TheScienceoftheTotalEnvironment288(2002)111–117 Assessing homeland chemical hazards outside the military gates: industrial hazard threat assessments for department of defense installations Jeffrey S. Kirkpatrick*, Jacqueline M. Howard, David A. Reed USArmyCenterforHealthPromotionandPreventiveMedicine,Attention:MCHB-TS-EES,5158BlackhawkRoad, AberdeenProvingGround,MD21010-5403,USA Received8June2001;accepted10September2001 Abstract As part of comprehensive joint medical surveillance measures outlined by the Department of Defense, the US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (USACHPPM) is beginning to assess environmental health threats to continental US military installations. A common theme in comprehensivejointmedicalsurveillance, in support of Force Health Protection, is the identification and assessment of potential environmental healthhazards, and the evaluation and documentation of actual exposures in both a continental US and outside a continental US setting. For the continental US assessments, the USACHPPM has utilized the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) database for risk management plans in accordance with Public Law 106-40, and the toxic release inventory database, in a state-of the art geographic information systems based program, termed the Consequence Assessment and Management Tool Set, or CATS, for assessing homeland industrial chemical hazards outside the military gates. As an example, the US EPA toxic release inventory and risk management plans databases are queried to determine the types and locations of industries surrounding a continental US military installation. Contaminants of concern are then ranked with respect to known toxicological and physical hazards, where they are then subject to applicable downwind hazard simulations using applicable meteorologicaland climatologicaldatasets.Thecompositedownwind hazard areas are mapped in relation to emergency response planning guidelines (ERPG), which were developed by the American Industrial Hygiene Association to assist emergency response personnel planning for catastrophic chemical releases. In addition, other geographic referenced data such as transportation routes, satellite imagery and population data are included in the operational, equipment, and morale risk assessment and management process. These techniques have been developed to assist military medical planners and operations personnel in determining the industrial hazards, vulnerability assessments and health risk assessments to continental United States military installations. These techniques and procedures support the Department of Defense Force Protection measures, which provides awareness of a terrorism threat, appropriate measures to prevent terrorist attacks and mitigate terrorism’s effects in the event that preventive measures are ineffective. (cid:1) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. Keywords: Environmentalhealthhazards;Toxicindustrialmaterials;Operationalriskmanagement;Emergencyresponseplanning guidelines *Correspondingauthor.Tel.:q1-410-436-8155;fax:q1-410-436-2407. E-mailaddress:[email protected](J.S.Kirkpatrick). 0048-9697/02/$-seefrontmatter(cid:1)2002ElsevierScienceB.V.Allrightsreserved. PII:S0048-9697Ž01.01112-3 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2002 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2002 to 00-00-2002 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Assessing homeland chemical hazards outside the military gates: 5b. GRANT NUMBER industrial hazard threat assessments for department of defense installations 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive REPORT NUMBER Medicine,Attention: MCHB-TS-EES, 5158 Blackhawk Road,Aberdeen Proving Ground,MD,21010-5403 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 7 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 112 J.S.Kirkpatricketal./TheScienceoftheTotalEnvironment288(2002)111–117 1. Introduction pational Health Risk Analysis, 2000). Part of this collaborative technical guidance uses US Environ- Historically, toxic industrial materials were con- mental Protection Agency data sets, to include sidered insignificant during military contingency toxic release inventories and risk management operations,wherethetraditionalnuclear,biological plans, to assist in the identification of industrial and chemical (NBC) weapons were the focused facilities near fixed location CONUS military items. Since the 1980s, there have been several installations. This paper outlines the assessment instances (e.g. Bhopal, India, methylisocyanate techniques forCONUSmilitaryinstallationsyfacil- leakage; Chernobyl, USSR, radiological accident; ities in support of homeland defense and pre- andtheTokyo,Japan,subwaySarinrelease)where deployment force health protection measures for the associated proliferation of NBC weapons and toxic industrial materials. toxic industrial materials have caused significant health consequences. Overall, a majority of these 2. Materials and methods incidents affecting outside continental United States (OCONUS) government facilities have There are three main components of an indus- increased force protectionynational security con- trial hazards assessment and they include: (1) cerns with respect to the protection of fixed identification of industrialfacilityandhazards;(2) facilities. a vulnerability analysis; and (3) an operational To date, the US Department of Defense (DOD) risk management analysis. The following describe has implemented various policies and guidance to each of the three components in relation to acutey enhance force protection measures for OCONUS catastrophic consequences. DOD installations. Part of these policiesyguidance integrate force health protection measures. Perti- 2.1. Industrial facilityyhazards identification nent industrial facilitiesytoxic industrial materials are identified and assessed with respect to acutey This primary component involves obtaining and catastrophic health consequences, resulting from documenting pertinent information to include: the potentialexposurestoindustrialchemicals(Armed location of industrial facilities that use, store, Forces Medical Intelligence Center, 1998). These produce, or process toxic industrial materials; OCONUS force health protection assessments for typesyquantitiesofchemicalsassociatedwithfacil- nearby industrial facilities support DOD direc- ity; types of chemical storage containersyvessels; tivesyinstructions on Joint Medical Surveillance surrounding transportation routes; and toxicologi- for military deployments (Department of Defense, calyphysical hazards of identified chemicals. The 1997). two main database reference sources of these are In order to complete the pre-deployment envi- the Emergency Planning and Community Right- ronmental health surveillance assessments as out- To-Know Act (EPCRA) (Environmental Protec- lined in by the Department of Defense (1997), tion Agency, 1986) and the US Environmental analogous environmental health threat assessments Protection Agency Risk Management Plans for continental United States (CONUS) military (RMPs) (Environmental Protection Agency, installations are beginning to be conducted by 1996). DOD Agencies (e.g. US Army Center for Health The EPCRA focuses on community emergency Promotion and Preventive Medicine planning with respect to industrial facilitiesreport- (USACHPPM); US Air Force Institute for Envi- ingthenamesandyortypesofhazardouschemicals ronment, Safety, and Occupational Health Risk when specified thresholds are exceeded. The Analysis (AFIERA). The CHPPM and AFIERA EPCRA Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) requires have collaborated to produce technical guidance industrial facilities to report annual emissions of for conducting vulnerability assessments for hazardous chemicalsysubstances into the environ- CONUS and OCONUS military installations (Air ment. The TRI Explorer is available at the univer- Force Institute for Environment, Safety, and Occu- sal record locator http:yywww.epa.govy J.S.Kirkpatricketal./TheScienceoftheTotalEnvironment288(2002)111–117 113 triexplorery. In addition, the EPRCA has created hazardsresultingfromthedispersalofradiological, State Emergency Response Commissions and biological and chemical agents, regardless of the Local Emergency Planning Committees, whichare user’s level of expertise and access to information responsible for coordination of local emergency (Science Applications International Corporation, planning districts and developingymaintaining 2001). local emergency plans, respectively. The major factor in this component is the The risk management plan consists of a hazards appropriate concentration guideline (or level of assessment program, accidental release program, concern) to compareydisplay predicted results and emergency response program to prevent the from the CATS solution. The level of concern is accidentalreleaseofhazardouschemicals,building used as the input concentration endpoint in CATS upon the safety work under EPCRA. Part of the todeterminethegeographicextentofthepredicted hazardassessmentprogramincludesconductingan plume and the resulting size of the associated off-site consequence analysis (OCA), which is an vulnerability zone. For this assessment, we select- analytical estimate of the potential consequence of ed the use of the Emergency Response Planning hypothetical worst-case release on the public and Guides (ERPGs) (American Industrial Hygiene environment around the identified facility. Association, 2000). The ERPGs are a three-tiered standard with common 1-h contact duration, and 2.2. Vulnerability analysis are the most widely used and accepted community exposure limits for emergency responders. The second component, a vulnerability analysis, builds on the primary data collection component 2.3. Operational risk management analysis to identify geographic areas onyoff the installation that may be exposed; personnel potentially subject to several injury levels; and what associated facil- The third component is an assessment of the ities, property, andyor environment is susceptible likelihood (probability) of an accidental toxic to damage from a toxic industrial material release. industrial material release, the severity of the For this second component, the Consequence release, and any associated consequences that Assessment Tools Set (CATS) (Defense Threat might occur. These are based on estimated vulner- Reduction Agency, 2000), is the selected geo- able zones derived from CATS scenarios. These graphic information system (GIS) solution to sup- procedures are similar to those used by the DOD port the vulnerability analysis. Developed under for operational risk management measures in mil- the guidance of the US Defense Threat Reduction itary operations (Department of the Army, 1998; Agency (DTRA) and the US Federal Emergency Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Management Agency (FEMA), CATS provides Medicine, 2001). The risk analysis provides an significant assistance in emergency managers’ estimation of the following: (a) probability of an training,exercises,contingencyplanning,logistical accidental release based on the history of current planning and calculating requirements for human- operationalymaintenance conditions; (b) severity itarian aid. The CATS predicts the damage and of consequences of human injury that may occur; assesses the consequences associated with that (c) potential mission impacts; and (d) type of damage as a result of a technological or natural damage to property and the environment. All of hazard. The technological portion of CATS pro- the informationydata collected, documented, and vides for the calculation of damage and conse- assessed in components 1 and 2 are used as the quence using real-time weather and a variety of basis for determining a relative measure of proba- sources,particularlythoseassociatedwithweapons bility and severity of a possible toxic industrial of mass destruction (WMD), as employed by material release event. Fig. 1 displays the opera- militaryforcesorterrorists.User-friendlygraphical tional risk management matrix and hierarchy of user interfaces (GUIs) and pre-defined event sce- occupational and environmental health hazards narios assist the CATS user in predicting credible (i.e. paradigm) adopted for this assessment. 114 J.S.Kirkpatricketal./TheScienceoftheTotalEnvironment288(2002)111–117 Fig.1.Operationalriskmanagementmatrixandhierarchyofoccupationalandenvironmentalhealthhazards. The estimation of the hazard probability identi- ing describes the steps to determine the relative fiedinFig.1involvesthreeprimaryconsiderations measure of probability and severity of a toxic to include: (a) comparability of the field unit’s industrial material release on the Fort X airfield exposure profile to the standard exposure profile and the associated consequence management used in the derivation of the exposure guidelines; measures. (b) proportion of the field unit that is likely to experience exposures relative to specific exposure 3.1. Industrial facilityyhazards identification guideline; and (c) confidence in the available data with respect to uncertainty and variability sources. Since this assessment is applicable for a hypo- The estimation of the hazard severity identified in thetical release scenario, the geographic locations, Fig.1involvesthreeprimaryjudgmentstoinclude: (a) proportion of the field unit that is likely to facility types, and chemicals (with associated tox- icological and physical hazards) at industrialfacil- exhibit effects relative to the specific exposure guidelines; (b) nature of the health effect(s) asso- ities surrounding Fort X were fabricated. The fabricated industrial facilities and associated haz- ciated with exposures at or above the guideline level; and (c) confidence in the available data ardous material operations were representative for the following types of industries: chemical plants; with respect to uncertainty and variability sources. refineries; petroleum and natural gas tank farms; All the hazard probability considerations and the railroad yards; waste disposal and treatment facil- hazard severity judgments support the operational risk management characterization levels (i.e. ities; and major transportation corridors and trans- extreme, high, moderate, and low) and are consis- fer points. For this assessment, representative chemical- tent with current operational guidance and the specific quantities, storage containers, toxicologi- preventive medicine approach to assessing health and medical threat risks (Army Center for Health cal and physical hazards were estimated from Promotion and Preventive Medicine, 2001). representative values found in the US EPA Toxic Release Inventories and Risk Management Plans. 3. Results The (fabricated) industrial facilities surrounding Fort X were rank-ordered with respect to expected In order to demonstrate the materials and meth- chemicals and associated toxicological and physi- ods highlighted in this assessment, a hypothetical cal values. The Harnack Phosgene Plant, located release scenario was developed. In this scenario,it in Simcity (approx. 5 km southeast of Scully was assumed that a brigade of military personnel Airfield), displayed the greatest healthymedical would be assembling for an 8-h period at ‘Fort X’ threat from an accidental or intentional release of to depart for an overseas deployment. The follow- phosgene. A total of 3000 kg of phosgene was J.S.Kirkpatricketal./TheScienceoftheTotalEnvironment288(2002)111–117 115 Fig.2.Simulateddownwindhazardareasforhypotheticalreleaseofphosgenegas. assumed to be stored at the Harnack Phosgene time. All of the downwind hazard regions were Plant. mapped to respective ERPG levels for phosgene, which are 0.2 parts per million (ppm) and 1.0 3.2. Vulnerability analysis ppm for ERPG-2 and ERPG-3 thresholds, respec- tively.Theresultingdownwindhazardareaimpacts boththeHarnackPhosgenePlantsurroundingsand In order to simulate the downwind occupational the Fort X installation. The mapped ERPG-2 and and environmental health hazards to Scully Air- field from a phosgene release at the Harnack ERPG-3 thresholds for phosgene were maintained Phosgene Plant, the following assumptions were for 75 min after the phosgene gas release. In made. The meteorological data were set as a fixed summary, the ERPG-3 hazard region remains in wind direction and speed in order to simulate the and around the Harnack Phosgene plant and these downwind plume (i.e. vulnerable zone) impacting levels are not predicted to occur on the Fort X theScullyAirfield.Avolumetricsourcesimulating installation. The ERPG-2 hazard region impacts the phosgene gas storage containers was used. the Fort X installation for an approximate 1-h With the source terms, the resulting downwind duration.TheScullyAirfieldisimpactedatERPG- hazard areas, predicted by the CATS software, 2 levels for approximately a 30-min duration. Fig. were output to 15-min time-steps in order to 2 graphically depicts the composite phosgene gas animate the downwind hazard regions through downwindhazardsareasfortheHarnackPhosgene 116 J.S.Kirkpatricketal./TheScienceoftheTotalEnvironment288(2002)111–117 Plant, Simcity, and Fort XyScully Airfield. In medical threat from an accidental or intentional addition, the CATS software hypothetically calcu- release of a toxic industrial chemical, posed oper- lated1350personnelexposedtoERPG-3phosgene ational risk management levels,whichcouldaffect levels (Simcity); 75 personnel exposed to ERPG- the installation andyor target population. One sig- 2 levels (Simcity); and 650 personnel exposed to nificant finding of this study was the availability ERPG-2 phosgene levels at Fort X. In addition, of commercial off-the-shelf consequence assess- the personnel preparing for deployment at the Fort ment and management software technology, which XScullyAirfieldareexposedtoERPG-2phosgene greatlyenhancedtheindustrialhazardsyvulnerabil- levels. ity assessment procedures. These techniques and procedures support the Department of Defense 3.3. Operational risk management analysis Force Protection measures, which provides aware- ness of a terrorism threat, appropriate measures to Based on the above methods and procedures prevent terrorist attacks and mitigate terrorism’s andestimatedoutcomes,anoverallModerateoper- effects in the event that preventive measures are ational risk category is selected for the Scully ineffective. Airfield exposure scenario. This operationalhealth risk category is derived from both a ‘critical’ Acknowledgments hazard severity ranking (defined as mild illness or temporary irritationsymptomsobservedduringthe mission) and a seldom hazard probability (defined The authors would like to thank Ms Veronique as 20–50% of the unit being exposed). With the Hauschild and Mr Tony Pitrat, USACHPPM, in supporting this paper for presentation at the Issues Moderate operational risk category, the expected and Applications in Toxicology and Risk Assess- consequences are a degraded mission capability in ment Conference, April 2001. terms of therequired missionstandardandtheunit reporting at a 70–84% strength range (Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Med- References icine, 2001). In addition, the surrounding environ- ment exposed to the listed ERPG-2 and ERPG-3 American Industrial Hygiene Association. The AIHA 2000 levels would be contaminated and require appro- Emergency Response Planning Guidelines and Workplace priate hazardous material site investigation and re- Environmental Exposure Level Guides Handbook.AIHA entryyre-use measures. Press,2000. Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, Medical Intelli- gence Assessment of Deployment Environmental Health 4. Discussion Risks,DI-1816-8-98,September1998(Unclassified). Headquarters,DepartmentoftheArmy.FieldManualNo.100- Overall, these techniques have been developed 14, Risk Management, Washington, DC, 23 April. 1998. to assist military medical planners and operations http:yy155.217.58.58ycgi-binyatdl.dllyfmy100-14y default.htm. personnel in determining the industrial hazards, Science Applications International Corporation, http:yy vulnerability assessments, and health risk assess- www.saic.comyproductsysoftwareycatsycats.html,2001. ments to continental United States military instal- US Department of Defense, Directive 6490.2, Joint Medical lations. These techniques have also supported Surveillance, August 1997, http:yyweb7.whs.osd.milypdfy several non-military industrial hazard assessments d64902p.pdf. including: the January 2000 State of the Union US Air Force Institute for Environment, Safety, and Occupa- Message (Washington, DC); the May 2000 Top tional Health Risk Analysis, Guidance for Conducting Air Officials Exercise (Portsmouth, NH); and the VulnerabilityAssessments(Draft),December2000. US Environmental Protection Agency, Emergency Planning August 2000 Republican National Convention and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), Chemical (Philadelphia, PA). In all, those identified indus- EmergencyPreparednessandPreventionOffice,1986,http:y trial facilities, which exhibited the greatesthealthy ywww.epa.govyswerceppy. J.S.Kirkpatricketal./TheScienceoftheTotalEnvironment288(2002)111–117 117 US Environmental Protection Agency. Chemical Accident US Army Center for Health Promotion Preventive Medicine. Prevention and Risk Management Program (RMP). May TechnicalGuide248,GuideforDeployedPreventiveMed- 1996.httpyywww.epa.govyswerceppyacc-pre.html. icinePersonnelonHealthRiskManagement,August.2001. US Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Consequence Assess- mentToolSet(CATS).2000.