United States Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting Command and Staff College Marine Corps University 2076 South Street Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068 MASTER OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES TITLE: Changing the status quo: the Canadian Forces would be better postured to meet the current and future strategic requirements by replacing the conventional land forces (Army) with lightly equipped Special Operating Forces (SOF). SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES AUTHOR: Lieutenant-Colonel Karl A.R. Michaud AY 05-06 Mentor:__Dr. Bradley J. Meyer____________________________________ Approved:____________________________________ Date:_____________________ Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2006 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2006 to 00-00-2006 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Changing the status quo: the Canadian Forces would be better postured to meet the current and future strategic requirements by replacing the 5b. GRANT NUMBER conventional land forces (Army) with lightly equipped Special Operating Forces (SOF). 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION United States Marine Corps,School of Advanced Warfighting, Marine REPORT NUMBER Corps University,2076 South Street, Marine Corps Combat Development Command,Quantico,VA,22134-5068 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 49 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 DISCLAIMER THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT. QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE. ILLUSTRATIONS Page Figure 1. CCFF TTrraannssffoorrmmaattiioonn -- PPhhaassee IIII CC22 SSttrruuccttuurree ((11 FFeebb 0066))…………………………………..6 Figure 2. Army Force Structure - Generic………………………………………………………….7 Figure 3. "Straw-man" Model…………..………………………………………………………….16 i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE…………………………………………………………… MOS COVER SHEET…………………………………………………………………………….. DISCLAIMER……………………………………………………………………………………... LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS……………………………………………………………………… i TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………………………………….. ii PREFACE………………………………………………………………………………………….. iv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY………………………………………………………………………... v INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………………. 1 BACKGROUND…………………………………………………………………………………... 2 SOF………………………………………………………………………………………….. 2 Organization………………………………………………………………………………… 3 KEY ASSUMPTIONS……………………………………………………………………………. 3 RATIONALE FOR A SOF-BASED ARMY 8 Defense Planning Guidance…………….…………………………………………………... 8 Tactical Resources - Shortfalls……………..………………………………………………. 8 Strategic Resources - Shortfalls…………………………………………………………….. 8 Ends, Ways and Means……………………………………………………………………… 9 Option 1…….……………………………………………………………………………….. 10 Option 2……………………………………………………………………………………... 10 General……………………………………………………………………………….. 10 Conventional War Employment……………………………………………………… 10 Combating Terrorism/Foreign Internal Defense (FID)...…………………………….. 11 Employment for UN and NATO "Peacekeeping" Type Operations…………………. 11 Option 1 vs Option 2………………………………………………………………………... 12 ii STRUCTURE ANALYSIS………………………………………………………………………... 12 General…………..………………………………………………………………………….. 12 Military Police (MPs)………..……………………………………………………………… 12 Medical………………..…………………………………………………………………….. 13 Service Support…………..…………………………………………………………………. 13 Signals…………………………………………………..…………………………………... 13 Air Defense…………………………………………..……………………………………… 14 Intelligence…………………………………………..……………………………………… 14 Combat Arms Units………..………………………………………………………………... 14 "Straw-man" Organizational Chart………………..………………………………………… 15 "Straw-man" Manning Sources…………..…………………………………………………. 15 Regular or Reserve Force.....………………………………………………………………... 17 Army Task Analysis……………..………………..………………………………………… 18 Implementation Timeline…….…………..…………………………………………………. 18 RECOMMENDATIONS………………………………………………………………………….. 19 General……………………………………………………………………………………… 19 Person-Year Reallocation….……………………………………………………………….. 19 Regular - Reserve Force Employment……………………………………………………… 19 Army Task Assignment……..……………………………………………………………… 20 Timeline Implementation…………………………………………………………………... 20 CONCLUSIONS………………………………………………………………………………….. 20 ANNEX A - PERSON - YEAR (PY) ANALYSIS ……………………………………………….. A - 1/2 ANNEX B - STRATEGIC TASK ANALYSIS …………………………………………………... B - 1/10 ANNEX C - IMPLEMENTATION TIMELINE ANALYSIS C - 1/5 ENDNOTES……………………………………………………………………………………….. vi BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………………………. viii iii PREFACE What a difference three years can make! In the past three years Canada: has purchased and used UAVs (the French made SPERWER) on operations; most of the “Clothe the Soldier” equipment has arrived in units; the much needed replacement of C130 Hercules aircraft has been announced; the purchase of heavy lift transport helicopters is out for contract; the desire to purchase amphibious shipping has been stated publicly; and the Joint Task Force II (JTF II) has been expanded sufficiently large enough to form the basis for a Special Operating Forces (SOF) structure. Despite “one-time” purchases for immediate operational requirements such as the UAVs for Operation ATHENA in Afghanistan, and heavy lift helicopters to support ongoing operations in Afghanistan, the Canadian Forces (CF) will not see any significant increase in spending over the next 15 years (at least) due to other fiscal pressures on the government, such as health care, the “baby-boomer” generation retiring, and tax reduction. Yet, given the recent purchases, announcements, and the strategic climate, the CF are at a crossroad; does the CF continue to produce and train conventional forces for operations, or does the CF truly transform to meet Canada’s unique strategic challenges. Three years ago, I would have said transforming the Army into SOF would be too cost prohibitive. Today, taking a fifteen-year outlook, I can envision a properly equipped, transformed Army coping with the strategic challenges of the future, having reached that end state within the confines of current fiscal realities. This paper will examine whether the CF would be better poised to meet Canada’s current and future strategic requirements by replacing the conventional land forces (Army) with SOF. In so doing, the CF would take the projected vehicle overhead, maintenance and ammunition savings to purchase required SOF items such as attack aviation, as well as strategic air and sealift capacity, thereby making the newly- created SOF expeditionary in nature, while still maintaining capabilities for the defense of Canada. In closing, I would be remiss if I didn’t especially thank my mentor, Dr. Bradley J. Meyer for his guidance and assistance throughout the development of this paper, and Dr. Wray R. Johnson for his insights covering this paper’s topic. iv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Canadian government’s historical fiscal and strategic Defense choices and current fiscal projections for the near term, the present-day and future threats to Canadian sovereignty, and the current Defense posture pose a unique challenge for the Canadian Forces (CF). This paper argues that the CF would be better postured to meet current and future strategic requirements while still meeting Canadian foreign policy objectives by replacing the conventional land forces (Army) with lightly equipped Special Operating Forces (SOF). Specifically, infantry, armored, engineer and artillery units located in each of the mechanized brigade groups would be re-roled as twelve SOF battalions, four PSYOP battalions, four Civil Affairs battalions and four independent UAV batteries. Savings realized in overall strength for the Army in terms of number of personnel (represented by Person-Years (PYs)), should be reallocated in four areas: augmentation for the Army Schools in order to teach a SOF training curriculum; creation of four attack helicopter squadrons; creation of a strategic airlift squadron; and to crew four Landing Platform Helicopter Carriers. Money earned by selling Canada’s armored and mechanized vehicles, in tandem with the projected vehicle overhead, infrastructure and maintenance savings, and the savings from large caliber ammunition such as Artillery and 25mm ammunition should be used to offset the purchase and maintenance costs for the Air Force and Navy. By converting the Army Regular Forces units into SOF, Canada would have a readily deployable force that was expeditionary in nature, viable as a future war- fighting force, viable as a future force for military operations other than war and better organized and equipped to fight the Global War on Terror. All this could be accomplished without compromising the defense of Canada. v (This page intentionally left blank.) -Abused, mismanaged, and neglected, with an active duty force of just over 50,000 in all services . . . backed by a miniscule reserve and sustained by barely one percent of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product, Canada’s military is hurtling toward what one senior serving officer has called a “mass extinction scenario”.1 INTRODUCTION The Canadian government’s historical fiscal and strategic Defense choices and current fiscal projections for the near term, the present-day and future threats to Canadian sovereignty, and the current Defense posture pose a unique challenge for the Canadian Forces (CF). Changing the status quo is no easy task, but in the eyes of many, it is absolutely essential to a sustainable future for the CF. This paper will argue that the CF would be better postured to meet current and future strategic requirements while still meeting Canadian foreign policy objectives by replacing the conventional land forces (Army) with lightly equipped Special Operating Forces (SOF). Specifically, Infantry, Armored, Engineer and Artillery units located in each of the mechanized brigade groups should be re-roled as twelve SOF battalions, four Psychological Operations (PSYOP) battalions, four Civil Affairs battalions and four independent Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) batteries. Savings realized in overall strength for the Army in terms of number of personnel (represented by Person-Years (PYs)), should be reallocated in four areas: augmentation for the Army Schools in order to teach a SOF training curriculum; creation of four attack helicopter squadrons; creation of a strategic airlift squadron; and to crew four Landing Platform Helicopter Carriers. Money earned by selling Canada’s armored and mechanized vehicles (286 of the 424 are “new”), in tandem with the projected vehicle overhead, infrastructure and maintenance savings, and the savings from large caliber ammunition such as Artillery and 25mm ammunition, should be used to offset the purchase and maintenance costs for the new helicopters and ships. 1/21