THE NEW MARITIME STRATEGY The Rest of the Story Robert C.Rubel T heU.S.Navy’snewmaritimestrategyiscontainedinafairlyterseten-page documentthatspeaksinbroadtermsabouthowseapowershouldbeused throughthenexttentofifteenyearstodefendthenationanditsglobalinterests. Soon after its release,analysts,pundits,and naval officers began to offer criti- cismsandinterpretations.Anumberofthearticles,blogs,ande-mailsdemon- strateaclearmisunderstandingofthestrategy,oratleastafailuretounderstand whatthestrategyismeanttodo.Theauthor,astheDeanoftheCenterforNaval WarfareStudiesattheNavalWarCollege,wasinchargeoftheprojecttodevelop maritimestrategyoptionsandanalysesfortheNavyStaff.Withoutengagingina defenseof thestrategyaswritten,thisarticlewillleverageitsauthor’sperspec- tivetoprovideadeeperunderstandingofthestrategy ProfessorRubelisDeanofNavalWarfareStudiesatthe by discussing the findings that emerged from the NavalWarCollege.BeforeretiringfromtheU.S.Navy inthegradeofcaptain,hewasanaviator,participating workshops and games that produced the options, as in operations connected with the 1973 Yom Kippur well as some of the background logic that governed War,the1980Iranianhostagecrisis,andDesertShield. our approach to the project. It will also offer some He commanded Strike Fighter Squadron 131 and servedastheinspectorgeneralofU.S.SouthernCom- personalanalysisofthestrategy’sunderlyingintent. mand.HeattendedtheSpanishNavalWarCollegeand It should be emphasized from the outset that the theU.S.NavalWarCollege,whereheservedonthefac- maritimestrategywaswrittenbyacombinationofof- ultyandaschairmanoftheWargamingDepartment, in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, before his ficersonthestaffoftheDeputyChiefofNavalOpera- presentappointment.HehasaBSdegreefromtheUni- tions for Information, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5) versityofIllinois,anMSinmanagementfromSalveRe- ginaUniversityinNewport,RhodeIsland,andanMA and some participating civilian academics and con- innationalsecurityandstrategicstudiesfromtheNaval tractors. The Naval War College delivered to them a WarCollege(1986). seriesofoptions,tobediscussedlater,whichtheyused NavalWarCollegeReview, Spring 2008, Vol. 61, No. 2 as raw material in the composition of the strategy Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2008 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2008 to 00-00-2008 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER The New Maritime Strategy: The Rest of the Story 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval War College,686 Cushing Road,Newport,RI,02841-1207 REPORT NUMBER 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 10 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 70 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW document. Throughout the development process, everyone avoided ascribing ideastoindividuals,sothatpositionswouldnothardenbecauseof“ownership.” Thus,whilenoparticularpersoncanbepointedoutasthestrategy’sprogenitor, aclearintellectualaudittrailwindsthroughthedevelopmentalevents,includ- ingawargameandworkshops,tothepublishedstrategy. InJune2006,duringtheSecretaryof theNavy–sponsoredCurrentStrategy Forum at Newport, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Michael Mullen,called in his keystone speech for the development of a new maritime strategy.Hecalledforastrategy“ofandforitstime”andenjoinedusto“elevate thediscussion.”Withintwoweeksafterthisspeech,ViceAdmiralJohnMorgan, the Deputy CNO for Strategy and Operations, visited the College to provide moredetailedtasking.Hespecifiedthatthestrategydevelopmentprocesswasto bea“competitionofideas”andwastobeopenandcollaborative.Theseparame- terswerethemselvesratherrevolutionaryinthehistoryofmaritimestrategyde- velopment,buttwoevenmoreimportantpiecesofguidanceemergedfromour discussions as well. When asked whether the project should be international- ized,hesaidyes.Whenaskedifwewerereallyworkingwithablanksheetofpa- per,withnoaprioriassumptionsoffleetsizeorpolicyconstraints,hesaidyes. This set of instructions put in train a strategic logic vector that heavily influ- encedprojectdesignandthenatureofthefinalproduct. Fromtheoutset,thisprojectwouldnotsimplyderivefromexisting strategic guidance,suchastheNationalSecurityStrategyortheNationalDefenseStrategy. Thismayseemsomehowsubversivetothosewhoareusedtomilitaryplanning processes in whichguidance fromhigherheadquartersis regarded asholywrit. However,consider our situation—the project was undertaken at the end of the Bush administration and our requirement was to look ahead twenty years. We could not responsibly make the assumption that current U.S. security strategy wouldremaininplace,andtherewasnoadequatewaytopredictthedirectionof thenextadministration’spolicies.Oursolutionwastopostulatefourdifferentpo- tentialstrategyvectorsofafutureadministration,whichresultedinhavingfour U.S. teams in a strategic war game we conducted. The first team represented a “Primacy” strategy, in which the United States would attempt to maintain its near-hegemonic status in the world.The second team adopted a “Selective En- gagement”posture,inwhichtheUnitedStateswouldfocusitseffortsonaverting conflict among major powers. The third team played a “Cooperative Security” strategy, in which the nation committed itself to seeking security through multilateralism and international institutions. The fourth team represented an “OffshoreBalancing”strategy,inwhichtheUnitedStatesretractedcertainsecu- rity guarantees and caused major powers to balance each other. RUBEL 71 Astheprojecttranspiredweattemptedtofindmaritimestrategyoptionsthat wouldbevalidacrosstwoormoreofthesepolicyfutures.Frankly,freeingour- selvesfromthedictatesofcurrentpolicyallowedustoperceiveandacceptgam- ingoutcomeswemightotherwisehavemissed.Wargamestendto“whisper”to you—thatis,theyproducesubtleresultswithinthecontextoftheirplaythatcan beignoredeasily,especiallyiftheyarethingsthatdefyconventionalwisdomor arethreateningtothegame’ssponsors.1Ourstrategicfoundationsgamedidin- deedprovidewhispers,andwewereabletohearthem. One of the things that improved our hearing was an initial workshop in whichwebroughttogethersomeofthe“oldhands”whohadparticipatedinthe developmentof the1980sMaritimeStrategy(capitalizedheretodistinguishit fromthecurrenteffort).2Inthatworkshop,oneoftheparticipantsassertedthat whatthatstrategyhadhad,andwhathadbeenmissingsincetheendoftheCold War,wascontext.WhathemeantwasthattheMaritimeStrategytoldnavaloffi- cerswhotheywouldfight,why,andwhere,inadditiontohow.The“...Fromthe Sea”series of white papers issued in the 1990s had not—they had been more doctrinalinnature.TheNavyneededtorediscovercontextifitsstrategywasto be compelling and useful. Another thread of discussion involved the need to “reglobalize”theNavy.Therewasnointellectualgluethatlinkedoperationsin the Philippine Sea with those in the Persian Gulf or the Caribbean, although most participants in the workshop, as well as those in a number of different games in recent years,instinctively felt that what happened in one part of the world had important ripple effects in other parts. Thus, as we designed and playedourstrategicgame,wewerealertforanyindicationsofwhatmightcon- stituteanewcontextformaritimestrategyandabasisforglobalvision. TheStrategicFoundationsGametookaboutsixweekstoplayandinvolved thefourU.S.teams,oneforeachpotentialpolicyfuture,andfive“strategicenti- ties,”countries and nonstate groups selected for detailed play.Teams were di- rectedtodevelopgrandstrategiesforthenexttwentyyearsthatwouldmaximize their security,aspirations,and interests.Non-U.S.teams were not required to demonstrate hostility to the United States unless that made sense in terms of their grand strategies. This represented a departure from normal gaming, in which worst-case scenarios are the rule. In the open adjudication sessions in whicheachteamproclaimeditsstrategy,acompellingcentralthreademerged. Eachstatehadanintrinsicinterestintheeffectivefunctioningoftheglobalsys- temoftrade,evensuch“rogue”actorsasIranandNorthKorea.Onlyal-Qa‘ida and associated groups had endemic hostility to the system. This insight pro- ducedthe“bigidea”thattheprotectionoftheexistingglobalsystemoftradeand security(asopposedtotheprocessofglobalization)providedboththecontext forthenewstrategyandtheintellectualgluethattiedtogetherallregionsofthe 72 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW world.Thus the notion of system security and defense figures prominently in themaritimestrategydocument,both“upfront,”initsintroduction,andinthe description of the maritime strategic concept.This could not have been more important—even,initsway,morerevolutionary.Itprovidedabasisfornotonly amaritimestrategybutanationalgrandstrategynotaimedagainstaparticular countryorthreatbutpositive,withoutbeingaggressive.Thestrategicconcept upon which the maritime strategy is based—defense of the global system of commerce and security—offers the opportunity for future administrations to adoptaclearlyarticulatedgrandstrategicdefensiveposture,withallthepolitical advantagesthatbrings.Asadefensivestrategy,itmakesglobalmaritimecooper- ationmucheasiertoattain. Whilethegameandworkshopshadnotroubleidentifyingcurrentandfuture threats,exceptinthecaseofIslamicextremists,thesethreatswereeithernascent or equivocal. Is China a true threat? How about a resurgent Russia? Iran and NorthKorea,whileclearlypotentialaggressors,werenotexistentialthreats,and atleastatthisjuncturedidnotseempoisedtoattackanyone.Moreover,glim- mersofprogressinreiningintheiraggressivetendenciesseemedtoexist.Thusit wasdifficulttopursuetraditionalthreat-basedplanningconvincingly.Indevel- opingthestrategy,werealizedthatoneoftherealdangers,especiallywithregard to emerging powers, is that considering them hostile for planning purposes couldbeself-fulfilling.Thuswetriednottoengagereflexivelyinthreat-basedor capabilities-basedplanning,techniquesthatwouldnaturallyassumethebreak- out of war. Instead, we realized, we had opportunities to disrupt the flow of eventstowardwar.Accordingly,thenewstrategyreflectswhatIcall“opportu- nity based” planning—positioning the maritime services to take positive ac- tionstopreventwar,protecttheglobalsystem,andcreateabetterpeace. Theinjunctiontoelevatethediscussionalsogreatlyaffectedthedevelopment process and the nature of the end product.The Navy has been afflicted in the pastfewyearswithacontroversyofsortsoverforcestructure.Onecampasserts that there are new mission sets,such as homeland defense,the Long War,and humanitarianassistance,thatrequirenewkindsofforces.Theothercampholds thattheNavyshouldonlybuildhigh-endcombatforcesandthatthesecanbeef- fectively used for less “kinetic”missions.A solution could not be found if the “dialogue”continuedatthelevelofforces;therefore,thestrategyprojectbanned anydiscussionofforcestructure.Participantsmostlyfollowedthisrule,andthe optionspresentedtotheproject’sexecutivecommittee,consistingof flag-level representativesfromtheNavy,MarineCorps,andCoastGuard,containednoth- ingthatwouldprovidestimulusoropportunityforthosewhoequatestrategy withforcestructuretodragthediscussioninthatdirection.Asaresult,thestaff- ing and vetting process forced the “three stars”and “four stars”to respond in RUBEL 73 kind,andthisappearstohavegeneratedbothanewlevelofdialogueintheNavy andanewstrategicconsensus.Therearemanywhoarefrustratedthatthenew strategy makes no mention of force structure, but it does seem to provide an overarching logic from which future force structure could be deduced.At the very least, it is a consensus document that has to some degree knit the Navy together. Atthisnexusofforcestructureandstrategy,itisusefultointerpretthestrat- egyin light of the ideas of the twogreatest maritime strategytheorists,Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett. In a sense, the new strategy is very “Corbettian,”inthatitrequiresthatcontroloftheseas—atleastinthenewsense ofmaritimesecurityandmaritimedomainawareness—beexerciseddayinand day out.Corbett described two traditional concentration points for the Royal Navy,oneneartheFrenchislandofUshantoffBrittanytocontroltheChannel, andtheotherintheDowns(aroadsteadnearDover)toguardagainstinvasion threats from the North Sea. These concentration points were established be- cause Britain’s proximity to them afforded little geographic strategic depth. However,fleetsconcentratedtherecoulddispersefor“systemic”sea-controldu- ties,beingalwaysreadytoregroupifamajorthreatdevelopednearhome.3Simi- larly,thenewmaritimestrategyprescribestwoconcentrationpoints,oneinthe Arabian Gulf andthe otherin northeast Asia,where important economic ele- ments of the global system are near potentially aggressive states.4 Per current U.S.Navypractice,these“combatcredible”forceswill“starburst,”ordisperse, forengagementpurposesbutcanregroupquicklyincaseofneed.Corbettsaid thatcommercialshippingelsewherecouldbeprotectedbycruisersandthe“flo- tilla”—smaller ships that could deal with most threats short of first-class forces—typesnotnormallyencounteredinthefar-flungreachesoftheempire. Theanalogtodayisthe“thousand-shipnavy,”theloosenetworkofnaviescoop- eratingformaritimesecurity.TheU.S.partofthatflotillawillbethoseunitsas- signedtoGlobalFleetStationsandother,moreadhocdeploymentstocatalyze greaterlevelsofcooperation.Thekeywordiscatalyze.Wewouldnotbuildafleet ofpatrolcrafttodoothernations’jobsforthem.Wewoulddispatchshipsand otherkindsofforcesthatwouldhelpothernaviesandcoastguardsadoptcon- gruentstrategiesandprovidethemwiththetrainingandperhapsequipmentto implement them. The exact types and numbers of forces required are not self-evidentandneedtobethesubjectofanalysisandgaming. The notion of two deployment hubs where strong naval forces are concen- tratedfollowsthelogicofsystemdefense.JustasCorbettacknowledgedthene- cessity for concentration points in the home islands due to their proximity to threatsemanatingfromEurope—thatis,alackofstrategicdepth—sotoodoes thismaritimestrategyprescribefleetconcentrationsinareaswherethereislittle 74 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW geographicspaceinwhichtoabsorbanattack.TheoilfieldsofIraq,Kuwait,and Saudi Arabia are uncomfortably near Iran; Seoul is within artillery range of NorthKorea;andTaiwanisonlyanarrowstraitawayfromthepowerofthePeo- ple’sLiberation Army.Certainlythe oilfieldsof the Persian Gulf andthe pro- ductivecapacityof SouthKoreaandJapanarekeyorgansof theglobalsystem andmustbeprotected.Ifdeterrencefails,wemustbereadyandabletodefend theseareas.Again,theexacttypeandnatureof forcesneededtodothisisnot self-evident,especiallysincerapidtechnologicaldevelopmentoverseashassig- nificantlymorphedthekindsofsea-denialthreatswewillface.Theymust,how- ever,bethemostrobusttypeofhigh-endcombatforces. ThestrategyhasitsMahanianaspectstoo.OneaspectofMahan’swritingthat is widely ignored or misunderstood is his focus on deterrence.Mahan’s world wascharacterizedbytheexistenceofgreatpowersoverseasthathadnaviescapa- bleofconductingoperationsintheWesternHemisphere.Mahanworriedabout thedefenseofthesoon-to-be-openedPanamaCanalandaboutotherEuropean adventurisminLatinAmerica.Hisprescriptionforastrongbattlefleetandits deploymentwasbasedasmuchondeterringoutsideinterventionintheAmeri- casasitwasonprotectingAmericaninterestsoverseas.5Thisnotionofdeterring arangeofmajorpowersthroughastrong,high-endfleetisanintrinsicpartof thenewstrategy.Moreover,Mahan’sprescriptionforaconsortiumofcooperat- ingnaviesbelongingtolike-mindedpowershasastrongechointhenewstrat- egy. In Mahan’s era, Britain was the preeminent naval power, but there were others on the rise, including Germany, Japan, and the United States. Mahan couldseethateventheRoyalNavymightnotbeabletopolicetheworldinanera wherecapitalshipswerebecomingevermoreexpensiveandanysinglenation mightnotbeabletokeeptheseasfreearoundtheworld.Thusheproposedthat thenaviesofseveralnationsactinconcert(notnecessarilyinalliance)tomake sureregionalpowerscouldnotcloseofflargepartsoftheoceantotrade.6Today, even though the United States enjoys a measure of naval relative advantage Mahancouldnothavedreamedof,theworldisstilltoobigforasinglenavyto actassheriffoftheseas.Therefore,thenewmaritimestrategyadvocatesacon- sortiumof naviesandcoastguardsworkingtogethertoassuremaritimesecu- rity,thenewmanifestationofseacontrol. ThestrategyalsoimpliesareturnbytheU.S.MarineCorpstoitsexpedition- aryroots.Theglobaldistributionof forcesforcatalyzingcooperativerelation- ships,preventingorcontaininglocaldisruptionsbeforetheyimpacttheglobal system,andforrenderingvariouskindsofassistanceisarecipeforthekindof flexiblemaritimemaneuverforwhichtheMarinesarefamous. Preventionofwarisanaturallydeducedmissionfromtheconceptofsystem protection.Throughout history,nothing has been more disruptive to the free RUBEL 75 movementofglobaltradethanwaramongthemajorpowers.NiallFergusonin hisTheWaroftheWorldmakesthecasethattheworldwasglobalizinginthede- cadesleadinguptoWorldWarI.Itwasaworldofmultiplegreatpowersthaten- joyedunprecedentedlevelsofprosperitybutthatwasalsoinfectedbynonstate actors with various agendas. This world slid into a ruinous global war whose consequences afflicted it for more than seventy-five years.7 One can make the casethat,atthedawnof thetwenty-firstcentury,theworldisjustnowgetting back to globalizing in the way it was before the Great War tore it apart.Mark Twainfamouslysaidthathistorydoesnotrepeatitselfbutrhymes.Thus,inthis globalizing worldthat is populatedby one big navy anda number of growing ones,an implicit aim of the new maritime strategy is to help prevent a future slideintoglobalcatastrophesuchasthatof1914. Therewasanotherelementofthoughtthatattendedthedesignofthestrategy developmentprocess.Thefocusongrandstrategyhadnotonlytodowithele- vating the discussion in order tountangle force-structure controversies.More broadly,therewasafeelingamongseveralresearchersinkeypositionsthatsince theColdWartheUnitedStateshadlackedaconceptaroundwhichacoherent nationalgrandstrategycouldcoalesce.Intheauthor’spersonalview,thecon- ceptofcontainmentthathadguidedAmericanpolicyandstrategythroughout theColdWarhadnotbeenreplacedwithanythingofsimilargeostrategicratio- nality.Mostimportantly,becausetheglobalconceptualgluementionedearlier hasbeenmissing,Americanpolicyandstrategyhavetendedtoviewtheworldas acollectionofregions,eachofwhichcanbeapproachedasanindependenten- tity.TheresulthasbeenthattheUnitedStates,throughsuccessiveadministra- tions,hasbackeditswayintoadefactoEurasiancontinentalistgrandstrategy,in whichithascommittedvastresourcestoprojectsofthekindonewouldexpect toseefromamajorEurasianlandpowerattemptingtoestablishbufferzones,al- mostasifCaliforniabuttedupagainstIran.Theseprojectsincludedtheenlarge- mentofNATOtotheeast,the“‘Stans’project”tosecurebasesandinfluencein the heart of Eurasia,establishment of ballistic missile defenses in Poland,and theinvasionofIraq.Thedangerofthisratheradhocandinadvertentgrandstra- tegic vector is that it is leading to strategic overextension. There has been no compellingalternatevisionorconcepttodeflectitsthrust.Thenewmaritime strategydoesnot,inandofitself,constitutethatalternatevision,butourgoalin helpingformulateitwastofindthekernelofanideathatcouldtranslateintoa globalconceptthatdoesnotrequiretheUnitedStatestointerveneeverywhereit seestroubleandthatprovidescriteriauponwhichtheadvisabilityofpotential projectscouldbejudged.NeithertheWeinbergernorPowelldoctrinepossesses suitablebreadthofvisiontoserveinthisrole.8 76 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW Itshouldbesaidatthispointthatthestrategiclogicexpressedabovewasnot meanttobearecipefordisengagement.“OffshoreBalancing”wasindeedoneof thefourU.S.policyfuturesexamined,butintheendnobodythoughtthatthe UnitedStatesshouldretreatfromitsstrategicalliancesorfromitsforwarden- gagement,and especially not from the forward-deployed posture of its forces. Rather,it is meant to be an injunction to look at the world as a whole.At the global level, because the world is 70 percent water, grand strategy necessarily takes on a maritime flavor. Moreover, Eurasia is just one land mass; there are others.TheUnitedStatesisabouttoestablishAfricaCommand.Africaissecond onlytoEurasiainsize,andifEurasiacanabsorballthestrategicresourcesofa powerfulnation,thenEurasia,Africa,SouthAmerica,andNorthAmericacan overwhelmanypowerthatseekstouselandsuperioritytoassureitssecurity.Le- veragemustbesought,maneuveronaglobalscalemadepossible,andcriteria for investment and risk established. Only a global, and therefore maritime, grandstrategicconceptcanprovidetheneededperspectiveandguidance.Thus itwasfromhopesofatleastinitiatinganewdialogueonnationalgrandstrategy thatthemaritimestrategydevelopmentprocesstookitscue. Asitturnedout,theStrategicFoundationsGameandtheseveralworkshops did not produce the maritime strategy options in a straightforward way.Naval War College researchers were left with a considerable body of data, but the plannedeventsproducednocleardefinitionofoptions.Thustheysetabouttry- ingtodeducestrategyoptionsfromthefourpolicyfutures.Thisworkproduced five options. The first, called “Winning Combat Power Forward,” was derived fromthePrimacypolicyfutureandcalledforstrong,war-winningforcestobede- ployedinthenorthernArabianSeaandinnortheastAsia.Theunderpinningas- sumption was that since deterrence could not be relied upon and sufficient strategicdepthintheseareaswaslacking,strongforcesmustbepositionedwhere theywouldbeneeded.ThesecondoptionwasbasedontheOffshoreBalancing policyfutureandcalledforU.S.navalforcestobeforwarddeployedonlyinthe PersianGulf.TherestoftheNavywouldremaininhomewaters,ina“surge”sta- tus.Monetarysavingsofthisposturewouldbeusedtoincreaseforcestructureor totransformtheNavy.Thethirdoptioncalledforafocusonsecuringtheglobal commonsasakeyelementinthehealthoftheglobalsystem.Thisoptionseemed tohaverelevanceacrossmostof thepolicyfutures.Thefourthoption,onethat came“overthetransom”fromoutsidetheCollege,calledforhigh-endforcesto combatanti-accesscapabilitiesinnortheastAsiaandlow-endforcesfortheLong Warandengagementelsewhere.Thefinaloption,anotheronethatcameinfrom an outside source,was an outgrowth of the Selective Engagement policy future andcalledforraisingwarpreventiontothesamelevelofimportanceaswarwin- ning.Preventionwastobeachievedthroughacombinationofdeterrencethrough RUBEL 77 strengthandwidespreadengagementtoreducethecausesofdiscontent,resource competition,and failed governance that could spawn wars. These five options were offered to the Executive Committee. These were quickly winnowed down to three: war-winning power forward, securing the global commons, and war prevention. These three were carried forward for staffingand,eventually,wereallcombinedintoasinglestrategy—theonethat hasbeenpublished. Inlookingatthecompleteddocument,animportantaspecttonoteaboutthe strategyisthatitismeanttooperatecontinuously.Inthisrespectitisverydiffer- ent from contingent warfighting strategies of the past that would only be in- vokedincaseofwar.Itisalsodifferentfromthedoctrinalstrategycontainedin the“...FromtheSea”whitepapers.Thisstrategyismeanttopreventwarsand ensure a better peace by deploying and operating forces in a systemic fashion. Somehavetermeditapolicy,notastrategy,andthatmaybetrue,butinmyview itconstitutesawayofachievingstrategicends,whichmakesitatruestrategy. Anotherwaytoassessstrategiesistoconsiderhowtheyuseforcetoachieve theirgoals.Somearemeanttoachievedefinitivecheckmatesofanenemy,either throughbruteforceormaneuver.Othersarecoercive,posingthreatsorimpos- ingdestructioninordertoextractconcessions.Thisstrategyiscatalytic;itsaim istogetourmaritimeservices,ourfutureadministrations,andindeedallgov- ernmentsandnaviesoftheworldthinkingintermsofcooperatingtoprotectthe globalsystem. ThenewstrategywasannouncedinOctober2007,andalreadytherehasbeen considerableanalysisandcritique.Inreviewingthearticlesandblogsonthestrat- egy,Ihaveobservedtwoprincipalcriticismsorobjectionstoit.Thefirstisthatit doesnotidentifyspecificthreats.Anumberofcommentatorsfeelthatthestrategy shouldhavespecificallymentionedChina,Iran,andNorthKorea,ataminimum, asthreatsthatneedtobecountered.Myanswertothisisthatifthestrategy’spur- poseistopreventwaramongmajorpowersandgeneratethewidestpossiblemar- itime cooperation, why create hostility by singling out specific countries as threats?ThatisespeciallythecasewithChina,withwhichwehaveadeeplyinter- dependent economic relationship and which is working hard on conducting a “peacefulrise”foreignpolicy.Itturnsoutthatthestrategyisgettingsomefavor- ablereviewsfromtheChinese,whichseemstometobeasmallstepforwardthat wouldnothavetakenplacehadwelistedthatnationasathreat.AstheUNESCO preamblesays:“Sincewarsbegininthemindsofmen,itisinthemindsofmen thatthedefensesofpeacemustbeerected.”TothisendtheNavalWarCollegehas alreadystartedimplementingthestrategy,byhostingaworkshopwiththeChi- nesenavyoncooperationandavoidanceofincidents.Ithinkthatremarksmade concerningnavalcooperationbetweentheUnitedStatesandChinabyaChinese