t c e BUILDING MILITARY j o “E-COIN-OMIC” POWER r P BY h LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD E. NOLAN United States Air Force c r a e s e R DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited. y g e USAWC CLASS OF 2010 t a This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. r The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the t official policy or position of the Department of the S Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050 The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle State Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation. 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REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED (From - To) 13-01-2010 Strategy Research Project 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Building Military “E-COIN-OMIC” Power 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Nolan 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT Professor James B. Bartholomees, Jr. NUMBER Department of National Security and Strategy 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Unlimited 13. S UPPLEM ENTARY N OTES 14. ABSTRACT Today, a great debate in political science is taking place about how the U.S. can more effectively use non-kenetic instruments of power in current military operations. This paper focuses on the military’s role projecting economic power and explores whether the military is doing a satisfactory job in employing economic strategies in twenty-first century counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The paper demonstrates how an intertwined military economic and kinetic strategy can improve the U.S.'s chances of winning the "hearts and minds" of indigenous people while undermining the efforts of insurgents. The paper explores military economic strategies employed in previous U.S. COIN operations; economic concepts in the Army and Marine Corps foray into COIN operation doctrine (FM 3-24) and later Joint COIN operational doctrine (JP 3- 24); and whether the military is currently organized, trained and equipped to succeed in this mission. 15. SUBJECT TERMS Economics, Instrument of Power, Fragile States, Counterinsurgency 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE 19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area UNCLASSIFED UNCLASSIFED UNCLASSIFED UNLIMITED 28 code) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18 USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT BUILDING MILITARY “E-COIN-OMIC” POWER by Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Nolan United States Air Force Professor James B. Bartholomees, Jr. Project Adviser This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. U.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013 ABSTRACT AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Nolan TITLE: Building Military “E-COIN-OMIC” Power FORMAT: Strategy Research Project DATE: 13 January 2010 WORD COUNT: 5,171 PAGES: 28 KEY TERMS: Economics, Instrument of Power, Fragile States, Counterinsurgency CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified Today, a great debate in political science is taking place about how the U.S. can more effectively use non-kenetic instruments of power in current military operations. This paper focuses on the military’s role projecting economic power and explores whether the military is doing a satisfactory job in employing economic strategies in twenty-first century counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The paper demonstrates how an intertwined military economic and kinetic strategy can improve the U.S.'s chances of winning the "hearts and minds" of indigenous people while undermining the efforts of insurgents. The paper explores military economic strategies employed in previous U.S. COIN operations; economic concepts in the Army and Marine Corps foray into COIN operation doctrine (FM 3-24) and later Joint COIN operational doctrine (JP 3- 24); and whether the military is currently organized, trained and equipped to succeed in this mission. BUILDING MILITARY “E-COIN-OMIC” POWER The twenty-first century is typified by a volatile international environment, persistent conflict, and increasing state fragility…resulting in political strife, instability, or even insurgency. —Joint Publication 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations1 Economics in Historical Counterinsurgency Doctrine The military has a long history of employing counterinsurgency (referred to as COIN) strategies. The Department of Defense (DoD) currently defines a Counterinsurgency as “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”2 Over time, insurgencies have changed how they organize (many are now non- state actors), how they raise money (globally), from what they draw their power and inspiration (idealism and money), who and where they recruit (radicals from all over the globe), how they get their message out (the Internet, e-mail, social networking websites), their motivations (hatred of the west, criminal activities), and strategies (suicide bombers, improvised explosive devices, cyber attacks). In 2005, an Al-Qaida spokesperson, Abu Mus’ab al-Najadi, offered this strategic aim: …our war with America is fundamentally different, for the first time priority is defeating it economically. For that, anything that negatively affects its economy is considered for us a step in the right direction on the path to victory. Military defeats do not greatly effect how we measure total victory, but these defeats indirectly affect the economy which can be demonstrated by the breaching of the confidence of capitalists and investors in this nation’s ability to safeguard their various trade and dealings.3 And while economic actions and strategies have always played a role historically in counterinsurgencies, this quote highlights the growing importance economics play in conducting future COIN operations. Although early American wars were actually fought as successful insurgencies, the first foray into U.S. “counterinsurgency doctrine” is often attributed to political scientist Francis Lieber during the American Civil War. At the request of the Union’s General in Chief, Lieber authored what would be issued by President Lincoln on April 24, 1863 as General Orders No. 100 "Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field." Also known as the Lieber Code, these instructions codified rules that governed warfare and ensured protection of the captured and non- combatants.4 The Lieber Code was significant because it recognized that if the Union did not provide fair treatment and accountability on the battlefield, the South might never reconcile its differences—which would have disastrous economic implications. U.S. counterinsurgencies continued throughout the 19th Century, but further Army interest in COIN-style doctrine was episodic and brief.5 In the twentieth century, two of the most renowned and respected authors on counterterrorism strategy were foreign officers. In 1962, French Colonel Roger Trinquier published his book, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, based on his experiences in Indochina and Algeria. He described ‘modern warfare’ as an "interlocking system of actions - political, economic, psychological, military - which aims at the overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime."6 Colonel Trinquier was critical of the traditional French army's inability to adapt itself to changing circumstances and noted, “Action of this kind [forcing insurgents to fight away from their own terrain] often implies political or economic measures that do not always fall within the purview of military leaders, but they should be used whenever possible.”7 In 1971, British General Frank Kitson, authored Low 2