U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency •ahV Winter 2009 Peace Is Our Profess* The U.S. Air Force during the Cold War Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: Aligning Capabilities with National Strategy Towards a New A History of Chemical Deterrence Warfare Part II The Zero Hour Silver Bullets for Peace in the Middle East Opportunities for Higher Education in Nuclear Engineering at the University of Maryland Inside the Journal Combating WMD History 3 Countering Weapons of Mass Destruc- 24 Peace is Our Profession, The U.S. Air Force tion: Aligning Capabilities with National during the Cold War Strategy By CW5 Stephen A. Gomes By Mr. Al Mauroni 30 Chemical Warfare: Part II 9 Just When We Thought the Hard Part Was Over By Mr. A. Mark Diglio By LTC Andrae Brooks 37 USANCA Officially Opens New Headquarters Lawrence E. Boeing Toward a New Deterrent Analysis and By Mr. Paul Bello, Fort Belvoir Eagle Staff Writer, Ms. Marny Malin, Fort Belvoir Eagle Staff Photogra- Recommendations for the Commission on the pher Strategic Posture of the United States By The New Deterrent Working Group, Book Review Introduction by VADM Robert R. Monroe Science and Technology 38 Code Name: Downfall By Lt Vern Conaway, USAF 18 The Zero Hour - Silver Bullets for Peace in the Middle East Wing Attack Plan R cover sheet idea courtesy of Stanly Kubrick's movie, By MAJ Todd Hathaway "Dr. Strangelove: or, How I learned to stop worrying and love the bomb" 22 Opportunities for Higher Education in Nuclear Engineering at the University of Maryland COLUMNS From The Director 1 CWMD Planning By Mr. Peter Bechtel 36 International CBRN Standardization in NATO (Non-Medical) By Mr. Frank R. Jordan Do You Know... 1 6 Medical Microbots Are Nearer Than You Think? By Mr. Robert Pfeffer Combating WMD £ 40 Combating Resource Page v WMD Resources Disclaimer: Combating WMD Journal is published semi-annually by the United States Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency (USANCA). The views expressed are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense (DOD) or its elements. Com- bating WMD Journal's content does not necessarily reflect the US Army's position and does not supersede information in other official Army publications. Distribution: US Army organizations and activities with CBRN-related missions, to include all combat and materiel developers and units with chemical and nuclear Published by the surety programs, to each FA52 officer, and to Army attaches. The Secretary of United States Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the (USANCA) transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department. Use of funds for printing this publication was approved by HQ, TRADOC, 12 Nov 98, IAW Army Regulation 25-30. Director Mr. Peter Bechtel Article Submission: We welcome articles from all US Government agencies and academia involved with CBRN matters. Articles are reviewed and must be ap- proved by the Combating WMD Journal Editorial Board prior to publication. Sub- Managing Editor mit articles in Microsoft Word and include photographs, graphs, tables, etc. as CW5 Stephen A. Gomes separate files, please call or email us for complete details. The editor retains the right to edit and select which submissions to print. Editorial Board Mr. Mark W. Fishback, Mr. Joseph Nellis, Mailing Address: Director, US Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency ATTN: MONA-CWO, Suite 101, Springfield, VA 22150-3198. and MAJ Joseph Beckman Telephone: 703-806-7858, DSN 656-7858, Fax 703-806-7900 Design/Layout CW5 Stephen A. Gomes Electronic Mail: [email protected] Subject line: ATTN: Editor, CWMD Journal Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. FROM THE DIRECTOR CWMD Planning Mr. Peter Bechtel, Director U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency Army Service Component Command (ASCC) enlist the operational tenets of land warfare. This is where USANCA excels as a Field Operating Agency (FOA); we have explored several planning models with the ASCCs and standing US Field Armies in an en- deavor to develop tailored, well coordinated, and executa- ble CWMD campaign support plans. There are several key areas where USANCA influences or directly supports ASCC activities as illustrated by figure 1. Under AR 10- 16, USANCA is able to field two unique capabilities to ac- complish the nuclear and CWMD mission. The first such capability is the CWMD Planning Assistance Team (CPAT); the second is the Nuclear Employment Assis- tance Team (NEAT). As the CPAT name implies, it is de- signed to provide technical expertise across the opera- tional and tactical spectrum of CWMD to ASCC staffs. We have already experienced a great deal of success partici- pating in the USFK and USARCENT planning efforts. At th present, USANCA teams are poised to assist 8 US Army, USARPAC, and USARAF. In the next twelve to eighteen months, the weight of USANCA will lend doctrinal fidelity and operational depth to all ASCC planning efforts. Mr. Peter Bechtel Culminating our engagement activities for fiscal-year Director th 2009 was the 4 Annual Army Combating Weapons of U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency Mass Destruction Conference held at our new facility on Fort Belvoir from 15-17 September 2009. The purpose of Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) re- the Army CWMD conference was to provide a forum for cently completed the Joint Planning and Execution dialogue across the Army CWMD community to address Community (JPEC) review process for their re- key Army CWMD issues. There were 78 attendees at the spective Combating WMD (CWMD) campaign plans. This conference including representatives from all of the Army process sought to align the aforementioned plans with Service Component Commands (ASCCs), the Joint Staff, various national-level strategies and strategic guidance the Army Staff, Defense Threat Reduction Agency th documents (e.g., Guidance for the Employment of the (DTRA), 20 SUPCOM, TRADOC, FORSCOM, Army Ma- Force). As a result, each GCC CWMD campaign plan em- terial Command (AMC), Office of the Secretary of Defense braces an operational design that provides a common (OSD), Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG), Edgewood planning framework for CWMD across geographic Chemical Biological Center (ECBC), Defense Intelligence boundaries and global commons. However, the rather Agency (DIA), National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) broad end states and strategic objectives found within and USANCA. ASCCs were the main focus of the confer- theater-level campaign plans often presents challenges for ence. Our goal was to identify and address key CWMD the Army when viewed through the lens of full spectrum planning issues and capability gaps affecting the Army's operations (FSO) and when implemented through the ele- ability to support Geographic and Sub-Unified Command ments of ground combat power (e.g., movement and ma- plans for CWMD. The high level of participation allowed neuver, intelligence, fires, etc.). Operational granularity us to identify a number of issues that have the potential to remains paramount to Land Component Commanders significantly improve the ASCCs' planning and support (LCCs) as they will bear the brunt of CWMD execution. efforts. Therefore, it is imperative that CWMD planning at the 1 Combating WMD Journal Issue 4 National i Military Strategy USAREUR 8.7thUS Army ARCENT (3rd US Army) USARPAC IARNORTH |(5thUS Army) Figure 1. USANCA Planning Support. This is only the start for the annual process. The Army derstanding of nuclear weapons effects and nuclear tar- Council for CWMD (ACCWMD) is the mechanism for con- geting, NEAT personnel also provide support to the De- tinuing deliberations and consultations. The ACCWMD fense Threat Reduction University in presenting the Thea- using three distinct working groups will cover Policy; Plans ter Nuclear Operations Course. and Operations; and Capabilities, will meet on a regular basis as a mechanism for exchanging information and Providing CWMD and nuclear targeting expertise and addressing issues. As the various ASCC CWMD plans support to the Army is a mission essential task for garner fidelity, those mature plans should assist with in- USANCA. USANCA planners are engaged in the CWMD forming nascent planning efforts. USANCA is postured to planning process; we have enjoyed the privilege of assist- assist this linkage, and to advocate for resources within ing in the development of GCC CWMD plans throughout the Army Staff, TRADOC, and FORSCOM. the JPEC review process; taken requests for follow-on technical and planning support; stand ready to assist Finally, USANCA maintains the capability to employ ASCCs and JFLCCs in planning, coordinating and execut- Nuclear Employment Augmentation Teams (NEAT). ing their CWMD missions. NEAT provides offensive nuclear planning support to aug- ment ASCC and LCC staffs in support of training, plan- ning, exercises, and operations. This includes providing V analysis of consequences of execution and, most impor- tantly, the potential impact of planned nuclear strikes on maneuver operations. USANCA coordinates with and supports U.S. Strategic Command Center for combating WMD, DTRA and other Joint and Service staffs in main- taining an ability to compute, coordinate, nuclear weapons safety, effects, target coverage data, and target analysis procedures for all nuclear weapons of all U.S. Services and NATO. Because of these relationships and their un- Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 2 COMBATING WMD Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: Aligning Capabilities with National Strategy Mr. Al Mauroni Senior Defense Consultant The views expressed are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense (DOD) or its elements. Combating WMD Journal's content does not necessarily reflect the US Army's position and does not supersede information in other official Army publications At a past conference at the "other priorities." • Improve knowledge of National Defense University, I and capabilities for nuclear made a comment about the There is no clearer example of this warfare and operations in nebulous nature of the term doctrinal dyslexia than how combat- chemical, biological, radiologi- "weapons of mass destruction" or ing WMD is portrayed in the Universal cal and nuclear environments. WMDs. I suggested that our ability to Joint Task List. Consistently over the • Renew emphasis on and develop and evaluate distinct con- past seven years, there has been no understanding of strategic de- cepts and capabilities to counter visible, organized attempt to identify terrence, including nuclear de- WMD threats was impaired by the the WMD tasks associated with com- terrence. deliberate avoidance of using direct, bating terrorism and homeland de- clear terms that address homeland fense/civil support tasks as distinct The National Military Strategy to security requirements distinct from from those faced by military forces Combat WMD parrots the National warfighter requirements. People use facing a nation-state adversary. In- Strategy to Combat WMD in its con- the term "WMD" when they are stead, they are all consolidated under cept and terms. Both purport to iden- clearly only interested in addressing the topic of "combating WMD," which tify a "nexus" between international nuclear weapons, for instance. A primarily addresses the protection of terrorist organizations and nation- member of the audience waved me US military forces during conventional state WMD programs, without clearly off. "We know what we mean when operations. Instead of recognizing defining the differences between we say 'WMD,'" he said. At the break, that these are distinct concepts, it homeland security and warfighting a man from the State Department became easier to just move all WMD concepts. The Deterrence Operations approached me. "Definitional clarity is tasks into one basket. This threat- Joint Operational Concept (JOC) and the beginning of all wisdom," he said. based approach to viewing complex, the Combating WMD Joint Integrating Currently, we lack that definitional strategic unconventional warfare Concept (JIC) discuss nuclear weap- clarity. weakens our understanding of this ons and WMD issues (respectively), important topic. As a result, the mili- but these concepts are stove piped The U.S. Joint Forces Command tary community has struggled - and and not integrated into the main- failed - to discuss and evaluate the released a document outlining the stream of military operations and "Joint Operating Environment 2008" capabilities of nuclear deterrence and strategy. The few joint publications in December 2008. This document combating WMD within defense pol- specifically addressing WMD issues assures us that the "the threat of icy, the defense budget, and overall are, sadly, a mulligan's stew of tacti- mass destruction - from nuclear, bio- modernization requirements. cally-focused tasks and procedures logical, and chemical weapons - will from the four services, and are not likely expand from stable nation- The issues of employing nuclear focused at the strategic level. states to less stable states and even weapons and protecting military Throughout the Department, discus- forces from WMDs are complex, but sions of conventional or irregular war- non-state networks." The Depart- this should not be an excuse to ig- fare overinflate the threat of WMDs ment of Defense (DOD) "Capstone 2 nore them. In the "Report of the Sec- on the modern battlefield and treat Concept on Joint Operations," re- retary of Defense Task Force on the issue as a "special topic" - a leased in January 2009, touches on DOD Nuclear Weapons Manage- threat that needs to be considered, the need to address the threat of ment," Dr. James Schlesinger ob- but dealt with at the national strategy WMDs in both conventional and ir- served that DOD has not addressed level. Meanwhile, those responsible regular conflicts of the future. Two the capabilities required to execute to address this topic within the Office imperatives that require implementa- nuclear deterrence within the evolving of the Secretary of Defense studi- tion to allow the success of this con- Joint Capability Area (JCA) structure. ously ignore WMD issues in light of cept include the need to: 3 Combating WMD Journal Issue 4 maneuverability to control escalation. tinct, parallel capability area. The JCA framework is an ongoing The creation of the recommended attempt to functionally group DOD Portfolio/JCA for deterrence and capabilities to support capability This is not necessarily a bad thing; fenced funding for nuclear capabilities in fact, the decision ought to be ap- analysis, strategy development, and investment decision-making. would help address these shortfalls in plauded, from an academic point of Schlesinger believed that the ab- view. The military capabilities re- the current process. sence of a "Strategic Deterrence quired to execute strategic deterrence and combating WMD are not sepa- JCA" at the top tier negatively im- There are nine Tier 1 JCAs, 35 pacts the Department's effectiveness rate and unique from those currently Tier 2 JCAs, and 116 Tier 3 JCAs in 4 in addressing modernization of nu- required to execute combat functions the latest framework. The Depart- clear weapons and associated deliv- during conventional and irregular op- ment's intent is to manage the top- ery systems (specific aircraft and sub- erations. Whether the Joint Staff and level JCAs as vetting boards and Services actually view and manage marines). "capability portfolios" during require- strategic deterrence and combating ments development, budget reviews, Important national and DOD-level WMD functions appropriately is an- and policy discussions. During past documents refer to nuclear deter- other story. The Protection Functional reviews of the JCA taxonomy and rence with varying degrees of clarity. Capability Board (FCB) - the groups definitions, there was a discussion as The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Re- that meet to review and vet issues for to whether the capability to "combat view (QDR) states that the nuclear each Tier 1 JCA - reviews all com- WMD" ought to be identified as a dis- deterrent will remain robust as a key- bating WMD mission areas except for crete Tier 1 JCA. The combating stone of U.S. national power. Other offensive operations, which is han- WMD advocates not only lost their policy documents subsume nuclear dled by the Force Applications FCB. argument for a Tier 1 JCA, but also The board does not distinguish home- weapons in the terminology of kinetic the following proposal to see it as a strike or WMD. All make reference to land security capabilities or antiterror- subordinate Tier 2 capability under nuclear deterrence but stress devel- ism programs as distinct from those the Protection JCA. Instead, the eight oping additional, nonnuclear capabili- required for military combat opera- mission areas identified within the ties to increase the number of options tions. As Dr. Schlesinger notes, there National Military Strategy to Combat available to the President. Most of the is no clear pathway for strategic de- WMD are addressed in three Tier 1 documents deal with the strategic terrence capabilities. The current JCA JCAs - offensive operations under aspects of force employment. This taxonomy does not allow the Depart- "Force Application;" threat reduction results in deterrence capabilities be- ment to make serious reviews as to cooperation and security cooperation ing taken for granted. Recent history aligning resources against required and partner activities under "Building has demonstrated that without ade- capabilities to counter WMD. Partnerships;" and WMD interdiction, quate policy articulation and oversight WMD elimination, active defense, by the DOD, the military services will Assessing Capabilities to Counter passive defense, and consequence not be motivated to sustain the nu- WMD management under "Protection." ° In clear deterrent—and will use the re- Perhaps the greatest challenge in addition, the capabilities of situational sources elsewhere. assessing DOD capabilities to com- awareness of the presence and bat WMD or to effect strategic deter- movement of WMD technology and As opposed to force employment ca- rence is the poor development of material and WMD attribution are ad- pabilities, in recent years the military these concepts in light of current op- dressed under "Battlespace Aware- has tended to discount the political erational and strategic concepts of ,, 6 ness. and psychological element of deter- warfare. It is difficult to clearly articu- rence and focus exclusively on late what military capabilities are re- Similarly, strategic deterrence is whether there were sufficient weap- quired for combating WMD when its currently addressed by capabilities ons to threaten or attack a set of tar- "Joint Integrating Concept" is incoher- identified under Force Application, gets. Such a criterion, employed by ent and too broadly based. Consider Building Partnerships, and Protection. some in the military for deciding that document's stated end, ways and It may be true that the Department whether a weapon system is means to combat WMD: has not actively addressed the ele- "militarily cost-effective," misses the ments of strategic deterrence under crucial point of whether the weapon • End: The United States, its the JCA taxonomy or developed a system can contribute to overall de- Armed Forces, allies, partners, modernization plan based upon the terrence. This concept is important for and interests are neither co- new JCA taxonomy. However, the the deterrence umbrella, because erced nor attacked with WMD. Department has made the decision different capabilities provide different that both strategic deterrence and levels of deterrence, assurance, or • Ways: The Joint Force combating WMD, while important dissuasion depending on the potential Commander (JFC), in support of concepts, are executed through the adversary or ally and its individual globally integrated Unified Ac- application of particular capabilities psychology. The same principle also tion, will conduct a campaign to that also address conventional war- holds true for the dissuasion of adver- proactively and comprehen- fare concepts, rather than as a dis- saries and provides greater political sively dissuade, defeat, deter, or Combating WMD Journal Issue 4 4 mitigate the rogue behavior of Faulty assumptions of the current Because of this ambiguity in the multiple networks of state and and future WMD threat; to wit: National Military Strategy, material non-state actors. The JFC fo- projects developed to address the cuses the military campaign * That state pursuit of WMD armed forces' requirements are com- against the decision-making will continue and the num- peting with those projects designed calculus of the WMD actor. The ber of WMD-capable states for homeland security functions (e.g., JFC will influence this decision- opposed to US interests will chemical and biological detectors making calculus through selec- grow (they have actually designed for combat operations and tive application of military capa- declined over the past three the equipment used by the WMD Civil bilities against an expanded decades). Support Teams). Proposed concepts operational environment to im- for combating terrorist WMD efforts, pose costs or deny benefits or * That state support of ter- such as improving information, sur- to influence the perception of rorists' pursuit of WMDs will veillance, and reconnaissance capa- costs, benefits, and value of continue (no such activity bilities to identify the flow of WMD restraint for any WMD-related by any distinct group has materials and technologies, are con- course of action. actually been noted or re- fused with pandemic flu surveillance ported). concepts. The deliberate ambiguity in the national strategy, with its focus on • Means: Fully integrated US * That those terrorists a specific threat, has weakened the Armed Forces capabilities linked "inclined towards rogue be- Department's ability to develop fo- across components, echelons of havior" will be more capable cused capabilities to counter WMD command, and elements of Uni- of pursuing WMDs without threats. fied Action and enabled by a state sponsorship (pursuit common and collaborative infor- should not be equated to To correct this ambiguity, the De- mation environment. achieving a capability to partment should immediately pull ref- cause mass casualties). erences to "non-state actor pursuit of Classic Pentagonese, for those WMDs" and "enabling WMD net- familiar with the language. One might When the DOD Counterprolifera- works" from its strategy and concepts summarize the "ways" section by stat- and make it clear that the current Na- tion Initiative was developed in the ing that US military forces will seek to mid-1990s, it was focused on the tional Military Strategy addresses the compel adversaries not to use WMDs threat of adversarial nations lacking protection of its armed forces from by all available means. The Joint Inte- nuclear weapons but having an offen- nation-state unconventional weapon grating Concept elaborates upon the sive CB weapons program. This con- programs. There is no evidence of "ways" section by identifying four mili- the collaboration of terrorist groups cept, which evolved into the National tary strategic objectives, which in turn Strategy to Combat WMD, was fun- and "rogue nations" to exploit WMD lead to the eight combating WMD damentally altered in 2000-2001 to capabilities, and it is unclear whether mission areas. This construct allows remove consequence management there are "networks" to attack as the the Department to then identify and as a subordinate capability to coun- means to defeat them. The counter- analyze discrete tasks necessary to terproliferation and to become an terrorist community needs to address accomplish the missions, and corre- equal "pillar" with nonproliferation and the threat of terrorists seeking CBRN spondingly, the capability gaps that hazards, just as it addresses the gen- exist. But the major challenges with counterproliferation. The strategy eral threat of all terrorist activities. this concept remain: viewed nuclear weapons, either in the The Department needs capability- hands of terrorists or nation-states, as based concepts and tools, not strate- • Equating nuclear, radiologi- the most challenging threat, but used gies that address specific tactics and cal, biological, and chemical the term "WMD" as its default expres- weapons. weapons as equal threats under sion. This was a purposeful act, de- the term "WMD." signed to develop a single national Similarly, the Department's efforts • Viewing general terrorist strategy that addressed both home- to address WMD threats within the capabilities to use CBRN haz- land security response to potential scope of homeland defense and civil ards in discrete, small-scale terrorist CBRN incidents and military support ought to be clearly segre- events as equivalent to those of operations against nation-state WMD gated as a distinct threat from nation- nation-states with large WMD programs. The National Military Strat- state forces poised to attack military egy developed later, purported to ad- programs. forces. While the technical aspects of dress homeland security, but to a • No clear distinction be- CBRN hazards and WMDs are simi- large extent, it remained a modifica- tween capabilities required to lar, the targeted audiences are differ- tion of Cold War proliferation theory protect military forces during war ent, the desired level of risk to the for use against nation-states, rather and capabilities required to sup- responders is far different, and DOD than one designed to plan for and port anti-terrorism programs that forces are acting in support to other respond to domestic WMD terrorism. protect noncombatants and mili- federal agencies or governments tary installations. rather than as lead agents. The De- 5 Combating WMD Journal Issue 4 Table 1. Capability Framework for Protection Addressing Conventional Threats, WMD Threats and Homeland Security Missions. Tier 2 Counter- Combating Homeland Security Tier 3 proliferation Terrorism (DOD Aspects) Prevent and Defeat Significant Threats Homeland Defense Detect Threats Prior to Employment WMD Antiterrorism - - Threat Control Access to Critical Areas Interdiction Physical Security Awareness Investigate and Intercept Threats Seize Materials and Defeat Weapons Protect Individuals, Systems, and Facilities Assess Infrastructure & Assets Implement Protective Measures for Antiterrorism - Critical Infrastruc- Critical Facilities Active & Pas- Resource ture Protection Mitigate Risk to Individuals and sive Defense Application (DOD) Systems Provide Threat Information to Leaders Provide Force Health Protection Respond to the Incident/Accident Assess the Hazard and Understand the Consequences Battlefield Domestic/Foreign Provide Hazard Info to Leaders Consequence Consequence Civil Support Management Management Minimize Hazard to Individuals Manage Casualties Support Initial Federal Response to the Incident/Accident Recover Fully from the Incident/Accident Provide Impact Analysis Humanitarian WMD Emergency Assistance/ Reconstitute the Infrastructure Elimination Preparedness Disaster Relief Restore the Environment Dispose of Hazardous Materials and budget strategies together, it has partment should not confuse the need Partnerships" and "Corporate Man- to protect military personnel from gotten more complicated. "Force Ap- agement" are not hard combat capa- WMD effects during high-risk combat plication," while retaining two simple bilities, but reflect desired DOD capa- operations with the much more chal- subtasks - move and engage - is bilities necessary to execute the De- lenging requirement of responding to detailed down to more than 80 sub- partment's missions. And then there a terrorist CBRN incident to protect tier capabilities. That may be due to is "Protection." noncombatants within the United the parochial concerns of the four States. services when it comes to the under- The Protection JCA is broken into standably important area of offensive two aspects - preventing attacks and g The Problem with Protection capabilities designed for a future bat- mitigating effects. Under the pre- The JCA taxonomy is not the easi- tlefield. Various communication capa- vention capability, the goal is to de- est thing to understand. Basic military bilities can be found in "Battlespace feat kinetic and non-kinetic weap- capabilities for the Army used to be Awareness," "Net-Centric" operations, ons that are delivered from the air as simple as "shoot, move, and com- and "Command and Control." Combat and space, from the earth's surface municate." Because the JCA taxon- support services can be found in (ground or sea), and from below the omy is designed to link common ca- "Logistics" and "Force Support" capa- surface (underground or under the pability requirements, defense policy, bility areas. The goals of "Building Combating WMD Journal Issue 4 6 counterproliferation, combating terror- ism, and homeland security. At the same time, the Building Partnerships JCA must take on the burden of iden- tifying and assessing nonproliferation activities, to include security coopera- tive agreements and threat reduction programs. These activities are in line with the responsibilities of that JCA, and they should not be abrogated to the Protection JCA merely out of con- venience or attempts to bundle all combating WMD mission areas under one umbrella. Fundamentally, the Department needs to reassess how it has devel- oped the concepts of strategic nu- clear deterrence, combating WMD, and combating terrorist WMD. The 2002 National Strategy to Combat Marines don chemical gear at a range in the Middle East. WMD is not a valid approach for to- 12 day's WMD challenges, as it was USMC Photo by Cpl. Jeremy Ross based on faulty assumptions to begin sea). Under the mitigate capability, eral engineering, required to "modify, with. The Department needs a grand the goal is to minimize the impact of maintain, or protect the physical envi- strategy that addresses how the lethal and non-lethal threats, to in- ronment" is under the Logistics JCA armed forces, in coordination with clude chemical, biological, radiologi- instead of Protection. Combat engi- other federal agencies, counter WMD cal, nuclear, electromagnetic pulse neering, required to support land activities to ensure the ability of its (distinct from nuclear weapons ef- combat maneuvers by defeating haz- military forces to move, shoot, and fects), explosives, projectiles, di- communicate unhindered by nation- ards and enhancing survivability, is rected energy, and natural hazards. not under Force Support or Protec- state use of WMDs. This counter This is the only JCA in which the un- tion, but is also in Logistics. One sees WMD strategy should be viewed as a derlying tiers are threat-based rather here a selective application of individ- three-legged stool, requiring strategic than capability-based actions. That ual agendas by specific communities deterrence, nonproliferation, and bears repeating - directly contrary to for convenience rather than by de- counterproliferation for optimal stabil- the original philosophy of the JCA rived logic. ity. Another key aspect is the return of framework, the underlying concept of consequence management the Department's Protection JCA is The Joint Staff and Services have (specifically addressing military instal- threat-based. been intellectually lazy in this area. lations and facilities attacked by na- There is another model for Protection, tion-states with WMD capabilities) as In addition to articulating threat- readily available, found in the Depart- a subordinate element to counterpro- based requirements, the Protection ment of Homeland Security's mission liferation. Similarly, we should use the JCA is poorly designed to address area analysis. The overall mission of term "defense support to civil authori- the gamut of capabilities required for "Secure the Homeland" is supported ties" or civil support when referring to force protection (anti-terrorism) and by four missions: Prevent, Protect, the DOD support to the overall fed- homeland security. Certainly there is eral response to domestic catastro- Respond, and Recover. Using the more to homeland defense and civil phic disasters and incidents. Continu- framework within this document, and support than "preventing" and ing to define "WMD" or "CBRNE" con- ignoring the Joint Staff's rule that a "mitigating." This framework is en- sequence management as if it were sub-tier cannot use the same words tirely too simplistic and focused on distinct from all other incident man- as in the Tier 1 title, one can develop traditional combat operations, and agement is ridiculous and self- a capability-based framework for Pro- does not address the full spectrum of defeating. tection that addresses conventional DOD force protection requirements. threats, WMD threats, and homeland For instance, the JCA does not in- The homeland security and com- security missions (see table 1). clude force health protection, the ca- bating terrorism communities should This is by no means an exhaustive pability to "sustain and protect the address the possibility of terrorist list, but it is an illustrative example of health" of military service members. CBRN incidents under an all-hazards how the Protection JCA could be Force health protection is included approach, integrating all federal ac- modified to become a capability- under "Force Support" with other tivities addressing the response to a based framework that accurately ad- medical capabilities. Similarly, gen- terrorist CBRN incident under the dresses the mission areas within 7 Combating WMD Journal Issue 4