The Development Of A Joint Operational Concept, “Effects Based Operations And Rapid Decisive Operations” CSC 2001 Subject Area Operations This paper explores the parallel development of the joint operational concepts, Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) and Effects-Based Operations (EBO), with the Marine Corps' emerging operational concept, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW). It explores the role of operational concepts in providing future warfighting capabilities and seeks to answer the questions, how will a joint operational concept enhance future warfighting capability, and, how the Marine Corps can best contribute to the joint force of the future? This paper is divided into six sections. Section I provides an overview of the future security environment in which the joint force of tomorrow will operate. "The Defense Department's Joint Strategy Review concluded that the 2lst century security environment would be characterized by chaos, crisis, and conflict, caused by political ideology, ethnic and religious animosity, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and competition for scarce resources."1 Section II explores the major developments in joint warfighting; the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, better known as the Goldwater Nichols Act (GNA), JV2010/2020, and the evolution of United States Joint Forces Commands' (USJFC) role in developing joint operational concepts. Section III provides a framework for operational concepts and articulates the tenants of an operational concept. "Operational concepts are general descriptions of how military forces intend to fight in a future environment. Such concepts originate from innovative ideas about how to fight, as well as notions on how advances in technology might be applied to warfare."2 _____________________ 1Richard A. Shultz, Jr., "Crises Response and Power Projection in Nonpermissive Environments and Conflicts", The Role Of Naval Forces in 21st Century Operations, Richard A. Shultz, Jr., and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., ed. (Washington: Brassey's), Forward 1 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2001 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2001 to 00-00-2001 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER The Development Of A Joint Operational Concept, ?Effects Based 5b. GRANT NUMBER Operations And Rapid Decisive Operations? 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Marine Corps War College,Marine Corps University,Marine Corps REPORT NUMBER Combat Development Command,Quantico,VA,22134-5067 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 47 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 It argues the need for a joint operational concept that will be able to drive the combat development processes of the individual services. Without a joint operational concept, the intent of neither GNA nor the vision established in JV 2020 will be realized. Section IV examines the current RDO and EBO initiatives. It analyzes the USJFC RDO wargames, and the Joint Strike Force initiative. Section V analyzes the Marine Corps' corresponding efforts to develop its' new operational concept, EMW. As the Marine Corps continues to develop the operational concept EMW, it should focus on articulating how the Marine Corps plans to act as an enabling force for joint operations. Section VI provides the authors' conclusions and recommendations for the future development of operational concepts. Future operational concepts must focus on the needs of the regional CinCs and provide the NCA with the greatest future warfighting capability across the spectrum of conflict. USJFC must be given the authority commensurate with the responsibility that they have been given as DOD's lead agency for transformation. The individual services must overcome service parochialism and actively support USJFCOM in their attempts to develop an operational concept. The Future Security Environment The fall of the Soviet Union has ushered in a new era of political and military uncertainty. The currently unsettled nature of our policy, strategy, and doctrine after more than fifty years of certainty, brought about by containment, is the source of much angst in official and academic communities. The lack of a clearly defined threat, the rapid pace of changing technology, and the effects of globalization are creating a non-linear world to which our political and military establishments are having a hard time adapting.3 Historically, our approaches to policy, strategy, ____________________________________________________________________________________________ 2Paul K. Van Riper, "Operational Concepts in Context", (Unpublished, 2000) 1. 3 Hart—Rudman Commission, "New World Coming-Overview Briefing: Phase I", The United States Commission on National Security /21st Century, (Washington D.C. 1999) 2 and doctrine have been focused on an identifiable enemy and a linear battlefield. The ongoing debates calling for a revolution in military affairs, Department of Defenses' (DOD) focus on transformation, and the emerging focus on asymmetric threats are all attempts to categorize and simplify the chaotic nature of the future security environment that the U.S. will encounter. In an ambiguous and uncertain world, the challenge that confronts the U.S. military is how to best prepare its forces to meet the challenges of shaping the international security environment, as well as execute missions throughout the spectrum of conflict.4 Instability exacerbated by over- population, scarcity of resources, cultural and ideological frictions, as well as regional competitors will create challenges to U.S. interests. As the effects of globalization continue, these challenges may come in the form of economic, political, and ideological challenges. Without a near-term peer competitor, future challenges will most likely come from asymmetric threats. "The rise of nonstate actors is not the main crisis that we have to worry about. It is chaos. It contrasts sharply with the good old days of crises, where there were state actors and one could pick up the phone and talk to somebody."5 The proliferation and commercial off-the-shelf availability of military technologies into the hands of state and non-state actors greatly enhances the risk to U.S. forces. Advances in information and missile technology will extend the battle space to the continental U.S., thereby increasing the risk of U.S. involvement abroad. In such an uncertain future, the one thing that seems inevitable is that the U.S. military will be called upon to meet these challenges.6 _________________________ 4Hart—Rudman Commission, "New World Coming-Overview Briefing: Phase I", The United States Commission on National Security /21st Century. (Washington D.C. 1999) 5 General Charles C. Krulak, "Ne Cras: Not Like Yesterday", The Role Of Naval Forces in 21stCentury Operations Richard A. Shultz, Jr., and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., ed. (Washington: Brassey's), Forward 6 For a complete analysis of the future security environment read the 21st Century Security Reports (Hart Rudman Reports), the National Defense University's report on alternative futures. For a better understanding of the effects of Globalization, read Friedman's, The Lexus and the Olive Tree or Tolivers, War and Anti War. For those 3 Although the future security environment is uncertain, the U.S. faces less risk than during the era of the Cold War. It would be naive to think that the uncertainty we face today compares with the risk we faced during a period when our security strategy was based on "mutually assured destruction." This strategy threatened the existence of not only the U.S. and Soviet Union, but also the world, as we know it. During the Cold War era our security strategy was based on the threat of nuclear holocaust. Limited conflicts, such as Korea and Vietnam, were fought on the periphery of Soviet and U.S. interests to avoid direct confrontation between the two super powers. According to Andrew Krepinevich, "The strategic environment in which the United States finds itself today is far more favorable than that which existed during the Cold War. It could be argued that, irrespective of what course the Defense Department follows in modernizing its forces, U.S. military superiority over any prospective near-term challenger is so great that we are unlikely to confront a significant threat to our vital interests over the next ten years, and perhaps longer."7 Although we face less risk to our existence as a super power, the operational risk of the military will be greater than ever. The reason this view is important to this paper is that without a realistic view of the future, the military will develop an operational concept that is not relevant to future threats. Uncertainty itself will demand a robust capability to operate along the entire spectrum without inflating the nature of risk in the future security environment. Throughout the 21st century, the U.S. will be directly involved in protecting the human rights of others. This involvement will occur as a result of the effects of globalization in situations that have limited direct bearing on U.S. national interests; the risk to our Armed Forces will be great. The military faces the risk of failure in situations where the outcomes are not based on military _____________________________________________________________________________ with Secret access who want the DOD's view on the future security environment read the Joint Strategy Review (Fall 2000). 4 victory. In his book, The Principals of War for the Information Age, Robert Leonhard contends that, "the U.S. Armed Forces will have a hard time adjusting to the political realities and constraints of war in the st century. It has already become a reality that the aim of military 21 action is no longer the destruction of the enemies' military forces."8 According to Lt. Gen (RET) P.K. Van Riper, "Future conflicts are likely to involve not only the military, but also other government agencies, intergovernmental and international organizations, and nongovermental and private volunteer organizations. It is possible that in some coming contingencies the geographic combatant commander may not be the lead as the armed forces play a supporting role to other agencies or organizations."9 The future security environment calls for a military that can operate decisively across the entire spectrum of conflict. To meet the security challenges of the future, the U.S. Armed Forces must be able to operate as a single Joint Force. Despite considerable progress in joint warfighting over the past two decades, there is still no joint operational concept to drive the services to achieve the intent of the GNA. Furthermore, the vision of full spectrum dominance as set forth in Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020) cannot be realized without a true joint operational concept that provides direction and guidance to the individual services. "Unlike anytime before, defense is virtually being inundated with technologies, all vying for attention and funds. By describing in some detail how forces are to be deployed, employed, and sustained, a joint operational concept forms the basis for developing future warfighting capabilities."10 All of the services use a similar concepts-based combat development process that drives Doctrine, Organization, Training, Manpower, ______________________________________________________________________________ 7Andrew Krepinvich, "Emerging Threats, Revolutionary Capabilities and Military Transformation" (Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threat, Washington D.C., March 5, 1999) 8Robert R. Leonhard, The Principals of War in the Information Age (California: Presidio, 1998) 9Paul K. Van Riper, "Operational Concepts in Context", (Unpublished 2000) 6 10Dr Jacques S. Gansler, "Changing Defense", Armed Forces Journal Oct 1999, 20 5 Leadership development, Personnel, and Financial expenditures (DOTMLPF).11 Yet, each of the services currently has its own operational concepts that drive the combat development process. Without a joint operational concept to drive DOTMLPF development and decision-making toward a cohesive joint force capability, neither the intent of GWN nor the vision of Full Spectrum Dominance will be achieved. The road to a Joint Operational Concept A review of the GNA, the impact of Joint Vision 2010/2020, and the development of USJFC's mission to develop a joint operational concept, provides the reader with a historical context from which to analyze the need for a joint operational concept. Congress mandates jointness through legislation The intent of the GNA was to improve the performance of the Armed Forces by synergizing the effects of joint operations while reducing the cost of redundant capabilities. This new kind of jointness requires centralization and integration of organizations, doctrines and command.12 The aim was to coordinate the combat capabilities of the services and allies or coalition partners to achieve the greatest possible military advantage.13 This was to be accomplished through the creation and execution of plans, which maximized the unique capabilities of each of the services. The result was to be synergistic forces of significantly greater joint combat power than if each service had been employed individually against the same enemy. ________________________________ 11The Marine Corps is currently the only Service that does not follow joint doctrine of DOTMLPF. The Marine Corps currently uses Doctrine Organization Training and Education, Equipment, and Supporting establishments (DOTES) to organize their CDP. The Marine Corps has emulated the JROC process by creating the MROC process. 12 Peter J. Roman and David W. Tar, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff: From service Parochialism to Jointness", Political Science Quarterly: New York; Spring 1998, 91 13Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1. Joint Warfighting (Washington D.C., 1999) 6 The law revised and clarified the DOD's operational chain of command and the Joint Chiefs of Staffs' functions and responsibilities to provide for a more efficient use of defense resources.14 The law redefined the roles of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the Service Chiefs, and the CinCs. The role of the Chairman was elevated to that of advisor to the National Command Authority (NCA), with the Joint Staff working directly for the Chairman. The role of the Service Chiefs became more subordinate to that of the Chairman, because he no longer needed consensus from the Service Chiefs in providing advice to the NCA. The Geographic CinCs were given areas of responsibility with a direct link to the NCA. GNA was a mandate from Congress for the services to eliminate redundant capabilities and improve joint warfare capabilities. It is important to note that the individual services maintained the responsibility for training and equipping the forces. This meant that the services still controlled the acquisition and budgeting processes. GNA did not give the Chairman the power to modify the services' Program Objective Memorandum (POM); however, he can recommend changes to the Secretary of Defense. Prior to 1986, no single individual or agency had overall responsibility for joint doctrine. As a result, there was no established process for the identification of critical joint doctrine voids, or procedures for participation by the combatant commands in the development of joint doctrine. Also, no single agency was responsible for ensuring consistency between existing joint doctrine, service doctrine, and multi-service doctrine and combined doctrine. The GNA made the CJCS singularly responsible for “developing doctrine for the joint employment of the Armed Forces.” In turn, this 1986 law generated directives that amplified these new joint doctrine responsibilities given to the Chairman. ________________________ 14 Chiarelli, Peter W. Beyond Goldwater Nichols, Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1993, 71 7 Genesis for change The Gulf War proved that GNA had improved the responsiveness of DOD in meeting the needs of the NCA. The opening nights destruction of Iraq's integrated air defense system highlighted this fact. From the opening shots fired by Army attack helicopters, to the close cooperation of Navy, Marine, and Air Force jammers to mislead Iraqi radar operators, the air capabilities of the four services were closely integrated to achieve synergistic effects. The challenge that now presents itself to American military leaders is how to make the ad hoc nature of the preparations of Desert Shield integral to the "American Way of War."15 Despite the success of the military as a whole and the remarkable performance of the separate services, the intent of GNA to produce a joint force had not materialized. An examination of the operational concept used during the Gulf War showed a lack of the services' ability to operate together to achieve the synergistic effects desired in GNA.'6 Cases of fratricide and the inability to coordinate the timing of the ground offensive are the best examples of the shortfalls that still remained. JV 2010/2020 provides a vision for the development of a Joint Force. As a result of the lessons learned from the Gulf War and in a continuing effort to improve joint warfighting capabilities, the Chairman published Joint Vision 2010 to provide guidance for the future joint force. The vision expressed a desired capability for Full Spectrum Dominance through the attainment of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection.17 ________________________ 15Future Joint Force Working Group. "Future Joint Force", (Institute for Defense Analysis: 2000), 6. 16Chiarelli, Peter W. Beyond Goldwater Nichols. Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1993, 76 17 JV 2010/2020 8 ty Dominant Maneuver periori Ponrecision Engagement n Su vati SpeFcutlrlum o o Dominance ati nn m I or Focused Logistics Inf Full Dimensional Protection The capability sets of JV 2010 have carried over to JV 2020. JV 2020 went further in identifying information as a domain with the new functional areas of information operations and space operations. The impact of information and information technologies on war is still uncertain. As a result, policy-makers and strategists are confronted with a series of critical issues, including whether - and to what extent- information technologies represent simply an additional means to achieve strategic objectives, or actually spur the creation of new missions.18 Information technology, the key enabler to information superiority, was laid out as the critical enabler to attain information superiority. JV 2020 articulated a vision for the future capabilities of a joint force, yet the means and methods for achieving this vision have yet to be articulated. Without a way to match means, "operational capabilities", with ends, "Joint Force", the vision remains superfluous. In order to take the next step in establishing a joint force the CJCS established an organization that would be given the overall responsibility of transforming the current force into a force capable of meeting the vision of JV 2020. USJFC gets the mission to develop a Joint Operational Concept 9