seALs from Joint task Force 510 with Armed Forces of the Philippines during counterterrorism training off basilan Island Winning in the Pacific The Special operations Forces Indirect Approach Meyers) w Andre By DaviD P. FriDov ich and Fr eD t. kraWchuk Group, Pacific ( mbat Co Fleet Download as wallpaper at ndupress.ndu.edu C ombat operations in Iraq and cannot simply enter sovereign countries uni- forces. The indirect approach relies heavily Afghanistan dominate the laterally and conduct kill-or-capture missions. on the SOF capability to build host nation headlines, but Southeast Asia has It must blend host nation capacity-building defense capacity, provide civil affairs forces to emerged as a quiet yet increasingly and other long-term efforts to address root give humanitarian and civic assistance, and crucial front in the Long War. Given the suicide causes, dissuade future terrorists, and reduce offer information operations assets to aid the bombings in Bali, the presence of the terrorist recruiting. The 9/11 Commission Report states partner. groups Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf, that the United States must “help defeat an The indirect approach demands and increased anti-Americanism,1 the need ideology, not just a group of people.”2 diplomacy and respect for political sensitivi- for a continued and comprehensive approach To address the underlying conditions ties. SOCPAC focuses on working in close to combating terror in the Pacific is clear. The that foster terrorism, SOCPAC works with coordination with host nation military and U.S. Special Operations Command, Pacific host nation partners to help provide security political leadership, law enforcement, and U.S. (SOCPAC) has been improving ties with and stability. This method promotes eco- country teams in the region (to include the regional allies and increasingly applying an nomic development and shapes conditions for U.S. Agency for International Development indirect approach to address the threat posed by good governance and rule of law. Much of the and Department of State Public Diplomacy militant groups with connections to al Qaeda. command’s effort consists of foreign internal officials). These stakeholders share the defense and unconventional warfare.3 The responsibility of capacity-building and lever- The Indirect Approach primary contribution of Special Operations age each others’ strengths and synchronize Addressing threats requires a sophis- Forces (SOF) in this interagency activity is efforts. To produce institutional change, host ticated and indirect approach. The Nation to organize, train, and assist local security nation partners have to be willing to reform as required. Interagency and multinational will Major General David P. Fridovich, usA, is commander, u.s. special operations command, Pacific. Lieutenant and capacity-building must go hand-in-hand colonel Fred t. Krawchuk, usA, is a staff officer, u.s. special operations command, Pacific. for the indirect approach to succeed. 4 JFQ / issue 44, 1st quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu JFQ44[text].indd 24 11/27/06 10:33:17 AM Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2007 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2007 to 00-00-2007 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER The Special Operations Forces Indirect Approach 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION U.S. Pacific Command,USPACOM/J01PA,Box 64031,Camp H M REPORT NUMBER Smith,HI,96861-4031 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 4 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 fRIDOvICH and kRAWCHUk Success is measured in terms of Host nation government and senior military accomplishments through, by, and with host partners are building officials, as well as the U.S. Ambassador, often nation partners. Over time, these partners a self-sustaining attend. The demonstration is visible proof are building a long-lasting, self-sustaining capability to provide of what the host military gained from U.S. capability to provide security, develop good participation. Tangible improvements and security, develop good governance, attract foreign direct investment, demonstrated abilities enhance American governance, attract and counter violent ideology. This process is credibility with host nation officials and the foreign investment, slow, but it achieves lasting results. Part of our Ambassador alike. commitment is to remain patient and focus and counter on a long-term indirect method that results in violent ideology Indirect Approach Elements self-sustaining host nation partners. Three elements constitute SOCPAC’s indirect approach in the Pacific region: Relationships institution-building, capacity-building, and Besides their long-term benefits, outside factors. These elements influence relationships also play a vital role in com- whom we partner with and the breadth and bating terrorism. SOCPAC members have depth of those relationships. Integrating the saisg cnoinfisctarnutc rteivgei ornelaalt eioxnpsehriipens cwei aths wotehlle r A. Villalovos) phaelrptsin pgr ohvoisdt ensa at icoonm pparrethneenrss ibveec mometeh soedlf o-f nsehxacitpiho.a nFnsrg’e eSqsOu aeFlnl oat wndde U pc.loSon.y vpmeenernstiotosnn, neaexl lef torocr iciseme slme, aaednresdre - Pacific (Jennifer suffnic i Iennstt iitnu tdieofne-nbsuei lcdaipnag.b Tilhiteie bs:roader ttsuhheripamsl skoenvlveoerw sa liennd egtxhet eeb nraedsgeei,do a npn,ed br isuouidlsdt.a ai nso rceiloatciuoln-- Camera Group, padreoepp oruiflvtaeetndio .e nTcsoh wne ohgmoro siucupaplspl yuo sarent dtteh reirsdo udrceisapttr igiovrnaoatuiloplyns in Through experience, we know we can mbat a quid pro quo way (for example, the terrorist succeed only through bilateral or multi- Co group gives a child an education along with lateral cooperation. Unilateral actions are Fleet radical indoctrination). Finding out how to get neither necessary nor welcome. Partner there first to give the people a leg up without nations willingly accept the lead in their creating resentment is an important aspect of own countries. Additionally, many nations institution-building. SOF support these efforts prefer that the United States maintain a to help countries build healthy institutions of low-visibility presence on their soil. SOF security, governance, rule of law, infrastruc- can do this with little external support and ture, and economic stability. low overhead from higher headquarters, n Capacity-building. U.S. Special Opera- which supports the Department of Defense tions Command, Pacific, works closely with concept of small footprints in the region. host nation forces to assess training needs This method respects local populaces, and assist in building a more professional and increases legitimacy, and improves the modernized force that respects human rights. American image among host populations. Hughes) The command ensures that it is operating aanndd tchrBeeyd c iwobuoilrnikttyri.ny Sg te ewravimitnh, g Sh iOonsC tt hPneAa t“Ciao dcnrv episaaetre atsnn tedrru ss t mpany (Eric E. wUcoinmtihtmiendi ttSthitena tgpe osto lai tnai cdtar talh ianen ipdna glre tpgnraeolr gc rnoaanmtsito.r nAai bncetosfmo orpfe rt eh-e aeasscihs to”t rhoelre ,a pbaorutti ctihpea ntrtasi hnainveg tnoe bede so opfe tnh we ith Signal Co hasesnessisvme ecnaptsa ocift uy-nbiut ciladpinabgi plirtioegsr, acmul truerqaul ires security forces, as well as which capabilities th55 awareness of political-military sensitivities, they bring that can help build capacity. Devel- Top: appropriate training programs, expert SOF oping competent forces on both sides requires sailor works with bottle-nose trainers, and validation of efforts. dolphin during mine countermeasure candid assessments and dedication as well n Outside Factors. Of course, the war operations, exercise rim of the as clear communication. Participants must on terror extends beyond the Pacific region. Pacific 00 not ignore feedback or overreact to training Today, the majority of SOF are deployed in setbacks. Instead, they must continue to assess Bottom: support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and and adapt training programs, and be aware of u.s. special Forces and troops from Enduring Freedom. This deployment requires republic of Korea prepare for fast- which capacities are improving. that SOCPAC must do more with less. The rope training aboard Joint venture Such a focused training cycle produces command must prioritize where personnel high-speed vessel quantifiable and observable results. Typically, go and what they do and ensure that they the host nation force performs a capabilities can manage expectations. Outside factors demonstration during a closing ceremony. also include external support of terrorist ndupress.ndu.edu  issue 44, 1st quarter 2007 / JFQ    2 JFQ44[text].indd 25 11/27/06 10:33:30 AM Winning in the Pacific organizations in the form of finance, logistics, to learn what the people of Basilan needed to populace saw that the AFP was more powerful equipment, communication networks, and sever their ties with Abu Sayyaf. The islanders’ and legitimate than the terrorists. The indi- ideology. Close cooperation between host greatest concerns were roads, water, security, rect approach of the Basilan model enabled nation forces and U.S. country team officials medical care, and education. Addressing the AFP to provide locals with a stable envi- to help eliminate the lifelines of transnational those needs meant digging wells and building ronment that enabled commerce and quality threats is vital. roads. SOCPAC also worked with its Philip- of life improvements. For more than 5 years, SOCPAC pine counterparts to construct piers and an Archipelago Region. Due to the trans- involvement in the war on terror in the airstrip for AFP operations. The plan was for national nature of terrorist organizations, the Pacific region has been consistent and this infrastructure to be left for the Philippine archipelago of the Philippines, Malaysia, and ongoing. The command now partners with military and civilian population. Indonesia is a key focus of SOCPAC indirect 10 countries and participates in more than This collaboration helped the command efforts. The approach is similar to that taken 50 military-to-military events a year. This gain the confidence of our counterparts and in Basilan and has been adapted to the socio- indirect approach has been a slow and delib- the population through a variety of engi- economic and geographic characteristics of erate process that requires commitment to neering, medical, and community outreach the archipelago region. Once stability and building trust and confidence throughout the projects. The AFP led in setting security good governance are established in the outer region and knowing that the results will not conditions that enabled capacity-building islands, nongovernmental and private orga- be immediate. This effort is especially well efforts. Within months, SOCPAC received nizations will more likely operate and com- along in key areas. additional forces that extended its humanitar- merce will more likely expand. The Philippines. SOCPAC’s continued ian assistance program. Units, working side Initial steps in this region have included contribution to its counterparts in the Philip- by side with the Filipinos, began improv- slowly and steadily reestablishing ties with the pines exemplifies a successful interagency, ing schools, hospitals, and mosques. The Indonesian military. The command initially multinational indirect approach to combating local population became supportive of the engaged with their military through a series terror. In the aftermath of 9/11, SOCPAC SOCPAC and national military presence, and of 2-week subject matter expert exchanges deployed to the Muslim south of the Philip- the AFP increasingly developed trust in the (SMEEs) and post-tsunami civic action proj- pines for the first time since World War II to U.S. advise-and-assist role. ects. After conducting 5 SMEEs and several assist the military and civilian population in After 2 years, the environment no humanitarian assistance initiatives in 8 light of the security challenges in Basilan. The longer fostered terrorist activities on Basilan months, the Indonesian military approached rest of Southeast Asia was watching to see if Island, and Abu Sayyaf left. The AFP had SOCPAC regarding expanding its role to the U.S. military would honor its words with effectively drained the swamp of the underly- advise and assist their forces. The SMEEs and action. ing conditions favorable to terrorists with civil-military operations set the conditions SOCPAC personnel arrived on Basilan U.S. assistance. With the Basilan people now for continuing the partnership. We have now Island in January 2002 with the mission of living in a safer environment, the AFP down- completed six combined events and several advising and assisting the Armed Forces sized its presence from 15 infantry battalions construction projects with the Indonesian of the Philippines (AFP), who would then to 2. By guaranteeing security, the Philippine military, which have increased the trust conduct operations against Abu Sayyaf. At the military allowed teachers and doctors to between the forces. More events are planned. time, Basilan Island was known to the AFP return, while business and nongovernmen- SOCPAC has also started achieving and local population as a terrorist safe haven. tal organizations could operate in areas stronger military-to-military relationships The command operated under strict rules of they once shunned. The AFP won back the in Malaysia. Success with Malaysian forces engagement and stayed in the background to support of the population and government, focuses largely on partnering during mul- ensure that the AFP was up front. producing a long-lasting effect. tinational naval exercises. The world-class On hitting the ground, SOCPAC person- Another indicator of success came from training events and professionalism of U.S. nel assessed the units they would work with the Basilan people, who chose to support the forces impressed the Malaysian military, and conducted a series of population surveys government rather than Abu Sayyaf. The and we gained immensely from their U.S. Air Force (Sean P. Houlihan) U.S. Navy (John L. Beeman) the indirect approach requires commitment to building trust throughout the region and knowing that the results will not be immediate  JFQ / issue 44, 1st quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu JFQ44[text].indd 26 11/27/06 10:33:37 AM fRIDOvICH and kRAWCHUk state-of-the-art training facilities, which measure how effectively SOCPAC assists host economic opportunity, safety, different assisted SOCPAC efforts to execute realis- nation partners in winning over populations channels for political influence to travel, and tic training scenarios. Strengthening ties and developing institutions of stability. The ways to strengthen family and cultural ties with the three archipelago nations builds a system has shown that we are making lasting outside of terrorist movements. solid foundation for a multilateral indirect progress even though the results are not A better understanding of the concerns approach to transnational security. instant. The effects-based approach helps the of stakeholders will aid the search for alter- Thailand. In addition to the archi- command prioritize efforts, shift resources, natives to political violence. This requires pelago nations, SOCPAC counts on Thailand and ensure that the indirect approach leveraging the knowledge and capabilities of as an important regional partner. The remains focused and balanced. U.S. and host nation diplomatic, informa- command has enjoyed a rich relationship Given its success in the southern Phil- tional, military, economic, and law enforce- with the Thai military for many years. It ippines, the command plans to partner with ment instruments of power in a coordinated consistently participates in a variety of other countries to achieve similar effects, and focused effort. combined training and exercises, maintain- with host nation forces in the lead. Every ing extended relationships with some units. situation is different and requires a program U.S. Special Operations Forces are This military partnership demonstrates the that is appropriate to the local context and uniquely organized and equipped to win importance of building on the trust already needs of the stakeholders. The approach the warfare of the 21st century. Through its established with host nations. in other Asian nations will be methodical, actions and tangible results, Special Opera- The Thai military gives SOCPAC assessing underlying conditions and host tions Command, Pacific, has demonstrated solid, quiet support. Its leaders have asked nation units, improving the socioeconomic that the indirect approach is an effective for advice and assistance in areas of concern and security situation at hand, enhancing the model for addressing asymmetric threats. and provide constructive feedback on the legitimacy of local government, and severing By actively implementing an indirect indirect approach. Because the relationship ties with terrorists. approach, the command has shaped condi- is strong, the Thai officers reveal when a spe- In 5 to 10 years, the command will be tions so that commerce, rule of law, and cific approach does not work for them and working with new partner nations while education can flourish and provide alterna- how we might improve, all with complete sustaining existing partnerships. We have tives to violence and despair. Relationships candor. They are also open to our comments, anchored relationships in the Philippines and with host nation counterparts have provided a sure indicator of a firm relationship formed Thailand and will continue growing partner- a robust exchange of actionable recommen- over time. ships in Malaysia and Indonesia. SOCPAC dations that promote measurable results. will most likely broaden indirect efforts to This innovative approach is relevant in an Effects-based measurement include working by, through, and with forces increasingly complex security environment. In the end, the only meaningful in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and India. The Working by, through, and with multina- criteria for judging SOF strategy and opera- U.S. approach will continue to develop trust- tional and interagency partners will be criti- tions in the war on terror in Southeast Asia ing relationships, with host nation partners cal to continued success in combating terror are the results and changes that ensue. in the lead. The command will engage these in the Pacific. JFQ SOCPAC has established an effects-based nations in a purposeful manner to ensure assessment system that looks closely at its that it can build relationships as successfully NOTES return on investment regarding activities as it did in Southeast Asia. with host nation partners, measuring the As it creates partnerships, the 1 Pew Global Attitudes Project, America’s Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over effects quarterly. command looks forward to establishing Iran, Hamas, June 13, 2006, available at <http:// This effects-based system assesses how strong links with U.S. Embassies and Asian pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252>. we are doing in building strong relationships multilateral security organizations. Diffus- 2 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, and improving capacity—not simply count- ing terrorist organizations requires working The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the ing the number of activities. The intent is to together to offer alternative ideologies, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 376. Fleet Combat Camera Group, Pacific (Edward G. Martens) 3 According to Joint Publication 3–07.1, Joint Left to right: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign chairman and secretary field press Internal Defense, foreign internal defense “is the questions on humanitarian relief in participation by civilian and military agencies of a Philippines after mudslide government or other designated organization to free coastguardsman discusses maritime and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, interdiction with Philippine navy and insurgency.” Unconventional warfare builds on boarding team, exercise southeast the foundation of working by, through, and with Asia cooperation Against terrorism indigenous or surrogate forces. Although the mili- tary and law enforcement agencies kill, capture, and Army special Forces conduct security detain terrorists, these direct action missions should assistance training for Philippine soldiers, operation Enduring Freedom not be at the expense of the “advise and assist” approach that foreign internal defense and uncon- ventional warfare offer as their centerpiece. ndupress.ndu.edu  issue 44, 1st quarter 2007 / JFQ    2 JFQ44[text].indd 27 11/27/06 10:33:40 AM