USMC-USSOCOM Relationship: Does Increased Interoperability Necessitate Force Contribution? CSC 2004 Subject Area National Military Strategy Executive Summary Title: USMC-USSOCOM Relationship: Does Increased Interoperability Necessitate Force Contribution? Author: Major John A. Van Messel, USMC Thesis: This paper will examine the Marine Corps’ past, present, and future relationship with Special Operations Forces (SOF). It accomplishs this by discussing the historical background of the unification of special operations under United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM); why the Marines Corps chose not to contribute forces to USSOCOM; how the relationship between the Marines Corps and USSOCOM has evolved; what the Marine Corps’ current experiment in force contribution is; and what I believe the future relationship of the two organizations should be. Ultimately, this paper attempts to determine if interoperability between the Marine Corps and USSOCOM is sufficient or whether the Marine Corps should provide a permanent force contribution to USSOCOM. Discussion: The failed hostage rescue attempt in Iran in 1979 and the special operations interoperability problems in Grenada in 1983 led to the enactment of the Cohn-Nunn Amendment to the DOD Authorization Act of 1987. This amendment established USSOCOM as a new unified command. As USSOCOM was formed, the Marine Corps successfully resisted the assignment of forces by arguing that the Marine Corps did not possess any SOF. Instead, the Marine Corps pursued a MAGTF concept with some special operations capabilities. From 1992 to 2001, USSOCOM and the Marine Corps maintained a limited relationship. Following the events of 11 September 2001, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was signed between the two organizations to examine current capabilities and missions, to establish an interface between staffs, and to synchronize warfighting developments. Following the initial MOA, the Marine Corps offered a “proof of concept” force contribution to USSOCOM. The MCSOCOM Det consists of 87 Marine and Sailors organized into Headquarters, Fire Liaison, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence elements that deploys with a Naval Surface Warfare (NSW) Squadron in 2004. i Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2004 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2004 to 00-00-2004 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER USMC-USSOCOM Relationship: Does Increased Interoperability 5b. GRANT NUMBER Necessitate Force Contribution? 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Marine Corps War College,Marine Corps Combat Development REPORT NUMBER Command,Quantico,VA,22134-5067 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 50 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 The future relationship of the Marine Corps and USSOCOM will benefit from increased interoperability through the USMC/USSOCOM Board, permanent and augment billets, exchange programs, and “real world” operations. Force Contribution provides the advantages of increasing jointness, fixing reconnaissance, reducing future cost, and alleviating some Marine Corps’ fears. Force Contribution also provides the disadvantages of redundancy in mission, cost in resources, creation of an “elite culture”, and presenting the myth of a “great” investment. Conclusion(s) or Recommendation(s): I believe that through increased interoperability, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM can gain a better understanding of each organizations’ culture, abilities, and limitations. Closer ties will ultimately lead to a better combined force on the battlefield. As for force contribution, I do not believe it is in the best interest of the Marine Corps to pursue this initiative after the “proof of concept” test. Most of the advantages can be realized through increased interoperability without having to provide a “buy-in” to USSOCOM. ii Table of Contents Disclaimer ii Executive Summary iii Table of Contents v Introduction 1 Unifying Special Operations under USSOCOM 2 USMC Resists Force Contribution to USSOCOM 9 USMC/USSOCOM Relationship 1992-2001 14 USMC Contribution to USSOCOM 20 Proposed Future 24 Conclusions 37 Annex A 38 Annex B 41 Bibliography 43 iii Introduction Special Operations – Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. Theses operations are conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.1 The definition of special operations above clearly shows a distinction between specially organized, trained, and equipped forces as opposed to conventional, non-special operations forces. For years the Marine Corps has wrestled with this distinction. Is the Marine Corps a special force? Does the Marine Corps have special forces? Is the Marine Corps a conventional force that is uniquely capable of conducting some specialized operations? These questions among others have been debated for years. With a current National Military Strategy (NMS) designed to fight a War on Terrorism (WOT) and a Department of Defense emphasis on special operations, these questions have risen yet again to the forefront of topics in the Marine Corps. This paper will examine the Marine Corps’ past, present, and future relationship with Special Operations Forces (SOF). It attempts to accomplish this by discussing the historical background of the unification of special operations under United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM); why the Marines Corps chose not to contribute forces to USSOCOM; how the relationship between the Marines Corps and USSOCOM has evolved; what the Marine Corps’ current experiment in force contribution is; and what I believe the future relationship of 1 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington DC: 12 April 2001), 397. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html the two organizations should be. Ultimately, this paper will attempt to determine if interoperability between the Marine Corps and USSOCOM is sufficient or whether the Marine Corps should provide a permanent force contribution to USSOCOM. 2 Unifying Special Operations Under USSOCOM U.S. national security requires the maintenance of Special Operations Forces (SOFs) capable of conducting the full range of special operations on a worldwide basis, and the revitalization of those forces must be pursued as a matter of national urgency.2 -Deputy Secretary of Defense William H. Taft IV 3 October 1983 Following a significant and effective role during the Vietnam War, United States Special Operations Forces began a period of steady decline during the 1970s. Nine active Army Special Forces Groups shrank to three, SOF aircraft suffered similar cuts or reverted to the Reserves, and the Navy decommissioned its only special operations submarine.3 In addition to force reduction, SOF saw their budgets reduced, their manning levels drop below authorized strength, and a growing level of distrust from the conventional military. This combination of challenges led to an erosion of capabilities that would directly impact mission performance. A key catalyst in highlighting the deficiencies of our Special Operations Forces was the failure of a clandestine rescue attempt of fifty-three Americans held hostage in Iran. On 25 April 1980, eight helicopters, twelve fixed-wing aircraft, and a group of special operators headed for Tehran to conduct Operation EAGLE CLAW. After a variety of challenges were faced at a rendezvous point known as “Desert One,” the mission was aborted. While “Desert One” was only a codeword used during Operation EAGLE CLAW, it became synonymous with special operations failure. 2 Paul X. Kelley, General, USMC, “The Marine Corps and Special Operations,” Marine Corps Gazette, October 1985, 22. 3 John M. Collins, Special Operations Forces: An Assessment, 1986-1993 (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994), 9. 3 Operation EAGLE CLAW was designed as a three-phased rescue operation. Phase 1 entailed an Army special operations assault force flying in C-130s from Germany and Egypt to a clandestine base in the Iranian Desert, approximately 500 kilometers southeast of Tehran. At this location, codenamed “Desert One”, the assault force would marry up with eight Navy RH- 53D helicopters, flown by Marines from the carrier USS Nimitz in the Gulf of Oman. After the helicopters were refueled, they would transport the assault force to a location just outside of Tehran. Phase II entailed the assault force moving into the city under cover of darkness, rescuing the hostages, and recalling the helicopters to exfiltrate from the city. Phase III entailed the helicopters linking up with a C-141 at an airfield 50 kilometers south of Tehran. The airfield was to be secured by a detachment of Army Rangers while the rescue attempt was being conducted. At the airfield, the helicopters would be abandoned and the assault force and hostages would be transported by C-141 to safety. Due to mechanical problems and a heavy dust storm, two of the helicopters aborted the mission early on. At “Desert One”, an additional helicopter experienced hydraulic failure. With only five helicopters remaining, and a minimum of six required to carry out the mission, the rescue attempt had to be called off. While the planes were attempting to refuel for the return, a RH-53D collided with a C-130 tanker. The resulting explosion killed five airmen, three Marines, and wounded dozens. The “Desert One” fiasco led the Defense Department to appoint an investigative panel to review the mission. Former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James L. Holloway, chaired the 4 commission. The commission studied 23 separate issues in depth, eventually identifying 11 major areas that needed to receive careful consideration at all levels prior to planning any future special operations.4 Lack of command and control was identified as the most significant cause of the failure. In response to the findings, the Defense Department established a Special Operations Advisory Panel consisting of active and retired officers with career special operations backgrounds. This solution ultimately failed to cause any significant change, as special operations continued to be controlled along service lines. In 1983, Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada highlighted continuing interoperability problems between the services and in the integration of SOF into joint operations. Combined with the terrorist bombing in Lebanon that killed 237 Marines, the debate for SOF reform was reignited. Both events highlighted the growing threat of low-intensity conflict and the need for joint interoperability. Also noting the challenges of these events was the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William H. Taft III. He published his concerns in a memorandum to the service chiefs in which he noted the need for revitalizing SOF. Secretary Taft directed the service chiefs to provide the necessary force structure expansion and enhancements in command and control, personnel policy, training, and equipment no later than the end of Fiscal Year 1990.5 Concurrent with Defense Department initiatives, there was also a growing sense of interest in Congress to reform the military. In June 1983, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SAC), under the chairmanship of Senator Barry Goldwater, began a two-year long study of the 4 Charles M. Sellers, USA, “United States Special Operations Command: How Marine Corps Participation Could Enhance Current Special Operations Capabilities,” Masters Thesis, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA. 1993, 9. 5 Kelley, 22. 5 Department of the Defense. The following year, Senators Sam Nunn and William Cohen of the SAC and Representative Dan Daniel, Chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, were determined to overhaul SOF. Congressman Daniel had become convinced that the U.S. military establishment was not interested in special operations, that the country’s capability in this area was second rate, and that SOF operational command and control was an endemic problem. Senator Nunn expressed concern with the Services reallocating monies that were directed for SOF modernization. Senator Cohen believed that SOF needed a clearer organizational focus and chain of command for special operations to function in future low-intensity conflicts.6 In October 1985, the Senate Armed Services Committee published the results of its two- year review of U.S. military structure, entitled “Defense Organization: The Need For Change.” This study led to the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, and to amendments to reform SOF. During the spring of 1986, SOF reform bills were introduced in both houses of Congress. Senators Cohen and Nunn led the call for a joint military organization for SOF and the establishment of an office within the Department of Defense to oversee funding and mission focus on low-intensity conflict and special operations. Representative Daniel proposed the creation of a national special operations agency. This agency, headed by a civilian, would work directly for the Secretary of Defense. Representative Daniels main concern was to eliminate the Joint Chiefs and the Services from the SOF budgetary process. 6 United States Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Command History (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: September, 1998), 4. 6