Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2001 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2001 to 00-00-2001 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Aircraft Survivability: Science and Technology Initiatives in Aircraft 5b. GRANT NUMBER Survivability, Summer 2001 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION JAS Program Office,200 12th Street South,Crystal Gateway #4, Suite REPORT NUMBER 1103,Arlington,VA,22202 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 32 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 JOINT AERONAUTICAL Contents JACG COMMANDERS GROUP TRheveo Sluutrivoivna bati lDityA RPA 4 by Dr.David A.Whelan Aircraft Survivabilityis published three times a year by the Joint Technical Coordinating Survivability/Reliability Group on Aircraft Survivability (JTCG/AS). and the Unmanned Air Vehicle 6 The JTCG/AS is chartered by the Joint by Mr.Jerry L.Lockenour Aeronautical Commanders Group. Views and comments are welcome and may be The Low Altitude addressed to the Editor at the following Battlespace Environment 8 address. by BGen J.F.Amos Editor—Joseph P. Jolley A Short History of JTCG/AS Central Office Aircraft Survivability 10 1213 Jefferson Davis Highway by Dr.Richard P.Hallion Crystal Gateway #4, Suite 1103 Arlington, VA 22202 The Joint Aircraft Survivability to Man-Portable PHONE: 703.607.3509, ext. 14 Air Defense Systems Joint Feasibility Study 14 DSN: 327.3509, ext. 14 by Dr.Kristina Langer E-mail: [email protected] http://jtcg.jcte.jcs.mil:9101 Pioneers of Survivability— Mr. Michael “Mike” Meyers 16 Mailing list additions, deletions, and/or by Dale B.Atkinson changes may be directed to: Aviation Survivability Survivability/Vulnerability Equipment Overview (ASE) 18 SSUURRVVIIAACC by Dr.Steven Messervy and Mr.Steven Stegman InformationAnalysisCenter 460G/OGM/OL-C/SURVIAC Survivable Engine Controls 24 Attention: Linda Ryan by Mr.Charles Frankenberger and Dr.Alan Pisano 2700 D. Street, Building 1661 Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433-7605 Army S&T Program for PHONE: 937.255.4840 Aircraft Survivability 28 DSN: 785.4840 by Mr.Malcolm W.Dinning and Mr.Bruce S.Tenney FAX: 937.255.9673 E-mail: [email protected] Low Altitude Helicopter Combat Operations 30 by Mr.Gerald J.Burblis Creative Director Christina P. McNemar Calendar 32 SURVIAC Satellite Office 3190 Fairview Park Drive About the cover—Northrop Grumman ISS unveiled its design for an unmanned aircraft to demonstrate some of the technologies emanat- Falls Church, VA 22042 ing from its new Advanced Systems Development Center (ASDC) in El Phone: 703.289.5464 Segundo, CA. Pegasus, an internally funded program, will perform a E-mail: [email protected] proof-of-concept demonstration with flight tests scheduled to begin later this year. Pegasus is being designed and built to demonstrate aerodynamic flying qualities suitable for aircraft carrier operations. Newsletter & Cover Design Specific objectives include— Christina P. McNemar • Low speed aerodynamic handling qualities • Compatibility with carrier landing systems • Simulated landing arrestment • Demonstrate an air vehicle management and architecture applicable to future unmanned air vehicles Distribution Statement A: Designed with stealth features and shaped like a kite, Pegasus is built largely with composite materials. The aircraft measures 27.9 feet long Approved for publice release; and has a nearly equal wingspan of 27.8 feet. First flight is planned distribution is unlimited. for the fourth quarter of this year at the Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, CA. One of the first tasks of the Pegasus flight program will be to demonstrate the aerodynamic qualities of an autonomous UAV that would allow it to operate from an aircraft carrier, thus reducing the risk for carrier operations of a Naval UCAV. 2 Aircraft Survivability • Summer 2001 Editor’s Notes The theme for this issue of Aircraft Survivability is Science and Technology (S&T) initiatives in aircraft survivability. Two persuasive articles by Dr. Whelan and Mr. Lockenour address how survivability is being viewed in the design and employment of unmanned air vehicles. Another interesting article describes a successful JTCG/AS funded project in engine digital control technology that may find its way onto now- and next-generation high performance turbine engines. New control algorithms will provide a capability to detect sudden engine damage inflicted in combat or peacetime events like foreign object damage (FOD)—and then employ a damage mitigation action to minimize the damage effects and also retain realistic engine performance capacity. Three articles focus on operations in the low altitude battle- space environment, including one by BGen James Amos, USMC, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. The JTCG/AS is supporting a Joint Test & Evaluation (JT&E) program titled, Joint Aircraft Survivability to MANPADS (JAS- MAN). This JT&E is now in the Joint Feasibility Study (JFS) phase and is due for review by the OSD JT&E Senior Advisory Council soon. Dr. Kristina Langer is the JASMAN technical director and has written an informative article that describes the JT&E program in general and the objectives of JASMAN. For a change of pace, we appreciate the contribution of Dr. Richard Hallion, Air Force Historian. In his article, Dr. Hallion offers a historical review of the military experience with aircraft survivability, beginning with the end of the Vietnam war. Being recognized as our pioneer in survivability for this issue is Mr. Mike Meyers of The Boeing Company. Mike has been active in the JTCG/AS for many years as an industry representative. After a long and distinguished career with McDonnell Aircraft Company and then Boeing, Mike will retire 30 June 2001. The symposium will examine issues and As always, we solicit your comments on any of the articles or challenges to air combat survivability posed by other parts of the newsletter. The E-mail address is new and existing threats and all aspects of the [email protected]. The theme of the next issue of Aircraft system/subsystem integration process. The Survivabilityis Credibility of Modeling and Simulation in Aircraft symposium format and venue has proven itself Survivability. We thank all of the authors in this issue for taking over the past several years to be highly con- the time to contribute to Aircraft Survivability. ducive to promoting meaningful interaction and Finally, LTC Schwarz, JTCG/AS Central Office Director is being networking with key participants in the U.S. transferred effective 9 July 2001. His new assignment is to an survivability community. This forum offers an OSD special program at the Pentagon. We appreciate LTC ideal opportunity to present your work, ideas Schwarz’ efforts during his tenure with the JTCG/AS and wish and perspectives on key topics to a very wide him well in his new assignment. spectrum of key observers and decision-makers. U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. James V. Downen, Jr. Aircraft Survivability • Summer 2001 3 The Survivability Revolution at DARPA by Dr. David A. Whelan The Defense Advanced Research Projects Spacecraft Survivability Agency (DARPA) has been developing The ability of the United States to dominate the “high revolutionary military and national sys- ground” of space is being challenged by a rapidly tems for over 40 years. From the Saturn V rock- increasing number of nations with space capabilities. et to stealth technology and the Internet, Thus, it was very good to see that the Winter 2000 issue DARPA programs have historically created par- of Aircraft Survivability focused on space survivability. adigm shifts in aerospace and information. In that issue, Ball and Kolleck stated— The current portfolio of DARPA programs holds the same promise—warfighting twenty Spacecraft susceptibility reduction can also be achieved by years from now will little resemble current providing the on-orbit satellite with some type of maneuver practices. Survivability is one of many areas in capability (spacecraft tactics). The ability to change orbit will which DARPA programs will make a dramatic allow the spacecraft to avoid getting hit by large pieces of difference. orbital debris and meteoroids and help defeat accurate foreign What does it mean to create a “revolution” tracking/orbit determination. Accurate foreign tracking/orbit in survivability? The development of stealth determination capability is one of the biggest threats to U.S. technology provides a good example. In 1977, space systems. Any effective foreign space object identification DARPA began funding the Have Blue program, program will allow a potential enemy to possibly engage in a followed in 1978 by the Tacit Blue program. denial and deception program. This in turn could negate the The Have Blue aircraft, otherwise known as the effectiveness of U.S. reconnaissance assets and result in a mis- “Hopeless Diamond,” made its first flight in sion kill without attacking any of the elements in the space 1981, followed in 1982 by the Tacit Blue air- system. craft, or “Whale.” Neither of these aircraft met a complete set of requirements for a military aircraft. Yet DARPA had created two existence proofs that aircraft could fly virtually undetect- ed by state-of-the-art radars. That was the rev- olution. But the development of a new technology should never be undertaken without thinking about tactics. Tactics must be considered from the conceptual phases of a new capability in order to get real gains. For example, consider the synergy between electronic warfare tech- niques and stealth capabilities. While signa- Figure 1. In addition to reducing predictability of ture reduction might have been the principal orbits, satellite maneuverability can also be used to focus early in the stealth program, it became increase coverage. This graph shows the increase apparent that the greatest tactical effectiveness in radar coverage over a standard 24-satellite con- would be achieved when electronic warfare stellation when the spacecraft are maneuvered to tactics were part of the employment strategy. optimize the coverage. In this article, I will try to describe the revo- lutions we at DARPA are trying to foster in The fact is, most spacecraft have a maneuver capabil- both aircraft survivability and spacecraft sur- ity. The reason they do not use it is that they cannot be vivability. refueled. Inability to refuel means, of course, that 4 Aircraft Survivability • Summer 2001 maneuvers will shorten mission lifetime. Imagine if tac- and overall space system life cycle costs will tical jet aircraft had to be filled with all the fuel they come down. Rather than a human-based refur- could ever use, right when they came off the production bishment scheme such as was used on the line! Equally absurd, today, would be procuring military Hubble Space Telescope, the servicing mis- jet aircraft that did not have an inflight refueling capa- sions of Orbital Express will be executed by bility. But spacecraft today cannot be refueled, so their unmanned spacecraft controlled by fuel must be scrupulously conserved—for altitude con- autonomous mission software, requiring a trol, for deorbiting at the end of their useful life, and for minimum of interaction with the ground. orbit adjustment in support of the occasional military Orbital Express is being designed as an entire crisis. architecture rather than a specialized system, with standard interfaces and protocols, so its benefits will be available to a wide variety of spacecraft. If Orbital Express is successful, space opera- tions of twenty years from now will look little like they do today. Aircraft Survivability The advent of low observable aircraft was the first DARPA-led revolution in aircraft sur- vivability. The F-117 Nighthawk proved its bat- tle-worthiness in Operation Desert Storm. During some inclement nights over Kosovo, Figure 2. The small size and weight of the Miniature the only aircraft flying was the B-2 Spirit. These Air-Launched Decoy minimize its impact on the low observable aircraft deliver payloads accu- strike aircraft payload. Here three MALDs are rately and bring their crews back. loaded on a wing pylon. But not all aircraft in the inventory are low observable, now or in the near future. DARPA has a program to revolutionize the way we Adversary surface-to-air missiles are proliferat- operate spacecraft. Called Orbital Express, it will ing and at the same time becoming more demonstrate for the first time the refueling of spacecraft lethal. Even an F-117 fell prey to them in on orbit. This will give spacecraft operators the ability to Kosovo. In order to help strike aircraft get to maneuver spacecraft to take maximum advantage of the target and back safely, DARPA has devel- their capabilities, without fear of premature mission oped the Miniature Air-Launched Decoy expiration (see Figure 1). Adversaries will no longer be (MALD) (See Figure 2). This 98-pound air able to accurately predict orbits to escape observation of vehicle has achieved an average unit flyaway hostile activities. Fuel will no longer be a treasure to be price of only $30,000, by developing a minia- hoarded, but a commodity to be delivered when need- ture turbojet engine and using mostly com- ed and used when appropriate. The survivability and mercial airframe components. The effectiveness of U.S. national security spacecraft will revolutionary aspect of MALD is that now both be enhanced by Orbital Express. there is an effective penetration aid whose cost We have structured the Orbital Express program to is many times less than the threat surface-to-air demonstrate yet another revolutionary capability. The missile. MALD is an example of asymmetric system will deliver and install Orbital Replacement warfare by the good guys! With dozens of suc- Units (ORU) on orbiting spacecraft. This will allow cessful test flights behind it, 150 MALD vehi- capabilities to be upgraded or refurbished on orbit; cles will be purchased by the Air Force over the long-lived, expensive hardware such as optics and struc- next three years in a limited production buy. ture can be kept operating rather than being discarded; continued on page 20 Aircraft Survivability • Summer 2001 5 Survivability/Reliability and the Unmanned Air Vehicle by Mr. Jerry L. Lockenour Replacement cost in the military should include the actual cost of replacing the vehicle as well as the logis- tics cost of resupplying it to the theater. For a fixed range/duration mission the value of the platform is a strong function of the value of the mission payload. The relationship of payload value to the cost of a hypo- thetical UAV relative to an equivalent manned aircraft is characterized in Figure 1. The cost of removing the man from an air vehicle (removing the cockpit and the relat- ed man support systems) is only about one-third of the total cost savings realized by the deployment of a UAV The fundamental consideration that has instead of a manned system. The remaining two-thirds driven the use of classical survivability saving comes from the design choices that are made in the design of military air vehicles possible throughout the rest of the vehicle. Taking an has been the high value placed on human life. ISR mission as an example, on the lower extreme of For all manned platforms this “value of life” payload, one might carry simply an optical camera. drives design features such as component reli- Further up the scale in payload value, a mix of RF, EO, ability, system redundancy, hydraulic line and and IR sensors may be considered. And on the very high wire bundle separation, and component hard- end could be a sophisticated array of sensors similar to ening. Unmanned vehicles, to date, have not that found on the JSTARS or AWACS manned aircraft. employed the same level of survivability or As systems move up this scale, it is unlikely that vehicles reliability. They have been considered to be would be considered “throw-away.” UAVs at the “high more expendable than manned systems. The value” extreme of the scale would likely require similar result is that today’s UAVs are very low cost. As reliability and survivability as the manned equivalent. we now consider UAVs for more sophisticated UAV Cost Differential will be missions we must examine their survivability a Function of Payload Value requirements and decide what criteria should be used to determine the appropriate numeri- cal requirements. There are two dominant factors that will Manned Vehicle daUiannneA tddtVeu r 2rsmrnye),s li inmttaehebmie si tslsvhii.tao ey1ln u)d aeTrer eohegq fer ue itvnehiar ceelto umoore vpe weoonrfhrta a tilfhtcloe heUdr p AtsahiVunyer lptv ooUilava AadtffuVb oatisrnul mitdrtoye,; Vehicle Cost ReRSdeaSumvac&iveno idRnvg iegsSn lsiufg arrf obrMvmoiilvamitanybilitUy n m a n n e d V e hicle operate in proximity to or cooperation with manned vehicles, either military or civilian. The Value of the Platform. When there is no man-in-the-loop, survivability considera- Payload Value tions can be based primarily on economic considerations, i.e., a direct trade-off can be Figure 1. The relationship of payload value to the made between replacement cost and the cost cost of a hypothetical UAV relative to an equivalent of adding survivability or reliability features. manned aircraft. 6 Aircraft Survivability • Summer 2001 In this case, the cost savings would shrink to that of simply removing the pilot (and crew). Operation in Civil Air Space: UAVs are facing another challenge—that of operating in civilian air cor- ridors. Military UAVs to date have been operated in large part within the military theater and outside of civilian corridors. However, as the range of UAVs increases, and as they become more numerous, two changes must occur. One, the mission of some of them will dictate that they operate in close coordination with manned vehicles; and two, in some cases they will be required to operate in civilian airspace. The reliability requirements for such operations have not been deter- mined. For mixed military operations, although one could choose to accept the loss of the UAV it must not California Los Angeles (UCLA). Mr. Lockenour is endanger the manned systems. And to operate in civil- a registered professional engineer in Ohio and ian air space, there are no passengers or crew on the California and an Associate Fellow of the AIAA. UAV but one must again insure that collision (in the air He has taught Control Systems Design at the col- or on ground) with civil aircraft does not occur. The lege level and short courses in the USA, in Europe vehicle reliability must also address the possibility of a and Taiwan. He has served on the NASA UAV coming down in a populated area. Aeronautics Advisory Committee. He may be It is projected that the consideration of survivability reached at [email protected]. and reliability in the design and certification of UAVs will vary widely depending largely on the value of the Editor’s Note: In April of this year, mission payload and the degree to which the mission USD(AT&L) and ASD(C3I) in the Office of the requires their operation in the presence of manned sys- Secretary of Defense, released a consolidated tems either in mixed military missions or in civilian air unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) roadmap. space. As mission complexity (payload cost) and oper- The document presents the DoD roadmap for ational flexibility (operating with manned aircraft) developing and employing UAVs over the next increase the classical survivability and reliability con- 25 years (2000 to 2025). The roadmap is siderations will play an important role in meeting the available to download in pdf format at UAV design objectives. http://www.acq.osd.mil/acqweb/help/ welcome.html. Jerry Lockenour is manager of Technology Development & Applications for the Air Combat Systems Business Area of the Integrated Systems Sector of Northrop Grumman Corporation. Named to his present position in March 1997, he has research and development responsibility for Flight Sciences, Weapons Integration, Vehicle Systems, Structures, Avionics, Software, Low Observables and Manufacturing Technology and Materials Development. In addition, Mr. Lockenour is responsible for the sustaining and upgrade engineering on the world wide fleet of F-5 and T-38 air- craft. Mr. Lockenour received a B.S. in Aeronautical Engineering from Purdue University in 1967 and a M.S. in Mechanical Engineering from Ohio State University. He has completed Executive Business Management programs at University of Southern California (USC) and University of Aircraft Survivability • Summer 2001 7 The Low Altitude Battlespace Environment by BGen J. F. Amos Marine Air Ground Task Force lies major theater warfare, the proliferation of sophisti- (MAGTF) operations are con- cated weapons, and weapons of mass destruction. At strained by the context of the inter- the low end resides a greater demand for military oper- national political and cultural landscape, ations other than war, the specter of trans-national driven by the tenets of Expeditionary threats, and increased non-aligned international terror- Maneuver Warfare (EMW), and framed by the ism. The diversity across this full spectrum of conflict operational, political, and technological man- highlights the demands with which the military in gen- dates under which the U.S. Marine Corps eral, and the Marine Corps in particular, must contend. operates. Over the course of the next several To be capable of responding to a multitude of missions decades, these factors will likely necessitate across the spectrum of conflict is a signature character- Marine Aviation, again, to operate in the low istic of the vision of the Marine Corps, and it is likely altitude battlespace environment. the Marine Corps’ involvement in these missions will Always a challenging environment in continue to rise. which to conduct operations, low altitude bat- There is no near-term relief in sight for the high tlespace is particularly difficult in the realm of paced military operational tempo that has come to be survivability. Yet, one of the keys to surviv- accepted by the American public as the norm. This ability in this environment is knowing what increased operational tempo obviously entails to expect. Even though the world situation is increased exposure to hostile forces and agents. This as unpredictable as it has ever been, a look at increased exposure in turn mandates developing and the present- and near-term environment acquiring measures to counter, negate, or avoid the reveals some clear trends. The trend of popu- threats posed by these forces and agents. This will lation explosions in underdeveloped regions require that our forces be able to locate and identify all will continue. By 2010, over 70 percent of the hostile threats and address them in real time. These are world’s population will live in urban areas, key factors in MAGTF aviation survivability. and most of these within 300 miles of a coast- As Marines, we organize for combat in response to line. Urban densities will continue to grow. the situation and the expected environment providing Demand for resources will increase corre- the combatant commander with a scalable force spondingly. The migration of the world pop- (another signature characteristic of our vision). We are ulation to these littoral areas will bring trained, organized, and equipped as an expeditionary together disparate ethnic, tribal, ideological, force capable of being deployed and employed any- and religious values, some of which have where in the world on short notice. This approach is clashed for hundreds of years. These demo- reflected in our core competencies: ready to fight and graphic factors will drive future unrest in the win, expeditionary in culture, combined arms opera- littorals. The political and cultural impact tions, task organized, integrated reserve expertise, caused by any civil unrest or natural disaster forcible entry from the sea, naval in character, and joint undoubtedly will be proportionate to the con- competency. As we conduct our operations, we will do centration and size of the population. What is so with the expertise resident in these competencies also likely is that our nation will be required and within the construct of our capstone operational to respond to events in these predominantly concept, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW). urban littorals. The Marine Corps is prepared Built on the twin pillars of our philosophy of for this response. maneuver warfare and our expeditionary heritage, Complex challenges confront the military EMW describes the unique contribution of the Marine commander. At the high end of the spectrum Corps to the nation’s security. The Marine Corps will 8 Aircraft Survivability • Summer 2001 provide America with a single, integrated force that employs much of the same configuration and enables Joint, Combined, and Multi-national opera- retains many of the susceptibilities it did when tions. The Marine Corps will maintain sustainable for- it first saw service in Vietnam. While future air- ward presence and the ability to rapidly project craft will come to the battlefield well suited to multidimensional combat power to influence events address present and projected threats, existing ashore. legacy aircraft have more formidable chal- From a standpoint of aviation survivability, EMW lenges. A review shows these aircraft have not primarily addresses susceptibility reduction (as fared well in the budget planning process opposed to vulnerability reduction, which, in the cur- when survivability enhancements have been rent fiscally-constrained climate, is always difficult to addressed. Initiatives to address basic reliabil- modify). EMW transforms the operational mindset. It ity, maintainability and safety have consistent- espouses maneuver and naval warfare (vice attrition ly (and properly) pre-empted such upgrades. warfare) using the sea as maneuver space. EMW gener- Hence, vulnerability and susceptibility have ates overwhelming tempo, using swift strikes against historically been an operational constant and a critical enemy vulnerabilities to create confusion challenge for a large percentage of Marine wherein the enemy does not know how to react. By Corps aircraft. conducting over-the-horizon operations, it allows Adapting to these challenges requires Marine Aviation to reduce the probability of detection. Marine Aviation to continue to organize, train, It increases the element of surprise, and at the same equip, and sustain forces for dynamic, expedi- time affords increased protection to naval platforms tionary operations. The key to accomplishing with embarked MAGTF aviation assets. It significantly this is the development of new initiatives for reduces predictability, as it leverages the advantages of current/legacy systems that address the chal- sea basing, and thereby greatly reduces both the foot- lenges that lay ahead while focusing on aggres- print ashore and the overall susceptibility to attack—all sive modernization of our aviation systems. of which increases survivability. The current political and developmental curves As forward-deployed, first-to-fight forces, a few oper- may have intersected now to present a unique ational certainties confront the MAGTF and magnify the opportunity to enhance the baseline surviv- low altitude survivability challenge. First, the missions ability of MAGTF aviation. This then becomes of the Marine Corps will, at times, require exposure to the challenge for industry. The mix of legacy the threat with flight operations in the heart of hostile and new aircraft in the MAGTF will present weapons engagement envelopes. Second, the Marine unique requirements that industry may be able Corps will continue to answer our nation’s call without to address within the framework presented for the benefit of choosing the time or place for every con- the future. The Marine Corps is ready and flict. Third, MAGTF aircraft will fly profiles (into urban eager to team with industry to address these areas, embassy compounds, etc.) that place them at the challenges. peak of susceptibility to weapons engagement. More specifically, we will continue to fly at low altitudes in Brigadier General Amos graduated from the high threat environments—because some missions will University of Idaho in 1970. He was designated a demand it. Our challenge is to do so—and survive. Naval Aviator in 1971 and has held a variety of Legacy and future aircraft possess markedly different operational and staff assignments since 1972. He capabilities. For example, with its significantly increased is currently serving as the Assistant Deputy speed, range, and payload, the MV-22 Osprey will revo- Commandant for Aviation (Code AA), HQMC, lutionize assault support operations and will be one of Washington, D.C. effective June 29, 2000. the most survivable aircraft available. Likewise, the Joint Brigadier General Amos is a graduate of the Armed Strike Fighter and the UH-1Y and AH-1Z upgrades will Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA and the Air War largely change the operational employment characteris- College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He may be tics of our expeditionary aviation assets and also shrink reached at 703.614.2380 or susceptibility windows. In contrast, the legacy CH-46E [email protected]. Aircraft Survivability • Summer 2001 9