UnitedStatesMarine Corps CommandandStaffCollege Marine Corps University 2076South Street Marine Corps CombatDevelopment Command Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068 f--- I I MASTER OFMILITARY STUDIES TITLE: InsurgencyinPeru, Retrospective analysis ofthe SenderoLuminoso's (ShiningPath) SUBMITTED INPARTIALFULFILLMENT OFTHEREQUIREMENTS FORTHEDEGREE OF MASTER OFMILITARY STUDIES AUTHOR: MAJOR NIKOLAUS GURAN AY07-08 Co~mittee 4 ~ S Mentor and OralDefense Member: 'S...J :Xrl5.<::lrJ Approved: ~ar A ~. ? Date: ~o r D~ . comJi1fttee~er: 3 E OralDefense r<.. IQ... F!113UtKJ9. Approved: ~ > _ U· Date: Go 4frS1L ex' ~ Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 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THIS PAGE Same as 35 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 ExecutiveSummary Title: InsurgencyinPeru, Retrospective analysis ofthe Sendero Luminoso's (ShiningPath) Author: MajorNikolaus Guran, United States Army Thesis: Sendero Luminoso (ShinningPath) movementinPeruclearly demonstrates that the motivations and techniques usedbythe radical Islamic are notnew. Itproves thatinsurgencies are fought on aregionallevel as definedbyindigenous populations according to their ways, means andends. DiscussionRadical Islamist's desire to establish aworld dominantCaliphate is an age old conceptthat has merelytaken on anew form. In many ways itmodels the international Communistmovementofthe 20thcentury. Bothmovements promote an ideologythat proves to provide leadership andmotivation on a global scale. Senderb Luminoso (ShiningPath) movementinPeru clearly demonstrates that the motivations and techniques usedbythe radical Islamic arenotnew. Itproves thatinsurgencies arefought on aregionallevel as definedby indigenous populations according to their ways means andends. The Sendero Luminoso movement adoptedits philosophyfrom Marx, Lenin andMao. Itthen tailoreditphilosophyto fit theconditionpresentinPeru andcalled Gonzalo thought orthe Fourth SwordofCommunism. The Sendero Luminosois known as onethe most successfulrevolutions inLatinAmerica. Itsaw much success throughout theearly 1980's and suddenly 1988 itbeganto decline andby 1992it hadvirtuallydisappeared. There are many reasons why Sendero failed inPeru. Most importantlythe governmentlearnedhow to fight acounterinsurgency. As time passed, Sendero beganto make mistakes internally. Itfailed politically economically and socially. Conclusion: Al Qaedamustbe defeated atthe local level. Whereveran Al Qaedacellpops up inthe worldit canbe defeated at thelocal level politically, economically and socially. Each individualinsurgencyhas theironeunique traits. Thereis no cookie cutter solution to counter insurgency. However, examples such as the defeat ofthe Sendero Luminoso canbeused to create aframework onhow to conductcount-insurgencies inthefuture. Insurgencies are protracted wars andmany use this idea as theirkeystone for theirideology. It shouldbe remembered that this ideacouldbeused againstthem. As the prolonged warcontinued, Sendero lostits focus, forgets its roots andbecameimpatientwith the protractedwar, they made many mistakes andthey weredefeated. In conclusion, theUnited States shouldrememberthatitis the side thatprovides abetterlife for the peoplethe world. Itis the side that wins the hearts and minds that willprevail against Al Qaeda. I I DISCLA1MER THE OPINIONS ANDCONCLUSIONS EXPRESSEDHERINARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENTAUTHORAND DONOTNECESSARILY REPRESENTTHEVIEWS OFEITHERTHEMARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE ORANY OTHERGOVERNMENTALAGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDETHEFOREGOING , STATEMENT. QUOTATIONFROM,ABSTRACTIONFROM, ORREPRODUCTION OFALL OR ANY PARTOF THIS DOCUMENTIS PERMITTEDPROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENTIS MADE. .I ii Table ofContents Page DISCLAIMER .ii TABLE OF CONTENTS iii INTRODUCTION 1 HISTORYAND LANDSCAPE · 2 EMERGENCE OFREVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP .4 REVOLUTIONARYIDEOLOGY 6 THEFIVEPHASES OF GONZALO THOUGHT 9 THE GOVERNMENTLEARNS COUNTER-INSURGENCY 12 INTERNALFAILURE OF THEMOVEMENT: POLITACALLY, ECONOMICALLY AND SOCIALLy 18 HOWIS THE SENDERORELEVANTTO AL QAEDA 23 CONCLUSION 25 ! iii ------------------------ ._-----_.._-- Introduction Throughouthistory, conflicthas intrinsicallybeenpartofthehuman condition. The desirefor the oppressedto riseup anddefeattheir oppressorsthroughthemeans ofviolence has, andwill always existso long as onemandesires whatanothermanhas. Ithasbeensaidthatthe emergence ofinternationalterroristorganizationis anewradical conceptwitha newsetofrules thattheUnited States andits allies mustadaptinorderto maintainits security,l Therealityis thatthe RadicalIslamist's desires to establisha worlddominate Caliphate is anage oldconcept thathas merelytakenonanewform. Inmanyways itmodelsthe international Communist th movement ofthe 20 century. Bothmovements promote anIdeologythatprovesto provide leadership andmotivationona global scale. Sendero Luminoso (ShiningPath) movementin Peru clearlydemonstrates thatthe motivations andtechniquesusedbythe radical Islamic are not new. Itprovesthatinsurgencies are fought ona regionallevel as definedbyindigenous populations accordingto theirways means and ends. This paperwill discussthe Sendero Luminosomovementinthe contextofits landscape andhistory, the emergence ofleadership, its ideology, as well as the movement's failures politically, economically and socially. Itwill also discuss the governmenthadto adapt and learn howto create andeffective counterinsurgency. Itwill concludewithdiscussiononhowthe defeatoftheSendero isrelevantto AIQaeda. TheUnited States and its allies cantake away manylessons learnedinPeru and applythemto assistinthe defeatofregionalized Islamic insurgencywithanultimate endstate ofthe defeat ofRadical Islamworldwide. History and Landscape The Sendero Luminosoisknownas onethe mostsuccessfulrevolutions inLatin America. Itsawsuccessfor severalreasons. Thefirstreasonisthattheconditionswereripe for 1 --j I the rise ofarevolutionarymovement. Theeconomywas inastate offailure witha growing disparitybetween economic and ethnic classes. Second, PeruhadSOO-yearhistory ofrepressive colonial governmentsthatcompletelyignoredtheneeds ofthe conqueredindigenous populations. Third, thecountryhada successionofweekgovernmentsthatledto aperiodof politicaltransitionleavingPeruvulnerablefor the rise ofrevolution. These circumstances combinedwiththe government'sinabilityto mobilize aneffectivecounter-insurgency, add numerous humanrightsviolationsnearly, as well as a forcedrelocationprogramthatindigenous populationoutdepartments consideredto be ina state ofemergency away fromtheirnative lands, further lendingthe alienationoftheruralpopulation. Together,these reasons wouldlead to the ShinningPaths successthroughoutthe 1980's. The Sendero Luminoso, more commonly calledthe radical wingofCommunistPartyof Peru, first eruptedinthePeruvianconsciousness onMay 17, 1980, whenitdeclaredwaronthe 2 Peruvian state. Forthebetterpartof12years the Senderoheldtheinitiative, andfor a brief time is seemedasifitwere ontheverge ofaccomplishingits goals oftaking overpowerand creatinga state of"NewDemocracy" as itsleaderAbimael Guzmanwouldcall it. Like ~merging radical Islamicmovementsofthe 21stcentury, Sendero Luminosohastraditionally beenassociatedwithunparalleledviolence. Itis founded onamulti-facetedandcomplex ideologythatbears close examination. The complexityofSendero Luminoso canonlybe understoodby examiningthe roots from whichit sprang. Theroots ofSendero arefounded intheideaofanexistingPeruvianreality. Whatwas the Peruvianreality, priorto 1980? Itwas one ofa feudalistic society, with anexploitative socioeconomic structurefoundedinSpanishColonialism. Thoughthe Spanishcrownhadbeen expelledfrom SouthAmerica 160years agothe Spanishcolonial structure oflatifundia still 2 --j I i existed.3The onlydifference was insteadofapeninsul~r aristocracyexploitingboththe mestizo andthe nativeindigenouspopulations ofthe QuechuaIndians; itwas nowa Creole aristocracy.4 Togetherall SouthAmericans foughtfor independencefrom Spainbutonlya fewbenefited. Inthe 1970sthesituationwas becameworse. Itwas a Peruvianrealityofgrowing disparitybetweenthe richandthepoor. Inparticularthe Andeandepartmentswhichare home to the indigenous people ofthe QuechaIndiancontinuedto beisolatedandneglectedbysuccessive Peruvianadministrations. Thisisolationwas aresultofroughmountainousterrainofthe Andes andthe QuechaIndiansinabilityto create aviable economy. The departmentofAyacucho had thehighestnumberofinhabitantswithoutpotablewater (66.96 percent), electricity (82.86 percent), sewageremoval (90.67percent) andanaverage of1doctorper3,000people. Onlythe 5 neighboringdepartmentofApurimachadahigherliteracyrate of45 percent. This continued class strugglewouldbethe primaryfactorto the eventuallyrise ofthe communistmovementin Peru. NotonlydidPeruhave continuedclass stratificationbutalso the countrywas also politicallyunstable. From 1968to 1980Peruwas governedunderthemilitaryreformist governments ofGenerals JaunVelasco Alvarado andFransisco ~oralesBermudez. Themilitary reformersmade sweeping agrarianlawreforms, transformingthe agrarianstructureinthe country, finally destroying 500 years ofthelatifundia andredistributingtheland.6 They attemptedto cutPeru'stiesto foreign capitalbynationalizingforeign industryinthe country. These attempts were made to lessenthe feudalistic and colonialnature ofthenation's socioeconomic system. Theyultimatelyfailed. Theagricultural cooperatives wereunableto supportthemselves andhadto relyheavilyongovernment subsidies. Peru's international borrowingexpandedasthe nationattemptto industrializeitself. More importantly, the agrarian 3 ----------"-------"------------------ reforms wereinrealitypapertigers. Thisleftabadtaste inthemouthofthepeople, andbrought discreditto the governmentbecause ofpromisesmade andbroken. Inthe endthe military reformers werereplaced withaweakciviliangovernmentinthe reins ofFernando Belaunde Terry. Withafragile economyandinthewake ofapoliticaltransitionperiod,the conditions were setforrevolution. Thetime was rightand all thatwas needed was an esoteric leader and a people'smovementto strikethe sparkand startthe fire. TheEmergence ofRevolutionaryLeadership Who was the "Spiritual"leaderofthe movement?Abimael Guzmanwas born3 December 1943 intheporttownofIslay, inthe departmentofArequipa.? Hewasthe illegitimate sonofafatherwithsixchildrenbythree differentwomen. Hismotherdiedwhenhe wasfive andwentto live withhis mother's family and laterhemovedto the city ofArequipa where helivedwithhisfather. While livingwithhisfatherhe attendedcatholic secondary school andeventually atthe age of19hebecame a studentatthe Social Studies Departmentof SanAugustinNational University(SAND).8 He was describedas shy, disciplined, obsessive and ascetic.9Itwas duringhis experience atSANDwhenhe beganto followMarxisttheoryandthe writings ofJose CarlosMariategui,thefounder ofthe ThePeoples CommunistPartyofPeru (PCP). In 1962 Guzmanbecame amemberofthe faculty atthe University ofSanCnsotbal de Huamanga(UNSCR) as aprofessorofphilosophyand social scienceinthe Education , Department. TheUNSCRwas founded bythe Spanishin 1677 andwasintendedto serve as a regional educationcenter. Afterbeing shutdownfor 80 years, the Universitywas reopened in 1959 inresponseto aneedto educateIndianand mestizo inhabitants inAyacucho, withpurpose 10 to improvetheirstandard ofliving. Thiswas ironyatits best. The governments attemptto do 4 goodwouldbringjustenougheducationforthepoorbecome aware ofthe realitytheylivedin. UNSCHeventuallybecamethe centerofcultural lifeinthedepartment; bringanewcultural awareness to theyouthofthe Department. The environmentofUNSCHcombinedwitha desperatelypoorregionprovidedanexcellentstartingpointforMaoist-styleinsurrection. WhenGuzmanarrivedinAyacucho he was already amemberofthe PCP. He immediatelybeganteaching anddisseminating Communisttheory. Hisdeep conviction, charismaandhis magneticpersonalitybothinandoutofthe classroomdrewmanyfollowers. Notonly didhe attractstudentsbutalso he drewinlocalinhabitants andotherfaculty members. Guzmaneventuallymanagedto getelectedtotheuniversity's executive council, the body responsible for directingallofUNSCH's institutionalpolicies. He servedas the directorofthe General Studies program, atwo-yearseries ofcourse obligatory for all incomingstudents to attend.II By combininghis administrative cloutanddynamic teaching abilities, Guzmanwas able to increase his poolofstudentsthatidentifiedwithMarxistandMaoistdoctrine. In 1970 Guzmanwas appointedDirectorofPersonnel Facultyand Staffandusedhis positionto dismiss his political opponentsreplacingthemwithpersonnelthathadbeliefscloserto hiS.12 Oncehe gainedcontrol ofUNSeH, Guzmansenthisfollowers outto begineducatingthe oppressed Mestizo andIndianpopulations inAyacucho, Apurimac andHuancavlic. When Guzman's students graduatedmanyofthemwouldreturnto theirnative villagesto pass onGuzman'sversionofMaoistteachings. Thiswas doneverballydueto the verylow literacyrateinthe Andeanregions ofPeru. Theverbal traditionofpassing informationand doctrine wouldbe ahallmarkofthe Sendero Luminoso movement. Itwas done sowellthat Guzman'sMaoistideologywouldbe calledthefourth swordofcommunismandformany of followers itwouldbecome atheology. Theverbaltraditionmade itverydifficultforthe Peruvian 5