(cid:0) (cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:6)(cid:15)(cid:5)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:17)(cid:11) (cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:4)(cid:2)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:8)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:7)(cid:13)(cid:12)(cid:4) (cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:6)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:11)(cid:2)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:10)(cid:15)(cid:11)(cid:16)(cid:9)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:12)(cid:11)(cid:16)(cid:17)(cid:17)(cid:7)(cid:6)(cid:18)(cid:9)(cid:11) (cid:19)(cid:7)(cid:12)(cid:14)(cid:7)(cid:18)(cid:20)(cid:11)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:11)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:11) (cid:0)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:6)(cid:9)(cid:5)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:11)(cid:15)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:16)(cid:8)(cid:13)(cid:6)(cid:11) (cid:0)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:0)(cid:4)(cid:4)(cid:5) (cid:6)(cid:6)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:7)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:5) (cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:16)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:5) (cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:3)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:5)(cid:11)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:5)(cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:9)(cid:6)(cid:14)(cid:14) Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 30 JAN 2009 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2009 to 00-00-2009 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER India-U.S. Relations 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Congressional Research Service,The Library of Congress,101 REPORT NUMBER Independence Ave, SE,Washington,DC,20540 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 83 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 (cid:0)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:5)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:16)(cid:10) (cid:10) (cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8) Long considered a “strategic backwater” from Washington’s perspective, South Asia has emerged in the 21st century as increasingly vital to core U.S. foreign policy interests. India, the region’s dominant actor with more than one billion citizens, is often characterized as a nascent major power and “natural partner” of the United States, one that many analysts view as a potential counterweight to China’s growing clout. Washington and New Delhi have since 2004 been pursuing a “strategic partnership” based on shared values such as democracy, pluralism, and rule of law. Numerous economic, security, and global initiatives, including plans for civilian nuclear cooperation, are underway. This latter initiative, launched by President Bush in 2005 and finalized by the 110th Congress in 2008 (P.L. 110-369), reverses three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy. Also in 2005, the United States and India signed a ten-year defense framework agreement that calls for expanding bilateral security cooperation. Since 2002, the two countries have engaged in numerous and unprecedented combined military exercises. Major U.S. arms sales to India are underway; more are anticipated. The influence of a growing and relatively wealthy Indian-American community of more than two million is reflected in Congress’s largest country-specific caucus. Further U.S. interest in South Asia focuses on ongoing tensions between India and Pakistan rooted largely in competing claims to the Kashmir region and in “cross-border terrorism” in both Kashmir and major Indian cities. In the interests of regional stability, the United States strongly endorses an existing, but currently moribund India-Pakistan peace initiative, and remains concerned about the potential for conflict over Kashmiri sovereignty to cause open hostilities between these two nuclear-armed countries. The United States seeks to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in South Asia. Both India and Pakistan resist external pressure to sign the major nonproliferation treaties. In 1998, the two countries conducted nuclear tests that evoked international condemnation. Proliferation-related restrictions on U.S. aid were triggered; remaining sanctions on India (and Pakistan) were removed in late 2001. Upon the seating of a new U.S. President in 2009, most experts expected general policy continuity with regard to U.S.-India relations. Yet some look to history in anticipating potential friction on issues such as nonproliferation (where India may be pressed to join such multilateral initiatives as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty); human rights and Kashmir (where the new Administration could become more interventionist); and bilateral economic relations (where the new Administration may pursue so-called protectionist policies). Yet President Obama’s statement that, “Our rapidly growing and deepening friendship with India offers benefits to all the world’s citizens,” suggests that the bilateral strategic partnership likely will continue and even deepen. India has been in the midst of major and rapid economic expansion. Many U.S. business interests view India as a lucrative market and candidate for foreign investment. The United States supports India’s efforts to transform its once quasi-socialist economy through fiscal reform and market opening. Since 1991, India has taken major steps in this direction and coalition governments have kept the country on a general path of reform, yet there is U.S. concern that such movement is slow and inconsistent. India is the world’s fourth-largest emitter of greenhouse gases. Congress also continues to have concerns about abuses of human rights, including caste- and gender-based discrimination, and religious freedoms in India. Moreover, the spread of HIV/AIDS in India has been identified as a serious development. This report will be updated regularly. (cid:17)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:12)(cid:16)(cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:5)(cid:13)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:16)(cid:12)(cid:5)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:12)(cid:19)(cid:22)(cid:4)(cid:20)(cid:12)(cid:10) (cid:0)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:5)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:16)(cid:10) (cid:10) (cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:14)(cid:8) Introduction.....................................................................................................................................1 Key Current Issues and Developments............................................................................................2 The Newly-Seated U.S. Administration....................................................................................2 Greater U.S. Engagement on Kashmir?..............................................................................3 The Appointment of a U.S. Special Representative............................................................4 The Mumbai Terrorist Attack and Deteriorated Relations With Pakistan.................................4 Pre-November 26 Engagements.........................................................................................4 Terrorism in Mumbai..........................................................................................................6 Fallout for Bilateral Relations.............................................................................................6 Implications for U.S. Interests............................................................................................9 Renewed Conflict and Elections in Indian Kashmir.................................................................9 The Emergent Indigenous Terrorism Threat............................................................................11 India’s Economic Woes............................................................................................................11 U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation.....................................................................................12 Arabian Sea Piracy and Indian Military Action......................................................................13 Context of the U.S.-India Relationship.........................................................................................13 Background.............................................................................................................................13 India’s Regional Relations......................................................................................................16 Pakistan ............................................................................................................................16 China.................................................................................................................................19 Afghanistan.......................................................................................................................22 Iran ...................................................................................................................................23 The “IPI” Pipeline Project ...............................................................................................24 Burma................................................................................................................................26 Sri Lanka...........................................................................................................................27 Other Countries.................................................................................................................28 Political Setting.......................................................................................................................30 National Elections and Competition ................................................................................30 The Congress Party ..........................................................................................................31 The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) ....................................................................................32 Regional Parties................................................................................................................33 The Left Front ..................................................................................................................33 Bilateral Issues..............................................................................................................................34 “Next Steps in Strategic Partnership” and Beyond.................................................................34 Civil Nuclear Cooperation ...............................................................................................34 Civil Space Cooperation...................................................................................................45 High-Technology Trade ...................................................................................................46 Security Issues.........................................................................................................................47 The Indian Military ..........................................................................................................47 U.S.-India Security Cooperation.......................................................................................48 Nuclear Weapons and Missile Proliferation .....................................................................53 U.S. Nonproliferation Efforts and Congressional Action.................................................53 India’s Economy and U.S. Interests........................................................................................54 Overview...........................................................................................................................54 Trade and Investment........................................................................................................56 Barriers to Trade and Investment......................................................................................57 (cid:17)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:12)(cid:16)(cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:5)(cid:13)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:16)(cid:12)(cid:5)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:12)(cid:19)(cid:22)(cid:4)(cid:20)(cid:12)(cid:10) (cid:0)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:5)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:16)(cid:10) (cid:10) Special Economic Zones (SEZs)......................................................................................59 Multilateral Trade Negotiations .......................................................................................60 The Energy Sector and Climate Change...........................................................................61 The Kashmir Issue...................................................................................................................63 Other Regional Dissidence......................................................................................................67 The Northeast....................................................................................................................68 Maoist Insurgency.............................................................................................................69 Communal Tensions and Conflict.....................................................................................71 Human Rights Issues...............................................................................................................72 Human Trafficking............................................................................................................74 Religious Freedom............................................................................................................74 Caste-Based Discrimination..............................................................................................74 Female Infanticide and Feticide........................................................................................75 HIV/AIDS...............................................................................................................................76 U.S. Assistance........................................................................................................................76 Economic..........................................................................................................................77 Security.............................................................................................................................77 Selected Relevant Legislation in the 110th Congress..............................................................77 (cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:16)(cid:17)(cid:9)(cid:18)(cid:11)(cid:4) Figure 1. Deaths Related to Kashmiri Separatism, 1988-2008.....................................................66 Figure 2. Map of India...................................................................................................................79 (cid:19)(cid:7)(cid:20)(cid:6)(cid:18)(cid:11)(cid:4) Table 1. Direct U.S. Assistance to India, FY2001-FY2009...........................................................78 (cid:21)(cid:10)(cid:8)(cid:12)(cid:7)(cid:22)(cid:12)(cid:11)(cid:4) Author Contact Information..........................................................................................................79 (cid:17)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:12)(cid:16)(cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:5)(cid:13)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:16)(cid:12)(cid:5)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:12)(cid:19)(cid:22)(cid:4)(cid:20)(cid:12)(cid:10) (cid:0)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:5)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:16)(cid:10) (cid:10) (cid:15)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:6)(cid:10)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:17)(cid:12)(cid:18)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:8) Long considered a “strategic backwater” from Washington’s perspective, South Asia has emerged in the 21st century as increasingly vital to core U.S. foreign policy interests. India, the region’s dominant actor with more than one billion citizens, is often characterized as a nascent major power and “natural partner” of the United States, one that many analysts view as a potential counterweight to China’s growing clout. Washington and New Delhi have since 2004 been pursuing a “strategic partnership” based on shared values such as democracy, pluralism, and rule of law. Numerous economic, security, and global initiatives, including plans for “full civilian nuclear energy cooperation,” are underway. This latter initiative, launched by President Bush in 2005, provisionally endorsed by the 109th Congress in 2006 (P.L. 109-401, the “Hyde Act”), and finalized by the 110th Congress in 2008 (P.L. 110-369), reverses three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy. Also in 2005, the India in Brief United States and India signed a ten-year Population: 1.15 billion; growth rate: 1.6% (2008 est.) defense framework agreement that calls for expanding bilateral security cooperation. Since Area: 3,287,590 sq. km. (slightly more than one-third 2002, the two countries have engaged in the size of the United States) numerous and unprecedented combined Capital: New Delhi military exercises. Major U.S. arms sales to Head of Government: Prime Minister Manmohan India are underway. The influence of a Singh (Congress Party) growing and relatively wealthy Indian- Ethnic Groups: Indo-Aryan 72%; Dravidian 25%; other American community of more than two million 3% is reflected in Congress’s largest country- Languages: 22 official, 13 of which are the primary specific caucus. Moreover, since 2001, Indians tongue of at least 10 million people; Hindi is the primary have been the largest foreign student tongue of about 30%; English widely used population on American college campuses, Religions: Hindu 81%; Muslim 13%; Christian 2%; Sikh with nearly 95,000 students in 2008 2%, other 2% (2001 census) comprising fully 15% of all foreign students in the United States.1 Life Expectancy at Birth: female 72 years; male 67 years (2008 est.) During the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign, Literacy: female 48%; male 73% (2001 census) both leading candidates expressed full-throated Gross Domestic Product (at PPP): $3.4 trillion; per support for a deepened and expanded U.S.- capita: $2,953; growth rate 5.6% (2008 est.) India partnership. Then-Senator Barack Obama Currency: Rupee (100 = $2.37) said he would seek U.S.-India ties strengthened Inflation: 8.1% (2008 est.) “across the board,” with a particular focus on energy issues. Senator John McCain claimed Defense Budget: $25.3 billion (2.3% of GDP; 2008) the United States has a “vested interest in U.S. Trade: exports to U.S. $26.1 billion; imports from India’s success” and he called for improved U.S. $19.2 billion (2008 est.) military and counterterrorism cooperation, Sources: CIA World Factbook; U.S. Department of along with mutual efforts to strengthen Commerce; Economist Intelligence Unit; Global Insight; democracy and energy security. Both International Institute for Strategic Studies candidates were explicit supporters of U.S.- India civil nuclear cooperation as proposed by the Bush Administration.2 A January 2009 1 See http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/pr111708.html. 2 “‘‘I Am Reluctant To Seek Changes In The N-Deal’” (interview with Barack Obama), Outlook (Delhi), July 21, 2008; (continued...) (cid:17)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:12)(cid:16)(cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:5)(cid:13)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:16)(cid:12)(cid:5)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:12)(cid:19)(cid:22)(cid:4)(cid:20)(cid:12)(cid:10) (cid:23)(cid:10) (cid:0)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:5)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:16)(cid:10) (cid:10) report issued by the New York-based Asia Society asserted that India “matters to virtually every major foreign policy issue that will confront the United States in the years ahead” and it recommended “dramatically enhancing” U.S.-India cooperation between both governments and private sectors.3 (cid:19)(cid:13)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:3)(cid:6)(cid:6)(cid:13)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:3)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:8)(cid:5)(cid:11)(cid:16)(cid:8)(cid:20)(cid:13)(cid:21)(cid:13)(cid:22)(cid:10)(cid:23)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:14)(cid:8) (cid:19)(cid:23)(cid:18)(cid:4)(cid:24)(cid:18)(cid:25)(cid:6)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:18)(cid:7)(cid:12)(cid:18)(cid:13)(cid:4)(cid:29)(cid:3)(cid:28)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:13)(cid:30)(cid:15)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:9)(cid:7)(cid:12)(cid:15)(cid:10)(cid:8)(cid:4) Days after President Obama took office, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee agreed to “further strengthen the excellent bilateral relationship” between the United States and India. On January 26, India Republic Day, President Obama issued a statement of commemoration asserting that, “Our rapidly growing and deepening friendship with India offers benefits to all the world’s citizens” and that the people of India “should know they have no better friend and partner than the people of the United States.”4 As part of her confirmation hearing to become Secretary of State, Clinton told Senators she will work to fulfill President Obama’s commitment to “establish a true strategic partnership with India, increase our military cooperation, trade, and support democracies around the world.”5 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Sen. John Kerry apparently concurs in contending that the United States must “work to deliver the deal’s geopolitical potential to leverage our peaceful nuclear cooperation into a 21st-century U.S.-India strategic partnership” and that “India will be increasingly key to solving international challenges” looking forward.6 Many experts expect general policy continuity with regard to U.S.-India relations. Yet some look to history in anticipating potential friction on issues such as nonproliferation (where the new U.S. Administration may press India to join such multilateral initiatives as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty);7 human rights and Kashmir (where the Administration could become more interventionist); bilateral economic relations (where the Administration may pursue protectionist policies); and relations with China (where economic factors could lead to geopolitical tensions in Asia). While many Indian analysts opine that Republican U.S. presidents typically have been more beneficial to Indian interests than have Democratic ones, most appear to conclude that undue worry is unnecessary, and that the selection of a Secretary of State perceived as friendly to India has done much to ameliorate such concerns.8 (...continued) John McCain, “America Has a Vested Interest in India’s Success” (op-ed), Indian Express (Mumbai), August 8, 2008. 3 “Delivering on the Promise: Advancing US Relations With India,” Asia Society Task Force Report, January 2009, at http://www.asiasociety.org/taskforces/india09/DeliveryOnThePromise_USRelationsWithIndia.pdf. 4 Indian Ministry of External Affairs, “Telephonic Conversation Between EAM and US Secretary of State,” January 23, 2009; White House statement at http://www.whitehouse.gov/58_years_of_Indian_democracy. 5 See http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/KerryClintonQFRs.pdf. 6 John Kerry, “Building a Stronger U.S.-India Friendship” (op-ed), Wall Street Journal, October 8, 2008. 7 Secretary of State Clinton has stated that the Obama Administration will seek ratification of the CTBT and will encourage India to become a party to that pact (see http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/KerryClintonQFRs.pdf). 8 “Experts Say Obama to Strengthen India, US Ties,” BBC Monitoring South Asia, November 5, 2008; “Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Obama Presidency: What Awaits India?,” Observer Research Foundation (Delhi) Analysis, November 5, 2008; Siddharth Varadarajan, “Obama Presidency to Pose Challenges for Indian Diplomacy” (op-ed), (continued...) (cid:17)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:12)(cid:16)(cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:5)(cid:13)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:16)(cid:12)(cid:5)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:12)(cid:19)(cid:22)(cid:4)(cid:20)(cid:12)(cid:10) (cid:23)(cid:10) (cid:0)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:5)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:16)(cid:10) (cid:10) (cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:7)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:5)(cid:13)(cid:4)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:12)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:15)(cid:12)(cid:7)(cid:16)(cid:5)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:14)(cid:19)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:7) After the U.S. presidential election, press reports began speculating that the Obama Administration was planning a diplomatic push to resolve the Kashmir dispute.9 Even before the polls, then-candidate Obama had made statements revealing his interest in pursuing such a tack: Kashmir in particular is an interesting situation where that is obviously a potential tar pit diplomatically. But, for us to devote serious diplomatic resources to get a special envoy in there, to figure out a plausible approach, and essentially make the argument to the Indians, you guys are on the brink of being an economic superpower, why do you want to keep on messing with this?10 These and other comments on Kashmir caused immediate consternation in India, where many both inside and outside of government believe any direct U.S. involvement in the issue would have negative repercussions, in particular by causing a predicted hardening of Pakistani policy and an uptick in the incidence of separatist militancy in Indian Kashmir. Some analysts speculate that, by taking a “regional” approach to the Afghan problem, the United States could seek to make India a party to the conflict there.11 Even some Pakistani analysts note a perceived futility of greater U.S. pressure on New Delhi.12 In an indication of official Indian sensitivities, New Delhi strongly rejected the British foreign secretary’s January suggestion that South Asian security was closely linked to the Kashmir dispute. The Indian national security advisor later opined that President Obama risks “barking up the wrong tree” if he seeks to broker a settlement between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.13 Secretary of State Clinton recognizes the dangers of rising tensions in Kashmir while also deferring calls for greater U.S. involvement in the situation, saying the U.S. role will continue to be as it was under the previous Administration: settlement facilitation, but no mediation.14 Two senior Washington-based experts had earlier suggested that a mid-2008 uprising in Kashmir showed the United States can no longer enjoy the “luxury” of inattention to the dispute; they urged more active U.S. diplomatic engagement to impress upon both New Delhi and Islamabad the importance of restraint and resolution, perhaps to include the dispatch of a “senior official to defuse the crisis.”15 Some independent analysts warn that South Asian circumstances are not amenable to such engagement and/or pressure, and that U.S. involvement could even backfire by (...continued) Hindu (Chennai), November 6, 2008; “Is Barack Obama Good for India?,” India Today (Delhi), February 2, 2009. 9 See, for example, “Is Kashmir Key to Afghan Peace?,” Christian Science Monitor, November 21, 2008. 10 “The Full Obama Interview,” October 23, 2008, at http://swampland.blogs.time.com/2008/10/23/ the_full_obama_interview. 11 See, for example, C. Raja Mohan , “Barack Obama’s Kashmir Thesis” (op-ed), Indian Express (Delhi), November 3, 2008; “Obama’s Kashmir Conundrum,” BBC News, January 21, 2009. On Afghanistan, see “M.K. Bhadrakumar, “U.S. Draws India Into the Afghan War” (op-ed), Hindu (Chennai), December 25, 2008. 12 See, for example, Ijaz Hussain, “Obama and Kashmir” (op-ed), Daily Times (Lahore), December 3, 2008. 13 “India Disagrees With Britain Over Security, Kashmir,” Reuters, January 21, 2009; “India Warns Obama Over Kashmir,” Financial Times (London), February 3, 2009. 14 See http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/KerryClintonQFRs.pdf. 15 Howard Schaffer and Teresita Schaffer, “Kashmir’s Fuse Alight” (op-ed), Washington Times, September 3, 2008. (cid:17)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:12)(cid:16)(cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:5)(cid:13)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:16)(cid:12)(cid:5)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:12)(cid:19)(cid:22)(cid:4)(cid:20)(cid:12)(cid:10) (cid:23)(cid:10) (cid:0)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:5)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:16)(cid:10) (cid:10) breeding resentments in regional capitals. These observers urge instead a measured approach focused on the creation of a coherent and comprehensive U.S. regional strategy.16 (cid:21)(cid:18)(cid:4)(cid:7)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:23)(cid:15)(cid:19)(cid:12)(cid:6)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:12)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:15)(cid:24)(cid:7)(cid:5)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:7)(cid:10)(cid:23)(cid:4)(cid:25)(cid:19)(cid:5)(cid:26)(cid:7)(cid:27)(cid:4)(cid:23)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:17)(cid:4)(cid:12)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:4)(cid:7) Two days after taking office, President Obama announced the appointment of former Clinton Administration diplomat Richard Holbrooke to be Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Prior to the announcement, and as suggested in the above discussion, there was speculation that the new U.S. President would appoint a special envoy to the region with a wider brief, perhaps to include India and even Kashmir. Some earlier reporting listed Holbrooke’s title as “Special Representative for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and related issues” [italics added], yet this latter phrase was omitted from his official title. Upon persistent questioning, a State Department spokesman insisted that Holbrooke’s mandate is “strictly” limited to dealing with “the Pakistan- Afghanistan situation.” By some accounts, the Indian government vigorously (and successfully) lobbied the Obama Administration to ensure that neither India not Kashmir were included in Holbrooke’s official brief.17 Still, on his maiden “orientation” travel to the region, New Delhi was on Holbrooke’s itinerary. (cid:19)(cid:23)(cid:18)(cid:4)(cid:31)(cid:17)(cid:30)(cid:20)(cid:7)(cid:15)(cid:4)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:15)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:12)(cid:12)(cid:7)(cid:22) (cid:4)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:13)(cid:4)!(cid:18)(cid:12)(cid:18)(cid:9)(cid:15)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:7)(cid:12)(cid:18)(cid:13)(cid:4)"(cid:18)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:12)(cid:15)(cid:10)(cid:8)(cid:11)(cid:4)#(cid:15)(cid:12)(cid:23)(cid:4) (cid:0)(cid:2) $(cid:7) (cid:15)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:7)(cid:8) (cid:4) (cid:29)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:30)(cid:31)(cid:15)(cid:28)(cid:4)(cid:14) (cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:7)!"(cid:7)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:5)(cid:13)(cid:4)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:12)(cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:7) Among the top goals of Indian officials in 2008 was gauging the new civilian Pakistani government’s commitment to the bilateral peace process. Within this modest context, the outcome of Pakistan’s February national elections was viewed as generally positive.19 However, ensuing months saw a marked deterioration of India-Pakistan relations, with some in New Delhi expressing frustration that Islamabad’s civilian leaders exercised little influence over Pakistan’s powerful military and intelligence agencies.20 In May, India accused Pakistan of committing multiple cease-fire and territorial violations along the Kashmiri Line of Control (LOC). June visits to Islamabad by External Affairs Minister Mukherjee, and later by Pakistan’s foreign minister to New Delhi, were cordial and appeared to get the peace process back on track, but produced no new initiatives. Then, on July 7, a suicide car bomb killed 58 people, including four Indian nationals, at the Indian Embassy in Kabul, 16 See, for example, Daniel Markey, “So You Want to Be a Special Envoy,” Foreign Policy (online), January 2009; Lisa Curtis, U.S. South Asia Regional—Not Kashmir—Envoy Needed, Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 2158, December 5, 2008. 17 See http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2009/jan/115448.htm; “India’s Stealth Lobbying Against Holbrooke’s Brief,” Foreign Policy (online), January 23, 2009. 18 See also CRS Report R40087, Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai, India, and Implications for U.S. Interests. 19 “Quietly Forward,” Frontline (Chennai), June 20, 2008. 20 ”India Frustrated by a Rudderless Pakistan,” New York Times, August 12, 2008; “India Yearns for Pakistan’s Musharraf Amid Turmoil,” Associated Press, August 12, 2008. In August, the Indian national security advisor expressed worry at the possibly imminent removal from office of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, saying such a development would “leave radical extremist outfits with freedom to do what they like” in the region (“Q&A With Indian National Security Advisor MK Narayanan,” Straits Times (Singapore), August 12, 2008). (cid:17)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:12)(cid:16)(cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:5)(cid:13)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:16)(cid:12)(cid:5)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:12)(cid:19)(cid:22)(cid:4)(cid:20)(cid:12)(cid:10) (cid:24)(cid:10) (cid:0)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:5)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:16)(cid:10) (cid:10) Afghanistan. Afghan and Indian officials later claimed to have evidence that Pakistan’s intelligence agency was complicit in the attack, a charge echoed by the U.S. government. Late July serial bomb attacks in the cities of Bangalore and Ahmedabad killed scores of people and triggered heightened suspicions of foreign involvement in terrorist acts inside India.21 In late July, Foreign Secretary Menon met with his Pakistani counterpart in New Delhi to launch the fifth round of the bilateral Composite Dialogue. Following the meeting, Menon warned that recent events—culminating in embassy bombing—had brought the peace process “under stress.” Blunt language again followed a high-level meeting in Sri Lanka, where Menon suggested that India-Pakistan relations were at a four-year low ebb.22 Along with the Kabul bombing, Indians widely suspect Pakistani complicity in summer terrorist attacks inside India. At the same time, further lethal shooting incidents along the LOC exacerbated bilateral tensions. When the Pakistani Senate passed a resolution on the situation in India’s Jammu and Kashmir state (see below), an Indian official called the move “gross interference” in India’s internal affairs. The exchange was soon repeated when the Pakistani foreign minister decried “excessive and unwarranted use of force” in Kashmir by the Indian government, a charge rejected as unhelpful by New Delhi. Moreover, New Delhi’s progress in an initiative that would allow India to purchase nuclear materials and technologies on the international market spurred Islamabad to warn of a potential new nuclear arms race on the Asian subcontinent.23 Still, senior government officials in both capitals sought to press ahead with engagement. Prime Minister Singh met with the Pakistani President in New York City, where the two leaders formally stated their intent to restart the waning peace process by scheduling the fifth round of composite dialogue talks by year’s end.24 National Security Advisor Narayanan hosted his Pakistan counterpart, Mahmud Ali Durrani, in New Delhi in October to review issues of mutual concern. Days later, a special meeting of the bilateral Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism was held, also in New Delhi. Both sessions were said to have been held in a positive atmosphere.25 In late November, a fifth round of Home/Interior Secretary-level talks on terrorism and drug trafficking was held in Islamabad and, mere hours before the November 26 Mumbai terrorist attacks began, Pakistan’s foreign minister was in New Delhi to review progress in the latest composite dialogue round, which Indian leaders expected to be “productive and fruitful.” Thus, on the brink of yet another serious derailing of the peace process caused by a major terrorist attack, many observers were sanguine about the outlook for improving relations.26 21 July’s terrorist attacks may represent the “Indianization of the jihad,” according to some analysts. The violence spurred many commentators to lament what they describe as an incompetent national security apparatus (“Sophisticated Attacks Catch Indian Agencies Napping,” Reuters, July 29, 2008; “Hello, Anybody There?” (editorial), Times of India (Delhi), July 29, 2008). 22 “Briefing by Foreign Secretary After India-Pakistan Foreign Secretary-Level Talks,” Indian Ministry of External Affairs, July 21, 2008; “India Official Sees Sinking Relations With Pakistan,” New York Times, August 1, 2008. 23 “Bombings May Threaten India-Pakistan Relations,” Christian Science Monitor, July 28, 2008; “Skirmishes Can Hurt India-Pakistan Peace Process,” Reuters, July 30, 2008; Indian Ministry of External Affairs Press Briefing, August 7, 2008; “India Reacts ‘Strongly’ to Pakistan Comments on Kashmir Violence,” BBC Monitoring South Asia, August 12, 2008; “Pakistan Warns of New Nuclear Arms Race With India,” Associated Press, July 23, 2008. 24 “India, Pakistan Leaders Agree to Kickstart Peace Talks,” Agence France Presse, September 24, 2008. 25 See http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2008/Oct/PR_312_08.htm and http://www.mofa.gov.pk/ Press_Releases/2008/Oct/PR_325_08.htm. 26 Indian Ministry of External Affairs, “Opening Statement by Minster of External Affairs,” November 26, 2008; “Signs of Thaw in Bitter South Asian Dispute,” Christian Science Monitor, November 26, 2008. (cid:17)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:12)(cid:16)(cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:5)(cid:13)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:16)(cid:12)(cid:5)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:12)(cid:19)(cid:22)(cid:4)(cid:20)(cid:12)(cid:10) (cid:23)(cid:10)