CHINA’S MANNED SPACE PROGRAM Sun Tzu or Apollo Redux? Joan Johnson-Freese Nothing is more difficult than the art ofmaneuver.What is difficult about maneuver is to make the devious route the most direct and to turn misfortune to advantage. SUNTZU C hinaisonafasttrackintospace.Chineseofficialshavestatedthatamanned space launch is imminent—likely in the second half of 2003. The four launches since 1999 of the Shenzhou (Divine or Sacred Vessel) spacecraft in- tendedtolaunchthetaikonautsintoorbitevidencesubstantialChinesetechni- cal achievement and the seriousness of the program.1 Those achievements, plus pronouncements about timetables, space laborato- Dr.Johnson-FreeseisthechairoftheNavalWarCollege’s ries, shuttles, space stations, lunar bases, and now NationalSecurityDecisionMakingDepartment.Since Marsmissions,naturallymakeonewonderjustwhat earningadoctorateatKentStateUniversity,shehas servedasChair,TransnationalIssuesattheAsia- the Chinese are up to. Is there a new, twenty-first- PacificCenterforSecurityStudies,inHonolulu;taught centuryspaceracebrewing?Ifthereis,whoisracing, attheAirWarCollegeatMaxwellAirForceBase,Ala- andtowardwhatgoal?Analysisandcommentaryhave bama;beenavisitingfellowattheInstituteofSpaceand Aeronautical Science in Sagamihara, Japan; and di- spawnedseveral,oftenone-dimensional,scenarios. rectedtheCenterforSpacePolicyandLawinOrlando, Policyandacademicanalysesof Chinesespaceac- Florida.HerrecentbooksandmonographsincludeThe Viability of U.S. Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Policy: tivitieshavebeenlimitedand“stovepiped”withindis- MovingtowardSpaceControl(2000),TheChinese ciplines. With few exceptions, analyses have either SpaceProgram:AMysterywithinaMaze(1998),and focusedontechnicalparametersorhavebeenhighly Space, the Dormant Frontier: Changing the Para- digmforthe21stCentury(1997).Asummaryofthis politicizedaspartofthreatassessments,usuallyinthe articlehasappearedinYaleGlobalOnlineMagazine, context of U.S.plans for missile defense.2 In the case of in English and Chinese. theformer,thoughmuchoftheChineseprogramre- Theviewsexpressedinthisarticlearetheauthor’salone mainscloakedinsecrecyduetoboththenatureofthe anddonotrepresenttheofficialpositionoftheDepart- mentoftheNavy,theDepartmentofDefense,orthe Chinesesystemandthemilitaryaspectsof thetopic, U.S. government. considerable agreement exists among technical ana- lysts concerning Chinese capabilities, now and Naval War College Review, Summer 2003, Vol. LVI, No. 3 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2003 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2003 to 00-00-2003 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER China’s Manned Space Program: Sun Tzu or Apollo Redux? 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval War College,686 Cushing Road,Newport,RI,02841-1207 REPORT NUMBER 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 21 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 52 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW potentially in the future.3 Securing consensus regarding political “intent” re- mainsmoredifficult.Thereareanalystswhofeelthatthepursuitofspacetech- nologycanbebenignanddevelopmentoriented;othersperceiveitasinherently nefarious.ThatChinaissolargeandcomplexthatonecanlookthereforproof ofanythesis,andfindit,complicatesthesituation. Some observers see China’s race to space as a battle with its own demons. Prestige, in this scenario, becomes the Chinese brass ring. Conquering space represents an opportunity in what China refers to as mankind’s “fourth fron- tier” to recapture its lost legacy of technological mastery and innovation.4 Cer- tainly,aChinesequestforprestigeisundeniable.Chinesescientistsandpolicy makers eagerly point out that when (not if) China launches taikonauts into space,itwillbeonlythethirdcountryintheworldtohavedoneso.NoEuropean countriescandothat,orJapaneither;mannedspaceflightwillbelongtoanex- clusivecluboftheUnitedStates,Russia,andChina.Theworldwasdramatically and tragically reminded of the technical difficulty of piloted spaceflight, and subsequently the high level of technical achievement requisite to accomplish such,withtherecentlossofthespaceshuttleColumbia.So,theprospectivedo- mestic,regional,andinternationalbenefitsofthatexclusivityareconsiderable. ButaretheyenoughforacountrythatdailyfacesHerculeanchallengesinkeep- ing its population fed, employed, and stable and pursuing essential domestic modernization,while it spends an estimated two billion dollars annually on a space program?5 Ifnot,thereasontheChinesearepursuingamannedspaceprogrammaybe to draw attention from its military space activities, which will clearly benefit fromthedual-usenatureofthetechnologybeingdeveloped.TheJuly2002An- nualReportontheMilitaryPowerofthePeople’sRepublicofChina,publishedby theU.S.DepartmentofDefense,stated,“Whileoneofthestrongestimmediate motivations for this [China’s manned space program] appears to be political prestige,China’s manned space efforts almost certainly will contribute to im- proved military space systems in the 2010–2020 time frame.”6 Global recogni- tion of the increasingly important role of space in military operations began withtheunofficialproclamationoftheGulfWaras“thefirstspacewar,”andit has grown steadily since.7 Under a worst-case scenario, the Chinese manned ef- fortsaremerelyaTrojanhorse.Ithasalreadybeensuggested,forexample,that Chinese leaders may see potential military value in Shenzhou as a reconnais- sance platform.8 Chinese government officials have, after all, included national defense in the stated aims of their space program.9 Bothhistoryandalogicalpolicyanalysis,however,rejectthenotionthatChi- nesereasoningmustbeviewedasaneither-orsituation.Farmorelikely,Chinese motivationsforeagerly,evenaggressively,pursuingaspaceprogram,including JOHNSON-FREESE 53 mannedspace,aremultifaceted.UnlesstheChinesesufferatechnicaldisaster— which they have been working to avoid, and will post-Columbia even more ardently—spaceyieldshighreturnsoninvestmentinmultiplepolicyareas.In- deed,intheUnitedStatesspacehasalwaysbeenasubfieldofotherareas—for- eign,nationalsecurity,economic,andsciencepolicybeingthemostprominent. Examining the Chinese space program under the same premises allows for a betterunderstandingofwhattheChinesearedoingandwhy.Extrapolatingthe currentenvironmentintothefuturemakesapparentthecontextforapotential comingspacerace,aswellaswhyitislikelytheUnitedStatesandChinawillbe theprimary—thoughnottheonly—competitors. KNOW THE ENEMY AND KNOW YOURSELF . . . PopularhistorytellsusthattheApolloprogramexemplifiedthe“cando”atti- tude and visionary approach of the John F. Kennedy administration.10 If only, somespace-explorationadvocatesstillwistfullymuse,anotherAmericanpresi- dentpossessedsuchimaginationandvision,theglorydaysof vigorousNASA spaceactivitywouldreturn.Thosereflectionsarebothabouthalf-right.Popular history’sviewofApollorightlyglorifiesthecan-dospiritbutgreatlyembellishes thevisionaspect.HavingobservedthedramaticandunanticipatedU.S.public senseinreactiontotheSovietlaunchofSputnikduringtheEisenhoweradmin- istrationthattheUnitedStateswastechnicallyinferiorto,andhencepotentially weakerthan,theSovietUnion—andhowthatimpressionspreadworldwide— theKennedyadministrationrecognizedthesymbolicpowerandallureofspace accomplishments.11 Additionally, the United States already had an active mili- taryspaceprogramunderway;itwaspatentthatthetechnologyrequisiteforci- vilian space activities would benefit the military side, and the American economyaswell.Ifthetechnicalriskscouldbemanaged,thebenefitswerepo- tentially enormous.Space became,on one level,a Cold War battlefield,where scientistsandengineerswerethefrontlinesoldiers,fightingfortheprestigeand globalinfluencethatwouldflowfromtechnicalprowess,prowessalsobeneficial to the military. On another level, the knowledge and hardware created would bringdomesticbenefitsbeyondthesymbolicandmilitaryarenas. Several parallels can be drawn between U.S.decision making in support of Apollointhe1960sandthatgoingoninChinatodaywithrespecttothemanned spaceprogram.Domestic,regional,andinternationalprestigeareclearlyfactors in Chinese decision making. Domestically, a positive “public-rallying” factor complementsnationalpride.ImagesoftheShenzhoubasicallymakepeoplefeel good about themselves and their country; they are found on consumer goods fromphonecardstowaterheaters.Also,domesticprideandinternationalpres- tige also yield increased governmental legitimacy, a strong consideration in 54 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW Beijing.Internationally,especiallytotheextentthatprestigeimpliesinfluence, inthesensethatitoncedidfortheUnitedStates,regionalpolitics,vyingforthe “top spot,” comes into play. Few areas of exclusive technical achievement re- main;manycountries(mostpertinentlyforChineseregionalconsiderations, JapanandIndia)havesatellites,launchfacilities,etc.(thoughwithawiderange of quality,size,and capabilities);however,there are still only two countries in theworldwithmannedspaceprograms.Hence,forpurposesofprestige,accept- ing the exponentially higher costs associated with manned versus unmanned launchesbecomesobligatory. Economically,the benefits for the United States of the space race generally andtheApolloprogramspecificallywerefarreaching,bothdirectandindirect. Education and on-the-job experience for the Apollo scientists and engineers created a generation of highly trained technical personnel. Engineering pro- grams were specifically set up in China’s plans are for a phased, incremental, colleges and universities to meet cautious—though ambitious—program. the need for new and specialized aerospace skills. In China, the University of Science and Tech- nology of China, Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and BeijingInstituteofTechnologyareallamongthetopuniversities,andalleagerly discussandpromotetheirinvolvementinthespaceprogram.Studentinterestin spaceissaidtohaveexplodedinChina.IftheChineseexperienceparallelsany- thing close to what has happened in Japan already,universities and industries must be using even remote possibilities of being involved in space ventures to lurethebestandthebrightestintotheirprograms. Anothereconomicpayoff istobeseeninthemovieApollo13.TomHanks’s charactershowsacongressionaldelegationthroughtheVehicleAssemblyBuild- ingattheKennedySpaceCenter(KSC).ThesetourswereoncearegularNASA function.Escortspointedoutwhatpartsoftheprogramwereproducedineach stateof theunionandhowtheapproximatelytwenty-fivebilliondollarsspent onApollowasbeingspreadacrossthecountry—informationpoliticallyneces- sarytokeepthefundsflowing.Governmentmoneyspentwasexpectednotonly to get a man to the moon but to employ a great many people in the process.12 In Chinatoday,programsthatbolstertechnicaleducationandcreatetechnicaljobs areofconsiderableinterest;thelessonsofApollohavenotbeenlostontheChi- neseleadership. Conversely,Chinaisalsoawarethatspaceprogramscanbeviewed,aswasthe case during Apollo, as desirable but expendable in favor of more pragmatic, near-termneeds.ManyU.S.scientistsobjectedtoApolloasdrainingfundsfrom toomanyotherprograms,andpoliticianshadotherpriorities.Somegroupsin JOHNSON-FREESE 55 Chinahavequietlybutdeliberatelyletitbeknownthattheyseespaceprograms asawasteof money.Thisnewphenomenon—Chinesepublicopinionactually mattering to the government—demands returns on investment heretofore unnecessary. WhiletheUnitedStatesblazedthroughtheheavensupthesteepestoflearn- ing curves, other countries recognized that a technology gap was developing, one potentially detrimental to their future.13 In the late 1960s and into the 1970s, European nations aggressively pursued space activity,separately and then col- lectively,for economic reasons.It was deemed that space engendered technol- ogy, technology led to industrialization, and industrialization fostered economicgrowth.InCanada,publicandpoliticalpressureforspaceactivitythat would prevent being on the wrong side of the technology gap produced a pro- gramdesignedtofocusononetechnologyatatime,carefullyselectedtobenefit theCanadianpeopledirectly.Communicationssatellites,linkingCanada’svast geographicexpanse,werethefirstfocus.Robotics(notablytheCanadarm),with potential industrial and hence economic benefits on Earth, were the second. Chinaiskeenlyawareoftheseestablishedrelationshipsbetweenspace,technol- ogy,economics,anddomesticpolitics. Finally,thereisthemilitaryconsideration.AccordingtotheStockholmInter- national Peace Research Institute, “No country can currently rival or contest U.S.spacedominanceortheadvantagesthatthisprovidestoitsterrestrialmili- tary operations.”14 Wired magazine put it differently in April 2002: “The Penta- gon’sroleinworldaffairshasgonethroughanepochaltransformation:fromthe FuldaGaptotheHighwayofDeath,fromAgentOrangetoGPS[theGlobalPo- sitioningSystem],fromarsenalofdemocracytoglobalcop.Whenyouareacop, sometimesyoukickdoorsin.Mostofthetimeyoustayonpatrol.Outerspaceis whereaglobalcoppatrols.America’seyes,earsandnervesareupthere,allday, everyday,circlingtheblueyonder.Spacevehiclesaretheultimateasymmetrical asset. They cannot be reached with a hijacked jet. They laugh at anthrax.”15 The ChinesearewellawareofU.S.spacedominance.Theyhavereadthe2001report oftheCommissiontoAssessNationalSecuritySpaceManagementandOpera- tion(commonlyknownastheSpaceCommissionReport),chairedbysecretary of defense and space supporter Donald Rumsfeld.16 That report surmised that sinceair,land,andseaallhavebecomebattlegrounds,itisinevitablethatspace willtoo;theUnitedStates,itwenton,wouldberemissnottoprepareforthatin- evitability.TheChinesearefullyabletoreadbetweenthelinesandseetheimpli- cationsfordevelopmentofspaceweapons. Identifying potential military gains from technology specifically developed for manned space activities is not, however, as straightforward as some have speculated. Using the Shenzhou as a reconnaissance platform, for example, 56 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW hardly seems to maximize capability while minimizing expenditures.In 1969, theU.S.militaryabandonedtheMannedOrbitalLaboratoryprogram,intended toperformreconnaissance,inlargepartbecauseunmannedsatellitescouldpro- vide the same—or better—capabilities.17 If the Chinese are solely or even pri- marily seeking what amounts to a high-resolution, real-time reconnaissance satellite, a direct approach to building one makes more sense technically and fiscally. Nonetheless,developmentofspacehardwareandknow-howforthemanned programswillcertainlypushtheChineserapidlyupthelearningcurveinevery- thingfrommaterialstocomputingpowertosystemsengineering,astheApollo programdidfortheUnitedStates.Theirdesireandperceivedneedtoscalethat curve is unambiguous.In January 2003,the Chinese launched their second Zi Yuan(ZY-2)photoreconnaissancesatellite,capableofresolutionintherangeof tentotwentycentimeters.Itisamilitaryversionofasatellitejointlydeveloped by China and Brazil for remote sensing (the ZY-1, or China Brazil Earth Re- sourceSatellite,CBERS)—evidenceofhowdevelopmentofacivilprogramcan haveclearmilitarybenefit. TherobustnessandactivismofU.S.militaryspaceeffortsundertheGeorge W. Bush administration—especially in contrast to the generally disapproving attitude of its predecessor—must also be considered in the context of U.S.-Chinarelationsmoregenerally.Until“9/11,”whenmanyinternationalre- lationships got turned on their heads and several strange bedfellows emerged, someanalystsfeltthatjustlyorunjustly,Chinahadbeendeemedthenextenemy oftheUnitedStates.China-U.S.relationshavebeenstrainedinthisrealm,com- mencingwiththe1998CommissiontoAssesstheBallisticMissileThreattothe UnitedStates(againledbyRumsfeld);theywereexacerbatedbythe1998Cox CommissionReportaccusingU.S.aerospacecompaniesofgivingChinatechni- cal assistance in its military space program through commercial satellite launches,andaggravatedbytheEP-3incidentin2001;andtheymustalwaysbe consideredinthecontextofbothAmericanmilitarysupporttoTaiwanandU.S. missile defense plans, which the Chinese perceive as severely impacting their own nuclear deterrence.18 Indeed,duringthistimealooseallianceofmembersofCongress,congressio- nalstaff,think-tankfellows,conservativejournalists,lobbyistsforTaiwan,for- mer intelligence officers, and a handful of academics proudly proclaimed themselvesthe“BlueTeam,”unitedintheirviewthatarisingChinaposedgreat riskstoAmerica’svitalinterests.Theyweredeterminedandeffectiveinencour- aging a hard-line U.S. government stance on anything Chinese.19 Their success wasinterpretedinChinaassignalingmainlineacceptanceof thoseviews;that has provided in turn an opportunity for backlash from Chinese hard-liners JOHNSON-FREESE 57 (potentiallytriggeringadangerousaction-reactioncycle).Therefore,anyactiv- ity that might increase Chinese capabilities in an area of clear and expanding U.S.dominance—likespace—wouldeasilygarnersupportinBeijing. Takentogether,thepolitical,economic,andmilitarybenefitstotheChinese inpursuingspaceactivity,includingmannedspace,validatetheircourseofac- tionasarationalpolicydecision.Althoughcertainlythereisnofull-blowncold war,thereareconsiderableparallelstotheApollo-eraU.S.rationalesintermsof domesticbenefits,surrogatestrugglesforregionalinfluence,andglobalpolitical andmilitaryposturing.IndeedChinaitselfisclearthatitispursuingspaceac- tivitynotjustasanendinitselfbutaspartofalargerstrategy. INVINCIBILITY DEPENDS ON ONE’S SELF . . . InNovember2000,theInformationOfficeof theStateCouncilissuedthefirst Chinese white paper on space, China’s Space Activities.20 The technical mile- stoneslaiddownwereimpressive,andthelanguagewasinsightful.Itreminded readersthatChinahadinventedgunpowder,the“embryoofmodernspacerock- ets.”Space,then,isafieldChinaseesitself ashavinginitiatedandoncedomi- nated,butwasthenovertakenin.Itnowwantstoregainaplaceofdistinction. Included in the development targets provided in the white paper were earth-observation systems, independently operated satellite broadcasting and telecommunicationssystems,anindependentsatellitenavigationandposition- ingsystem,upgradedlaunchvehiclesasnecessaryformannedspaceflight,aco- ordinated national satellite remote-sensing application system, space science, spaceexploration,andindustrializationandmarketingofspacetechnologyand applications.Equallyimportant,thepaperalsodeclaredthatthesegoalswould beachievedthroughadherenceto the principle of long-term, stable and sustainable development and making the de- velopment of space activities . . . serve the state’s comprehensive development strat- egy. The Chinese government attaches great importance to the significant role of space activities in implementing the strategy of revitalizing the country with science and education and that of sustainable development, as well as in economic construc- tion, national security, science and technology development and social progress. The development of space activities is encouraged and supported by the government as an integral part of the state’s comprehensive development strategy. Inthatcontext,thewhitepaperpromotedinternationalspacecooperation, placingpriorityoncooperationwithintheAsia-Pacificregionandsupporting Chineseparticipationininternationallaunchservices. Chinarecognizesthatitscurrent“catch-up”positionisatleastpartlyof its ownmaking.SpacescientistsandengineersdidnotescapethewrathoftheCul- tural Revolution.21 Facilities were destroyed, and individuals were starved and 58 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW sometimesbeatenwhilebeingforcedtocontinueworkinaustere,evenunimag- inableconditions.Oneearlylaunchaccount,forexample,describesrocketfuel beingloadedbybicyclepump.Chinadidhave,however,welltrainedindividuals initsspaceprogram.Many,includingtheprogram’sleader,QianXuesen,were Westerntrained;Dr.QianhadaPh.D.fromTorontoUniversityandhadworked at the California Institute of Technology for more than twenty years.22 Qian, alongwithapproximatelyahundredotherChinesescientists,wasexpelledfrom theUnitedStatesin1955duringtheMcCarthyeraandnowbearslong-standing, andmanysayunderstandable,illfeelingstowardtheUnitedStates. Fromthoseroots,Chinaproceededtumultuouslybutdeterminedly.TheChi- nese must be commended for development of what was,until very recently,a virtually indigenous space program.Between the updated German V-2 rocket (renamedR-2andleftbehindbytheSovietswhentheybrokerelationswiththe Chinese in 1960), the initiation of commercial satellite launches in the mid-1980s,andcollaborationwiththeRussiansonaspectsofthemannedspace programbeginninginthelate1990s,theChinesehaveworkedprimarilyalone, thoughnotentirelybychoice.MaoTse-tungscaredoffevenNikitaKhrushchev withhiscasualattitudetowardnuclearwar;therefollowedtheself-imposediso- lationoftheCulturalRevolution,andarelationshipwiththeUnitedStatesthat was tenuous at best, especially after Tiananmen Square. The Chinese quickly madesignificantautonomoustechnicalachievements,however,whenleftontheir own.Withinadecadeoftheirfirstsatellitelaunchin1970,theChinesecouldsuc- cessfully recover large satellites from orbit.This is important today as a critical stepinanymannedprogram,sinceitrequiresthedevelopmentofsuchtechnolo- gies as heat shields,sophisticated tracking systems,and automated controls. Nevertheless,theChinesealwaysmaximizedtheirabilitytolearnfromoth- ers. That their Xichang launch site is at approximately twenty-eight degrees northlatitudeandKSCisat28.5degreesnorthisnotcoincidence.TheChinese pickedasimilarlatitudetoallowemulationofAmericanpost-launchtrajecto- ries,whichweredescribedinsomedetailinopen-sourceU.S.literature.Evento- day,although the Shenzhou spacecraft bears similarities to the Russian Soyuz design,theChineseavidlydefenditastheirownproduct,whichtechnicalcom- parisons seem to bear out.23 They view having begun with the Soyuz design ratherthanreinventingthewheelassimplysmartbusinesspractice. InMay2002ChinaheldaNationalScienceWeek.Inoneexhibition,amodel showedChina’svisionof apermanentsettlementonMars.“Fromalong-term perspective,itisahistoricalnecessityformantotravelintospace,”aposterpro- claimed.Asix-wheeledroboticdetectorwasunveiledaspotentiallyChina’sfirst lunarvisitor.Theexhibition’stonereflectedChina’sacknowledgmentthatcon- siderableself-interestwasinvolvedinitsbidtobecomethethirdnationtoputa JOHNSON-FREESE 59 humaninspace.“Thedevelopmentanduseof technologiesformannedspace flighthavefar-reachingsignificanceforournationinthepolitical,military,eco- nomic and technological fields,” a poster said.24 The current manned space effort,known as Project 921,is China’s second. (Actuallyitisthethird,ifonecountsWanHu,asixteenth-centuryinventorwho builtarocket-propelledchair.Upontesting,boththeinventorandthechairmet withunfortunateoutcomes.)Inthepresentprogram,fourteentaikonautshave beenselected,andmuchlikethefirstU.S.astronauts,theyweredrawnfromthe eliteranksofmilitaryfighterpilots.TwotaikonautstrainedinRussia,butmost training is now conducted in a secret facility north of Beijing.25 The Chinese are deliberatelycreatinganauraofmystiqueanddramaaroundthetaikonauts.Af- terthelatestpreliminaryflight,theChinesereleasedrarefootageofthemenin training. The Shenzhou capsule is reportedly able to carry three or four taikonauts,thoughitislikelythattheinitialflightwillcarryonlyone.Therehas beenspeculationthatChenLong,athirty-year-oldfighterpilot,istohavethe honor of being the first Chinese into space.26 Theearliermannedprogramstartedinthe1970sandthenstoppedin1980, due to lack of funds, technological barriers, and a pragmatic decision to put more emphasis on applications satellites. That project was run purely on a planned, central-economy basis, with a one-way money flow. This second round,whichcommencedin1992,isbeingmanagedverydifferently. The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC, or CASTC)wascreatedin1999forthepursuitof nationaldefenseandaerospace endeavors; it spun off from the China Aerospace Corporation (CAC).27 The changewaspartofanefforttobecomemorecompetitive,inwhichtheChinese governmentreformedthetopdefenseandtechnologycorporations,likeCAC, whichwasalargestate-ownedenterpriseunderdirectsupervisionof theState Council.CAC,whichhadsome270,000employees,wasdividedintotheCASC andtheChinaAerospaceMachineryandElectronicsCorporation(recentlyre- namedChinaAerospaceScienceandIndustryCorporation),presumablywith about150,000employees.CASC,itselfalargestate-ownedenterprise,hasareg- istered capital of RMB* nine billion yuan.28 Over 130 organizations are subordinate to CASC, including five large re- search academies—the Chinese Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, the ChineseAcademyof SpaceTechnology,theShanghaiAcademyof SpaceFlight Technology, the Chinese Academy of Space Electronic Technology, and the Academy of Space Chemical Propulsion Technology; two large research and manufacture bases, the Sichuan Space Industry Corporation and Xian Space ScienceandTechnologyIndustryCorporation;aswellasanumberoffactories, *RMB=Renminbi(“people’scurrency”).