United States Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting Marine Corps University 2076 South Street Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068 FUTURE WAR PAPER Comprehensive Engagement: A Winning Strategy SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES AUTHOR: Major Brian H. Kane, USMC AY 2007-08 Mentor: Approved: ______________________________ Date: __________________________________ Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 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REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT ii ABSTRACT Title: Comprehensive Engagement: A Winning Strategy Author: Major Brian H. Kane, USMC Thesis: The Marine Corps will have to implement comprehensive engagement at the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) level by changing planner mindsets, creating a mechanism for change, and re-structuring the planning staff. Discussion: Comprehensive engagement is a way for the United States to develop a more positive perception of its actions and motives in the world. This strategy focuses on engaging groups/nations that the United States can help achieve what is called a status quo. In this context, status quo means reaching a point where the targeted group/nation becomes stable and balanced. This strategy will be a Phase Zero approach that could span years or decades. Future assumptions lead towards more of a small war and full spectrum operational focus, which are both well-suited for a comprehensive engagement strategy. The Marine Corps must recognize this future strategic requirement now to adjust mindsets to a more non-conventional focus, create mechanisms to implement the strategy, and adjust planning staffs to meet the requirement. These actions will be best implemented at the MEF level. The MEF provides the crucial operational link from the strategic goals to the tactical capabilities the Marine Corps has for conducting comprehensive engagement. MEFs will be able to focus on the diverse set of groups/nations within their areas of operation and conduct the operational cultural analysis for each that will serve as the basis for the comprehensive engagement campaign design. Actions using comprehensive engagement at the MEF level can be tactical in execution, but their additive effect synergized into a comprehensive engagement campaign plan will have decisive strategic impacts in the future. The key is to implement the changes now that will lead to the development and practice of the operational art required to link these complex concepts for a complex strategy that takes place years before any kinetic actions may be required. This kind of planning is a distinct departure from the conventional mindsets that have existed over time. However, if the Marine Corps can embrace this strategy and successfully demonstrate to the American public that the strategy can work, it will send the type of message Americans can believe in, which will subsequently drive the government to provide more support. Recommendation: Adjust doctrine to reflect the comprehensive engagement campaign design presented. This type of problem-setting should be codified as part of the Commander’s Battlefield Area Estimate (CBAE) when dealing with small wars or operations requiring a full spectrum approach. MEF level planning staffs should address the unique planning requirements necessary to make this strategy work by organizing and/or expanding the staff to man a cell that can handle this type of planning full-time. All MEF level operations should be viewed as Phase Zero operations in order to ensure the staff has the mindset that comprehensive engagement will permeate most future deployments of any kind. Wherever Marines are sent, they should be thinking about how to engage and build relationships. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Disclaimer………………………………………………………………………………… ii Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………… iii Table of Contents…………………………………………………………………………. iv List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………….. v Preface……………………………………………………………………………………. vi Introduction……………………………………………………………………………….. 1 The Nature of the Problem………………………………………..……………………….. 4 Types of Wars….….……………………………………………………………….. 4 Mindset Problems…………..………..…………….………………………………. 4 Assumptions and Counter-Arguments.…...…………...…………………………………… 5 Strategic Assumption.………………….……...…………………………………… 5 Strategic Counter-Argument………………….……………………………………. 6 Tactical Assumption………………...……………………..………………………. 7 Tactical Counter-Argument……………..….……………………………………… 9 Operational Art………………………………..…………………………………… 9 Three Elements for Comprehensive Engagement Campaign Design………..…………….. 10 Mindset Change……………………………………...…………………………….. 10 Mechanism for Change…………………………………………………………….. 12 Possible Staff Change………………………………..…………………………….. 15 Conclusions…………………………………………………..…………………………….. 17 Appendix A: Enemy Center of Gravity……………………..…………………………….. 19 Appendix B: Friendly Center of Gravity………………………………………………….. 24 Appendix C: How Comprehensive Engagement Campaign Design Fits within the MCPP……………………………………………………………….29 Endnotes………………………………...………………………………………………….. 30 Bibliography……………………………...…………………………………….………….. 33 iv LIST OF FIGURES Page Figure 1: Comprehensive Engagement Conceptual Planning ………………………....…. 2 Figure 2: Comprehensive Engagement Campaign Design Methodology…………………. 3 Figure 3: Enemy Center of Gravity.…..……………......…………………………………. 19 Figure 4: Key Enemy Critical Vulnerabilities.…..……..…………………………………. 22 Figure 5: Friendly Center of Gravity………………....………………...…………………. 24 Figure 6: Key Friendly Critical Vulnerabilities.…..…....…………………………………. 27 Figure 7: How Comprehensive Engagement Campaign Design Fits within the MCPP …. 29 v PREFACE The idea for this paper has been in my mind since my tour in III MEF during 2005 and 2006 while conducting or planning for several regional exercises and contingency operations. Specifically, while deployed to the Philippines, I was involved in humanitarian assistance operations and numerous community relations projects throughout the region. Being a logistics officer, I am in a field that often gets to use its resources to do projects like these while the infantry and air units are able to practice traditional conventional training. It dawned on me that while helping people who had never seen an American before, much less a Marine, that these kinds of actions could have a greater strategic impact if coordinated in some fashion. The people we helped will never forget what we did for them. It made me realize that you can change the world one person at a time if you can embrace the art of the possible. However, there is a down side. The first time the United States helps people, we are welcomed with open arms. But, if the military does not return, or uses these operations to get something in return, the people who initially love us lose faith fast. The enemy knows this. Therefore, not only anything we do is exploitable, but also what we do not do. While attending the USMC School of Advanced Warfighting this year, my thoughts coalesced into what you will read in this paper. This topic is a continuing journey for me --- this paper represents where I am right now with regard to where I think the future will take the Marine Corps and the United States. My limited experiences with helping people the previous two years have provided some clues to solving some real problems in the world. The United States military has become very good at conventional operations to the point where we have no challenger. I think some smart enemies out there realize this now more than ever and will cultivate other ways to get at us over longer periods of time than the traditional conventional vi cycle of operations is geared towards. I believe the enemy sees the same things that I did the previous two years, only they have seen them for a lot longer than me and are much better at manipulating indigenous people of various cultures than I could ever hope to understand. While the United States will always have to maintain its dominance in solving the hard conventional problems of the world, I believe there are other problems across the spectrum of operations with the small war concept that are the real complex problems military planners will have to solve in the future to truly establish peaceful environments. The enemy is way ahead of us in Phase Zero, but the military has to start somewhere. The more we wait as a military profession, the more we will end up creating conventional reactions for an unconventional enemy vice identifying and solving the real complex problem. As a Marine Corps Officer, this paper is my starting point, and it is designed to make the conventional thinker consider something else, at least conceptually if anything. The changes I recommend may not be the answer, but there are answers out there. Hopefully, this paper will at the least get the reader to think about and come up with a better way to deal with the complex problems the military will face in the future. The indigenous people I met while deployed around the Asia-Pacific region are a big part of the solution, and the Marine Corps must initiate the engagement effort and figure out how to help them, one person at a time if need be. Military organizations must try to understand the people who only want to live in peace and raise their families without fear so that operations can be designed to help them reach that goal. The military, if creatively applied, has the ability to do this. When we do, the people the military helps consistently will never accept the enemy into their midst, which will isolate and ultimately allow the military to destroy him. vii Introduction The overall strategic environment in the future will revolve around requirements for national security that focus on strategic comprehensive engagement.1 For this paper, comprehensive engagement will utilize a status quo approach.2 Status quo, in this context, achieves a balanced, stable society. For the military, helping groups/nations a achieve status quo will mean operating in small war and full spectrum operational environments. Previous United States executive administrations used this strategy to work somewhat successfully with China, Vietnam, and North Korea.3 As a result, in 2009, a new United States executive administration will look at utilizing a comprehensive engagement concept in its first published National Security Strategy (NSS). To facilitate this future strategic requirement, the Marine Corps will use a comprehensive engagement strategy at the operational level to develop the basis for peaceful conflict resolution by using integrated approaches in helping others to re-shape their identities in a way that will help them reach their status quo.4 To facilitate this concept, the Marine Corps will have to implement comprehensive engagement at the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) level by changing planner mindsets, creating a mechanism for change, and re-structuring the planning staff. This paper will focus on an innovative way to augment the Commander’s Battlefield Space Evaluation (CBAE) to better inform the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP). Joint campaign design and operational cultural analysis concepts will be embedded within the innovation in order to successfully apply comprehensive engagement at the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) level. These concepts are represented in Figures 1 and 2 below, while Appendix C displays how Figures 1 and 2 fit within the overall doctrinal framework of the MCPP. These figures will be the basis for discussion and description of concepts for the rest of 1 the paper. I will first examine the nature of the problem and the assumptions and counter- arguments that need to be presented at the strategic and tactical levels of war to provide a backdrop for the necessary mindset changes, mechanisms, and staff adjustments. I will then propose an option for a way to look at designing a comprehensive engagement campaign utilizing the CBAE, MCPP, and applicable joint and cultural publications. Finally, I will present an option for a MEF staff re-organization that could be used to effectively implement the proposed framework. Understand Derive the The Status Quo Culture Visualize the Campaign Goal R e d e s i g n Design the How to Advertise Campaign Success Figure 1: Comprehensive Engagement Conceptual Planning 2