Lee and the Operational Art: The Right Place, The Right Time JAY LUVAAS © 1992 Jay Luvaas A few days after the battle of Gettysburg, the official Prussian military observer who had accompanied Confederate headquarters during the campaign asked General Robert E. Lee about his command philosophy. "I think and work with all my powers to bring my troops to the right place at the right time," Lee explained, thert "I leave the matter up to God and the subordinate officers." To interfere at this stage "does more harm than good.'" "The right place at the right time!" This is the essence of the operational art as it is defined in the most recent edition of the Army's Field Manual 100-5, Operations: Operational art ... involves fundamental decisions about when and where to fight and whether to accept or decline battle. Its essence is the identification of the enemy's operational center-of-gravity and the concentration of superior combat power against that point to achieve a decisive success.2 Until recently Western soldiers and historians have separated mili tary activity into strategy and tactics. The theater of war belonged to the province of strategy, the battlefield to tactics. "Operations" was simply a term loosely applied to any of the various types of combat activity in the field offensive, defensive, siege, etc. Or, if the theater of war should itself be partitioned into sub-theaters, these might be called "theaters of operations.'" But with the insertion in US doctrine in 1982 of a third level of war-the operational level-the word took on added significance. 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TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Lee and the Operational Art: The Right Place, The Right Time 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION U.S. Army War College,ATTN: Parameters,122 Forbes REPORT NUMBER Avenue,Carlisle,PA,17013-5238 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 17 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 have an additional tool for analyzing generalship, providing fresh insights into old campaigns and perhaps a fuller understanding of history's commanders. To illustrate this point, let us look anew at Lee during Gettysburg. Lee and Gettysburg His motives for invading Pennsylvania were mixed. Lee needed a fresh source of food to sustain his army, for after the victory at Fredericksburg on 13 December 1862, shortages in food and forage had forced him to send Lieutenant General James Longstreet's corps south of the James River merely to subsist over the winter. By marching north Lee also hoped to draw his new opponent, Major General Joseph Hooker, northward to cover Washington and thus reduce the immediate prospect of another major Union thrust at Rich mond. The problem thus "resolved itself into a choice of one of two things either to retire to Richmond and stand siege, which ultimately must have ended in surrender, or to invade Pennsylvania.,,4 In February 1863 Lee ordered the best topographical engineer in his army to prepare a map of the Shenandoah Valley "extended to Harrisburg, Pa., and then on to Philadelphia. Such a move, he later reassured the Secretary ,,5 of War, would offer the best way to relieve pressure on Confederate forces in the west; he had already begun preparations when Hooker crossed the Rap pahannock on his vast turning movement toward Chancellorsville. After this brilliant victory, which Lee's foremost biographer described as "perhaps more nearly a flawless battle" than any ever planned and executed by an American commander, Lee reorganized his army, expanding his two corps to three. He had lost Lieutenant General T. J. "Stonewall" Jackson, his most dynamic corps commander, and he questioned whether any replacement could properly handle 30,000 men in the field.' Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania lacked a geographical objective. "It had not been intended to deliver a general battle so far from our base," he wrote in his after-action report, "unless attacked. From this we may infer that he ,,7 would rely upon what we today would call his operational skills either to catch the enemy off balance and defeat him in detail, or to occupy defensible terrain where the enemy would have to attack. Since he read Northern newspapers and Dr. Jay Luvaas is Professor of Military History at the US Anny War College. He is a graduate of Allegheny College (Pa.) and earned the M.A. and Ph.D. degrees at Duke University. Dr. Luvaas taught at Allegheny College from 1957 to 1982, and has been visiting professor of military history at the US Military Academy and at the US Army Military History Institute. Among his major works are: The Military Legacy of the Civil War (1959), The Education of an Army (1964), Frederick the Great on the Art o/War (1966), Dear Miss Em: General Eichelberger's War in the PaCific (1972), and three volumes in the US Army War College Civil War battlefield series thus far. - Autumn 1992 3 was aware of the growing anti-war sentiment in the North, he may also have assumed that the political and psychological effects of a victory on enemy soil would be greater than just another battle won in Virginia.8 Neither was possible, however, unless Lee had timely intelligence of enemy movements, and for the week preceding the battle of Gettysburg he had heard nothing from Major General Jeb Stuart, his cavalry commander. Stuart, we may recall, had been ordered to take three brigades, cross the Potomac east of the mountains, and then "move on and feel the right of Ewell's troops" at the head of Lee's invading column, collecting information and provisions en route.' On 28 June a scout finally brought word that three Union corps were near Frederick, Maryland, on the other side of the mountains much closer than Lee had assumed. He promptly ordered his three corps commanders to concentrate in the vicinity of Gettysburg, east of the moun tains that had shielded the Confederate advance. Had Stuart been present on 30 June as Lee accompanied Lieutenant General A.P. Hill's corps over the mountains, or if a cavalry brigade had been present the next day to feel out the Union position, Lee would have had some notion of what he was up against and could have accepted or declined battle as he chose. Instead, it was two Confederate infantry brigades that deployed and advanced to determine what force if any lay behind the dismounted Union cavalry screen on McPherson Ridge. Hill subsequently reinforced these units, and by the time Lee reached the scene, about 2 0' clock on the afternoon of I July 1863, the battle was under way. Lee was not a factor in driving the Union First and Eleventh Corps from the field that first day. His subordinates planned and executed the attacks. The Confederates had a numerical advantage, and their well-coordinated as saults on two fronts and the opportune use of reserves explain their success. "Some planoing, some luck, and an almost instinctive sense of timing possessed by veteran troops all played a part in determining the outcome. ,,10 While Lee was counting on his skill at the operational level to maneuver the enemy into a position where they would have to attack him, circumstances now forced him to function at a lower level. "Coming unex pectedly upon the whole Federal army," he explained, to withdraw through the mouutaius with our extensive trains would have been difficult and dangerous. At the same time we were unable to await an attack, as the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies in the presence of the enemy, who could restrain our foraging parties by holding the mountain passes with local and other troops. A battle had, therefore, become in a measure unavoidable, and the success already gained gave hope of a favorable issue. II Thus limited to decisions at the tactical level, Lee ordered Lieutenant General Richard Ewell, heir to Jackson's old corps, to follow up his success 4 Parameters GETTYSBURG ~ N Situation Evening, 7- " 2 July 1863 t 0 l . . . 0 II, I " Scale of Miles by assaulting Cemetery Hill "if he found it practicable." What "practicable" meant under these circumstances probably was not as clear to Ewell as to Lee's biographers. Ewell, who at the same time had been cautioned "to avoid a general engagement" until the army had concentrated, decided to wait until his third division, which had been guarding the corps trains west of the mountains, had reached the field. Since Lee stood beside Ewell while scru tinizing the Union position on Cemetery Hill, there is no reason why he Autumn 1992 5 himself should not have given the order to attack, if that is what he intended. Discretionary orders may be essential for success at the operational level; at a lower level they can be couuterproductive, especially when dealing with a subordinate who had only commanded a corps for six weeks and was fighting his first battle under the close eye of the army commander. Later that evening Lee ordered Ewell's corps back to Seminary Ridge because the terraiu offered better opportunities to attack from that side, but Ewell persuaded him that he should take Culp's Hill, which he mistakenly thought was unoccupied and the possession of which would enable the Confederates to dominate Cemetery Hill." This decision forced Lee to fight the battle ou exterior lines, and it is difficult not to agree with the judgment of Edwin Coddington, the foremost authority on the battle: "Responsibility for the failure of the Confederates to make an all-out assault on Cemetery Hill on July I must rest with Lee."" The next day Lee decided to assault the Union left flank, which he mistakenly placed "upon the high ground along the Emmitsburg road." At the time he issued his orders to Longstreet there were no Union troops at all in that location; the Union Secoud and Third Corps were deployed back on Cemetery Ridge, which diverged from the Emmitsburg road as it ran south, with the left flank anchored upon Little Round Top. The high ground along the Emmitsburg road probably concealed the southern portion of this line from Lee, who may also have assumed that when Longstreet attacked uorthward from the Peach Orchard, as specifically ordered, his lead division uuder Major General Lafayette McLaws would advance all the way to Cemetery Ridge before wheeling to the left to deploy. As it turned out, Longstreet's counter march to avoid detection by the Union sigual station on Little Round Top cost the Confederates valuable time, during which Union Major General Daniel Sickles disregarded orders and advanced his Third Corps forward to higher ground at the Peach Orchard, thus changing completely the situation that Lee had assumed when issuing orders and greatly extendiug the battlefield. On the Confederate left, Ewell was instructed "to make a simul taneous demonstration upon the enemy's right, to be converted into a real attack should opportunity offer."!4 But the distance betweeu Longstreet and Ewell was too great to achieve any effective coordination. One of Ewell's brigades did capture some Union breastworks, but this was only because the defenders had been rushed to the Union left to help defeud against Longstreet. Lee's plan for 3 July called for Ewell to renew the assault with one reinforced division while the main attack would be against the center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge. Again there was no coordination, which only Lee himself could have assured. At Culp's Hill the reinforced division of Confederate Major General Edward Johnson, who later admitted that "he never wanted to go up [Culp's] hill at all,"!' was pushed back by repeated Union assaults during the morning, thus ruining any chance for a combined 6 Parameters assault, front and rear, against Cemetery Ridge. In the afternoon Pickett's assault against the Union center failed, with the loss of 54 percent of the Confederates in the process. "It was a second Fredericksburg ... only the wrong way," wrote one Confederate survivor. "We had to charge over a mile a stone wall in an elevated position. ,,16 Lee's conduct of the battle is thus not impressive. Had this been his only battle, what would be the verdict of history? Certainly not that he was a McDowell, Pope, or Burnside, but it is also unlikely that all blame would have attached to Stuart, Ewell, or Longstreet. Lee appeared unsure how much latitude to give to his principal subordinates-he gave operational latitude to Ewell, a new corps commander, and issued specific tactical orders to Long street, his most experienced subordinate. On 2 July he sent only one message and received only one report, despite the fact that two of his three corps commanders were new at the job.I7 Lee's theory of command and his conduct at Gettysburg suggest that he felt more comfortable at the operational than the tactical level. A glance at his earlier battles seems to support this conclusion. Lee's Flowering as an Operational Artist On 31 May 1862, when Lee assumed command of what soon would be known as the Army of Northern Virginia, Union forces under Major General G. B. McClellan were within eight miles of Richmond. Lee's first concern was to prepare earthworks for the defense of Richmond, an unpopular activity for which he was dubbed "the King of Spades." But in fact he did this primarily for operational considerations: these defensive lines "would enable a part of the army to defend the city and leave the other part free to cross the Chickahominy and operate on the north bank," sweeping down that river to threaten Union communications with the York River. I' The idea of construct ing breastworks to minimize casualties did not occur to him until the end of the year, after the battle of Fredericksburg. Lee planned also to bring Major General T. J. Jackson's two divisions from the Shenandoah Valley to turn the Union right flank at Beaver Dam Creek, but Jackson's operations failed throughout the Seven Days battles (26 June to 1 July 1862). He was often late, occasionally in the wrong place, and sporadically lethargic, leaving Lee no choice but to emphasize tactical ac tivity. Strategically, it was a victory because McClellan withdrew to a new base on the James River, but repeated frontal assaults cost lee 20,000 men nearly 5000 more than McClellan lost. Even Douglas Southall Freeman, Lee's greatest admirer, acknowledged that in his first test as field commander "Lee displayed no tactical genius. ,,19 Part of the problem was organizational: the largest administrative and operational unit was the division, which goes far to explain why only once during the campaign had two divisions "cooperated for the whole of a bat- Autumn 1992 7 tle."2O No larger fonnation was possible under existing Confederate law. But in the following weeks Lee reorganized his nine divisions into two "wings," which officially became "corps" with the passage of enabling legislation later in the fall. Commanded by Longstreet and Jackson, his two best division commanders, the introduction of the corps now enabled Lee to operate effectively at a higher level. The corps had been an invention of Napoleon in 1800, and doubtless Lee's reading of the Napoleonic wars both inspired the concept and provided some of the detailed features. According to Napoleon, a corps of 25 to 30,000 men can be isolated; well led, it can either fight or avoid b(~ttle and maneuver according to circumstances without experiencing any misfortune, because it cannot be forced into battle and should be able to fight for a long time .... It will contain the enemy, whatever his strength, and will win time for the anny to arrive.21 Such a corps, Napoleon specified, should contain one brigade of light caval ry,22 and one might speculate whether Lee himself would not have been better served by following Napoleon's model and including cavalry. A we noted earlier, when Hill's corps marched toward Gettysburg, the presence of cavalry could have made a significant difference. The new organization paid off at Second Manassas (29-30 August 1862), where the staff work was "superior," the artillery and cavalry were "more effectively employed," the tactics were better, and the intelligence service "was much improved. ,,23 But the secret to Lee's success at Second Manassas was his obvious skill at the operational level. A turning movement by Jackson's corps, with one cavalry brigade screening his advance, had led to the destruction of Union supply depots and the dislocation ofthe army and especially of its commander. Jackson's corps functioned in this campaign the way Napoleon had intended with his organization-it located the enemy anny, selected the terrain, gave battle on its own terms, and held on stubbornly until help arrived. On the second day Longstreet anticipated Lee's orders for a general advance, and his smashing attack against the Union right wing produced the victory.2' Lee's operations were better because they were simpler, and responsibility was in the hands of fewer subordinates-Jackson, Longstreet, and Stuart." Lee's next major battle, Antietam (17 September 1862), can be under stood only within the context of his operational plan. He would move into the western part of Maryland, establish communications with Richmond via the Shenandoah Valley, "and by threatening, induce the enemy to follow, and thus draw him from his base of supplies.,,26 But first he would capture Harper's Ferry, which threatened his proposed line of communications through the Valley, sending six of his nine divisions under Jackson to surround the Union stronghold 8 Parameters while Longstreet with two divisions began the march toward Hagerstown. Only one division plus cavalry remained to guard the passes over South Mountain. But a copy of Lee's operational orders fell into enemy hands, and on 14 September three Union corps fought their way through the South Mountain gaps. Fearful that McClellan, who again commanded the Union army in the field, would turn south to relieve Harper's Ferry, Lee fell back to Sharpsburg, where he could threaten McClellan's right flank and rear should he attempt to raise the siege.27 Thus he elected to occupy the ground behind the Antietam for operational rather than tactical considerations. Harper's Ferry was surrendered to Confederate forces on 15 Septem ber. The battle of Antietam was fought two days later, and Lee survived because he managed to hold on long enough for the troops at Harper's Ferry to reach the scene. In this desperate conflict Lee let Longstreet and Jackson manage the battle, while he directed each division as it arrived from Harper's Ferry to that part of the field where it was most desperately needed. At first glance, Fredericksburg, Lee's next battle (13 December 1862), was little more than a successful defense of a fortified position against repeated but separate and uncoordinated Union attacks. Here again, however, PENNSYLVANIA f-------::::-----:::---,-&. GettysbUJ:g Hagerstown MARYLAND .Frederick DELAW~AR~fL-__L L ____~ Lee's Campaigns, 1862·63 1. Seven Days (June..July 1862) 2. Second Manassas (August 1862) 3. Antietam (September 1862) 4. Fredericksburg . (October·Dec.1862) 5. Chancel/orsville Appomattox c. H. (April·May 1863) 6. Gettysburg (June-July 1863) Scale 01 Miles Autumn 1992 9 Lee's success at the operational level was the key. When he moved Long street's corps to Culpeper in late October, he left Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley until the enemy's objective could be ascertained. Lee well understood. what today's Army doctrine prescribes, that "ideally the initial plan for an operation will establish the commander's intent and concept of operations and the responsibilities of subordinate units.,,28 "Should you find that the enemy is advancing from the Potomac east of those mountains," he wrote Jackson, "you will cross by either gap that will bring you in a best position to threaten his' flank and cut off his communications." "You must keep always in view the probability of an attack upon Richmond ... when concentration of forces will become necessary."" Lee was good at establishing his intent. When scouts reported that the new Union commander, Major General Ambrose P. Burnside, was moving toward the area between Aquia and Fredericksburg, Lee ordered Jackson to march east of the mountains to Culpeper, and later, on 27 November, to take position south of Fredericksburg along the Massaponax. Meanwhile Longstreet prepared the battlefield by constructing breast works, rifle pits, and artillery epaulements, and building a road to facilitate lateral movement behind his lines. On 12 December, convinced that the entire Union army was massing in his front, Lee called in Jackson's divisions. The next day, atop a prominent hill in the middle of his lines, he witnessed the repulse of a serious attempt to break through Jackson's lines to his right, and repeated efforts to storm Longstreet's position behind the Stone Wall at Marye's Heights on his left. Basically he left tactical decisions to his two corps commanders. After the battle Lee ordered a general strengthening of his lines by field fortifications, and as the parapets rose ever higher he reassured authorities in Richmond that the army "is as much stronger for these new entrenchments as if I had received reinforcements of 20,000 men.,,30 Burnside's successor, Major General Joseph Hooker, reached a similar conclusion and decided to fix Lee's forces in Fredericksburg with a frontal attack by three corps while sending another three corps-to be reinforced by a fourth on the eve of battle-on a wide and lengthy turning movement against Lee's rear. In the ensuing maneuvers and combats known collectively as Chancellorsville (30 April to 6 May 1863), Lee, although outnumbered nearly two to one in the theater of operations, utilized superior intelligence and knowledge of the ground, skilled use offield fortifications, and constant movement along interior lines to outmaneuver superior num bers in the wilderness of Virginia and achieve what one authority considered "as much the tactical masterpiece of the nineteenth century as was Leuthen of the eighteenth."'! Most students of the Civil War would agree that Chancellorsville was Lee's most brilliant achievement. Chancellors ville was won at the operational level. By keeping the two Wings of Hooker's army separated, Lee successfully fought one battle 10 Parameters