IMPLEMENTING THE SEAPOWER STRATEGY Captain Wayne P.Hughes,Jr.,U.S.Navy (Retired) A nidealofwar—somewouldcallitaprinciple—istoachieveperfectcollab- orationbetweenallcommanders,verticallyandlaterally.1Butprosecution of war entails decentralized authority and responsibility,and so a corollary to theidealofcollaboration—orcooperation—isinevitablefrictionbetweenwill- ful military and civilian leaders who have different styles, outlooks, and intentions. Said another way, successful collaboration connects upward, laterally, and CaptainHughesisSeniorLecturerintheDepartment downward.Upward unity of purpose is difficult,be- of Operations Research at the Naval Postgraduate causepoliticsandwarfaremustarriveatagoal-driven, School,Monterey,California.Heisagraduateofthe united logic while communicating with different U.S.NavalAcademyandholdsamasterofsciencede- greeinoperationsresearchfromtheNavalPostgradu- grammars.2Lateralunityofactionisdifficult,because ate School. On active duty he commanded a different services see the same problem through dif- minesweeperandadestroyer,directedalargetraining ferent lenses and aspire to different solutions.In our command,servedasdeputydirectorofSystemsAnaly- sis(OP-96),andwasaidetoUnderSecretaryofthe global worldthe collaboration between different ser- Navy R. JamesWoolsey. At the Naval Postgraduate vicesisdifficult,becausetheyarenotjusttheAmeri- Schoolfortwenty-sixyears,hehasservedintheChair ofAppliedSystemsAnalysis,asthefirstincumbentof canarmedforces.CollaborationbytheAmericansea theChairofTacticalAnalysis,andasdeanoftheGrad- services is uniquely critical, however, and most of uateSchoolofOperationalandInformationSciences. whatfollowsisintendedtopromotewellcoordinated CaptainHughesisauthorofFleetTacticsandCoastal Combat(2000),FleetTactics:TheoryandPractice actions within and among the U.S. Navy, Marine (1986),MilitaryModeling(1984),andCombatSci- Corps,andCoastGuard. ence:AnOrganizingStudy(forthcoming),andisaco- ExamplesoffrictionfromoperationsinIraqareper- authorofAConciseTheoryofCombat(1997).Heis a member of the Naval War College Press Advisory hapstooclosetousnow,butthereisaplethoraofhis- Board. toricalexamplesthatshowtheidealofcohesiveaction tobeunattainable.WorldWarIIhasspectacularcases NavalWarCollegeReview,Spring2008, Vol. 61, No.2 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 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THIS PAGE Same as 13 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 48 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW ofwillfulness.GeneralDwightEisenhower’swartimegeniuswastofostercooper- ationandunityamongdisparatefactions.HebroughttogetherfractiousFrench leadersinNorthAfrica.Heworkedwiththenavyandairforcecomponentcom- mandershewasgivenfortheD-Daylandings.HeneutralizedtheegosofBernard MontgomeryandGeorgePattonduringtheAllieddrivethroughFranceafterthe breakoutfromtheNormandybeachhead.Atalltimesheretainedtheconfidence ofPrimeMinisterChurchill,PresidentRoosevelt,andtheJointChiefsofStaff.Ei- senhowerisveritablytheexceptionthatprovestherulethatcollaborationishard to achieve. WorldWarIIisfortworeasonsanapt,neutrallaboratorytostudythechal- lenges of collective action.The first is that the war is dissimilar to American circumstances today and cannot be parroted as a template.Both world wars are,in fact,precedents to be avoided in establishing ways and means to deal with our contemporary emerging peer, the People’s Republic of China. Sec- ond, the two great wars illustrate the global reach of seapower. Neither war couldhavebeenwonwithoutachievingmaritimedominanceandexploiting operationalmaneuverfromthesea. Astrategyhasnowbeenconstructedinlesspassionatepeacetimecircum- stances to foster collaboration.It has been vetted by the operational and sea servicecommanderswhoareaffectedbyandmustfollowitstenets.Thenew maritimestrategyservesasanagreedpointofdeparturethatwillnoteliminate contentiousnessinthefuturebutwillbethecornerstoneof implementation, of the determination of affordable resources,of training to carry it out with theforcesinhand,andofthedesignoffutureseaserviceforces. IrefertothepithydocumentrecentlypromulgatedbytheCommandantsof theCoastGuardandMarineCorpsandtheChiefofNavalOperations,entitled “ACooperativeStrategyfor21stCenturySeapower.”Itistheresultofabroadly based,collaborativeefforttodevelopwhatwasoftenreferredtoas“anewmar- itimestrategy.”Thisarticleelaboratesonthedocument’sgreatsignificanceto- ward establishing a new Seapower Strategy to guide the nation’s maritime operations, as well as what it does not say and the extensive work still to be done. THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS First in importance, the new Seapower Strategy restores the primacy of seapowerinAmericansecuritypolicy.Thoughtheseaserviceleaderscannot proclaim a national maritime strategy, they have demonstrated the logic of seapoweranditsvaluein“fosteringapeacefulglobalsystemcomprisinginter- dependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and gover- nance.”Thethreeserviceleadersmakethecasethat“UnitedStatesseapoweris HUGHES 49 a force for good, protecting this nation’s vital interests even as it joins with otherstopromotesecurityandprosperityacrosstheglobe.” Inparticular,theSeapowerStrategyclearlyimpliesthatthetwo-major- regional-conflict force-shaping strategy of the 1990s is dead. The two-MRC strategyfocusedonfightingwarsonthegroundoverseas.Itwastoonarrowin scopetoproducearobust,adaptiveAmericanmilitaryestablishment.Itreduced theroleoftheNavytodeliveringground-warcapabilitiesandsupportingthem. Also,asrecenteventshavedemonstrated,thetwo-MRCstrategyclaimedacapa- bilitythatwasunachievable—thatof twoquick,conclusiveoperationsagainst foes who would bend to our will in “shock and awe”in the face of American might. Thestrategyofseapoweremphasizesthenaturaladvantageofmaritimepre- ponderance to “influence actions and activities at sea and ashore.”Below, de- scribed as four functions of navies, is an abridgement of the capabilities espousedintheseaservices’“Strategyfor21stCenturySeapower.” OntheSeas Toensurethesafetyofgoodsandservices.Anavyprotectsthemovementofship- pingandmeansofwarontheoceans,anditsafeguardsstationaryforces,toin- cludenuclear-poweredballisticmissilesubmarines(SSBNs),blockadingforces, coastal patrols,and ships fixed on station for theater ballistic-missile defense. CurrentlytheAmericanseaserviceshaveaworldwideroleofsweepingbreadth. Todenysafemovementbytheenemy.A seapower’s navy must have the visible meanstopreventmovementofenemyshippingandmeansofwar.Thedenialof stationaryenemyforcessuchasSSBNsisalessclear-cutcapability,butthesym- metryholdsinprinciple. FromtheSeas Todelivergoodsandservices.A navy puts land forces ashore to seize and hold territoryanddeliversairandmissilestrikesforavarietyof purposes.Thiswas theNavy’sprincipalrolefortheregionalcontingenciesinthetwo-MRCstrategy. Theabilitytoprojectpoweroverseasabides,butitismorediffuseandglobalin thenewstrategy. Topreventenemydeliveryofgoodsandservices.A navy and coast guard protect the homeland from every threat. For many states, this has been the foremost functionoftheircoastalforces.Untilrecently,theneedforAmericanhomeland defensewasnonexistent,becauseofmaritimesuperiority.Butthe“Cooperative Strategyfor21stCenturySeapower”makesclearthatthethreatof terroristat- tackshaspromotedtheimportanceofthisfunction. 50 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW Themilitaryobjectofacontinentalpowerisusuallytogainorholdterritory.3 Therehasbeennothinglikeownershipoftheseauntilrecently.Groundopera- tionsareaboutgeographicnodesofvalue.Maritimeoperationshavebeenabout the “arcs”that connect countries and their vital nodes on land.The Seapower Strategysaysthatthistruismnolongerholds.Theincreasedvalueofoceanown- ership—accompaniedbymanyrecentclaimsofoceansovereignty—isavisible trendinworldaffairs.Goingbeyondlong-standingdisputesoverfishingrights, in recent years the competition for seabed mineral resources has led to broad claims of ocean “ownership” that increasingly will threaten freedom of navigationandbreedmaritimeconfrontation. THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS ConstitutionalauthoritytoemploytheAmericanarmedforcesisvestedinthe commanderinchief,thepresidentoftheUnitedStates.Anelectedcommander inchiefcreatesadilemmafortheDepartmentofDefense.Thedilemmaispar- ticularlyseverefortheU.S.NavyandMarineCorps,withtheirglobalresponsi- bilities,butitisunmentionedintheSeapowerStrategy. Itsfullcomplexityisbestleftforexperts.Butherearetwoexamples.Afterthe collapseoftheSovietUnionandthroughoutthe1990stheUnitedStateshadno peercompetitor,diplomatic,economic,ormilitary.Thenewstrategypointsout theneedtobepreparedforwarbutassertsthatpeacefulinfluenceofanotherma- jorpoweriscoequallyimportantandmuchpreferred.Whilenopeerisnamedin the strategy,and arguably the People’s Republic of China has not yet attained thatstatus,American relationswithChinaare illustrative.Pastandfuture ad- ministrationshaveatvarioustimesattemptedtoinfluenceChinaanditsneigh- borsthroughcooperation,competition,andoccasionallyconfrontation. As I have written elsewhere and the Seapower Strategy implies,it would be follytothreatenawaronthegroundwithChina.4HencearolefortheNavyand AirForcemustbeconstructedwithinamaritimestrategy.Itshoulddemonstrate toChinaanditsneighbors(stretchingfromJapantoIndia)anunflaggingpri- macyofAmericaninterestinEastandSouthAsiafortheforeseeablefuture.The expressionofourinterest—variouslyeconomic,diplomatic,andmilitary—will changewithcommandersinchiefandtheirnationalsecurityadvisers.Itwillbe noeasymatterfortheU.S.NavyandAirForcetodesignacapabilitytosupport alternatingpoliciesofcooperation,competition,andconfrontation. Thesecondexampleofpresidentialpowerofdecisionliesattheotherendof thespectrum,inwhatmaybecalled“smallwars”and“constabularyoperations” madepossiblethroughAmericanseapower,toincludehumanitarianoperations in countries suffering from failed governance or natural disasters. The new SeapowerStrategyemphasizesdeterrenceofconflictbypeacekeepingpresence, HUGHES 51 notwithstandingthatdeadlyconflictswillsometimesensue.ButtheNavycan- notbeeverywhere.Itmustbeabletogoanywherewith,asthestrategystresses,a global reach and preponderant force, but where and when it is employed dependsonpolicychoicesmadebyfutureadministrations. Implicationsfornavalforceplanningaretwofold.First,aresponsivenavymust becomposedofsmaller,morenumerousbuildingblocksthatcanbescaledupor down to the circumstances. Peacekeeping and peacemaking tend to be long-drawn-outaffairsthatdonotindefinitelyrequirethemassivestrikingpower ofacarrierbattlegroup.Second,thecommandstructurewillbeamessofconfus- ing authority, with extensive civilian participation, including private, nongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs).Themanycompetinginfluences—and lackofcoherence—intheseoperationswillbe,astheyhavebeen,onesoverwhich the Navy has limited control.The Seapower Strategy gives high priority to im- provedintegrationandinteroperability.Itsaysthattheneedforproficiencyisas much a matter of human skills in collaboration—General Eisenhower’s talent writsmall—asitisamatteroftechnologicallinks.Thecentralelementofaneffec- tivenetworkisitspeople.Thenewstrategyemphasizesthattheseskillsarediffi- cult to master. Theneedforforcecomponentstoassistinsmallwarsandconstabularyoper- ationsisexplicitintheSeapowerStrategy.ButtheAmericannavyisnotyetde- signed to respond effectively and efficiently to all calls for peacemaking missions. RESOURCES AND AFFORDABILITY Without the means of war—the resources—a strategy is an aspiration. Re- sourcesprovidecapabilities.Capabilitiescomefrommoneyandskilledmilitary personnel.TheSeapowerStrategyistosomeextentcostconscious,butitsim- plementation will depend on affordability,which will take intense thought by defense analysts.A maritime capabilitywithglobalreachisnotcheap,andno onewillacceptthestrategy’saspirationuntilitscostsindefensebudgetandpeo- plearespecified.5 Withafewprovisos,theSeapowerStrategyisflexibleenough—thatistosay, scalableintermsof forceelements—tobeputintoeffect.Butwemustassume thatsomeprovisionsarerhetorical.Twoexamples. The introduction says, “The United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guardwillactacrossthefullrangeof militaryoperationstosecuretheUnited Statesfromdirectattack.”Itwouldbebettertotemperthisaspirationbyinsert- ing“insofaraspossible.”Thedifferenceisbetweeninvestingresourcestobuild animpenetrableMaginotLinearoundNorthAmericaandanaffordablecapa- bilitythevalueofwhichisweighedagainstotherneeds.6 52 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW The “Maritime Strategic Concept” says, in the third paragraph, “United Statesseapowerwillbegloballyposturedtosecureourhomelandandcitizens fromdirectattackandtoadvanceourinterestsaroundtheworld.”Laterthisun- qualifiedambitionistemperedwith,“Whilethisstrategyadvocatesawidedis- persalof networkedmaritimeforces,wecannotbeeverywhere,andwecannot acttomitigateallregionalconflict.”Justso.Theintention,Ibelieve,andasIhave assertedabove,istomaintainseaservicesthatcangoanywhereatthecallofthe commanderinchiefbutnotbeeverywhere. Affordable seapower will require the nicest sense of balance to achieve this globalreachwithinabudgetenvelope.Balanceisamatteroftherightemphasis. Readinesstoinfluenceandheadoffa“majorpowerwar”looksmoreaffordable if the othermajorpowerisnotan abstraction.Ourplanningwouldbe sharp- enedbyregardingChinaasthemajorpowerofinterest.Moreover,ourpositive influence must extend to China’s neighbors as well. Then the strategy can be moreaffordablyspecificaboutpartnerships,bases,andfocusedintelligencein EastAsia. The Seapower Strategy is salutary in promoting more attention to the two endsofthespectrum,withoverdueemphasisoncapabilitiesdesignedforsmall warsandconstabularyoperations.Butnowheredowefindtherelativeweightof resourcestodevotetoeachend.Thetwocapabilitiesarenotmutuallyexclusive, norbyanymeanswilltheglobalAmericannavybetwoseparatefleets,butclose examination shows there is little overlap. The hard part will be to create a balancebetweenthetwoends. Hereisanexample.WhenBritanniaruledthewaveswithaglobalnavytopro- tecttheempire,SirJulianCorbettspecifiedthreecomponentsoftheRoyalNavy: thebattlefleettodefeatanychallengetocommandofthesea;“cruisers”topatrol thesealanesandprotectBritishtrade;and“theflotilla”ofsmallcombatantscapa- bleoffightinginshore,wherebattleships,withalltheiroffensivefirepower,could not venture because torpedo boats, submarines, and mines threatened cheap kills.7Upontheriseof theGermanHighSeasFleetinthedecadesbeforeWorld WarI,thefirstsealord,AdmiralSirJohnFisher,foundhimselfbetweentwoun- palatableprospects.OnonehandGreatBritainsawagrowingthreattoseacontrol intheNorthSea,whileguaranteeingfreetradeandpolicingtheempire.Onthe other hand, Fisher was under severe pressure from a Liberal government that wantedtotransfernavalbudgettosocialprogramsandanarmythatwantedmore money for home defense against a German invasion. Collaborating with the primeministerincuttingtheRoyalNavy’sbudgetwasfarfromFisher’sMachia- vellian mind, but working out a new Royal Navy composition while simulta- neously scheming to effect it is a story that is pertinent for today.8 HUGHES 53 SomecriticsmightworrythatabimodalforcetoinfluenceChinaandfight smallwarsinmanyplacesabandonsNavycapabilitiestodealwith“warsinthe middle.”Theseconcernsaregroundless.ThepresentU.S.Navyisdesignedfor such conflicts, and we are supporting them now. No one may infer that the Seapower Strategy would scrap existing combat power to buy and man a new fleet.Whatevertheforceimplicationsof thenewstrategymaybe,theforcesin handwillremainwithusforseveraldecadesinthefuture. THE COMPOSITION OF FORCES Anewstrategyiseasiertoconstructthanasuitablesetofforcestocarryitout. Existingforceswillhavetoapplycombatpowerinadaptivewaystomeetthenew strategic needs for the immediate future. Here are three examples from the Americannavy. WorldWarII.BetweentheJapaneseattackatPearlHarboron7December1941 andthebeginningofthefleet’smajesticsweepacrosstheCentralPacificinNo- vember 1943 with the amphibious landing at Tarawa, every class of warship changed its function, excepting minesweepers. We achieved the changes by trainingtonewwaysoffighting.Newmethodsofemploymentwerejustasgreat intheAtlantictheater,butwithmanydifferencestofightGermanU-boatsand conductamphibiousassaultsinEurope.Wealsoinstalledcomponenttechnolo- gies,likehundredsof 20mmand40mmantiaircraftguns,theVTfuse,radar, IFF,andtheCIC.9Wehadtheluxuryofspendingmoneyandaddingpersonnel almost without limit, a situation not likely to happen again. We made these sweepingadjustments—atruetransformationof navalcapability—injusttwo shortyears,bycuttingalotofredtapeandwithhelpfromaCongressthatwas sympathetictothetaskanddidnotattempttoovercontrolthebudgetprocess with“efficiencies.”TheArmy,ArmyAirForce,MarineCorps,andCoastGuard also developed massive new capabilities, but theirs resulted during buildups fromverysmallbases,whereastheNavyhadenteredthewarwithasubstantial fleetthathadtotransformitself. TheKoreanWar.In June 1950,when North Korea came south,President Tru- manandhissecretaryof defensewokeupovernighttothevalueof theNavy’s sea-based air and amphibious assault capabilities,the special combat value of the Marine Corps,and the indispensable role of the merchant fleet.The Navy had been drastically cut, and its commissioned warships were being manned withhalf-crews.InthisinstanceWorldWarIIshipswereactuallybettersuited forthe“oldfashioned”Koreanwarthanweretheair-deliverednuclearbombsof Secretaryof DefenseLouisJohnson’sparsimoniousstrategytocontaintheSo- viet Union.ForKorea,the nation neededthe oldNavy.It got it,because Navy 54 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW leadership had had the prudence to mothball hundreds of warships and mer- chantshipsthatcouldbebroughtbackinahurry.Trainedpersonnelcamefrom aNavalReservethatwasonlysixyearsoutofdate. Vietnam.The fleet of the Vietnam War comprised ships designed to fight the SovietUnion.TheshipsincoastalMARKETTIMEpatrolswereill-suitedmisfits. Carrieraircrafthadtolearnnewtechniquesforstrikeandgroundsupport.The riverine force had to be built from scratch, and its hastily designed sensors, boats,andhelicoptershadmanydeficiencies. In1971,whenthewarinVietnamwaswindingdown,AdmiralIsaacC.Kidd wascommanderoftheFirstFleet.HisfatherhavingbeenkilledatPearlHarbor, everywhere Kidd went he preached “readiness now.”He believed that training for deployment to Southeast Asia was preparing for the last war. He said we couldnotconfronttheSovietUnionwithrequirementsfornewsystemsinpa- perwork sent to Washington.He trained the fleet to fight with what it had by workaroundsandself-helpfixes.Hewantedtobeabletofighttoday,notnext year.(ThatIkeKiddhadadifferentside,withalongertimeconstant,isbestil- lustrated by his many productive years as Chief of Naval Material, when his ChiefsofNavalOperations,AdmiralsElmoZumwaltandJamesHolloway,were tryingtoreshapetheNavyinthemoney-scarcepost-Vietnamyears.) Thereinliethreelessons.First,theNavyisalong-lead-timeservice.Whenstrat- egychangesandnewkindsof demandsareimposed,wecannotscrapthefleet and start over. We retool it with some new technology and matching tac- tics—cuttingredtapeasweareallowed—butinmostrespectswilloperatefor quite some time with the same ships and aircraft, as well as with the existing spacesatellitesandcommunicationsnetworks,whichhavetheirownformsof inflexibility.Intheshortterm,weadapt. Second,wewillnotlookasgood—forexample,indealingwithinshorecom- batoperationsorworkingwithourpartnersinthe“thousand-shipNavy”—as wecouldwithtimeandbudgettodesignsystemsexpresslyforthestrategy.10 Third,wesucceededinWorldWarII,Korea,andVietnambecausewehada firmplacetogo,knownthingstodo,and(though,Iblushtosay,withinfuzzy strategic goals in Korea and Vietnam) a purpose for which to train. The SeapowerStrategyisnotawarstrategybutapeacemakingstrategy,withdiffer- entneedsexpressed.Wewilladapttoitsnewconditionsbytrainingtheforceswe havetonewtasks.Thiswillhappenwhenourtraininginstitutionsareimbued withtheSeapowerStrategyandknowhowitaffectsoperations.Wemustalsoed- ucateourofficersinthesenewdirections.TheNavalAcademy,NavalPostgradu- ate School, and the war colleges have different horizons and educate with HUGHES 55 differingemphasesonengineering,thehumanities,thephysicalandsocialsci- ences,and the military arts.But no new strategy is instituted until it is being taught and new military technologies are being spawned. Admiral Gary Roughead,thenewChiefofNavalOperations,willknowwhetherthestrategyis goingtotakeoff andflyasmuchbytalkingtoourstudentsasbytalkingtohis flagofficers. DESIGNING FUTURE CAPABILITIES: LEARNING BY DOING Inthepastfiveorsixyearswehaveseenaconsiderableefforttotransformthe armedservicesfromthetopdown.Amoreproductivewayissometimesfrom thebottomup.Whenourofficersandpettyofficershavetofightinsurgencyin thelittoralsandriversofIndonesiaandthePhilippines,whenourcarrierpilots are taught to compete with the finest Chinese aircraft,when our submariners havetrainedtodefeatNorthKoreansubmarinesintheirshallowhomewaters, andwhenourforcesashorelearnhowtowintheheartsofgoodpeoplebeingin- timidated by terrorists, then simultaneously they will tell us ways to improve sensors,networks,ships,aircraft,andthelogisticsofwar. Wehaveseenthisbottom-upapproachinaction.Unmannedaerialvehicles are now ubiquitous,because their value was obvious in the Balkans,Afghani- stan,and Iraq and their cost-effectiveness unchallengeable.The tactics to face swarmsofsmallcombatantsarebeingdevelopedwithaccompanyingsearchand attacksystems.Wehavereawakenedtothethreatsfromminesandquietenemy submarinesthathavefortoolongbeenvirtuallyignored. Herearetwoexamplesofthebottom-upapproachfromtheNavalPostgradu- ate School.First, the Cebrowski Institute has been working on “hastily formed networks,”whichistosay,systemsthatarenottherigid,permanentsystemsim- posed from the top down,like the Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (the “NMCI”), butadaptablenetworksthatcanquicklybestooduptofillavacuumofcommuni- cationsinunforeseenplaces.NPSstudentsandfacultywereonsceneforboththe IndonesiatsunamiandHurricaneKatrina.Theylearnedbydoinghowtocollabo- ratewithavarietyofparticipantstoreestablishcommunicationsfromveritablya zerobase.Withthisandotherresearchasaspringboard,thesystemsengineering analysisstudents’nextCapstoneProjectwillbetodevelopwaysandmeanstocon- duct maritime interdiction operations in a logistically barren region. As a second example of learning by doing, the dean of research fosters red-tape-freedevelopmentofnewsensorandnetworktechnologies,oftenpro- videdatnocostbyeagercontractors.Theseareusuallytriedoutinthefield(sel- dom by computer simulations) at nearby Camp Roberts and Fort Hunter Liggett.Typically the gadgets are built into a system by attaching them to the school’s fleet of UAVs. Because the program is funded by, among others, the