U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE CHINA MARITIME STUDIES Number 4 Chinese Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Deng Era Implications for Crisis Management and Naval Modernization Nan Li Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. 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Chinese Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Deng Era Implications for Crisis Management and Naval Modernization Analytical Questions This study addresses two analytical questions: What has changed in Chinese civil- military relations during the post–Deng Xiaoping era? What are the implications of this change for China’s crisis management and its naval modernization? Why Important? Addressing these questions is important for three major reasons. First, because the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is a party army, it is commonly assumed that its pri- mary function is domestic politics—that is, to participate in party leadership factional politics and to defend the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) against political opposition from Chinese society. For the past twenty years, however, the PLA has not been em- ployed by such party leaders as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao against political opposition from either the CCP or Chinese society. The PLA’s ground force, which is manpower- intensive and therefore the most appropriate service for domestic politics, has been continuously downsized. Technology and capital-intensive services that are appropriate for force projection to the margins of China and beyond and for strategic deterrence but are inappropriate for domestic politics—such as the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), and the Second Artillery (the strategic missile force)—have been more privileged in China’s military modernization drive.1 This study, by examining change in Chinese civil-military relations, undertakes to resolve this analytical puzzle. Second, China’s civil-military interagency coordination in crisis management during the post-Deng era has remained an area of speculation, for lack of both information and careful analysis. By analyzing change in Chinese civil-military relations, this study aims to shed some light on this analytical puzzle as well. Finally, the PLAN was previously marginalized within the PLA, partly because the lat- ter was largely preoccupied with domestic issues and politics, where the PLAN is not especially useful. By exploring change in Chinese civil-military relations, this study also attempts to explain why during the post-Deng era the PLAN has become more impor- tant in China’s military policy. 2 china maritime studies Background: Legacies of Mao and Deng Traditional analysis of China’s civil-military relations assumes that the relationship between the CCP and the PLA remains symbiotic, without functional differentiation or technical specialization–based institutional boundaries. Such a symbiosis has been attributed to Mao Zedong’s reliance on a strategy of manpower-based mass mobilization rather than functional and technical specialization–based expertise and administrative efficacy for his revolutionary agenda and post-revolutionary development. A product of civil war and revolution, the PLA was naturally an integral part of Mao’s strategy. Party-army “symbiosis” did not imply the lack of political dynamics; on the contrary, political rivalries and alignments were rampant in the Mao years and immediately after. But rather than party-army institutional boundaries, highly personalized leadership fac- tions defined these rivalries and allegiances, which cut across and weakened further the party-army boundaries. That is, a few political-military factions engaged in a zero-sum struggle for political power.2 Photo 1. Mao met with PLAN sailors in 1953. But the PLAN was largely neglected by Mao because he wanted “politics to take command” in the PLA. The rise of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, however, led to the replacement of Mao’s revolutionary agenda with a nation-building project of “four modernizations”— modernizing industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defense. It was recognized that technical expertise and administrative efficiency based on a division of labor are indispensable for such tasks. As a result, functional differentiation and techni- cal specialization have been promoted. Institutional boundaries between the party and chinese civil-military relations in the post-deng era 3 the army became clearer, so that the latter could enjoy more institutional autonomy to pursue its functional and technical expertise. This trend was reflected in the downsiz- ing of the PLA by a million billets during 1985–87, the reduction of its role in domestic party and societal politics, the decline of cross-boundary circulation of elites, and the concentration of the armed forces on the military-technical tasks of modernization.3 Photo 2. Deng reviewing PLA troops on 1 October 1984. There was, however, one caveat. At the top leadership level, such as the Central Military Commission (CMC), Deng’s informal and personal influence remained substantial and institutional prerequisites were not so important. Deng, for instance, held the position of CMC chair from 1981 to 1989, though he did not hold the position of the CCP general secretary from 1981 to 1987 or any party or state portfolio between 1987 and 1989. Deng’s command of the military was based largely on his revolutionary and military cre- dentials, as well as his status and prestige as one of the founders of the People’s Republic of China and the PLA. Moreover, Deng appointed to key CMC positions close allies, like Yang Shangkun (CMC vice chair from 1981 to 1992 and CMC secretary general from 1981 to 1989) and such pre-1949 Second Field Army (where Deng served as political commissar) comrades as Qin Jiwei (CMC member and defense minister from 1987 to 1992), Liu Huaqing (CMC deputy secretary general 1987–89 and CMC vice chair 1989– 97), and Yang Baibin (CMC member 1987–89 and CMC secretary general 1989–92). These personal factors prompted Deng to employ the PLA covertly against political opponents within the party, such as Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, and explicitly against threats from society such as the popular rebellion in Beijing in the summer of 1989. The 4 china maritime studies PLA’s intervention in 1989 led some scholars to argue that the emphasis of China’s civil- military relations had shifted from military tasks to politics.4 Based on similar logic, the conventional wisdom suggests that Jiang Zemin, as the CMC chair 1989–2004, employed the PLA largely for factional struggle against political opponents within the CCP leader- ship, particularly in times of power transition.5 Useful Concepts The mobilization of armed forces against domestic political opposition or inserting them into domestic politics constitutes what Samuel Huntington calls “subjective con- trol,” which aims to enhance civilian power by a “divide and rule” strategy of “politiciz- ing” the military. It is also intended to preempt such major military interventions as coups. Subjective control is based on the premise that undesirable military intervention in politics is caused not by weak or failed civilian governance but rather by excessive institutional autonomy and professionalism of the military, fostering managerial ability, an ethos of public service, and internal cohesiveness and inculcating with the “military mind” skepticism regarding politicians.6 “Objective control,” in contrast, intends to enhance the institutional autonomy and professionalism of the military. It is based on the premise that coups and the like are in fact caused by weak or failed civilian governance or by the inability of civilian authori- ties to resolve major socioeconomic, political, or foreign-policy crises. It is not a product of military professionalism, because the military is mainly a conservative organization that prefers narrow functional and technical expertise to the broad and complex area of politics.7 In that view, the best strategy to preempt undesirable military intervention in politics is to enhance civilian governance, not to “politicize” the military. Central Argument This study argues that rather than employing the PLA against political opponents from within the CCP and Chinese society as suggested by the conventional wisdom, post- Deng leaders—Jiang and Hu—have prevented the PLA from intervening in intra-CCP and intra-societal political struggle, by changing the dominant paradigm of Chinese civil-military relations from subjective control to “objective control with Chinese charac- teristics.” Such a change, in turn, has major implications for Chinese crisis management and naval modernization. To flesh out the central argument, this study makes four specific subarguments. First, Jiang’s policies with regard to the PLA were similar to what Huntington calls “objective control”—that is, tending on the civilian side to enhance civilian governance, or the CCP’s legitimacy to rule, and on the military side promoting functional and technical expertise, or professionalization of the PLA. Both policies helped to maintain