U.S. Soldiers discuss tactics during counterinsurgency raids in Husiniyah Under the best circumstances, the police action [arrests] cannot fail to have negative aspects for both the population Michael Larson) adnemd athned c tohuen otpereirnastuiornge bnet cloivnidnug cwteitdh b iyt. p. r. o. fTeshseiosen raelas.sons Pacific ( —David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Group, Arresting InsurgeThneory acnd Prayctice1 mera Ca mbat Fleet Co By Kyle B. T eamey O ne of the primary goals of the with difficult security situations, authorities will Arrests of innocent personnel may occur counterinsurgent is to reestablish often feel a strong impetus to use illiberal arrest for a number of reasons, including: security and rule of law. An and internment techniques or to ignore political effective arrest and intern- or cultural expectations. Security forces and n inaccurate or poorly developed ment system is an essential part of a successful governments often make mistakes in the use of intelligence counterinsurgency effort, providing a nonlethal arrests and internment. Historically, there are n inability of troops to communicate effec- means of separating insurgents from the general five common errors: arresting innocent individ- tively with locals populace and thereby securing the populace. uals, releasing insurgents who are still a danger n innocent personnel arrested as witnesses The capture of insurgents and their equipment to the counterinsurgency effort, mistreating or for questioning provides valuable intelligence to counterinsur- arrested individuals, failing to anticipate the n arbitrary arrests or “fishing expeditions” gents and allows the option of rehabilitating effects of arrests and internment on the informa- used to try to identify insurgents insurgents and later releasing them back into tion campaign, and allowing prisons to serve as n collective punishment of a community. society. Mistakes made by counterinsurgents training areas for insurgents. in arresting or holding detainees may reinforce Authorities may also combine aspects of insurgent propaganda and otherwise undermine Arresting Innocents these errors. In Aden in the 1960s, for instance, the overall counterinsurgency effort. Simply Arresting innocent personnel makes the British forces lacked intelligence on insurgents, stated, a well-run system for arresting insurgents actions of counterinsurgents appear arbitrary, so they relied on mass arrests and interrogation will greatly aid a counterinsurgency effort while unjust, or repressive. It aids insurgent propa- as a means of developing intelligence. The poli- a poorly run system will retard it. ganda by providing a real error to exploit and cies led to international condemnation of British Policies governing the arrest and intern- can alienate segments of the populace, partic- tactics and greatly reduced public support ment of insurgents should contribute to ending ularly the individuals wrongly detained, their within Britain for the counterinsurgency effort, the insurgency while minimizing or eliminating families, friends, and neighbors. Individuals contributing to the failure of British initiatives the potential for political damage to the authori- alienated by wrongful arrest are susceptible to in Aden.3 ties involved. They should be developed and recruitment into the insurgency, and unwar- There are many examples of arrests and enacted with an eye toward the responses of ranted arrest may compel otherwise ambiva- internment of innocents leading to the creation local nationals, international observers, and the lent individuals to volunteer. A common of more insurgents than the arrests neutralize. In U.S. populace. Achieving a balance between the tactic of insurgents is to encourage the arrest Northern Ireland in the 1970s, British and Ulster need to provide security and the need to main- of innocent individuals to increase support security forces used inaccurate intelligence tain legitimacy is difficult. When confronted for their cause.2 to conduct mass arrests. Innocents were held in jails with members of the Provisional Irish Captain Kyle B. Teamey, USAR, is a consultant for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. He served Republican Army, who used their internment to with 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, in Ar Ramadi, Iraq, from August 2003 to September 2004, recruit new members.4 Likewise, mass arrests of and was a coauthor of Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency. civilians under the Phoenix Program in Vietnam ndupress.ndu.edu issue 47, 4th quarter 2007 / JFQ    117 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2007 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2007 to 00-00-2007 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Arresting Insurgency 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. 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THIS PAGE Same as 6 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 FEATURES | Arresting Insurgency allowed the Viet Cong to recruit members from authorities and allows insurgents to argue that macy of counterinsurgents both among the jails and holding areas.5 they are innocent and unfairly targeted. local populace and in the international arena.7 There are additional second- and third- There are numerous historical examples of Releasing Insurgents order effects from the improper release of insur- prisoner mistreatment hindering the efforts of Amnesties and prisoner releases are gents. If internees are regularly or arbitrarily counterinsurgents.8 often part of the political bartering that ends an released, those still in prison may be less willing The use of torture by the French in Algeria insurgency. However, the release of insurgents to provide information. The insurgent learns affected thousands of people and benefited who still pose a threat can make the task of that simply by waiting out his sentence, he can insurgent recruiting. The institutionalization of the counterinsurgent more difficult. Captured avoid having to negotiate or trade information torture and other illiberal practices also reduced insurgents pose a threat if they are still dedicated to procure his release. the support of the French people for counter- to the insurgency, especially if it is ongoing and More importantly, release of insurgents insurgency efforts in Algeria and may have the released insurgents can rejoin. There are makes intelligence collection more difficult contributed to the attempted coup by French several reasons release of dangerous insurgents within the populace. People may be less willing officers against their government in 1958.9 may occur: to risk their lives to provide information on sus- The second- and third-order effects of pects if insurgents will return from prison. The mistreatment of arrested individuals are not n clerical errors people may also come to see the counterinsur- always predictable. The execution of Irish insur- n mistaken identity gents as incompetent and unable to protect them gents in 1916, particularly the wheelchair-bound n escape if insurgents routinely regain their freedom. This James Connolly, helped spark the 1919–1921 n lack of evidence or intelligence to warrant contributes to the rise and spread of rumors of Irish War of Independence against British rule.10 further internment corruption within the counterinsurgent legal London was surprised by the uprising as the n underestimating or not assessing the system, such as the efficacy of bribes or power of insurgency had little public support prior to the effects of releasing insurgents insurgent leaders over the system. Finally, release executions. n public pressure on counterinsurgents. of insurgents may be harmful to the morale A further compounding factor is that the of counterinsurgents, who must capture the understanding of what comprises mistreatment Released insurgents may be difficult to same insurgents multiple times, or who suffer changes over time and is dependent on cultural recapture because they have learned from their repeated attacks from released insurgents. attitudes and perceptions. For instance, in the mistakes and have a thorough understanding of late 19th century, the suspension of civil rights the process of arrest, prosecution, and intern- Mistreating Detainees and use of summary execution were acceptable ment. Freed insurgents may become more dan- Mistreatment of arrested individuals tools for U.S. forces serving in the Philippines, gerous and better connected due to interactions generally means not treating them in accordance while neither is generally allowable today.11 with other detainees.6 In addition, they may gain with established rules of engagement, laws, or status among other insurgents for having been operating procedures. It can be expanded to Failing to Anticipate Effects arrested. mean not treating internees consistently with By its nature, “internment is such an illib- In most cases, counterinsurgents will be local culture or international norms. Mistreat- eral method that it will always give rise to wide- worse off when insurgents are released at inap- ment may occur while individuals are taken into spread international criticism and allegations propriate times and for inappropriate reasons. custody, while they are in a holding facility, or at of brutality, many of which will be believed.”12 There are circumstances where counterinsur- the time of their release. A wide variety of actors will scrutinize the way gents may arrest an insurgent knowing they Arrest and internment have additional arrests occur, the treatment of prisoners, inter- can only keep him in custody a short time, for importance in counterinsurgency because of rogation of prisoners, and release of prisoners. instance, to disrupt an impending insurgent the proximity of insurgents to counterinsur- Negative perceptions of these activities will aid operation. The use of such tactics should be gents. For many insurgents, incarceration will insurgent recruiting efforts, undermine support limited because the negative effects of such be the first up-close and personal encounter to the government, or diminish support to coun- temporary arrests, including an increase in the with counterinsurgents and the first time the terinsurgents in their home countries. Insur- gents invariably claim mistreatment of detainees internment may be the first time prisoners encounter objectivity, and detention of innocents. For instance, cap- fairness, and equality of the rule of law tured al Qaeda training manuals emphasize the importance of claiming abuse.13 The news media “street credibility” of detained insurgents and in counterinsurgents are seen without armor or may report these claims. Actual mistreatment the perception that the security forces are unable in a tactical situation. In a properly operating of detainees adds fuel to insurgent propaganda to keep insurgents imprisoned. The most stri- internment system, it may be the first time and will often be covered by the media as well. dent civilian parallel to this dilemma is the arrest prisoners encounter objectivity, fairness, and Counterinsurgents must anticipate these eventu- of organized crime leaders. Authorities spend equality of the rule of law. The first order effect alities and have in place responses and systems years building a case and allow the criminal of detainee mistreatment may therefore be for mitigating the effects. The modern informa- organization to commit lesser infractions that to steel the resolve of insurgents or convince tion environment compounds the difficulty for will only merit temporary incarceration in order innocent detainees that they should join the counterinsurgents as news can travel almost to ensure the legitimate, long-term removal of insurgency. The major second- and third-order anywhere in seconds. The counterinsurgency the leader. Acting too early “tips the hand” of effects are to undermine the support and legiti- effort will simultaneously be scrutinized by 118 JFQ / issue 47, 4th quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu TEAMEY insurgents, local nationals, populations of states n training regions of the world, particularly where counter- providing security forces, nongovernmental n intimidation of prisoners or guards insurgency efforts are ongoing. organizations, foreign governments, and the n organizing escapes, riots, hunger strikes, One focal point of national and interna- media. attacks on guards, or other disobedience tional scrutiny has been the internment center at The history of counterinsurgency is replete n passing guidance from captured leaders to Guantanamo Bay. The basis for this scrutiny has with examples of counterinsurgents failing free insurgents and vice versa. predominately been reported mistreatment of to take into account the effects of their arrest prisoners. Human rights activists have opposed and internment practices. For instance, while In Northern Ireland, for example, prisons the center since its inception because U.S. policy conducting counterinsurgency operations in became the “training centres” of the Provisional was to hold prisoners without charges indefi- Yemen in the 1960s, the British army developed Irish Republican Army in the 1960s and 1970s. nitely. Holding prisoners without due process a reputation for arbitrary detention of civilians The holding of insurgents and innocent civilians contradicts both U.S. and international laws and torture of prisoners. Although inquiries by in common areas facilitated this.16 In Algeria and norms. Supreme Court rulings in 2004 and the International Red Cross and Amnesty Inter- in the 1950s and 1960s, a similar situation 2006 reinforced this. Though a slight majority national found no evidence of physical abuse of prevailed in prison camps where hardcore insur- of Americans support the continued use of the prisoners, the rumors persisted and undermined gents were not separated from other prisoners.17 Guantanamo Bay facility and believe that pris- popular support to continued British involve- The greater the restrictions on insurgent oners are treated appropriately, views in many ment. Declining support at home contributed interaction, the less insurgents will be able to foreign nations on which the United States relies to the success of the Yemeni insurgency against trade information and organize. However, the for assistance in the war on terror are opposed to British rule.14 counterinsurgent must keep in mind that some the practices in Guantanamo and routinely call The conduct of indigenous security forces level of interaction or information-sharing for the end of internment there.18 working with foreign counterinsurgents may will occur. It is a matter of controlling the Guantanamo is a stark example of the also reflect on the entire force. As an example, interaction. necessity for anticipating the effects of intern- British forces in Cyprus in the 1950s tolerated There are many means of controlling ment on the information campaign. Reported the torture of prisoners by Cypriot police. Insur- detainees and their ability to communicate. practices such as denying prisoners due gents were able to capitalize on this, causing However, detention facilities cannot become process were bound to cause an uproar within political damage to the British government and enemy bases of operation if counterinsurgents the United States and abroad, particularly bringing international scrutiny on Britain.15 avoid capturing innocents and releasing insur- given that the internees are foreign nation- Modern media are so pervasive it should als. The plan for holding captured terrorists be expected that every action of the counterin- the greater the restrictions should have accounted for this and been surgent and his allies will be reported. The alle- executed in a manner that supported other on insurgent interaction, the gations of insurgents against counterinsurgents, aspects of the U.S. information campaign, such less insurgents will be able true or not, will often have an international as the importance of democracy and rule of to trade information and audience. Arrests and internment performed by law as tools against terrorism. counterinsurgents must be a part of the infor- organize Mistreatment has been an issue in both mation campaign. Otherwise, intense media Afghanistan and Iraq. Numerous incidents of coverage and the spread of rumors will aid the gents who are still a threat. Fewer innocent insurgents and may cause the counterinsurgency detainees mean fewer potential recruits in the effort to fail. detainee population. Additionally, training and sharing of tactics will have no effect on the Allowing Prisons to Be Insurgent Bases insurgency if captured insurgents stay in prison. Captured insurgents will communicate with one another while detained. They will find Contemporary Operations ways to talk directly, pass notes, or otherwise The United States currently supports mul- send signals. Their communication can extend tiple counterinsurgency efforts, including those beyond a detention facility to the outside world. in Colombia, the Philippines, Iraq, and Afghani- Insurgents may use communication to organize stan. In addition to these conflicts, Washington their efforts. Activities that may occur in prisons is embroiled in the war on terror, which is often include: considered a global counterinsurgency. Arrests and internment have been important tactics n creating relationships with insurgents used by U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and from other regions and backgrounds in the greater war on terror. mitt) m n sharing information on successful tactics Since the terror attacks of September 11, Su and techniques 2001, the United States has routinely made all of Rob n ideological or theological indoctrination the mistakes described above. The effects vary mera ( Ca of onth reerc dreutiatmineenest of noninsurgent detainees binyt eervnemnte anntd p craircctuicmess thaanvcee e, nbguet nUd.Ser. eadrr nesetg aantidve Combat Iraqi soldiers detain suspected insurgents into an insurgent organization sentiments toward the United States in many d982 during raid in Ad Diwaniyah ndupress.ndu.edu issue 47, 4th quarter 2007 / JFQ    119 FEATURES | Arresting Insurgency prisoner abuse and murder have been publicized There are also indications that innocent effort, the government must make prisoner by the international press. The most notorious detainees are recruited from the prisons, insur- handling part of the overall plan. Estimates of was the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in 2004. The gents use the prisons to share information and how many prisoners will be taken and what mistreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib greatly network, and arrest is not a deterrent because resources will be required should be developed affected international support for the war in Iraq, insurgents believe they will soon be released.25 in the planning stage. An operational plan impacted the sentiment of the American public Iraqi leaders have described Iraqi prisons as for conducting arrests, prisoner processing, toward the war, and increased support for the schools for al Qaeda, and a representative of the and internment should follow. Planning helps insurgency in Iraq. The scandal is regularly used Iraqi Islamic Party noted that “detainees will prevent ad hoc detainee operations that are come out in the form of car bombs and suicide damaging to the overall campaign. bombs.”26 Resource the Effort. An effective system of it is increasingly difficult to There are recent reports of widespread arrest and internment requires resources includ- get intelligence from captured corruption and abuse in the conduct of the ing personnel, training, facilities, and equip- insurgents as they know they internment system in Iraq.27 Iraqi judges regu- ment. Major requirements often include: will be released within larly release insurgents, citing lack of evidence 6 months or orders from high-ranking officials. Likewise, n subject matter experts to train and advise the Iraqi government and U.S. military authori- the force ties have conducted multiple mass releases in n internment facilities that are adequately in the propaganda of both Iraqi insurgents and an attempt to garner popular support from the sized, cannot easily be used for recruitment/ international terrorist organizations and may be families of detained individuals. Predictably, the training centers, and meet legal requirements used in conjunction with allegations of abuse at release of dangerous insurgents has stoked the n legal staff to provide oversight and operate Guantanamo to create the impression that the insurgency and caused problems for American the system United States maintains a policy of abuse and military personnel and Iraqis. U.S. military per- n adequate number of trained interrogators torture targeting Arabs and Muslims.19 sonnel report that it is increasingly difficult to for all organizations handling prisoners Though it has begun to improve, the get intelligence from captured insurgents as they n adequate number of interpreters for all system of arrests and internment in Iraq was know they will be released within 6 months of organizations handling prisoners poorly conceived and orchestrated. It began capture. U.S. military personnel have repeatedly n adequate number of trained guards for as an outgrowth of the system for processing found themselves fighting the same insurgents internment facilities prisoners of war. Without the necessary plan- again and again in a climate of rising violence n means for transporting prisoners ning and training to effectively run a system for and growing support for the insurgency and n automation for tracking detainees, their arresting and interning insurgents, U.S. forces in sectarian militias.28 belongings, and associated evidence, intelli- Iraq made every possible mistake. The overall gence, and debriefings. effect is a system that has turned some neutral Toward More Effective Policies and or progovernment Iraqis toward supporting the Procedures The importance of having experts avail- insurgency and is largely ineffective as a means Given the importance of arrests and able to run internment facilities and conduct for protecting the populace from insurgents. internment in counterinsurgency efforts and the interrogation cannot be overstated. In Algeria Mistreatment has arisen as a problem in potential damage from missteps in these activi- in the 1950s, it was noted that putting respon- all aspects of the system. The way arrests were ties, measures must be taken to ensure that they sibility for internment and interrogation in the conducted, particularly early in the counter- are carried out appropriately. hands of tactical commanders led to hugely insurgency, was not in accordance with local Plan the Effort. When becoming involved mixed results. In some areas, torture became culture and norms, creating resentment toward in a counterinsurgency or counterterrorism standard operating procedure. In others, units American forces. Detainee abuse, such as the Abu Ghraib scandal and other incidents, further fueled negative attitudes.20 In the words of Presi- dent George W. Bush, the Abu Ghraib scandal in particular “eased us off the moral high ground.”21 U.S. and Iraqi forces have also captured large numbers of innocent individuals and regularly release dangerous insurgents. Over the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom, American f1o8r,c0e0s0 h oafv we harormes taerde astti llel ainst c7u0s,t0o0d0y i.2n2 FIrraoqm, June Hitchcock) M. 2w0e0r5e ptor oJucenses e2d0 0a6t ,t hmeoatreer t ihnatner 1n6m,0e0n0t pfarcisiolintieerss, Angela but 11,000 were released.23 Anecdotal evidence Pacific ( iirnnatdneio cicnaettneesltl itaghneadnt cemen aodnrey di n oudfp its hicners ipmer diisneotanatei nd aeureerse t swot sei.nr2e4a ccu- Marine Forces MdReaatmraiinandeesie asen stdco o Fbraetl lAruebjlaueh aGsherda iibn prison 120 JFQ / issue 47, 4th quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu TEAMEY were simply incompetent in their interrogation components to this part of detainee opera- Operating facilities in accordance with techniques. The situation improved dramatically tions, including: applicable laws and doctrine ensures that after the creation of a professional internment holding facilities serve their purpose without and interrogation service.29 n ensuring that individuals are arrested in fueling insurgent propaganda. This means not Train. Training is a crucial part of the right way only maintaining humane treatment of detain- resourcing the effort; arrests and internment n ensuring that prisoners are taken only ees but also ensuring accountability about the cannot be left to amateurs. At the beginning of when intelligence or circumstances support it detainees and their property. U.S. operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, n ensuring that internment facilities operate Humane treatment safeguards the detain- it was largely untrained amateurs, in this case in accordance with all applicable laws, doctrine, ees, protects the personnel running the deten- American military personnel, who conducted and operating procedures tion facility from false accusations, and supports arrests and operated holding facilities. Though n ensuring independent oversight of intern- the mission by maintaining the legitimacy and well intentioned, these troops did not have the ment facilities. support of counterinsurgent actions. Insurgents training to appropriately accomplish tasks. The will often claim brutal treatment of prisoners subsequent establishment of predeployment The way prisoners are captured can greatly as a part of the propaganda. Such claims may training on counterinsurgency operations affect public perception of counterinsurgents. cause holding facility personnel to come under has done a great deal to overcome this. In the Because of the potential for negative effects on scrutiny regardless of whether they did or did future, it would be beneficial for troops to public opinion, David Galula went so far as to not commit abuse. Consistently operating receive training prior to entry into a counterin- suggest that arrests should be made by a police within the law, investigating cases of abuse, and surgency campaign so mistakes are not made in force that is completely separate from the force regularly monitoring and recording the physical the crucial early stages. endeavoring to win the support of the popu- health of prisoners will safeguard holding facil- Target. Targeting involves the collection of lace.30 Regardless of who conducts arrests, coun- ity personnel. intelligence to support operations and the use of terinsurgents should use techniques appropriate Maintaining accountability for prisoners intelligence to shape the operating environment. to the operating environment. For instance, and their property helps ensure that neither It plays two important roles with detainees. First, some cultures require taking revenge on anyone it provides a means for deciding who to detain. publicly insulting one’s family. Therefore, harsh public support may be lost Effective intelligence collection from multiple techniques for detaining insurgents can create if counterinsurgents appear sources, thorough intelligence analysis, and inte- more insurgents. In addition, public support overly harsh in taking gration of government agencies in the targeting may be lost if counterinsurgents appear overly detainees process ensure the detention of insurgents and harsh in taking detainees. For targeted insur- not civilians. gents, counterinsurgents should use techniques The second use of targeting is for release consistent with available intelligence on the intelligence nor evidence against detainees is lost of insurgents. Just as internees should not be insurgents, local culture, and threat level during and that detainees themselves are not acciden- detained without consideration of the effects, an operation. For prisoners taken as targets of tally released. they should not be released without similar con- opportunity, techniques should follow escalation Techniques and procedures for ensur- sideration, which includes: of force procedures as described in the theater’s ing that detention facilities operate effectively rules of engagement. If damage occurs to people include: n potential for the detainee to resume insur- or their property, counterinsurgent forces should gent operations consider compensating the injured people, their n training all holding facility personnel on n effects on insurgent organizations families, or the property owners. applicable laws and doctrine n reactions of the public Counterinsurgents may detain individu- n administering regular medical checkups n reactions of counterinsurgents . als for reasons other than direct involvement of prisoners in insurgent activities. For instance, a patrol n inspecting holding facilities regularly These considerations are most important may not have a translator and need to take n using biometrics to identify and track for mass releases of detainees. If the detainee individuals back to base camp to speak with detainees system operates effectively, there should never them. Another example is taking individuals for n standardizing spellings of prisoner names be a time when mass releases of innocent questioning after an insurgent attack or because n synchronizing prisoner tracking databases detainees occur, because mass numbers of they may have information on the insurgency. n synchronizing prisoner database with innocents will not be in detention facilities. Taking detainees for reasons other than their intelligence databases. However, mass releases may be part of negotia- involvement in insurgent activities should tion or trust-building between insurgent groups be avoided. If innocents must be taken in for Depending on the legal and operating and the government at the end of hostilities. questioning, they should be kept separate from conditions of the theater, requiring review by Under those circumstances, care must be the general detainee population so they cannot officers from both intelligence and the Judge taken to ensure that the release has the desired communicate with insurgents or be identified Advocate for either release or further incarcera- effects and does not simply reinvigorate the by them. In addition, individuals taken for tion of a detainee may also be beneficial. insurgency. questioning should be released as soon as pos- Even if holding facilities are run perfectly, Use Appropriate Arrest and Internment sible and in a manner that does not alienate outside oversight by nongovernmental organiza- Techniques and Procedures. There are multiple them or their families. tions may be beneficial. Organizations such as ndupress.ndu.edu issue 47, 4th quarter 2007 / JFQ    121 FEATURES | Arresting Insurgency the International Red Cross provide indepen- insurgent ideology and provide detainees with 11 Timothy K. Deady, “Lessons from a Suc- dent oversight that is respected worldwide. Their job skills they can use at the end of the conflict. cessful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899–1902,” Parameters, Spring 2005, 63–65. approval of holding facilities and operations Manage Perception. If arrests and intern- 12 Mockaitis, 60. may provide legitimacy to counterinsurgents ment aid insurgent propaganda and recruiting, 13 “The al Qaeda Manual,” 176–180. The manual and demonstrate that they are not cruel in their they are a liability to the counterinsurgency was captured in Manchester, England. The transla- treatment of prisoners. effort. Accounting for the above considerations tion of the sections relevant to this citation is avail- Coordinate with Local Authorities. When will help ensure that this does not happen. Plan- able at <www.usdoj.gov/ag/manualpart1_4.pdf>. possible, the United States should work through ning and conducting arrests and internment 14 Mockaitis, 60. local police and other authorities to arrest and must be continuously revaluated to ensure 15 James S. Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in intern insurgents.31 Coordinating with local desired effects on the battlefield. Counterinsur- Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies (Car- authorities, particularly police, can have a gents should ensure that arrest and internment lisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic number of beneficial effects. The locals may be synchronize with information operations. As Studies Institute, March 2006), 33. able to provide intelligence and aid in the target- long as perceptions remain neutral to positive, 16 Mockaitis, 102. 17 David Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 1956- ing effort. They have cultural insights that help arrests and internment can help end the insur- 1958 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, establish effective arrest and internment pro- gency rather than perpetuate it. original translation in 1963, reprinted in 2006), 318. cedures. They are often able to conduct arrests 18 Gallup Poll, April 2006, available at <www. themselves in ways that will not cause negative The United States will continue to be galluppoll.com/videoArchive/?ci=22246&pg=>. perceptions of the United States. involved in counterinsurgency efforts for 19 Jonathan Marcus, “US Faces Sceptical World Gather Evidence and Witness Statements. the foreseeable future. Over the last 5 years, Over Iraq,” British Broadcasting Corporation, Counterinsurgents may be legally required to America has made many mistakes common February 28, 2006, available at <http://news.bbc. produce evidence linking arrested personnel to counterinsurgency. By recognizing these co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4755770.stm>. to insurgent activities. Even in cases where mistakes and learning from them, better 20 Thomas E. Ricks, “The Lessons of Counter- evidence is not required for prosecution, policies and practices can be adopted, which insurgency: U.S. Unit Praised for Tactics against physical verification of insurgent activity will make the United States more effective in Iraqi Fighters, Treatment of Detainees,” The often has high intelligence value. Gathering countering insurgencies and will ultimately Washington Post, February 16, 2006, A14, available evidence and maintaining it with a detainee is save American lives. JFQ at <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2006/02/15/AR2006021502586_pf.html>. difficult, particularly in large-scale operations 21 George W. Bush, “Press Conference by the with many detainees from different locations. NOTEs President,” October 11, 2006, available at Training for Soldiers on witness statements <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10 and maintaining evidence with a detainee is 1 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: /20061011-5.html>. Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964), 124. helpful in overcoming this. Legal support by 22 Walter Pincus, “U.S. Holds 18,000 Detainees 2 Ibid. personnel from the Judge Advocate, Military in Iraq,” The Washington Post, April 15, 2007, A24. 3 Thomas Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency Police, Office of Special Investigations, Naval 23 Elaine Grossman, “US Officers in Iraq: Insur- in the Post-Imperial Era (New York: Manchester Criminal Investigative Service, or Criminal gents Are Repeatedly Captured and Released,” Inside University Press, 1995), 59–63. Investigation Command is also beneficial. the Pentagon, December 7, 2006. 4 Ibid., 102. After movement of prisoners to theater or 5 Ken Tovo, “From the Ashes of the Phoenix: 24 Steve Fainaru and Anthony Shadid, “In Iraq Jail, Resistance Goes Underground,” The Washington national-level holding facilities, it is important Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgency Post, August 24, 2006, available at <www.washing- that the capturing unit maintain contact with the Operations” (Research paper, U.S. Army War tonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/23/ personnel running the facilities. This ensures that College, 2005), 11–12. AR2005082301525.html>. interrogators understand why a prisoner is in 6 Ed O’Connel and Cheryl Benard, “A New IO 25 O’Connel and Benard. custody and what intelligence value he may have. Strategy: Prevention and Disengagement,” Strategic 26 Pincus. Insights 5, no. 5 (May 2006), available at <www.ccc. It also allows the Judge Advocate or host nation 27 Babak Dehghanpisheh, “Iraq Arrests Up; So nps.navy.mil/si/2006/May/o’connellMay06.asp>.. courts a means of requesting additional informa- Are Questions of Justice,” Newsweek, May 21, 2007. 7 John C. Davis, “The Cost of Expediency in tion or assistance from the capturing unit. 28 See Grossman. In the article, an officer is Counterinsurgency Operations,” Small Wars Journal, Inform and Educate Detainees. As detailed quoted as saying, “Why is it the top 10 people I’m available at <www.smallwarsjournal.com/docu- above, insurgents will often use holding facili- going after have all been to Abu Ghraib?” ments/swjmag/v5/davis.htm>. ties to spread their ideology and recruit new 8 Anthony James Joes, “Recapturing the Essen- 29 Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958, 314–316. members. Rather than ceding the information tials of Counterinsurgency,” Foreign Policy Research 30 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 124. battle in the holding facility to the insurgents, International, May 30, 2006, available at <www.fpri. 31 Kurt M. Campbell and Richard Weiss, Non- counterinsurgents can take steps to oppose the org/enotes/20060530.military.joes.counterinsur- Military Strategies for Countering Islamist Terrorism: insurgent message. Informing prisoners as to gency.html>. Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgencies, The the policies and principles of the government 9 Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Princeton Project on National Security (Princeton: Guerrilla in History, Volume I (Lincoln, NE: Uni- may undermine the belief of some insurgents The Woodrow Wilson School of Public and Inter- verse, 2002), 670–674. in their cause. In addition, job training, literacy national Affairs, 2006), 21–22, available at <www. 10 Conor Kostick and Lorcan Collins, The Easter programs, and other education provide a means hudson.org/files/publications/Counterinsurgency- Rising: A Guide to Dublin in 1916 (Dublin: The of constructively filling the time that insurgents Princeton-Campell-Weitz.pdf>. O’Brien Press, 2000), 129–130. spend in prison. Education may undermine 122 JFQ / issue 47, 4th quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu