--i ---~-------~--------~' I i UnitedStates Marine'Corps I I CommandandStaffCollege ! . Marine Corps University :: 2076South Street Marine Corps CombatDevelopment Command Quantico Virginia 22134-5068 I . MASTER OFMILITARYSTUDIES I I I TITLE: USMC AVIATION VISION2025 AND THE MISDIRECTION OFAIRBORNE ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUBMITTED INPARTIALFULFILJ\1ENT OFTHEREQUIREMENTS FORTHEDEGREE OF MASTER OFMILITARYSTUDIES AUTHOR: MAJR.M. KUDELKO, Jr. AY08-09 Mentor andOralDefense Co~eMember: _Dr. C.A. SWANSON _ ~~ Approved: , Date: ::;;'" z 7 ~f Z tfle::'9 / omr4l~ Memb:!D~A,---------_ OralDefense C, --~ ak~' ~ Approved: Date: 2.'''7 IJffCl L 20(.)9 ---- -- ~--------~-,-~---~-----'----~-~------------~'--~~-~---,-~---,-----,~-,~~- Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2009 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2009 to 00-00-2009 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER USMC Aviation Vision 2025 and the Misdirection of Airborne Electronic 5b. GRANT NUMBER Warfare 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION United States Marine Corps,Command and Staff College, Marine Corps REPORT NUMBER University,2076 South Street, Marine Corps Combat Development Command,Quantico,VA,22134-5068 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 35 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 (~ ~fl ExecutiveSummary . Title: USMC AviationVision 2025 andthe Misdirection ofAirborneElectronic Warfare. Author: MajorRobertKudelko, UnitedStates Marine Corps Thesis: TheMarine Corps plan to eliminate atactical aircraft dedicatedto the mission of electronic warfare as well as the increasedemphasis onunmanned systems to conductthe EW mission will leave the Mmine Corps significantly unprepm'edto deal with both current and emergingRF threats to MAGTFoperations. Discussion: TheMarine Aviation CampaignPlan is amodernizationprogramthat will eliminate all legacy aircraft andstreamline all tactical aircraft to theF-35 Joint StrikeFighter. Among the aircraftbeing eliminatedis theEA-6B, the nation's only dedicated tactical airborne electronic wm'fm'e aircraft. As areplacement to the EA-6B, the Mmines proposeF-35s andunmanned systems equipped withjammers to fill the needfor airborneEW. This solution does not adequately address the limitations ofthose two systems orthe supportneeds offuture.platforms likethe MV-22 andtheExpeditionaryFighting Vehicle. These new vehicles will allow MAGTF commanders to projectforces farther ashore and operatein an environmentincreasingly vulnerable to enemyradm' guidedthreats. Unmanned systems plannedto"fill EWrequirements do not have the liftcapacity to carryhigh poweredjammers anddo not have the range to operate ashore from sea-basedexpeditionaryvessels. Unmanned systems also have ahigherloss rate than do conventional aircraft, making theirpayloads vulnerable to enemycapture and exploitation. TheMarine Corps needs to re-evaluate theirroad aheadregarding EW requirements in orderto ensure that the capabilitythat they desireis, in fact, the capabilitythat they m'e purchasing. Conclusion: TheMarine Corps of2025 will be capable ofconducting electronic warfare with boththeF-35 andits UASs. Whatit will not have is the speed, flexibility and versatilitythat the Marines have COine to expect from their CUlTent airborne EW platfqrm, the EA-6B, whichis the type ofsystemthat will be needed to supportfuture expeditionary operations. DISCLAIMER THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREINARETHOSE OFTHE INDIVIDUALSTUDENTAUTHOR AND DO NOTNECESSARILYREPRESENTTHE VIEWS OFEITHERTHEMARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTALAGENCY. REFERENCES TO TillS STUDYSHOULD INCLUDETHEFOREGOINGSTATEMENT. QUOTATIONFROM, ABSTRACTIONFROM, ORREPRODUCTION OFALL ORANY· PART OFTillS DOCUMENTIS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENTIS MADE. i Preface This projectis the manifestation ofseveral years offrustration born out ofconstant indecisionregarding thefuture ofaviation electronic warfareintheMarine Corps. As an EW operator, I havebeenwitness to numerous conferences in which the Maline Corps has attempted to layout aroadmap for the future. In most ofthese meetings, the attendees areresigned to the understanding thattbe EA-6B communityis astepchildwithin Maline Aviation andmostEW related decisions are made outside ofhe Marine Corps. The complication lies in thefact that 'Big Navy' often determines the funding/procurement oftactical aircraft and th~ 'National As~et' label attachedto EA-6B's makes us outsiders within our own service. While theMarine Corps enters anew eraofV-22's, EXl?editionaryFighting Vehicles and Joint StrikeFighters, we are not keeping up with ourobligation to protectthose systems. My aircraft, the EA-6B, will retire in 2019 afternearly45 years ofservice andI do not believethatthe Marine Corps is poisedto address the RFthreat when that occurs.. I wouldlike to thankColWakeman andGySgt Gonzalez for the assistance they providedme inmy research. The materials andinsightthey gave me on the Joint StrikeFighterprogram and UnmannedAirborne Sensorprograms were valuable to myresearch. I would also liketo thank the current andprevious directors ofthe MalineAviation Weapons Requirements (EW) division atHeadquarters Marine Corps. Theirtireless dedication to promotingtactical electronic warrare thatis relevant to thefuture Marine Corps is whatinspiredmy decision to write this thesis. ii Table ofContents Page DISCLAIMER : : i PREFACE ii INTRODUCTION 1 PLATFORMSUITABILITY 2 JOINT STRIKEFIGHTER : 3 UNMANNED SYSTEMS 4 MISSIONPAYLOAD 6 SURVNABILITy : : :.:· ~10 " MISSIONREQUIREMENTS ; 11 O'GRADYTRAPMISSIOIN 11 ACEREQUIREMENTS 12 NEW SYSTEMEWLIMITATIONS ~ 14 MV-22 OSPREY..~ : 14 SEABASINGANDEXPEDITIONARYVEHICLES , 16 EWTARGETING 18 CONCLUSION 19 APPENDIX A: FUNCTIONS OFMARINE AVIATION 21 APPENDIXB: AIRFRAMETIMELINE/LIFEEXPECTANCY 22 APPENDIX C: FUNCTIONS OFINFORMATION OPERATIONS · 23 , , APPENDIXD: AIRCRAFTPERFORMANCESPECIFICATIONS ~ 24 APPENDIXE: SIZE COMPARISON CHART 25 APPENDIXE: MEUACE COMPARISON 26 ENDNOTES , 27 BIBLIOGRAPHY 29 ------i () I INTRODUCTION In the summerof2008, Marine,Corps Commandant General James Conwayreleased the publicationMarine Corps Vision & Strategy 2025. The commandant stressedthe pointth~t "MarineAviation will continue to provide sixfunctions to the MAGTF." Those six functions being: assault support, anti air warfare (AAW), offensive airsupport (OAS), control ofaircraft andmissiles, aerial reconnaissance andelectronic warfare (EW). Betweennow and2025, MarineAviation will undergo numerous changes. TheMarineAviationTransition Strategyis' , designed to replace andupgrade everymajor aircraft type in theinventory with next generation capability. Presentlythemediumlifthelicoptercommunityis undergoing the replacementofits fifteen Vietnamera CH-46 helicoptersquadrons with the tilt-rotor MV-22. This transition will becomplete within thenext ten years.* Boththe VSTOL attackjetAV-8B andmulti-roleFA-18 will eventuallybereplaced bytheF-35 Joint StrikeFighter (JSF). The fighter/attack transition to JSFis underway with an initial operational capability (IOC) date of2012 andcompletionby 2024. TheEA-6B Prowler, the world's onlytactical electronic attackjet, will beretiredoutright. TheEA~6B will beginits drawdown in 2016 andberetiredfrom service at the end of2019. When the Prowlerretires, it will markthe endofthe Marine Corps' only dedicated aviation electronic attackplatfor~. The que_stion that must be askedis: when the Prowlerretires, how will MarineAviation countertheradio frequency (RF) threat ofthe future and adequately supporttheMAGTF? That singlequestionis made up ofthree parts: threat, capability, andplatform. Whatis thefuture electronic threat to theMAGTF? WhatEWcapabilitydoes the Marine Corps needin orderto accomplish its mission? What platformis most suitablefor providingthatcapability at and •Attheend of2008,fourCH-46squadrons had completedtransition to MV-22. 1 --- --------------------- -----~----------------------- --_._-.--_._-_._._-----~_.-~---_.---~----_.-.---- ---_".._------------_.....-~ beyond2025? Optimally, the aJ.1swers to the first two questions drive the third._Unfortunately.. in the complex andbudget driven world ofweapons procurement, developmentis not always so linear. Circumstances likethis have helpedto shapethe Marines' aviation transition strategy, and this paperwillinvestigateplatform suitability as thefirst topic. Fromthere I will discuss areas whereMarinemissions will likelybein need ofEWcapabilities. Finally, I will coverthe limitedcapabilities Marine airhas in countelingthe RF threat. PLATFORMSUITABILITY Whatform must anEWplatformcomeinto suppOlithe MAGTFcommander? The Vision 2025 documentis heavily laden with an expeditionary theme. The future Marine Corps, "willbe increasinglyreliant onnaval deployment ... leanerin equipment, versatilein capabilities, andinnovativeinmindset."l The transformation ofMarine air will provideitwith "greaterrange, speed and agility" andthe associated technology will be "drivingnew concepts of operation to the MAGTF."z Unmanned systems are specifically chargedwith "enhance[ing] and extend[ing] the lethal andnon lethal capability ofthe MAGTF.,,3 These statements, along with the Tactical AircraftIntegration Plan and eventual Joint StrikeFightertransition give apretty goodguidance as to the desired shape ofthings to come. Thefuture ofMarine aviationis streamlined, multi-functional, andexpeditionary. Despite all ofits strengths, theEA-6Bs majorfault is its limited availability (quantity) an4its lackofatrue expeditionary capability. Prowlers cannot deploy aboard amphibious shippinglikethe STOVL capableAV-8B. The vmiousjammingpods necessaryfor different missionrequirements give theProwler alarge logistic foot print. TheProwlerwas never 2 manufacturedinsignificantnumbers to meet the high sortierates necessary to support sustained ground operations.* Finally, the limitednumbers ofaircraftneeded to fill high prioritymissions oftenresults in tasking originating above theMAGTFcommanders level. This tasking often results in theMAGTFcommanderhaving to appeal to aJoint or CombinedForces Air Component Commander (J/CFACC) in orderto source any aviationEW. This situationis frequently referredto as "low density, high demand." Any new platform wouldideallybe accessible to aMEUlevel commanderandideally wouldbecapable ofoperatingfrom a ship within the Amphibious Strike Group. Meetingtheserequirements while still complying with the Commandant's aviation campaign planimplies that the electronic warfare capabilitywill have to reside among multiple types ofaircraft. In 2025, those platforms will beUnmannedSystems, FixedWing (F-35, KC-130J), andTilt/RotaryWing (V-22, AH-l, CH-53). JOINT STRIKEFIGHTER Themost abundant ofthese platforms will be the F-35B. Thisis the VSTOLvariant of the JointStrikeFighter. TheMarine Corps plans on purchasing overthree-hundredofthese , aircraftbyFY2023. Itis certainlypossible that the Joint StrikeFighterwill be capable offilling some ofthe more traditional mission sets that the Prowleronceprovided. Originally designed as acoldwar weapon, the Prowlermission was focused on suppressing Sovietstyle enemy air defense networks. TheProwlerfacilitated otherstrike aircraftin attacking targets deep behind. enemylines. TheF-35, havingboth low observable characteristics and apowerfuljamming capability will enableitto penetrate enemy defenses withoutexternal support. Overthe years however, the Prowlermission has expanded greatly to include extensive communications EA-6Bsarecurrentlyflyingbetweentwo andfivetimestheirprogrammed utilization ratesinsupportof operationsin Iraq andAfghanistan. 3 jamming, force protectionmissions, andotherdimensions within Information Operationssuch as Psychological Operations (see App C). Itis in these newermission sets that aviation electronic warfare has madeitselfnotjustvaluableto the groundcombatelementbut a sought after capability. Thenature ofwarfare has evolvedto the point where the MAGTFcommanderwants EWcoverage in direct,support ofhis ground scheme ofmaneuverjustas much as he wants artillery andclose airsupport. Thatdemandis drawing attention awayfrom the air andcoastal defense threats'andtowards the low tech, groundOliented devices that we are encounteringin Iraq and Afghanistan today. TheMaline Corps proposal to make airborneEW more access able to more Marines on the groundis through the use ofnumerous unmanned systems. UNMANNED VEHICLES a Marine Corps Unmanned Aerial Systems conceptofemploymentis structuredin three tiersystem, each coinciding with the level ofcommandthey support. TierIis considered a battalion level orbelow asset, TierIIis adivision, regiment, battalion, orMEVasset. TierIIIis 4 assigned to the JointTaskForce/MAGTFcommander. TheTierI systemfor the Marine Corps is theDragon-Eye with an eventual'upgradeto the Raven-B. Problems observedwith these smallersystems are their susceptibilityto weather, windand turbulence. Furthermore, sensor quality'suffers because these smaller airframes al'e more sensitive to vibrations and al"e more vulnerable to gusting winds andenvironmentals noted above. Vibration andinstability are poorcharacteristics ofan EW platform. A_stableplatfollI).is neededfor accurateradio frequency (RF) directionfinding (DF) associated withElectronic Walfare Supportmissions as well as arequirementforjammersteering stabilization conducting Electronic Attackmissions. 4