation is counter to the method under which most the J3 Deputy Directorate for Antiterrorism/ military commands operate, especially if a threat is directed toward our Homeland Defense to share knowledge, personnel. Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon all of us to get smart on how support discussion, and impart lessons and interagency actions work, not just for terrorism, but particularly in the information in an expeditious and timely planning phases of consequence management. manner. The Guardian is not a doctrinal product and is not intended to serve as a The threats to our way of life remain serious and tangible. As we program guide for the conduct of operations witness the atrocities and self-defeating results of extremism in Iraq, and training. The information and lessons Afghanistan, and Pakistan, we must never forget that they underestimate herein are solely the perceptions of those our resolve to prevail. individuals involved in military exercises, activities, and real-world events and are not The price of freedom is eternal vigilance. necessarily approved as tactics, techniques, —Thomas Jefferson and procedures. SUBMITTInG nEWS & ARTICLES The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Joint Staff, DOD, or any other agency of the Federal Government. The editors invite articles Peter M. Aylward and other contributions on antiterrorism and Brigadier General, US Army force protection of interest to the Armed J-3, Deputy Director for Antiterrorism/Homeland Defense Forces. Local reproduction of our newsletter is authorized and encouraged. The Guardian • SPRInG 2008 Joint Terrorism Task Forces: Protecting DOD from Terrorist Attacks By Mr. Gregory Fuller, CIFA The terrorist attacks on the Khobar Towers, the In the United States, DOD has partnered with USS COLE, and the Pentagon are only the most recent the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the and visible reminders that DOD is one of the prime lead agency for counterterrorism (CT) within the targets, if not the prime target, of terrorist aggression United States, by placing DOD CI special agents against the United States. Even today, in places like on FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). Iraq, Afghanistan, and Indonesia, the men and women Designated by the FBI as the “nation’s front line of DOD live under the constant threat of imminent on terrorism,” JTTFs are charged with protecting terrorist attacks. Of all the steps DOD has taken to America from terrorist attacks. DOD special agents prevent and protect against future terrorist attacks, work shoulder-to-shoulder with FBI special agents what has DOD Counterintelligence (CI) done? investigating suspected terrorist activity, coordinating Overseas, DOD has partnered with the Department counterterrorist activities, and sharing terrorist of State to establish the Force Protection Detachment information. (FPD) program (for more information, see “Force Designated by the FBI as the “nation’s front line on terrorism,” JTTFs are charged with protecting America from terrorist attack. DOD special agents work shoulder- to-shoulder with FBI special agents investigating suspected terrorist activity, coordinating counterterrorist activities, and sharing terrorist information. Protection Detachments: Partnering with Foreign In the News Nation Counterparts” in the April 2007 issue of The Guardian). The FPD program permanently places DOD In a recent case, DOD special agents working on CI special agents at overseas locations with significant JTTFs were an integral part of the investigation and numbers of “in transit” DOD ships, personnel, and apprehension of Hassan Abujihaad, a former US aircraft—but without a permanent DOD CI support Navy sailor. Evidence suggested Abujihaad (also presence—to provide current and actionable force known as Paul R. Hall) corresponded via e-mail with protection information to the in-transit commander. 3 The Guardian • SPRInG 2008 known al Qaeda operatives during his duty aboard the and local law enforcement to combat an increasing USS BENFOLD. In the e-mails, Abujihaad provided number of terrorist bombings. Prior to 9/11, there sensitive ship locations and vulnerabilities, praised were 35 JTTFs in existence throughout the United those responsible for the USS COLE bombing in States. The FBI has since expanded the number of Yemen, and discussed killing fellow naval personnel. JTTFs to one at each of its 56 field offices and to In March 2007, officers from the Phoenix JTTF arrested approximately 46 of its annexes. Over 2,000 full- and Abujihaad and charged him with supporting terrorism part-time non-FBI personnel from more than 600 and terrorist organizations with the intent to kill US federal, state, and local agencies currently participate citizens and transmitting classified information to on JTTFs in support of terrorist-related investigations. unauthorized people. The FBI also established the National Joint Barely four months before these events, Derrick Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF), a multiagency task Shareef (who had significant connections with force co-located with the National Counterterrorism Abujihaad) was arrested in December 2006 by Center in McLean, Virginia. The NJTTF serves as a members of the Chicago JTTF. Shareef was arrested point of fusion for 44 federal, state, and local agencies, after having purchased several hand grenades and a each providing full-time representatives and meeting handgun with the intent of attacking a Chicago-area daily to share timely CT-related information. Fully shopping mall during the last Friday before the 27 percent of the NJTTF is composed of DOD agency Christmas holiday. representatives (12 agencies in all), ensuring DOD These cases, along with the recent disruption of interests are well represented at the national level. terrorist attack plans at Fort Dix and New York’s The DOD JTTF program Kennedy airport, support the belief that future terrorist activities are likely to be conducted by small The DOD JTTF program enables Service CI groups of people with either prior military training or agencies to partner with local, state, and federal law access to a military facility. enforcement agencies at FBI-led JTTFs to detect and neutralize terrorists, terrorist-enabling individuals, The Inception of JTTFs and DOD Participation and organizations that threaten DOD interests, The devastating attacks on the World Trade such as in the case of Hassan Abujihaad. The DOD Center and the Pentagon in September 2001 exposed special agents work closely with FBI special agents significant weaknesses on terrorism-related in our national security investigations with an architecture. Terrorists Hunting Foreign Intelligence Officers eye toward the DOD were training and planning connection in each case. attacks within our borders DOD agents participate Under the jurisdiction of the FBI, one DOD special agent while coordinating with in significant CT was able to identify and investigate an undercover terrorist networks outside operations to identify, the United States. intelligence officer from a hostile foreign government recruit, and direct assets Subsequently, the 9/11 operating within the United States. The operative was in the identification and Commission identified collecting information on US Soldiers in the Denver area collection of information the critical necessity of on suspected terrorist in an attempt to recruit Iraqis, conduct preoperational interagency cooperation cells and organizations surveillance, and gather intelligence. When the opera- and communication. The operating within the FBI, charged with the tive discovered that he was being investigated, he fled United States and lead to counter terrorist the United States and disappeared. targeting DOD and US activity within the United assets. Additionally, States, chose JTTFs as the special agents perform At that point, the FBI would normally have forwarded primary investigative a vital liaison role, the case to DOD for eventual follow-up—but because a and operational method continually exchanging to achieve interagency DOD special agent was already assigned to the Denver information with cooperation and JTTF, that agent continued the investigation without participating JTTF communication. agencies and facilitating interruption. Working with other DOD agencies, he lo- The JTTF program was the coordination of cated the operative in Iraq and coordinated with the US established by the FBI’s CT activities between FBI and Army Special Operations Command to develop a strike division based on a 1980 DOD. New York City task force plan. The operative was subsequently arrested and In March 2002, model that incorporated incarcerated and has since provided valuable informa- Congress appropriated members from federal, state, funding for DOD tion in the War on Terror. 4 The Guardian • SPRInG 2008 participation in the FBI’s JTTF program. Currently, protection of DOD equities. Additionally, because DOD provides over 75 CI special agents to nearly 50 DOD agents can identify a DOD nexus sooner than of the more than 100 JTTFs. DOD CI representation is other agents could, they are involved earlier and in comprised of one or more special agents from the Air more cases. Force Office of Special Investigations, Army Military Database Access Intelligence, or Naval Criminal Investigative Service. The agencies participating on the JTTFs are easily Assigning CI agents to the FBI’s JTTFs enables DOD to able to share, through the discretion of their special be directly involved in FBI terrorist investigations and agents, agency-specific information within the task CT activities affecting DOD equities, provides access force. This information sharing enables DOD to to FBI-derived terrorist threat data, and improves develop a fuller understanding of a person, place, or operational partnerships with US law enforcement organization. agencies. DOD agents have supported information security checks for local military security forces. In the event DOD Interaction on the JTTFs of a suspicious person requesting access, the local Although the FBI maintains jurisdiction and security office can contact the special agent and investigative oversight, JTTFs enable non-Bureau request a more thorough background check in real participation in a wide range of investigations and time. The special agent, in effect, enables the local operations related to suspected terrorist activity. The security forces to better respond to suspicious persons JTTFs also serve as a focal point for sharing collective while intelligently adjusting the force protection resources and hard-to-access, agency-specific responses quickly and more accurately. information from each participating agency. The FBI’s Guardian database system is designed Expanded Jurisdiction to share a terrorist-related investigative lead with all Because of the broad range of laws under the the appropriate JTTFs. Through this system, a DOD purview of the FBI, DOD special agents, by virtue of agent can nominate a DOD-related terrorist lead for their assignment to the JTTFs, are able to participate in review and action by any JTTF, leveraging all JTTFs significantly more investigations and operations than and participating special agents to develop DOD would otherwise be available to them. This expanded leads. The Guardian system’s storage and sharing participation translates into more thorough DOD capabilities also make it the ideal solution to replace involvement in CT cases. the DOD Threat and Local Observation Notice Deputation is one tool that JTTFs use to expand (TALON) database, which has now been terminated. the jurisdiction of state and local law enforcement Currently, DOD suspicious incidents and activity officers. Some JTTFs deputize all agents as a matter reports are being entered into the Guardian database, of practice, whether they are federal, state, or local providing additional information in support of JTTF law enforcement officers. Deputation expands investigations. the jurisdiction of the special agents to the FBI’s A Better DOD Workforce jurisdiction, protects the agents’ parent organization by elevating all litigation to the federal court system, The collaborative efforts of DOD CI special agents and provides all JTTF participants with unified working in conjunction with members of the federal, identification credentials, state, and local law which reduces public enforcement agencies foster The keen Eye of DOD Experience confusion over varied a significantly greater agency badges. level of interagency trust and communication. Advocacy in Cases A commercial photo lab employee provided the FBI In addition to the DOD special agents with photographs showing suspicious items, possibly primary benefits to DOD are the resident experts improvised explosive devices (IEDs) commonly used by previously mentioned, on the Department for terrorists. Although the FBI special agents recognized JTTFs also enhance and JTTFs and are best able to identify a real or potential the items in the photographs as suspicious, it was the expedite coordination and information sharing DOD nexus among DOD special agent who recognized the location of the among DOD and the developing JTTF cases and photographs as a ship’s berthing area; the address in participating agencies. leads. Furthermore, DOD one of the pictures as that of a ship at sea’s mailing agents advocate further Accelerated Interagency address; and the possible IEDs to be, in reality, training development of potential Coordination DOD-related cases and leads items for crew exercises. The DOD agent was able to JTTFs are catalysts for that would not otherwise prevent valuable time and resources from being spent accelerated interagency be pursued, enhancing the on a needless investigation through his knowledge of coordination and allow 5 navy equipment and his placement on the JTTF. The Guardian • SPRInG 2008 DOD special agents to leverage their task force Stronger Professional Relationships partners to provide increased and regular support to DOD special agents work daily with their fellow DOD events. Events that previously took weeks or agents, building and strengthening their professional months to coordinate can now be coordinated in days relationships. The team concept of a JTTF creates or weeks among fellow special agents. A DOD agent an enhanced level of trust and understanding needs only to reach out to a fellow agent within the among the various agencies’ special agents. The room, rather than over the telephone or across the city, JTTF environment encourages coordination and to coordinate a DOD event. Additionally, for specific collaboration to guarantee that every member is threats, emergencies, and crises, DOD special agents working toward the same goal. Task force experiences In the hours after the bombing of the USS COLE, the FBI immediately began putting together a task force to investigate the crime. Based on his experience on the JTTF, the DOD special agent was able to translate and clearly articulate FBI requirements to the Navy leadership and, in turn, advise the FBI on the proper Navy protocols and culture. This communication dramatically reduced the confusion and misconceptions to which high-profile, multiagency terrorist investigations are prone. are already fully integrated into the JTTFs and are also facilitate better working relationships with other able to immediately engage in appropriate responses, agencies when former DOD agents take their JTTF investigations, and operations rather than arriving experiences with them in their DOD careers. DOD at a JTTF after the event and trying to learn the task agents are able to draw on these past JTTF experiences force’s practices while the rest of the team is focused to “break the ice” and accelerate building new on developing the investigation. interagency relationships in their future assignments. In the hours after the bombing of the USS COLE, Furthermore, because they have worked so closely the FBI immediately began putting together a task with fellow special agents from other agencies, they force to investigate the crime. One of the first members understand the restrictions and capabilities of the of the task force was a DOD special agent already non-DOD organizations and can more easily work assigned to the New York JTTF. The DOD agent through these challenges to achieve greater success. served as a vital link in coordinating FBI activities These examples of benefits to DOD’s participation with the US Navy and DOD. Based on his experience on JTTFs are far from exhaustive. DOD special agents on the JTTF, the DOD special agent was able to regularly reap these and other benefits throughout translate and clearly articulate FBI requirements the course of the day, each time drawing DOD closer to the Navy leadership and, in turn, advise the FBI to the FBI and other participating agencies while on the proper Navy protocols and culture. This simultaneously seeking, finding, and neutralizing the communication dramatically reduced the confusion next terrorist threat to DOD and to the United States. and misconceptions to which high-profile, multi- Making DOD a Hard Target agency terrorist investigations are prone. The previous terrorist attacks on the Khobar Towers, Experience and Tools the USS COLE, and the Pentagon and averted attacks Each special agent brings his or her own agency’s like that at Fort Dix serve as grim reminders of the unique tools, techniques, training, and experiences terrorist threat to the United States. Would-be terrorists that are useful to investigations and operations. These indicate that the terrorist threat has not gone away but experiences and tools focus all of the assets of the is constantly changing to exploit weaknesses in our various organizations on developing terrorist cases national security. The FBI’s JTTF program has become and creating faster responses, clearer leads, and better the primary investigative and operational arm in the information, which result in improved case resolution. fight against terrorist activity in the continental United Some examples of agency-specific experience or States. The DOD JTTF special agents serve as a vital tools include the local police department’s detailed link among the FBI, other participating agencies, and knowledge and understanding of the local area, the DOD in providing information essential to protecting FBI’s Crime Lab, the Drug Enforcement Agency’s Service members and in participating in investigations El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), and numerous and operations to detect, deter, and disrupt terrorist multiagency databases within the Department of plans at home and abroad. With DOD coverage in Homeland Security. nearly 50 JTTF offices, DOD special agents are on the front line in the War on Terror in the United States. 6 The Guardian • SPRInG 2008 Critical Infrastructure: Vital Incident Response and Reporting By MAJ Jason Strickland MAJ Jason Strickland is a Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Planner at Standing Joint Force Headquarters North (SJFHQ-N), USNORTHCOM’s deployable Directorate. Much of the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program presence in the vicinity of that incident. Finally, I will (DCIP) has been focused to date on pre-incident offer recommendations that should be considered by activities such as identification, prioritization, DHS and DOD. assessment, deterrence, mitigation, and prevention. Learning from Our Past The consequences of an all-hazards catastrophic event for our nation’s critical infrastructure and One of the key resources (CI/KR) must also be appropriately many lessons “The chief of strategy for addressed.1 Current DCIP publications do not broach learned from Ahmadinejad, Hassan Abbassi, has the subject of catastrophic incident response in regard Hurricane Katrina said: ‘We have a strategy drawn up to defense critical infrastructure. Department of regarding critical Defense Directive (DODD) 3020.40, the authoritative infrastructure and for the destruction of Anglo-Saxon DCIP document, limits the DCIP to “identification, DOD’s response civilization ... we must make use assessment, and security enhancement” of DOD was that an of everything we have at hand to critical infrastructure and vaguely mentions “support effective COP did strike at this front by means of incident management” in word but not in action.2 The not exist between Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Sector-Specific Plan, DHS and DOD.6 our suicide operations or means of required by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan Although there our missiles. There are 29 sensitive (NIPP), neglects any mention of response activities are many ways sites in the US and the West. We as they pertain to either DOD-owned infrastructure to achieve a COP have already spied on these sites or that which falls under the DIB.3 Military operators via networks, RSS and planners must understand and adapt to effects in feeds, SharePoint and we know how we are going to the remaining 17 CI/KR sectors4, which have direct portals, and other attack them....’” bearing on DIB assets, DOD facilities, and the ability technologies, —Senate Committee on the Judiciary of the military to fulfill its assigned missions. This the key enabler Wartime Executive Power and the NSA’s article outlines recommendations for DOD response of information Surveillance Authority II; February 28, 2006; to a catastrophic incident as it pertains to critical sharing in testimony of R. James Woolsey infrastructure. this context is First, I will address one of the major findings from relationships. Hurricane Katrina: Build a common operating picture Repeatedly in after-action reviews regarding (COP) for the Department of Homeland Security interagency activities, the importance of preexisting (DHS) and DOD.5 Second, I will discuss DOD’s operational relationships surfaces as an area to 7 improve among agencies, governments, The Guardian • SPRInG 2008 CIP Event Cycle Analysis & Indications & Remediation Mitigation Response Reconstitution Assessment Warning Event Pre-Event Post-Event departments, and organizations. This need is This emphasis on critical infrastructure information especially important with regard to interagency sharing is supported by the Governors’ Homeland partners and Defense Support of Civil Authorities Security Advisory Council. Protecting critical (DSCA) events as they pertain to DOD. In more infrastructure remains the third-highest concern conventional settings, the DOD has had an “I’m in among the 56 state and territorial homeland security charge” mentality (and appropriately so) with regard advisors.10 Increasingly, the states are working to our standard (nondomestic) mission set. In DSCA, together to share information regarding critical the paradigm shifts to local agencies, first responders, infrastructure through organizations such as the All and, ultimately, the Incident Commander.7 At Hazards Consortium, a group of eight mid-Atlantic US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), this states and the District of Columbia that share in a perspective is certainly being promulgated.8 Both “culture of collaboration” to prepare the region for all formal and informal relationships continue to be types of hazards.11 The DOD would be well served to established to take advantage of the wealth of maintain informal relationships with organizations of information available for commanders and decision this type to foster rapid interagency response once a makers. USNORTHCOM established a robust Joint catastrophic event occurs. Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), composed On-Scene Activities of more than 60 agencies, to facilitate relationships among interagency partners with whom the DOD and Although information sharing among DHS, DOD, USNORTHCOM may interact during a catastrophic and others continues to improve, on-scene activities in event. Many of these agencies maintain a full-time the aftermath of a catastrophic incident are crucial to presence at USNORTHCOM, whereas others fold fulfilling DOD’s responsibilities within the National into the JIACG when responding to a crisis (or during Response Framework (NRF). DOD response begins appropriate exercises). This activity relates to sharing with the activation of a Defense Coordinating Officer critical infrastructure information by focusing on the (DCO) or a Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) formal and informal relationships at the three-letter that serves as DOD’s single point of contact within agency level. DHS, DOD, and USNORTHCOM the Joint Field Office (JFO).12 It is well known that have exchanged senior representatives to emphasize in the event of a significant catastrophic event, the the importance of these relationships. Exchanges DCE assigned to the affected Federal Emergency also take place informally and at lower levels. Management Agency (FEMA) region will quickly Within USNORTHCOM’s Force Protection/Mission become overwhelmed and need rapid augmentation.13 Assurance Division, relationships are established With regard to critical infrastructure, the DCE must with the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection’s speedily coordinate with the DHS Infrastructure Protective Security Advisors (PSAs) and the National Liaison (IL) within the JFO. The IL is usually a DHS Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC), with state PSA who serves as the chief advisor to the Unified critical infrastructure representatives, with Defense Coordination Group in support of the Principal Infrastructure Sector Lead Agents (DISLAs), and Federal Official (PFO) regarding all CI/KR.14 DOD’s with intelligence and law enforcement organizations. interests can and should be represented by having USNORTHCOM also has access to DHS data their own envoy within the JFO (as a part of the networks (e.g., Constellation/Automated Critical DCO or DCE working in either the Operations or Asset Management System [C/ACAMS], Cyber Planning Section) who can coordinate with the Warning Information Network [CWIN], Homeland IL. From this location, a DCIP representative can Security Information Network (HSIN)). All of these adequately exchange appropriate information with the relationships facilitate aggressive information sharing IL, USNORTHCOM, US Army North (ARNORTH), and result in a more effective COP, supporting the Emergency Support Function (ESF) 3 members (if national strategy for protecting CI/KR.9 activated), the DCO or DCE, and local infrastructure- 8