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CONTRACT NUMBER Presence - Do We Stay or Do We Go? 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,260 REPORT NUMBER Fifth Avenue SW Bg 64 Fort Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 3 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 Lasswell Pgs 8/26/97 11:35 AM Page 83 PRESENCE– y r a t n e Do We Stay or Do We Go? m By J A M E S A. L A S S W E L L m o A merica maintained an unprece- 340,000 in 1989 to under 100,000 c dented level of its military today. On the other hand, naval strength overseas for over forty presence remains about the same as years—from a quarter to a third it was during the Cold War, just of the Armed Forces. The primary purpose under 100,000. Why? While the cer- was to contain the Soviet Union. This ration- tain threat went away, the uncertain ones ale is now gone leaving defense intellectuals did not. to debate how to protect our interests in a Now an intense competition for re- new era. The naval camp contends it can be sources among the services prompts the achieved by forward presence—keeping some question: does the systematic naval presence combat forces abroad. The continental camp stay or does it go? The new Air Force white argues that it can be accomplished with vir- paper Global Presence (published in the last tual presence—forces based in the United issue of JFQ) proposes replacing “the cop on States but capable of rapidly responding to the beat” with virtual presence, satellite cov- overseas crises. This is the difference between erage of key areas backed by CONUS-based being engaged on the world scene and a re- bombers and troop transports responding on turn to Fortress America. warning. Still others maintain that defense attachés, mobile training teams, and ground What Now? units deployed for allied exercises are an ef- Form follows function in overseas pres- fective overseas presence. In essence, these ence as elsewhere. That presence was struc- alternatives are all CONUS-based strategies tured to oppose a specific land power in the indicative of isolationism. Cold War, the Soviet Bloc. U.S. presence The more important question is what abroad during that period—excluding the does the Nation seek to achieve on the Vietnam and Persian Gulf Wars—averaged world scene? If we choose a strategy that is about half a million. Of those, almost not supportive of that, the costs could be 400,000 were Army and Air Force personnel higher than realized. who directly countered threats in Europe What was a by-product of the Cold War and Korea. Naval forces made up the bal- now becomes the primary reason for main- ance, supporting Europe and Korea on the taining forces overseas—a liberal world econ- maritime flanks. And they handled uncer- omy.It developed behind the walls of con- tain threats—some 80 percent of the crises tainment, with the oceans—under the aegis to which the Nation responded from 1945 of a forward Navy—as the unifying medium. to the end of the Cold War. As the Soviet North America, Western Europe, and East threat receded, so did land-based presence in Asia account for three-quarters of the gross Europe. Force levels there dropped from world product. Accordingly, the National Se- curity Strategy seeks enlargement, incorpo- Colonel James A. Lasswell, USMC, is Deputy Direc- rating Cold War outsiders in this economy, tor of the Plans Division, Office of the Deputy on the premise that prosperity will bring re- Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies, and Operations, gional stability. at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Summer 1995 / JFQ 83 Lasswell Pgs 8/26/97 11:35 AM Page 84 DO WE STAY OR GO? The world economy that came out of when presence failed to deter Iraq, U.S. carri- the Cold War is vulnerable to post-Cold War ers covered the initial airlift to Saudi Arabia. disorder. Absent a threat, the international American presence is a critical thread community is becoming increasingly suscep- holding together an otherwise fragmenting tible to fragmentation. The symptoms are all world. Its interactions engage allies and too apparent: the proliferation of weapons friends in cooperative security efforts. When of mass destruction, rogue states, the rise of sustained over time, it builds interoperabil- national rivalries, deteriorating states, ethnic ity among forces. It sets the stage in crises unrest, and mass refugee migrations. The for successful coalitions which are ad hoc in world economic system is susceptible to dis- nature. Operation Desert Storm succeeded order as demonstrated by the 1987 Gulf largely because of four decades of allied Tanker War, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, work in NATO. Moreover, a credible Ameri- and the recent collapse of the Mexican peso. can combat presence provides a nucleus around which the forces from other nations Why Forward? can coalesce. U.S. military presence remains central to the regional stability on which the expan- Why Naval? sion and enlargement of the world economy Clearly, presence is critical to the security depends. A 1992 survey of American em- environment. But while many nations want bassies around the Mediterranean indicated the United States to remain in their region, unanimous agreement on the deterrent most do not want foreign troops on their soil value of our presence. East Asian nations even in times of crisis, as has been often want our presence for the same reason. seen.American presence will withdraw in- American presence deters since it represents creasingly from Eurasian shores to the decks the might of the only superpower. As Admi- of vessels operating in the Mediterranean, In- ral William A. Owens, USN—the Vice Chair- dian Ocean, and western Pacific. Naval man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—recently forces, which accounted for a fifth of our wrote, “Any potential opponent must as- overseas presence in the Cold War, are ex- sume that it cannot win a military con- pected to reach half after 2000. Future naval frontation with the United States.”1 presence will involve more than just crisis re- Overseas presence is sponse, which is how most people view it American presence is a critical real, as opposed to hy- today. As Owens notes, “Naval forces will in- thread holding together an pothetical, use of creasingly be seen as representative of the en- CONUS-based forces. tire range of U.S. military power.”2 otherwise fragmenting world “Any potential oppo- While naval presence may be out of nent of the United sight and mind for most Americans, its visi- States contemplating a fait accompli strat- bility to others means it plays a greater role egy,” Owens continues, “is likely to see in deterrence. As always, deterrence depends greater risk if U.S. forces are visibly present on an opponent receiving, understanding, than if they are not.” The initiative rests and heeding an intended signal. “We per- more with on-the-scene forces. They can ceived the U.S. Navy as more psychologi- readily influence events in contrast to the re- cally impressive,” a former Soviet admiral active nature of CONUS-based forces. And if stated, “since the U.S. Air Force maneuvers this forward presence fails to deter, it be- were not so obvious.”3 Conversely, the comes the “tip of the spear,” the enabler for British relied on overflights to demonstrate follow-on forces. their interest in the Falklands prior to the The efficacy of presence is readily appar- 1982 Argentine invasion. ent. Many nations in Asia want America to With the diffusion of nuclear power, for- remain the countervailing power in the face ward-deployed naval forces will be a more of an ascendant China. In the Mediter- credible deterrent. The threat posed by U.S. ranean, U.S. presence keeps rogue states such strategic weapons may be seen by lesser nu- as Libya in check. In addition, the rescue of clear states as too disproportionate to be noncombatants from Liberia in 1990 and, in credible. Accordingly, deterrence will shift particular, from Somalia in 1991 largely re- lied on the proximity of naval forces. And 84 JFQ / Summer 1995 Lasswell Pgs 8/26/97 11:35 AM Page 85 Lasswell y toward conventional weapons with greater This appears to have influenced r accuracy and lethality, launched by forward- Japan’s rejection of the Malaysian postured carrier air and Tomahawk land-at- proposal for a strictly Asian politi- a tack missiles.4 Deterrence may also depend cal-economic forum that excluded on ship-based theater missile defenses. the United States.But American mil- t Engaging and enlarging cooperative se- itary withdrawal means removing a n curity efforts will be done increasingly key incentive to discouraging the through naval presence. Their success in cri- formation of trading barriers and e sis depends on building confidence in mili- blocs. Consider the disintegration of m tary capabilities, as well as interoperability, the world economy into trading beforehand. But many nations do not have blocs where competition might turn the domestic political capital to allow U.S. adversarial. m forces on their turf for exercises, not to men- Also consider a world without tion for operations. In the words of the Chief U.S. presence, one in which security of Naval Operations, “Naval overseas pres- concerns drive nations to acquire nu- o ence may be the best way to establish mili- clear weapons. Asia is a prime exam- c tary-to-military relationships with many of ple. Faced with a nuclear-armed these new nations . . . they welcome the con- China, Japan would likely seek a nu- tact with the United States but do not want clear arsenal if our presence was re- to be smothered by it.”5 Largely because of tracted. If Japan went nuclear, so this, the Navy participated in 163 combined could most of East Asia. Maintaining or aban- exercises involving 58 nations in 1994. doning overseas presence may mean the dif- The most unappreciated reason for ference between nuclear proliferation being naval presence is freedom of the seas. The constrained or unconstrained. Those who be- seas remain unrestricted to global trade and lieve presence can be provided with less than strategic mobility largely because of the credible combat power—such as mobile train- Navy. This is more than a nod to Mahan. ing teams or defense attachés—may find that Under the U.N. Convention on the Law of they have offered up hostages to hostile na- the Sea (LOS) regional waters are more mili- tions and groups. tarized and some 82 countries have claimed Overseas presence is the price a super- excessive territorial seas. Unless contested, power pays for doing business in a relatively these claims might be regarded as valid safe and secure world. There is no short-cut. through acquiescence. Since the advent of Presence means either being there or not. It LOS in 1982, such claims have been opera- is the difference between engagement and tionally challenged more than 200 times, isolation. If we choose the latter option, it is primarily by the Navy, and as a result 12 na- likely to lead to a more dangerous world that tions have formally rolled back their claims.6 is far more costly than maintaining overseas presence today. JFQ What If We Don’t? Those who advocate CONUS-based NOTES strategies may not be considering the conse- 1William A. Owens, High Seas: The Naval Passage to quences of an increasingly fragmented an Uncharted World (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute world. After the continuous presence of Press, 1995), p. 12. American forces in a region, many nations 2Ibid., p. 38. would likely regard reduction or withdrawal 3Stanley B. Weeks, “U.S. Naval Forward Presence in as a diminishing of U.S. interest. Their anxi- the Cold War: Perceptions of Former Soviet Elites” (Sci- ence Applications International Corporation, November eties are likely to be manifested in forms of 1994). protectionism not realized before. 4Joint Strategic Planning Staff, “The Role of Nuclear The link between a reassuring presence Weapons in the New World Order,” Report of the Sci- and liberal trade must not be ignored. It is ence Advisory Group, October 1991, p. 26. unlikely that a nation would raise trade bar- 5Presentation by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed riers without concern over the withdrawal of Forces, September 20, 1994. U.S. forces by an angry American public. 6CJCS Instruction 2420.01, August 16, 1993, enclo- sure B, “Illegal Maritime Claims”; DOD Representative for Ocean Policy Affairs memorandum, subject: “Exces- sive Maritime Claims,” March 23, 1995. Summer 1995 / JFQ 85