Al Qaeda Refining a Failing Strategy A By Martin J . Hart l Qaeda’s inability to translate movement to the leadership, at least at a its post-9/11 approval in the nominal level, of a global Islamic insurgency Muslim world into a mass in order to destroy Western influence in the movement jihad against the Muslim world and reestablish the historic West is prompting a search for new ways to caliphate.1 Although many Muslims viewed regenerate lost momentum, but the group’s al Qaeda’s early attacks as heroic acts of defi- inherent weaknesses are likely to prevent ance against unjust U.S. policies, al Qaeda progress and gradually discredit its vision has failed to make the transition to a popular for the future of Islam. Al Qaeda’s long-term insurgency or win any permanent gains as a plan—according to the writings of its core result of its conceptual, organizational, and leaders, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al material shortcomings. These include an over- Martin J. Hart is an Intelligence Analyst with the Zawahiri—is to move from a small vanguard reliance on violence, weak efforts to organize Central Intelligence Agency. Rudisill) H. Cedric Squadron ( mera Ca mbat Co st1 Damage to Pentagon after September 11 attack ndupress.ndu.edu issue 51, 4th quarter 2008 / JFQ 117 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2008 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2008 to 00-00-2008 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Al Qaeda Refining a Failing Strategy 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,260 REPORT NUMBER 5th Avenue SW Fort Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 8 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 FEATURES | Al Qaeda: Refining a Failing Strategy political support in the Muslim world, a small operations, strategy, and policy goals, paying but also preordained by Allah.5 Al Qaeda and diffuse cellular structure, and insufficient particular attention to strategy as the critical leaders admit that the disparity in material safe havens and state sponsorship. bridge between policy goals and military power between the jihadists and the West Because these weaknesses have their means.3 So far, al Qaeda’s key strategic necessitates a prolonged struggle, but they roots in al Qaeda’s radical founding ideol- concept—fomenting a multistage insurgency also maintain that, because Allah is on the ogy, the group is unlikely to correct them against the West and its allies across the side of the jihadists, the only prerequisite quickly, if at all, and they will undermine any Islamic world—has failed to provide this for victory is dedication to jihad—or violent plans to regain the initiative. For instance, bridge. The group has been unable to knit action persistently applied.6 Intelligently although al Qaeda writings show a realistic together its limited tactical means and applied violence and adroit propaganda streak in recognizing the need for operational moderate propaganda capability with its campaigns may speed victory, but al Qaeda level adjustments, at the strategic level the messianic goals. leaders do not believe clever strategy is as group’s leaders rigidly believe that violence is Al Qaeda’s policy goal is to establish a important as faith and action. a religious obligation, alliances with Muslim single Islamic fundamentalist government Nevertheless, al Qaeda does have a strat- “apostates” should be eschewed, and victory in the territories previously controlled by the egy—to try to foment a global Islamic insur- is inevitable.2 Moreover, al Qaeda’s religiously historic caliphate or currently containing gency in four stages. According to multiple based disdain for the materialist aspects of large Muslim populations—a region stretch- writings by prominent al Qaeda thinkers— its enemies, both Muslim and Western, will ing from Spain and the Balkans in the west including Abu Bakr Naji’s The Management of continue to cause the group to underestimate to Indonesia and parts of the Philippines in Savagery, Zawahiri’s Knights under the Proph- the resilience of its opponents. As a result, any the east.4 This government would be based et’s Banner, and Abu Hajir al Muqrin’s A Prac- new plans are likely to be neither completely on Sunni Salafist principles, including a tical Course for Guerrilla War—the first stage flexible nor fully realistic. They will contain a return to the practices of Muhammad’s first is the awakening. During this phase, al Qaeda continuing mismatch between grandiose aims and “most pure” followers, rigid adherence doctrine calls for small terrorist cells, funded and inadequate strategic concepts and means. to shariah law, jihad against unbelievers and and directed by al Qaeda’s central apparatus, Nevertheless, some of al Qaeda’s weaknesses, apostates, and rejection of Western social to conduct spectacular mass-casualty attacks including its rigid worldview and cellular values. Salafists believe that deviation from against symbolic U.S. targets and other structure, lend the group a measure of deter- “true” Islam is responsible for the loss of sources of preexisting Muslim resentment mination and survivability that will make its Muslim power in the world and that a return to lift what al Qaeda considers a malaise of eradication a difficult process that may take to “purist” principles is necessary to restore Islamic defeatism.7 Al Qaeda believes such decades. Islam to its “rightful” position. violence can radicalize the Muslim population Although these goals may appear in a way that simple proselytizing cannot. Flawed Strategy to Western eyes as so ambitious that they Naji, for example, calls this “reviving dogma As Western strategic thinkers have strain credulity, even when viewed as and jihad in the hearts of the Muslim masses” observed, for a nation or group to be mili- propaganda for eager Islamic militants, al and removing the “deceptive media halo” tarily effective it must harmonize tactics, Qaeda believes they are not only possible around American power.8 Smoke rises over Manhattan 4 days after attack on Osama bin Laden poster World Trade Center U.S. Air Force (Michelle Leonard) DOD 118 JFQ / issue 51, 4th quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu HART In designing this stage, al Qaeda leaders have shown a keen understanding of the Roots of al Qaeda Strategy pent-up frustrations and humiliations felt by Al Qaeda’s strategy is essentially a variation of the “foco” many young Muslim men. These feelings have strategy practiced by communist insurgent Che Guevara been developed through personal experiences in the 1960s, which holds that a vanguard group can similar to Zawahiri’s torture in Egyptian jails, vicarious experiences of television images of use violence to create the political and psychological the Palestinian intifada, or simply the affront conditions that give rise to popular revolution. Al Qaeda to personal identity and self-worth resulting intellectuals have studied the guerrilla theories of Mao from repeated encounters with the superior Tse-tung and Che and have sought to integrate these success of the West. Zawahiri and bin Laden understand that these sentiments can be ideas with their own experiences—primarily the Afghan tapped by inspirational examples of successful war against the Soviets. Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and others attacks and the explanatory power of their saw the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan enflame Muslim ideology, both of which declare that a return passions, attract jihadist recruits from across the world, and lead to the defeat of to “authentic” Islam that battles the “corrupt- ing” influence of the West will restore Muslim a superpower. As Zawahiri writes, the Afghan “jihad was a training course of the pride. In this way, the genesis of al Qaeda’s utmost importance to prepare Muslim mujahidin to wage their awaited battle terrorism is similar to that of other groups: against . . . the United States.” Che, however, its violence is an expression of individual was famously unsuccessful in his attempt to use frustration, an assertion of peer group identity against threatening outsiders, and the organi- the foco strategy in Africa and Bolivia because a zation’s means to influence enemies and gain belief in the righteousness of his cause and the supporters.9 memory of singular success in Cuba clouded his According to Zawahiri, the aims of this judgment and encouraged him to believe in his stage are to rally Muslims to the al Qaeda banner and boost resources available to the theory’s universal applicability. Something similar organization—volunteers, monetary dona- afflicts al Qaeda’s judgment and application of the tions, and support of similarly minded terror- “lessons” of the Soviet-Afghan war. ist groups.10 Zawahiri and bin Laden hoped that the attacks leading up to and including 9/11 would force either a humiliating U.S. retreat from the Muslim world, for which al Qaeda could claim credit, or a direct U.S. targets and erode U.S. popular will to remain a stage of effeminacy which has made them military intervention, which al Qaeda would engaged in the Middle East. Naji and al unable to sustain battles for a long period of then propagandize as a “Crusader invasion” Muqrin suggest that militants attack U.S. eco- time.”16 to mobilize massive numbers of Muslim nomic interests abroad, such as oil facilities, volunteers.11 Some al Qaeda lieutenants judging that the West’s materialist culture al Qaeda doctrine calls for also hoped that Washington would compel cannot abide much economic pain before attacks against sources of pro-U.S. Muslim governments to publicly act demanding changes in U.S. policies perceived preexisting Muslim resentment against militant groups, thereby associating as prompting the attacks. According to Naji, to lift what al Qaeda considers these regimes with subservience to American “aiming blows of vexation directly toward actions against fellow Muslims and providing the economy is the most important element a malaise of Islamic defeatism Muslims another reason to act.12 This cycle of cultural annihilation since it threatens of actions would widen the scope of conflict the opulence and [worldly] pleasures which Al Qaeda intends to exploit weakening and provide real-world combat experience for [Western societies] thirst for.” 14 Al Muqrin U.S. prestige during this stage to break the growing numbers of militants. According to explains that the uncertainty these attacks bonds between America and its allies, espe- Zawahiri, militants “need to inflict maximum produce would roil Western economies dis- cially in the Middle East. The organization casualties . . . concentrate on martyrdom proportionately to their physical damage.15 Al hopes that the casualties and economic pain operations” and choose targets that “restore Qaeda’s call for inflicting heavy casualties on inflicted on the United States will prompt the struggle to its real size [that is, provoking a U.S. military forces in the Middle East stems isolationist tendencies among Americans, type of clash of civilizations].”13 from a similar belief that U.S. culture cannot thereby separating pro-U.S. Muslim govern- In the second stage, al Qaeda aims stomach the loss of more than a few American ments from U.S. support.17 The group also to harness this militancy by establishing lives. Naji writes, “If the number of Americans hopes an image of American weakness would new cells and connecting with like-minded killed is one tenth the number of Russians reduce the confidence that U.S. allies have in groups, such as Southeast Asia’s Jemaah killed in Afghanistan and Chechnya, they will the benefits of ties to Washington. As Naji Islamiyah, to expand attacks on Western flee, heedless of all else. . . . They have reached makes clear, this aspect of al Qaeda strategy ndupress.ndu.edu issue 51, 4th quarter 2008 / JFQ 119 FEATURES | Al Qaeda: Refining a Failing Strategy stems from a belief in the Afghan muja- forces or exploiting already ungoverned areas. maintenance of a safe haven as “the bridge to hideen’s central role in the destruction of the In this stage, al Qaeda would control one or the Islamic state which has been awaited since Warsaw Pact as a result of the Soviet-Afghan more “liberated” zones, as described in tra- the fall of the caliphate.”20 war: “By removing respect for the Russian ditional insurgent doctrine, and therefore be The fate of Iraq looms large in this army from the hearts of the masses whose compelled to provide basic government ser- stage, since Zawahiri has long emphasized regimes used to revolve in [the Soviet] orbit vices for people living in the area, indoctrinate the importance of al Qaeda gaining a territo- in Europe and Asia . . . one after another, they the masses, develop a rudimentary internal rial foothold more centrally located than its began to fall away and desert it.”18 security force, and secure and expand the previous base in Afghanistan: “The mujahid The third stage—which Naji calls “the zone against outside pressure.19 Islamic movement will not triumph against management of savagery” and from which he Naji calls this stage the most critical the world coalition unless it possesses a fun- draws the title of his book—is the establish- because of the safe haven’s contrasting vulner- damentalist base in the heart of the Islamic ment of safe havens that would allow al Qaeda ability and potential for wider success. He rec- world.”21 In 2005, bin Laden and Zawahiri to build large training camps, conduct logistic ognizes the danger of weak insurgent forces called on al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to prepare support activity more openly and efficiently, expending scarce resources on population to consolidate a safe haven in the country. and dispatch fighters to neighboring countries administration while simultaneously trying Zawahiri warned that the group needed to be to expand the group’s influence. These areas to defend territory and export the movement ready to handle a precipitous U.S. withdrawal would be created by defeating local security to other areas. Nevertheless, he also sees the by preventing Sunni tribes, Shia militias, and other native elements from squeezing out al Qaeda.22 Although AQI tried to do Al Qaeda’s WMD Option this—renaming itself the Islamic State of Iraq Al Qaeda’s material shortcomings will limit its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to be seen as an inclusive and indigenously led organization, for example—it failed to development and employment options. There is no credible evidence that the group broaden the group’s appeal.23 possesses more than a small-scale chemical weapons capability, demonstrated in captured video showing a dog dying in a cloud of unidentified white vapor.1 Accord- the third stage is the ing to the director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, al Qaeda had limited establishment of safe havens development capabilities in Afghanistan before the U.S. invasion, and since then that would allow al Qaeda its lack of money and unstable safe havens have probably exacerbated problems to dispatch fighters to with the internal-development option.2 Nevertheless, the revelation in the 1990s of neighboring countries a network run by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan—in which nuclear weapons knowl- edge and technology were sold to Iran and North Korea—shows the possibility of The transition from safe haven to the religiously, politically, and financially motivated transfers of WMD knowledge, and fourth stage of creating an Islamist state is not potentially capability, to al Qaeda. well articulated in al Qaeda literature, prob- ably because more thought has been given to conducting the current fight with its more There also is little indication how al Qaeda might prioritize WMD acquisition or use definable parameters, but some al Qaeda writ- WMD operationally. Al Qaeda’s most frequent WMD references are to chemical weap- ings on the subject are available. Al Muqrin’s ons development and use, but nuclear, biological, and radiological weapon acquisition Guerrilla War holds up the Taliban’s rise to efforts are possible, despite their low likelihood of success. Al Qaeda’s desire to justify power in Afghanistan as a possible model, describing the Taliban victory over the post- WMD use to Muslim audiences may Soviet government as a series of small battles focus its targeting on U.S. military assets that acquired increasing amounts of territory on American soil (a re-attack on the and eventually broke the government’s will.24 Pentagon with WMD, for example) and In this scenario, no decisive conventional offensive is envisioned as necessary for install- possibly Israel, if operationally feasible. ing Islamists into authority, only a power Use against civilians would not gain vacuum in the political center. Naji writes that more media coverage and could alien- if an opposing government is weak enough ate its remaining Muslim supporters.3 and the surrounding pro–al Qaeda forces strong enough, assassination of key enemy leaders may precipitate the collapse.25 1 Jack Boureston, “Assessing Al Qaeda’s WMD Capabilities,” Strategic Insight 1, no. 7 (September 2002), 3, avail- A group as diffuse and nonhierarchi- able at <www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/sept02/wmd.asp>. 2 Ibid. cal as al Qaeda will vary its application of 3 Jerry Mark Long, “Strategic Culture, Al-Qaida, and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” report prepared by Science this strategy. Operatives strike at targets of Applications International Corporation for Defense Threat Reduction Agency, November 20, 2006. opportunity and different militant writers 120 JFQ / issue 51, 4th quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu HART break down or aggregate the stages differently, includes putting “the issue of nationalism Al Qaeda’s overreliance on violence sometimes mixing the first stage “awakening” . . . out of our minds.”29 Al Qaeda’s response also has contributed to its neglect of the and second stage attrition of U.S. power. Also, to conflict in Iraq between local nationalist political organization necessary to harness because real-world application of strategic insurgents and nonindigenous al Qaeda cell any popular support that might be gener- theory is seldom as neat as it appears on paper, leaders was to create a fictitious native Iraqi ated by an improved message. Al Qaeda’s these stages often overlap in different areas at leader named “Abu Omar al Baghdadi” to small clandestine structure has no ability to different times. For instance, al Qaeda con- front for AQI—hardly a systematic solution.30 indoctrinate, organize, discipline, or direct tinues to try to wear down U.S. forces in Iraq Even in Saudi Arabia, with its conservative large numbers of Muslims or engage in mass while building a safe haven in the Pashtun Wahabi religious tradition, many people dissident activities, such as riots or dem- tribal area of northwestern Pakistan. publicly criticized al Qaeda militants after onstrations. Radical mosque and religious their attempts to damage the country’s oil school (madrassa) leaders, combined with Weakness Limits Growth facilities.31 Despite the energy devoted to develop- As a result, al Qaeda has remained an al Qaeda has remained an ing and implementing its strategy, al Qaeda’s elitist movement that draws general Muslim elitist movement that draws inherent weaknesses prevent it from reaching approval for trying to reduce U.S. power, general Muslim approval the strategy’s penultimate goal—the creation but it fails to attract participation from most of a global Muslim fundamentalist insur- Muslims because of its hardcore fundamen- for trying to reduce U.S. gency. As can be seen in each of the stages talist message. According to Christopher power, but it fails to attract described above, al Qaeda’s core weakness Henzel’s study of the origins of al Qaeda’s most Muslims because of is its ideologically based overreliance on ideology: its hardcore fundamentalist violence, which limits its strategic flexibility, message ability to attract a large Muslim following, For all the importance that Zawahiri attaches and capacity to consolidate early success (such to political action and organization among as in Iraq). Moreover, al Qaeda’s idea that the masses, the revolutionary Salafists have Internet and broadcast videos glorifying violence can spark a global clash of cultures aroused . . . little popular response to their attacks on Western forces, may generate tends to obscure the need to understand local efforts. In his 2002 book Jihad: The Trail of a few recruits, but without a semi-overt conditions where the group hopes to nurture Political Islam, Gilles Kepel argues convinc- political organization able to communicate branch al Qaeda movements. Without a ingly that contemporary political Islamist quickly and frequently with large numbers more flexible strategic concept, al Qaeda will movements can succeed only when they are of people, al Qaeda is unlikely to produce remain unable to grow beyond a cell-based able to mobilize, and maintain an alliance mass activism in any form, violent or non- terrorist network. between, the masses and pious middle classes. violent. On the other hand, Hizballah, which Thus far, al Qaeda has not shown any Natural tensions between the two constituen- some analysts have called the world’s most ability to create a broadly appealing vision cies are inherently difficult to control and effective Islamic insurgency, has built an for the future or cement the loyalty of more are repeatedly the downfall of contemporary efficient grassroots organization on Leba- than a small number of dedicated jihadists. political Islamist movements, most notably in nese territory with strong government-like Even in Afghanistan, where al Qaeda and Algeria.32 social services.33 the Taliban had years to do their proselytiz- ing, al Qaeda ideologue Abu Musab al Suri Iraqi citizen talks to Iraqi and U.S. soldiers complained that friendly tribal groups quickly surrendered or betrayed al Qaeda members to U.S. forces during the post-9/11 invasion of Afghanistan.26 Bin Laden and Zawahiri have vacillated between publicly criticizing the failure of Muslims to rally to the anti-Western cause and recognizing the need to craft better appeals to mass Muslim audiences, to little effect thus far.27 Part of the problem is that al Qaeda’s vision of a global religious movement causes it to eschew ethnic, nationalist, political, and economic appeals in favor of fundamentalist and anti-Western appeals, despite the fact that insurgencies featuring ethnonationalist appeals have proven the most successful over the past century.28 The education given to most al Qaeda militants, according to Army bin Laden’s former bodyguard Abu Jandal, U.S. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 51, 4th quarter 2008 / JFQ 121 FEATURES | Al Qaeda: Refining a Failing Strategy Even worse for al Qaeda, its ideology of insurgencies receive material assistance, polit- persed organization and an ability to attract violence reduces the pool of potential allies ical support, and a measure of international groups, however small, of highly motivated and arouses enemies, limiting its freedom to legitimacy from one or more nation-states. young men—invest the organization with operate. Although al Qaeda maintains ties Hizballah, for instance, gains great material considerable survivability and resiliency. Al to like-minded Islamist terrorist groups, its benefit from Iran and Syria. Al Qaeda has Qaeda maintains a network of geographically ideologues have dismissed other anti-Western no state sponsor and must rely on wealthy dispersed clandestine cells that often operate groups. Bin Laden and Zawahiri have criticized like-minded Muslims, illegal contributions without knowledge of each other to boost the Muslim Brotherhood for “confusing” from some Muslim charities, and criminal security. Although these cells increasingly Muslims with ideas on nonviolent religiously enterprises such as drug dealing and kidnap- function without support from al Qaeda based change. Even Hamas, a violently anti- ransom schemes in Iraq to generate money leaders, they have become financially self-sus- Israeli Palestinian organization, comes under to travel, buy weapons, and generally support taining and draw some operational benefits verbal al Qaeda attack for participating in itself. According to unnamed U.S. intelligence from Web-based doctrine, training manuals, Western-style elections and moderating its officials quoted in the Los Angeles Times, al and propaganda. This type of structure may violence for “ephemeral” political gains.34 In Qaeda’s core leadership, rebuilding its former inhibit sophisticated large-scale operations, turn, groups such as Hamas and Hizballah Afghanistan safe haven in Pakistan’s tribal but it makes the organization difficult to iden- have avoided close ties to al Qaeda, probably areas, is limited in the funds it can disburse to tify and roll up as a whole. over concern that such links would create cells abroad and is surviving on money from The other great strength of al Qaeda more Western and regional opposition to their criminal enterprises in Iraq.36 These funds is its determination to continue the fight, activities without any compensating benefits. are relatively small, sent in tranches of several expressed in its guerrilla war concept and sup- Meanwhile, al Qaeda attacks have awakened tens of thousands of U.S. dollars, and some of ported by its religious belief in preordained local security services such as those in Saudi it probably goes to ensuring the goodwill of victory. Because group members face long Arabia, which were willing to ignore militant Pakistani tribal allies.37 odds for personal survival and see ultimate activities directed against theaters abroad until victory as a distant prospect, there are no “free the al Qaeda faction in Arabia began strikes Strength Ensures Survivability riders” attracted to material benefits the group against economically vital oil facilities.35 Unfortunately, these weaknesses do might provide. Thus, most members are likely Another crucial al Qaeda weakness is not mean al Qaeda will quickly collapse to be highly motivated.38 This mindset gives al its lack of material resources. Most successful because its countervailing strengths—a dis- Qaeda operatives mental resilience in the face U.S. flag waves over abandoned fighting position overlooking Bagram, Afghanistan Bracken) Michael Squadron ( mera Ca mbat Co d982 Download as computer wallpaper at ndupress.ndu.edu 122 JFQ / issue 51, 4th quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu HART of setbacks, making it difficult for the West to and criticized the Bush administration (not worry that English-speaking al Qaeda opera- inflict a decisive psychological defeat. It also America) for plunging Iraq into civil war.40 He tives living in Europe could take advantage of makes defections unlikely and recruiting al also discussed the failure of U.S. Democratic the visa waiver program and their familiarity Qaeda personnel into Western intelligence legislators to bring troops back to America, with Western ways to eventually strike in the networks problematic. blaming pressure from U.S. business interests. United States once again.45 Although bin Laden appears not to under- Trying to Adapt stand that as the lead perpetrator of the 9/11 Dead End In the months ahead, al Qaeda is likely attacks he has no credibility as a statesman- Even with more focused operations, al to try to leverage these strengths to regain like figure in the United States, he is clearly Qaeda will continue to struggle to achieve momentum in the area that al Qaeda writings trying to influence U.S. deliberations on Iraq its goals. Attempts to more precisely target consider most vital and where both threats through more traditional political arguments violence for political effect, across a variety of and opportunities are most fluid—the Middle rather than direct threats.41 differing political and security environments, East; but the group’s mindset is likely to limit Further evidence of the possibility of a using the increasingly loose network of some- new plans to the operational level and prevent targeted operational campaign is the growing times poorly trained and poorly resourced the development of new strategic paradigms. type of Internet literature called “jihadi strate- cells, will be problematic. New operational The main change is likely to be more targeted gic studies.” 42 This literature includes realistic ideas will not be absorbed or applied equally violence and more sophisticated media cam- discussion of short-term Western vulnerabili- by all cells, and al Qaeda has not implemented paigns to gain quick political and psychologi- ties, the best example of which was the Web any systematic solutions to its structural cal victories in the region. site, visited by the 2004 Madrid train bombers weaknesses. Thus, the results are likely to be Given al Qaeda’s aim of gaining a safe before their operation, that advocated terrorist less decisive than bin Laden and Zawahiri haven in the heart of the Middle East and attacks on European countries to destroy their may expect. the fading opportunity to secure one in Iraq, support for U.S.-led operations in Iraq.43 The To achieve its goals, the United States the group may seek to influence the U.S. site noted Spain’s vulnerability to such opera- should consider the following actions, always Presidential election by increasing attacks on tions due to the growing divide between the mindful of the psychological impact of each American forces in Iraq and thus the attrac- pro–U.S. Government camp and a population action on allied, al Qaeda, and wider Muslim tiveness to U.S. voters of candidates calling increasingly dissatisfied with the govern- audiences: for quick withdrawal. Following the success of ment’s support for the war in Iraq. Given n kill or capture dedicated al Qaeda members resistant to psychological defeat religious belief in preordained victory gives al Qaeda operatives n continue to target al Qaeda safe havens, mental resilience in the face of setbacks, making it difficult for directly or through regional allies, to limit al the West to inflict a decisive psychological defeat Qaeda logistics, training, and command and control activities n continue to disrupt al Qaeda’s Internet- the U.S. military “surge” in reducing violence the widely accepted notion that the Madrid based training, command and control, money in Iraq, such a strategy may be calculated bombings led directly to the electoral defeat transfers, and propagandizing designed to aid to have a “Tet-like” psychological impact— of Spanish President Jose Maria Aznar and the creation of new cells highlighting the cost of continued involve- the subsequent withdrawal of Spanish troops n publicize Western successes against ment and the difficulty of achieving lasting from Iraq, al Qaeda probably has already al Qaeda to strengthen impressions of U.S. stability, while prompting Western media incorporated this lesson into its thinking. strength and shrinking al Qaeda capabilities claims that White House statements of prog- Meanwhile, al Qaeda will continue to and popularity—thus discouraging fence ress are unwarranted. Although it is difficult try to make its presence felt in other areas sitters from joining an organization headed to gauge the potential political effectiveness of to bolster its claim of being a worldwide for defeat renewed attacks in Iraq, studies of Palestinian movement. Its central leadership will seek n avoid exaggerations and disinforma- terrorist violence preceding Israeli elections to further strengthen its base in the loosely tion in U.S. information operations that may indicate that attacks on nonlocal targets—that governed and geographically rugged Pashtun undermine American credibility is, strikes against fellow Israelis but far from tribal areas of eastern Afghanistan and n describe intentional al Qaeda efforts a voter’s neighborhood (as Iraq would be for northwest Pakistan. Also, al Qaeda is likely to harm fellow Muslims—killing Iraqi sol- U.S. voters)—tend to boost support for pro- to mount new attacks in Europe to further diers, assassinating civilians, and blocking peace candidates.39 undermine support for U.S. Middle East poli- humanitarian aid efforts, for example (this is Al Qaeda would probably supplement cies and harness the large and partially disaf- different from showing al Qaeda’s disregard this more targeted violence with continued fected Muslim population in Western Europe. for bystanders, which Muslims observing at a efforts to fashion an increasingly sophisti- Al Qaeda has pledged to strike Germany, Italy, distance can rationalize as “collateral damage”) cated media campaign. In his September Denmark, and the Vatican, and Britain’s intel- n enable former militants and Muslims 7, 2007, video aimed at U.S. viewers, for ligence chief in November 2007 said publicly harmed by al Qaeda to tell their stories example, bin Laden made no overt threats, that he believed the terrorist threat had not n choose strategic communications wore a dyed beard to appear more youthful, “reached its peak.”44 Moreover, U.S. authorities words and themes carefully, with the Muslim ndupress.ndu.edu issue 51, 4th quarter 2008 / JFQ 123 FEATURES | Al Qaeda: Refining a Failing Strategy worldview in mind—for example, “new 7 Alan Cullison, “Inside Al-Qaeda’s Hard in Five Terrorist Groups (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, freedoms,” “justice,” “anticorruption,” and Drive,” The Atlantic Online, September 2004, 2005), 44–53; Daniel Byman, Understanding Proto- 15, available at <http://www.theatlantic.com/ Insurgencies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), “improved economic and educational oppor- doc/200409/cullison>. appendix A. tunities” are likely to resonate better than 8 Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery, 34 Brachman and McCants, 9; Blanchard, 12; “democracy” and “political pluralism,” which trans. William F. McCants (Cambridge: John M. Naji, 4. may seem like U.S. cultural imports; in addi- Olin Institute of Strategic Studies, Harvard Univer- 35 Cigar, 41–47. tion, the phrase “moderate Muslim” can be sity, May 23, 2006), 1, 9. 36 Greg Miller, “Iraq a ‘big moneymaker’ for al- understood as “half-hearted Muslim,” indicat- 9 Chris E. Stout, ed., Psychology of Terrorism Qaeda, says CIA,” The Los Angeles Times, May 20, ing the need for a more sophisticated term (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 49. 2007. n pursue international agreements 10 Zawahiri, 47, 102. 37 Ibid. that hinder terrorist activities—cross-border 11 Cullison, 15. 38 Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The money transfers, for example—both for their 12 Naji, 8. Politics of Insurgent Violence (New York: Cam- own sake and to show broad international 13 Zawahiri, 100–101. bridge University Press, 2007), 9–10, 42–43. 14 Naji, 8. 39 Dennis Foster, Alex Braithwaite, and David support for the war on terror. 15 See discussion of Muqrin’s economic target- Sobek, “Terrorist Violence and Israeli National ing ideas in Cigar, 31. Elections,” conference paper presented to the As al Qaeda fails to deliver on its 16 Naji, 9. International Studies Association, Honolulu, promise of increased pride and power for 17 Mahan Abedin, “The Essence of Al Qaeda: Hawaii, March 5, 2005; Claude Berrebi and Esteban Muslims, its radical influence is likely to fade An Interview with Saad Al-Faqih,” Spotlight on Klor, “Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism? Direct much like that of the failed Arab nationalist Terror 2, no. 2 (February 5, 2005), available at Evidence from the Israeli Elections,” October 2007, and other radical movements of the 1960s <www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article. available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. and 1970s. If these Arab nationalist experi- php?issue_id=2907>. cfm?abstract_id=963965>. ences are a useful analogy, however, the decay 18 Naji, 8. 40 Mary Louise Kelley and Melissa Block, of al Qaeda’s radicalism may likewise take 19 Ibid., 11–12. “Bin Ladin Offers No New Threat in Latest decades. In the meantime, al Qaeda terrorists 20 Ibid., 4. Video,” National Public Radio, October 30, 2007, 21 Zawahiri, 98–99. available at <www.npr.org/templates/story/story. may cause great physical damage and human 22 Shmuel Bar and Yair Minzili, “The Zawahiri php?storyId=14239653 >. suffering, especially if they acquire weapons Letter and the Strategy of al-Qaeda,” Current 41 Ibid. of mass destruction. It behooves the West, Trends in Islamist Ideology, vol. 3 (February 16, 42 Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer, therefore, to maintain pressure on al Qaeda 2006), available at <www.futureofmuslimworld. “Jihadi Strategic Studies: The Alleged Al Qaeda weaknesses to undermine its military capacity com/research/pubID.40/pub_detail.asp>. Policy Study Preceding the Madrid Bombings,” and speed its strategic decline. JFQ 23 Lydia Khalil, “The Islamic State of Iraq Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27, no. 5 (Septem- Launches Plan of Nobility,” Terrorism Focus 4, no. 7 ber-October 2004), 355–375. (March 27, 2007), 1–2. 43 Ibid.; Cigar, 12. 24 Cigar, 19. 44 Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, “Al NOTES 25 Naji, 69. Qaeda’s Second Front: Europe,” International 26 Jarret M. Brachman and William F. Herald Tribune, July 15, 2005; Sarah Lyall, “British 1 Christopher Henzel, “The Origins of al McCants, “Stealing Al-Qaeda’s Playbook,” Combat- Intelligence Chief Sharpens Terrorism Warning,” Qaeda’s Ideology: Implications for US Strategy,” ing Terrorism Center at West Point, February 2006, The New York Times, November 6, 2007. Parameters 35, no. 1 (Spring 2005), 76. 16. 45 Michael Jacobson, The Changing and 2 Norman Cigar, “Al Qaeda’s Doctrine for 27 Christopher M. Blanchard, Al Qaeda: Expanding al-Qaeda Threat, Policy Watch #1263 Insurgency: A Translation and Analysis,” Marine Statements and Evolving Ideology, Congressional (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute, July Corps War College, August 2007, 14. Research Service Report RL32759, July 2007, 6; 25, 2007), available at <www.washingtoninstitute. 3 Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, Zawahiri, 50. org/templateC05.php?CID=2639>. eds., Military Effectiveness, Volume I: The First 28 Zawahiri, 14; Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terror- World War (Boston: Unwin Hyman, Inc., 1988), ism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 26–27; and James D. Kiras, Special Operations and 170–171. Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terror- 29 Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda in Iraq Executes ism (New York: Routledge, 2006), xii. Bombing Offensive,” The Long War Journal, 4 This goal is not stated explicitly in any al December 8, 2007, available at <www.longwarjour- Qaeda document or public statement, but it can be nal.org/archives/2007/12/al_qaeda_in_iraq_exe. inferred from study of the group’s multiple state- php>. ments of goals. 30 Michael Scheuer, “Al-Qaeda Doctrine: 5 See discussion of Allah’s preordained victory Training the Individual Warrior,” Terrorism in Cigar, 14. Focus 3, no. 12 (March 28, 2006), available at 6 Ayman al-Zawahiri, Knights under the <www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article. Prophet’s Banner. Serialized in London-based php?articleid=2369944>. daily Al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 2001. Trans. 31 Cigar, 25. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 2002 32 Henzel, 77. (BIS–NES–2002–0108), 95. 33 Brian Jackson et al., Aptitude for Destruction, Volume 2: Case Studies of Organizational Learning 124 JFQ / issue 51, 4th quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu