Arguing for a Comprehensive Space Protection Strategy Terry Everett The contributions that space brings to our daily lives extend far beyond the military. In June 2006, while serving as chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, I held a hearing to bring focus to the magnitude of our military and economic dependence on space. Lt Gen c. Robert Kehler, vice-commander of US Strategic command, pro- vided several examples of how space capabilities are integral to the daily execution of virtually every military campaign, operation, and exercise involving US forces. In Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) space capabili- ties enabled blue-force tracking (which lowered combat losses), command and control of dispersed ground forces (which facilitated ground maneu- ver around enemy strong points), and the geolocation of downed aircrews. The use of global positioning system (GPS)-guided precision munitions also resulted in lower collateral damage, more efficient use of limited mu- nitions inventory, and mission execution during adverse weather condi- tions.1 On the commercial side, the executive director of the Satellite In- dustries Association, Mr. David cavossa, estimated that space contributes over 90 billion dollars annually to the global economy, supporting daily activities such as truck fleet management, credit card validations, pay- at-the-pump services, ATM withdrawals, high-speed Internet, traffic and weather reports, and almost all television and radio distribution.2 Not only has space become essential to modern warfare, it also has established itself as a permanent utility in our global commerce. However, I believe much of congress and the American public are largely unaware of how space capabilities contribute to our daily com- cong. Terry Everett (R-AL), second district, is an eight-term member of the US House of Representa- tives. He became the first chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces in 2004. The Strategic Forces Subcommittee oversees nearly $60 billion annually, covering military intelli- gence, military space, missile defense, and nuclear weapons programs. As chairman, he called for increased protection of America’s commercial and military satellites, which underpin both our economy and our national security. In 2007, with the change in party control of the congress, Everett was named the subcommittee’s ranking Republican member. He is also a senior member of the House Intelligence and Agriculture committees. 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THIS PAGE Same as 16 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 Arguing for a Comprehensive Space Protection Strategy merce and broader economic security. Unless our nation truly under- stands our dependence on space, we cannot understand the risks of losing this capability. To this end, I personally included language in the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act calling on the National Space Studies center at Maxwell Air Force Base’s Air University to examine this issue “to assess the value of space contributions with emphasis on the United States’ dependence on space, innovative ideas contributing to ensuring freedom of action in space, and integration of all space forces.”3 On 30 January 2007 House Armed Services committee ranking mem- ber Duncan Hunter of california and I signed a letter to the President calling for a change in America’s defensive space strategy in the face of a singular but landmark event 19 days earlier. That letter read, in part: china’s recent test of an anti-satellite missile, destroying a satellite in low earth orbit, marks the commencement of a new era of military competition in space. The dependency of American warfighting capability, and the economy, on space assets compels our nation to take the necessary steps to ensure our forces cannot be targeted through an adversarial space strike. Space capabilities are integral to the daily execution of virtually every military campaign, operation, and exercise involving U.S. forces today. Therefore, a review of Department of Defense pro- grams intended to preserve American space assets is warranted. Further, new pro- grams which provide protection, redundancy, and reconstitution of space assets should be essential. As an advocate of a vigilant defensive space policy, the chinese antisatel- lite (ASAT) test is worrisome to me and warrants a clear and considered US response. America must develop a comprehensive space protection strategy, rethink its national security space architecture, and reexamine its policies on space protection and the use of space. While some have said that we should not be overly worried about this event, I believe this is a clear wake-up call for the Administration, congress, and the American people. Recognizing Our Vulnerabilities After I became chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee in 2002, I warned of the potential loss of our commercial and military satellite constellations to foreign attack. The United States has more satellites in orbit than any other nation. As the most technologically advanced nation in the world, we are also the most vulnerable to disruption if our satellites are threatened. Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Fall 2007 [ 21 ] Terry Everett Unfortunately, our adversaries do not need to be educated about our re- liance on satellites. On 11 January 2007 the chinese launched a medium- range ballistic missile into space. It targeted an aging chinese weather satellite orbiting 500 miles above the planet. The kill vehicle rammed into the target satellite, sending out into orbit thousands of pieces of debris of varying sizes with speeds up to 1,400 miles per hour, according to Air Force Space command.4 Particles a few centimeters in length are large enough to cause major damage, which is what makes this debris so sig- nificant and why, given its potential to stay in orbit for years to come, it poses a long-term hazard to our satellites. The United States, with its space surveillance network, will bear the long-term responsibility for warning others of potential collisions, including foreign and commercial operators, and ironically, the chinese. The likely result is that the space shuttle, the International Space Sta- tion, and many satellites in low Earth orbit will need to expend precious fuel to maneuver around debris. At some point, our satellite operators will determine the loss of “mission life” due to this extra maneuvering. This could be a sizeable impact when we are talking about multibillion-dollar satellites designed for lifetimes of five to 10 years. In recent testimony before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Gen James cartwright, com- mander, US Strategic command, commented that “we are going to have to make significant adjustments as collision, or, as we call it, conjunction opportunities occur over the next 20-plus years. . . . That is going to have an effect on business, on commerce. And it is going to have an effect on our national assets that are in low Earth orbit.”5 Simply stated, the chinese ASAT event was a significant and irrespon- sible act. In a recent trip to china, the chairman of the Joint chiefs of Staff, Gen Peter Pace, commented that china’s senior military leaders still refuse to disclose any details about their recent test.6 Though the chinese have firmly denied any malicious intent, I remain highly skeptical based on other activities. Apparently, this single test is part of a broader effort to mature their direct-ascent ASAT capability and to develop a spectrum of counterspace capabilities. This is consistent with their larger military modernization and advanced technology efforts, evidenced by the roughly 18 percent increase in military spending this year alone. A similar observa- tion was made in a recent report by the bipartisan US-china Economic and Security Review commission. [ 22 ] Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Fall 2007 Arguing for a Comprehensive Space Protection Strategy china has been a student of US space operations dating back to Op- eration Desert Storm. It knows all too well the advantage space offers the United States, as well as our vulnerabilities. china’s military planners have advocated the use of technology that would deny us access to our space assets. This tactic is consistent with what many consider china’s unofficial doctrine of asymmetric warfare. The world has not seen an ASAT test like the chinese conducted in over 20 years; the United States last tested an ASAT system in 1985. It was believed that the Soviets had also developed and tested different ASAT variants, including co-orbital and direct-ascent ASAT systems. However, at the height of the cold War, a delicate strategic balance was upheld. Both countries understood that a strike against a space asset would be destabilizing, leaving either side vulnerable to a debilitating first strike that could escalate to nuclear war. During this time the use of space was predominantly for strategic purposes, providing global missile warning, intelligence, and secure communications for the command and control of nuclear forces. This was before we had an operational GPS constellation, widespread satellite communications, extensive civil and commercial use, and near-real-time battlefield intelligence supporting tactical and theater- level military operations. Today, the repercussions of an attack that existed in the cold War seem to have diminished. In fact, ASAT incidents and tests are occurring, and we have seen few consequences for the culprits. In the past few years, we have seen a handful of GPS and increasing numbers of satellite commu- nications (SATcOM) jamming incidents. In the early stages of OIF, US forces encountered a GPS jamming situation. In this case, precision mu- nitions were used to hit these jamming sources, which allowed our forces to quickly resume operations.7 We have seen several SATcOM jamming incidents, including Iranian jamming of a US satellite from cuba in July 2003; ongoing jamming by Iran against Panamsat, AsiaSat, ArabSat, and EutelSat from June 1997 to July 2005; and Libyan jamming of two inter- national SATcOM systems in December 2005.8 Last fall it was reported that a chinese ground-based laser illuminated a National Reconnaissance Office intelligence-gathering satellite.9 What is most troubling is that these attacks are coming during a period of widespread use of GPS, satel- lite communications, and space-based imagery. The Strategic Forces Subcommittee has received a number of briefings on the threats to US space systems over the past few years. As I mentioned Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Fall 2007 [ 23 ] Terry Everett above, there is a spectrum of potential threat capabilities looming on the horizon to include electronic jamming, low-power laser blinding, high- energy lasers, microsatellites, direct-ascent ASATs, cyber attacks, physical attacks to ground stations, and possibly even a nuclear explosion. These threats can target satellites in orbit; their communications links to and from the ground; or their ground-based command, control, and receive stations. Our satellites are also vulnerable to other threats including space debris, close approaches, solar flares, and severe weather damaging ground stations. All produce the same general result—they render our space capa- bilities temporarily or permanently useless. Many of these antisatellite technologies exist today, and many are dual-use in nature, including a microsatellite that could be used as an experimental spacecraft or, with a simple command, could shadow or collide with another satellite. Space is no longer a sanctuary. Those who wish to challenge America’s role in the world increasingly recognize the strategic importance of space and are more willing to deny us freedom of action in space by employing a wide range of methods. The Pentagon’s annual report to congress on china’s military power finds that “the direct ascent ASAT system is one component of a multi-dimensional program to generate the capability to deny others access to outer space.”10 I do not believe the threat we face is merely a ques- tion of technology; the question to ask is one of motive and intent. In the case of the chinese, what motivated their ASAT test and why are we seeing them develop a comprehensive suite of counterspace capabilities? To understand this we need to extend our understanding of threat capa- bilities and our vulnerabilities, as well as foreign actors’ policies, doctrine, motives, and concepts of operations for use. Our nation must posture itself to defend its space capabilities, retain its leadership and technical advantage in space, and adapt our systems to meet and overcome the threat. These threat assessments influence our space architecture planning, acquisition programs, and operations concepts. If we presume it takes roughly 10 years to acquire a new satellite system and that satellite will be on-orbit for seven to 10 years, we place an onus on our intelligence community to predict the threat 10 to 20 years from today and our acquisition community to design satellites to perform in this threat environment 20 years from now. Regrettably, much of our space intelligence analytical and collection capabilities have withered since the end of cold War. As a member of the House Intelligence committee, I see a resurgence in space intelligence, including the accession of talented young analysts. However, rebuilding [ 24 ] Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Fall 2007 Arguing for a Comprehensive Space Protection Strategy our nation’s space intelligence capabilities takes time, resources, and com- mitment from leaders within the defense and intelligence communities. New analysts must be trained, decades of knowledge transferred from se- nior analysts, and new collection capabilities developed so that the nation is postured to understand, deter, mitigate, and respond to current and future threats to space. Developing a Space Protection Strategy As a national security space community, and as a nation, we have a vested stake in protecting our interests in space and developing a comprehensive space protection strategy. This includes both the need to protect our space sys- tems and the need to preserve our assured use of space. The chinese ASAT is but one striking example of why I believe this issue requires urgent attention. Our satellite programs are often faced with size, weight, or power con- straints, forcing designers and engineers to make trades, usually between performance and protection. For satellites with these constraints, adding a transponder or perhaps a secondary payload has been preferred to adding ra- diation hardening, fuel for maneuvering, or some other form of protection. However, as we see threats to the space domain come to fruition, we can no longer afford to ignore protection capabilities. This is not unprecedented. As antiaircraft capabilities and air defense systems matured, so too did our nation’s aircraft survivability capabilities. These capabilities have matured over time, beginning with advanced research and development, modeling and simulation, and red teams, growing eventually into robust technical and operational capabilities and countermeasures. Today, these are all con- sidered integral components of all aircraft development programs. Based on my observations and discussions with senior military leaders, our nation currently lacks a comprehensive protection and survivability strategy for space—one that spans the defense and intelligence communi- ties and addresses policy and strategy, architecture planning, system acqui- sition and requirements definition, science and technology development, and training and operations. Working with the new chairman of the Stra- tegic Forces Subcommittee, Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-cA), the House of Representatives has included a provision in the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act which accords a priority to space protection and space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities: “It is the policy of the United States that the Secretary of Defense accord, after the date of enact- Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Fall 2007 [ 25 ] Terry Everett ment of this Act, a greater priority within the Nation’s space programs to the protection of national security space systems.”11 This provision further directs the Secretary of Defense to develop a comprehensive space protec- tion strategy to include • identification of threats and vulnerabilities to US space systems; • description of protection capabilities contained in the program of record, including material and nonmaterial, and needed capabilities; • assessment of gaps and shortfalls, investment plans, and how pro- tection requirements are defined and incorporated into acquisition processes; • description of how the Department of Defense (DoD) programs and budgets for protection capabilities; and • description of how the DoD is organized and managed to address policy, planning, acquisition, and operations of protection-related systems and capabilities.12 The manner in which we protect and increase the survivability of our space capabilities spans a diverse spectrum of options. These include rapid replenishment, hardening, redundancy, distributed architectures, alter- natives such as unmanned aerial vehicles, active prevention and denial, passive measures, reversible and nonreversible means, and nonmaterial solutions. Each of these solutions has its advantages and disadvantages, employment scenarios, and associated costs. In developing the protection strategy, it is my hope that the DoD will consider these factors. A foundational component of space protection is space situational aware- ness. The DoD defines SSA as “the requisite current and predictive knowl- edge of the space environment and the operational environment upon which space operations depend—including physical, virtual, and human domains—as well as all factors, activities, and events of friendly and adver- sary space forces across the spectrum of conflict.”13 As we learned on 9/11, seemingly benign systems can have latent or concealed offensive capabilities. An object that appears to be orbital debris or a research satellite may, in fact, be an ASAT targeted at US or friendly assets. Likewise, noise in a data link may be accidental interference or intentional jamming. Unless we can de- tect and distinguish a hostile event from a malfunction or other benign ef- fect and then attribute that hostile event to the right actor, we will be limited in our ability to mitigate and respond to attacks against our assets. [ 26 ] Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Fall 2007 Arguing for a Comprehensive Space Protection Strategy I do not believe we have invested sufficient resources in SSA to address the growing threat to space, and the defense bill attempts to address this by authorizing additional resources for SSA and protection efforts. The Air Force is starting to place greater emphasis on SSA, and the commander of Air Force Space command has made it a top priority. The House continues its support of ground-based radars and optical telescopes, which enable frequent detection and tracking of all objects in orbit. The House version of the defense bill includes additional resources for the development of the Space Fence—an upgraded ground-based ra- dar “fence” that will enable us to detect and track very small objects, in- cluding space debris such as that ejected from the chinese ASAT test. We also continue to support system development efforts such as the Rapid Attack Identification and Detection Reporting System to detect electronic jamming of communications and GPS satellites and the Space-Based Sur- veillance System—the low Earth orbiting system intended to detect small objects out to geosynchronous orbit. A relatively straightforward means of increasing SSA is to make each satellite its own sensor, able to monitor its own health and status and detect any anominal activity. I am pleased we were able to add resources for an Air Force unfunded priority in this area and some classified programs. As I look forward, I also see a greater opportunity for sensors from other mission areas to contribute to the SSA mission. Missile defense assets, such as the ground- and sea-based tracking radars and the soon-to-launch Space Tracking and Surveillance System, when not on missile warning/missile de- fense alert, could be configured to support SSA missions. Furthermore, there is potential to leverage capabilities from our allies/friends as well as civil and commercial entities that could be brought to bear on the SSA mission. SSA and all options for protecting our space interests must be examined and weighed as part of a comprehensive space protection strategy. This strategy should encompass the desired mix of active, passive, material, and nonmaterial capabilities; how these capabilities fit together; as well as our priorities for protec- tion. I recognize we will not be able to protect, nor can we afford to protect, all systems to the same level. Therefore, risk management, informed by our knowl- edge of threats and vulnerabilities, should be our guide. While the emphasis in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee has been on space protection efforts within the DoD, the intelligence community must also emphasize protection and analysis of its foreign counterspace capabili- ties or risk losing its vital space-based intelligence-collection systems. To be Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Fall 2007 [ 27 ] Terry Everett successful in protecting our space assets and use of space, we need the de- fense and intelligence communities tightly coupled. The success of the DoD in executing its space defense mission is dependent on an accurate intelli- gence assessment and timely reporting of the threat. In addition, the protec- tive measures used for a low Earth orbit intelligence-gathering satellite may be the same as those used to protect a weather or communications satellite. There is too much work, too few resources, and too much riding on these communities not to fully integrate efforts and minimize duplication. Reexamining Our National Security Space Architecture I believe the chinese ASAT can also serve as a catalyst for reexamining our national security space architecture and planning our future capabili- ties in space beyond protection and SSA. We have an opportunity to take a hard look at what implications this incident might have on our nation’s future space architecture, specifically the desired attributes of the architec- ture, composition of needed capabilities, and investment strategy. One of the most common themes emerging from ongoing discussions on space threats is the desire to create a more distributed and robust space architecture with greater numbers of satellites, more frequent launches, and shorter development timelines. Others have discussed placing sat- ellites in higher orbits, making them more difficult for antisatellite sys- tems to reach. I encourage the exploration of concepts to fly intelligence and other traditionally lower-altitude satellites in higher orbits. There is great performance value, given sufficient science and technology develop- ment and systems engineering. These concepts may also buy time against some threats such as direct-ascent ASATs—at least until countries develop space launch systems that can reach higher orbits, which the chinese al- ready possess—and mitigate the effects of others like laser blinders, which would have insufficient energy to damage systems in higher orbits. Some key benefits of this thinking include a quicker ability to adapt to threats, greater ability to prove out and stay ahead in technology, and strengthen- ing of the industrial base. To capitalize on this thinking, we must first fix the problems plaguing our space acquisition programs leading to cost overruns, schedule delays, and technical challenges. Delays in critical space programs can have ripple effects on multiple other defensewide systems, such as the Future combat [ 28 ] Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Fall 2007