Power Projection and the Challenges of Regionalism GORDON R. SULLIVAN W ith the end of the Cold War, America faces a different world, one that from a political, military, and economic perspective is far more com plex. The interests of the United States have never been more global, more interdependent with those of other nations and peoples, and there are risks to these interests throughout the world. Where America's relationships with the various regions of the world were once subordinated to and conditioned by the superpower confrontation with the Soviet Union, the regions are now becoming important actors in their own right. Within these regions, it might be added, certain countries are emerging as centers of estimable military power. These developments-which I will refer to as regionalism-are chang ing the power relationships between the United States and the rest of the world. Such ferment is not necessarily bad. For states or groups of states to pursue their national interests within the norms of accepted international behavior is to be welcomed and encouraged. On the other hand, the rise of hostile powers that could dominate various regions would be an unwelcome development so far as America's interests are concerned. America's post-Cold War national military strategy recognizes the evolving power relationships within this new geostrategic environment. The elements of the strategy-strategic deterrence and defense (maintenance of a sizable nuclear and conventional stateside reserve), forward presence (dis criminate overseas representation as opposed to large standing deployments), crisis response (appropriate reaction in any exigency), and reconstitution (mo bilization in the face of a global threat)-address the need for a broad, flexible capability to answer not only expected threats but those presently unforeseen. This national military strategy is creating demands for a new kind of United States Army. It requires something far different than simply a down sized version of the Army that snccessfully deterred Soviet aggression. Since 2 Parameters Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 1993 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1993 to 00-00-1993 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Power Projection and the Challenges of Regionalism 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION U.S. Army War College,ATTN: Parameters ,122 Forbes Avenue REPORT NUMBER ,Carlisle,PA,17013-5238 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 14 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 Vietnam we have made the Army the best land combat force in the world, and we can be proud of that accomplishment. Certainly that force serves as a superb foundation for shaping the Army of the future. But change we must. The particular conditions we find in the world today require us to make specific adjustments in roles and missions, force structure, training and leader development, and doctrine. In this article I shall give my perspective of the challenges that regionalism poses for our nation's security strategy and the capabilities required by the Army in support of that strategy. These capabilities address the full range of military endeavor-from operations other than war (nation assistance, counterdrug, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, disaster re lief, anti-terrorism, counterinsurgency, domestic assistance, etc.) to actual war in all its phases (mobilization, deployment, operations, conflict termina tion, etc.). It shonld be noted that domestic assistance, where the armed forces are used to service the civilian sector, is a traditional mission going back to the early days of the republic when soldier Zebulon Pike explored the West, and to the early days of this century when soldier George Washington Goeth als built the Panama Canal. The Army's main focus must remain on fighting and winning the nation's wars, that is true. But in the new environment there is a growing role for our military in peacetime security activities that will go a long way toward precluding hostilities or bringing about their rapid and decisive conclusion if they cannot be prevented. The Challenges of Regionalism Since taking up my duties as Army Chief of Staff in the summer of 1991, I have traveled to virtually all the far-flung theaters and regions of the world, and I've been amazed at the degree of change-political, economic, and social-that has been wrought in these two short years. This is especially true in Europe, where I spent a good portion of my early career and am able to gauge personally the rapidity of developments. The struggle to establish new govern ments and adapt to democracy in Eastern Europe has been accompanied by the reemergence of traditional ethnic and religious animosities. Accompanying this General Gordon R. Sullivan is Chief of Staff of the Army. He received a B.A. in history from Norwich University in 1959 and wa.<; commissioned in the armor through ROTC. He also has an M.A. in political science from the University of New Hampshire and is a graduate of the Army War College, He served two tours in Vietnam. in 1962~63 as an advisor with the Vietnamese 21st Infantry Division and as a MACV intelligence officer, and in 1969~70 with I Field Force Headquarters. General Sullivan also served a tour in Korea and four tours in Germany. He commanded the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Ft. Riley, Kansas, and was the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. Prior to taking up his present position in June 1991, he was Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. Summer 1993 3 political and cultural unrest has been enormous economic dislocation. With the artificial glue provided by the Warsaw Pact now suddenly dissolved, states of the region are free to express their own intrinsic individuality and historical imperatives. Not surprisingly, intense competition in matters of economic and geographic security is resulting. Democracy is also trying to take hold outside of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where a similar pattern of age-old animosities and competition is producing conflict as well. There is the obvious example of Somalia, where government has collapsed and gang violence and survival politics are the rule of the day. There are others, like Peru, Lebanon, and Afghanistan, where, though government is intact, the growth of democratic institutions faces staggering challenges nonetheless. The Cold War order of nations is thus disintegrating and assuming new forms. This new order and the changed relations between countries engendered thereby call for a rethink ing of vital US interests and how we can best exert influence to further those interests. But we must be careful as we forge ahead. We do not know whether the trends we see today will continue. We simply cannot predict the ultimate course of the winds of change nor can our uniquely tolerant American view of human intercourse easily fathom the bewildering ferocity and complexity of ethnic and religious conflict. Our euphoria over the triumph of democracy in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has been tempered by the realities of Yugoslavia and the emergence of fascist nationalist organizations and political parties. Our policies and actions must thus be tempered by a high degree of contingency and prudence. We cannot wish away historical enmities or naively assume they will not resurface. Neither can we assume that military intervention will neces sarily lead to the peace and stability we seek. Unfortunately, relations between regional actors will not always be governed by the rationality of a common reverence for democracy. Rather, the struggle for regional ascendancy, de fined in terms of political, ethnic, religious, economic, and military factors, will often be the dominant imperative. While these developments may seem quite removed from us today, the close interdependence of events everywhere means that such developments can pose significant danger to America's regional interests and to the broader interests of world peace and stability. However, we also must accept the fact that, in some instances, our ability to influence regional events through military power may be frustratingly limited. To add to our concerns, there is the increasing international aware ness of "environmental" problems. Under this rubric are such issues as disease control, industrial pollution, wildlife and plant extinctions, and global warm ing. While each of these may affect a given country disproportionately, most are transnational in character. Many countries, including the United States, 4 Parameters are beginning to understand that environmental problems are security threats just as much as hostile armed states or organizations, which further compli cates the national security equation. Confronted with this evolving regionalism, the United States Army is energetically reexamining the way it does business in the various regions of the world and will be ready to respond when the nation calls. In this context, let me share some of my thoughts on each of the major regions. Europe and the Former Soviet Union With the end of the Cold War, there is a great temptation to conclude that the requirement to keep forces in Europe no longer exists. After all, the threat of a ground invasion of Western Europe by a rejuvenated Warsaw Pact or even a residual threat from Russia or the Commonwealth of Independent States is .now a distinct improbability. However, the very developments that have caused some to favor a removal of US forces from Europe may make the most compelling argument for their retention there. As we have seen, the shattering of the rigid framework of the Soviet Empire has created a potentially dangerous instability. For example, consider the disagreement between Ukraine and Russia over control and disposition of nuclear weapons stored on Ukrainian territory. Given the problematic control of those strategic nuclear weapons, it is vital to the security interests of the United States that strong democratic governments emerge in these areas. Additionally, the ethnic and religious tensions that have turned to bloody and tragic violence in Yugoslavia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and other areas continue to be dangerously unsettling factors. Throughout this transition, the nations in the region have been seeking varying degrees of contact with the West. In many instances, military-to military contact has provided the first tangible interaction. The stability and security represented by the West on a political and economic level are of course epitomized by NATO. Not surprisingly, many of the nations in this region have expressed interest in becoming members of NATO or of some future pan European security organization. Today Russian and other Eastern European officers participate in exchanges with the US Army War College and the Army's Command and General Staff College. The US Army Russian Institute is being expanded into the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, which will focus on strengthening civil-military relations in the former Warsaw Pact countries. We are helping them learn not only what it means for an army to be responsible to democratic institutions in a free society, but more important what it means to be democracy's guardian. US forces, as the linchpin of NATO, are essential for providing stability and continuity as the Atlantic community transitions to a new security framework. NATO provides an anchor of stability and security as the various Summer 1993 5 members of the new Europe sort out what their security relationships will be. As the sole remaining superpower, the United States provides a degree of escalation control and deterrence simply by maintaining a credible force in Europe. Nevertheless, we have to recognize that the forces at work in the wake of the Cold War are causing fundamental alliance realignments. The commencement of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council on 20 December 1991 provides a good example. Under the aegis of NATO, the council gives formal structure to the growing links between the Western alliance and the former Soviet bloc, including the three Baltic states. Further, the Western European Union, possibly expanded from its present membership of nine states, will figure importantly in the emergence of a new European security order, one likely role being to serve as a link between NATO and the European Union. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, though unwieldy by virtue of having 51 member states, promises to continue develop ment of its peace-maintenance roles. Southwest Asia America's involvement with the Middle East has been a key aspect of our foreign policy for almost 50 years, and the Persian Gulf War has given an added dimension to that policy. Moreover, the spinoff effects-resurrection of the Arab-Israeli peace talks; military training and prepositioning of equipment in Kuwait; humanitarian assistance/protection operations; monitoring Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions; and the resurgence of Iran-will continue to dictate some level of American military presence in the region. The changing power relationships in the region and the pressures for increased democracy and civil rights create a less stable environment than we would prefer. The Middle East well illustrates the global reverberations of regional issues-in this case, energy and religion. The action of Islamic states in the former Soviet Union may be influenced by the militant Islamic fundamen talism of Iran. At the same time, Islamic but non-Arab Turkey, a member of NATO, is bordered by Islamic states that are either unfriendly or unstable. The vexing Kurdish issue continues to plague the Tnrks in their southeastern provinces. Economically, the region will remain of great importance to other regions of the world-particularly the West-because of their dependence on its energy resources. India/Pakistan Next to the changing geostrategic environment in Europe, the situa tion in the Asian subcontinent is probably the most typical of the challenges that regional developments will present to the United States. Pakistan, having 6 Parameters common borders with Iran, Afghanistan, and India, and proximity to the Central Asian Republics of the former Soviet Union, is a key state in the region. Its conflict with India over Kashmir, while not resulting in major fighting in recent years, remains a source of tension. Though Pakistan has been a long-time US ally, we have discontinued military aid because of congressional concerns about Pakistan's military nuclear program. India's burgeoning popUlation, which threatens to surpass that of China in the near future, is a diverse mix of races and religions creating severe internal strains. National fragmentation along ethnic and religious lines is an explosive trend in a nation such as India, despite its relative commitment to pluralistic democracy-witness, for example, the Hindu-Sikh violence involv ing riots and destruction of mosques and temples, the recent fundamentalist Hindu demonstrations in New Delhi, and the wave of deadly bombings. More over, India's size, resources, and increasing ability to project military power in the Indian Ocean are creating apprehension among its neighbors. Our concern in the region is compounded by the question of nuclear proliferation, particular ly in the case of India and Pakistan, which is likely to continue to constrain our interaction and influence at the military level. Pacific Rim/Southeast Asia Because of North Korea's continued militancy and its repeated refusals to cooperate on nuclear weapons inspections, Northwest Asia is one region in the world where we face a significant threat to peace. While there has been some progress in improving bilateral relations between the two Koreas, it remains to be seen what North Korea's real objectives are, since it refuses to take the most elementary steps to reduce military tensions. In fact, North Korea's declaration of intent to withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty was a dangerous step in the opposite direction. It is unreasonable to assume that any meaningful moves toward disarmament will occur before the resolution of the leadership succes sion in North Korea. Consequently, the United States must retain a significant ground combat capability on the Korean peninsula. China retains the potential to become the dominant regional actor in military, economic, and diplomatic terms. The Chinese face significant internal pressures for change while at the same time confronting discomfiting political ferment along its borders-everything from the radical devolution of inde pendence upon the republics of the former Soviet Union to the more measured, yet no less historic, progress toward assimilation of Hong Kong. Moreover, despite some overtures with Taiwan, the prospects for reconciliation or affilia tion remain distant at best. Equally unclear is the shape of Japan's defense policy in the years ahead. Japan has taken the first fledgling steps in Cambodia to involve its military forces in international peacekeeping activities. While it is far too Summer 1993 7 early to make much of this, it is demonstrative of the types of changes that are beginning to dot the strategic landscape in the region. However, just as in Europe, we cannot let the appearance of normalcy in this area overshadow the very real historical quarrels and mistrust existing among the three major competing regional actors-China, Korea, and Japan. Southeast Asia is a hodgepodge of the old, the new, and question marks. Our relations with Australia, New Zealand, and Thailand will probably change little over the next few years. We have positive new relationships evolving with Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. As we consider our strat egy of power projection and coalition operations, these nations could playa significant role. At the same time, despite our long-standing good relations with the Philippines, the figurative winds of change-helped along by a literal volcano-have made our future connection with that developing country somewhat problematic. Immediately to the west, we are expanding diplomatic and economic ties with Vietnam. Finally, in another instance of how our military is responding more and more to the world's trouble spots under the umbrella of the UN and other international organizations, we are contributing modestly to United Nations peacekeeping operations in Cambodia. Africa The African continent is the setting for what is potentially the greatest tragedy facing the world community. Daily we are engulfed by media images of emaciated populations living in unimaginable misery. Such condi tions prompt calls for multinational-or, failing that, unilateral-military action to ensure safe havens for populations and relief workers, and to create an environment in which the restoration of normal political intercourse can occur. Somalia provides a graphic example. Elsewhere, equally tragic, though less visible, events are unfolding. Ecological disaster resulting from natural and man-induced factors looms on a scale that may become irreversible. The refugee problem has reached almost unmanageable proportions and threatens political stability in some countries. By various estimates, there may already be ten million children in Africa orphaned because of war, famine, and disease. AIDS is a catastrophe of unprecedented proportions in Africa. In some countries there, the population between the ages of 20 and 40 is being decimated by the disease. With only children and old people left, African society could take decades to recover. In the interim, it would probably fall farther and farther behind the industrialized societies and even other Third World regions. This widening gap, exacerbated by low education levels, will create the climate for instability and revolution in which democracy will have great difficulty taking hold. Whether in a humanitarian role or in response to revolutionary violence, international military action will increasingly become 8 Parameters Soldiers of the 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, man their M-60 machine gun during a combined US-Canadian assault to seize the Belet Uen airfield in Somalia, part of Operation Restore Hope. the remedy of choice. However, even with the demonstrated ability of the military to provide solutions where all else fails, the magnitude of the crises may well exceed our capacity to mitigate them. Latin America Closer to home. the prospects are somewhat brighter. The trend toward democracy remains strong but must overcome two major roadblocks: economic disparity and narco-terrorism. We are already deeply involved in addressing the latter. New trade agreements such as that among the United States, Canada, and Mexico signal the effort of Western Hemisphere countries to generate a widen ing economic prosperity that will undercut the monetary lure offered by the drug traffickers and strengthen democracy at the same time. It will be in our interest to enhance the internal security of nations in this region to combat the threat posed by revolutionaries and drug cartels, but we must do so in conjunction with a broader strategy that fosters the emergence of democratic institutions over the longer term. In most countries of this regiou, national armies have undergone remarkable changes, becoming far more positive forces in society than in the past. The US Army through its army-to-army contacts is proud of its contribu tion to that evolution. Summer 1993 9 Implications for the Army From the foregoing regional survey, three important implications for the Army emerge. First, the result of such wholesale political metamorphoses may well be a change in the way we define regions. The traditional geo strategic approach is already beginning to give way to groupings of nations based upon other considerations such as economic, trade, or technological ties. One such organization, for example, is the Group of 7 (G-7), composed of the seven major non-communist economic powers from around the entire globe. Another is the European Economic Community. Along with the re alignment will come new power relationships that could present significant challenges to American interests. The ultimate configuration of the evolving security, political, and economic organizations among nations is impossible to foretell, but as the Cold War dichotomy disintegrates and old national antagonisms wane, the resulting realignments will certainly present new problems-and new opportunities-to US security planners. These factors provide the broad framework for determining the Army's role in meeting the problems posed by post-Cold War regionalism. Second, each region of the world has specific requirements and chal lenges that will condition our training and preparation. We cannot hope to project power successfully into a region of the world that we do not know or for which we have not adequately prepared. We are confident, however, that we understand the nature of the challenges and their complexity and that we are trained and organized to accomplish our mission in concert with the other services. The main reason for this confidence is that we have a generation of leaders who are committed to our nation and its values, and who have the skills to adjust quickly to a rapidly changing and uncertain world. The Army is more than military forces. It is an institution that understands the dynamics of national power and the ultimate importance of projecting not only force but ideals. Third, the shift to regionalism dictates that the United States have a trained and ready power-projection Army to execute the national military strategy in support of America's domestic and global interests. The Army prepares itself to respond to crises through hard readiness training and by conducting a variety of overseas exercises and operations. The Army's capa bility to generate power derives from its composition as a Total Force, that is, an integrated structure incorporating all components-active, Reserve, National Guard, and civilian. Such a force is trained and ready, serving the nation at home and abroad, and capable of decisive victory. The American people have every right to expect the Army to respond successfully to whatever missions are assigned-missions that are becoming increasingly difficult to forecast. To be successful in the post-Cold War world, the United States must be capable of applying its power directly at the scene of the. problem. The complementary capabilities of all the military services provide a degree of 10 Parameters