Colloquium Brief U.S. Army War College and 21st Century Defense Initiative of The Brookings Institution COIN OF THE REALM: U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY Ralph Wipfli The Brookings Institution Dr. Steven Metz Strategic Studies Institute KEY INSIGHTS: • R egardless of whether counterinsurgency (COIN) will be the dominant form of military activity in the future or simply one of several, the United States needs an effective national strategy which explains when, why, and how the nation should undertake it. • T he basic assumptions of the current approach need revisited, especially those dealing with the role of the state, the strategic framework for American involvement, and the whole-of-government approach. • G iven the demands placed upon the armed forces by the current campaigns, most of the effort has been on tac- tics, training, and doctrine. Ultimately strategic transformation is at least as important if not more so. • R ather than thinking of counterinsurgency and warfighting as competing tasks, the military and other govern- ment agencies must pursue ways to integrate them, thus assuring that the United States can address the multi- dimensional threats which characterize the contemporary security environment. The “Future Defense Dilemmas” seminar series is a new partnership between the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution and the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. Its goal is to bring together defense experts and policy leaders from academia, the military and defense community, other governmental organizations, and nongovernmental institutions for discussions on looming defense questions and dilemmas. On October, 22, 2007, the 21st Century Defense Initiative and the Strategic Studies Institute launched the Future Defense Dilemma series with a day-long seminar entitled “COIN of the Realm: U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategy.” This was inspired by the recent U.S. military experience in Afghanistan and Iraq and the subsequent renewed interest in COIN. This has far-reaching effects on military doctrine, education, training, knowledge management, force structure planning and personnel management, as research, development, and acquisition priorities. In a very real sense, the U.S. military of the future will be shaped by efforts to become more effective at counterinsurgency. Given this wide-ranging and deep impact, the seminar explored two key questions: (1) Is the United States pursuing and executing the right strategy? And (2) Does the military’s focus on counterinsurgency detract from other defense and security needs? To address these issues, the seminar organizers assembled an impressive group of experts from the military, government, and academia to present their assessment of the current effort, lay out the challenges, and offer options for further increasing U.S. effectiveness at counterinsurgency. The event was not-for-attribution to encourage candid debate. This brief summarizes the presentations, arguments, and discussions at the general level without attribution to any particular speaker or participant. Professor Douglas Lovelace, Director of the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, and Dr. Peter W. Singer, Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at Brookings, provided introductory remarks, introduced panel speakers, and moderated the discussions. Visit our website for other free publication downloads http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ To rate this publication click here. 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THIS PAGE Same as 4 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 parties to the national government are fragmented and PANEL 1: ARE WE GETTING COIN RIGHT? parochial. They do not trust each other and have more allegiance to their ethnic, sectarian, or tribal constituents The first panel addressed the question of whether or than to Iraq as a whole. Afghanistan is similar. Places not the United States is getting its new COIN strategy like Somalia are even worse—there is not even a flawed right. Dr. Janine Davidson of the Pentagon’s Department and dysfunctional government there. Given the realities of Defense Stability Operations Capabilities, Dr. Steven and conflicts of the 21st century, state-centric approaches Metz of the Strategic Studies Institute, and Colonel T. X. to COIN may be inadequate. It is not clear, though, what Hammes (USMC, Ret.), author of The Sling and the Stone, should supersede them. set the stage for a lively discussion. Their presentations The military component of counterinsurgency must analyzed, challenged, and developed the conceptual always be balanced against and integrated with the framework and theoretical underpinnings of the current other components. One participant argued that rather U.S. COIN strategy. than thinking of COIN as a military activity, it should be The U.S. military’s emphasis on COIN raises conceptualized as a strategic communication campaign new skill requirements. Commanders in the field, for supported by a military component. Iraq is again instance, need an in-depth understanding of local power instructive. According to one expert at the seminar, the structures, organizations, and culture. The ability to United States has failed to develop an effective, culturally establish and maintain personal relationships must be attuned narrative in its strategic communication effort. transmitted to the next generation of leaders. General The narrative has often shifted as themes are tried, then David Petraeus had begun exploring ways to do that abandoned. By focusing on the national level, it has not as the commander of the U.S. Army Combined Arms fully integrated local messages and priorities which have Center and Fort Leavenworth and is now implementing the greatest influence on the daily lives of Iraqis. And it it on an even broader scale in Iraq. But transferring has been hampered by perceived divergences between organizational knowledge is not easy with frequent the American message and American behavior. The personnel turnover. This poses an enduring challenge U.S. narrative says that the war on terrorism is not a for the U.S. military. “clash of civilizations,” but senior officials sometimes use When engaged in counterinsurgency, the United language that suggests that they do see it that way when States focuses on restoring or augmenting the capacity addressing domestic audiences. The narrative promotes and legitimacy of a partner state. Discussions at the the rule of law, but to Iraqis, the United States appears seminar suggested that this may be inadequate in the 21st to allow security contractors to operate above the law. century since very few national governments in conflict- The United States maintains what many people around prone regions can sustain this degree of legitimacy the world see as illegal incarceration and interrogation and control. Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, are programs for its enemies. The United States opposes wrought with weak central governments and internal nuclear proliferation but tolerates Israel and India’s divisions. Their national governments exercise limited nuclear programs. The resulting credibility deficit is authority in major parts of their territory. Subnational hard to overcome. organizations, many built on sectarian, ethnic, or tribal The conflict in Iraq demonstrates that counter- lines, provide security and services, filling the void insurgency is difficult when strategic objectives change left by the weaknesses of the national governments. A or remain unclear. It also shows that the U.S. obsession counterinsurgency strategy which ignores subnational with clear metrics and indicators of success complicates groups and seeks only to strengthen the national counterinsurgency. Success in COIN is often difficult government may be doomed to failure. While existing to measure. There are as many setbacks as victories. counterinsurgency doctrine does not fully reflect this, National level metrics may have little relevance at the military leaders and civilians on the ground in Iraq and local level. Local ones may vary from place to place. Afghanistan do. They have, by necessity, become more This means that strategic planners and policymakers closely involved with subnational political and security may not know with certainty what works and what does organizations. But as the United States remains involved not. Sustaining public and congressional support under in counterinsurgency, it must address enduring tensions such conditions is an enduring challenge. A seminar between local and national initiatives. participant suggested that the United States also needs The state-centric approach to COIN works when clear indicators of failure so that it can decide when it there is a viable partner government truly committed to might be best to disengage. This would allow weighing economic, political, and security sector reform and willing the cost of continuing a COIN campaign against the and able to make difficult decisions to see it through. In desired outcome. Disengagement or changes in strategy the 21st century, this is increasingly rare. Take Iraq. The would be easier to justify, plan, and execute if the 2 conditions for them were specified from the outset. Peters (USA, Ret.), author of Wars of Blood and Faith: The The first panel stressed the need for a whole-of- Conflicts That Will Shape the 21st Century and many other government approach to counterinsurgency. Jointness books and articles. The presentations and discussions must become seamless interagency cooperation. At addressed balancing counterinsurgency with other this point, most of the effort expended on reviving U.S. defense capabilities. counterinsurgency capabilities has been within the The current environment puts many demands on military, and at the tactical and operational levels. There the U.S. defense establishment: defending the homeland; is no framework for a whole-of-government approach conducting the broader war on terrorism; undertaking (although efforts are under way). If successful, this stability operations and addressing state failure and should facilitate strategic communications and local ungoverned spaces; preventing the proliferation of narratives. weapons of mass destruction (WMD); traditional deterrence and force projection; and humanitarian STRATEGIC AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES intervention. There are few instances of a conflict involving a single type of threat. Instead, every operation involves During lunch, Dr. Conrad Crane, lead author of multiple threats and requires a broad range of military the Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24 “Count- capabilities. Counterinsurgency must be approached in erinsurgency,” discussed the genesis of the new doctrine this more complicated and multidimensional context. and criticism of it. He identified seven ideas that have COIN operations, in particular, demand capabilities emerged from security scholars and experts: (1) the which are in short supply including Special Operations doctrine is wrongheaded because only brutality can Forces, translators, cultural experts, military police, and quell an insurgency; (2) the doctrine should focus more engineers. These low-density, high-demand capabilities on the enemy; (3) the doctrine is irrelevant because still need to be expanded. In addition, significant shortfalls contemporary internal wars may include elements of exist in important nonmilitary capabilities dealing with insurgency, but are not, strictly speaking, insurgencies; governance, reconstruction, economic development, (4) the doctrine reflects 20th century insurgencies more civil society building, policing, and intelligence. While than contemporary ones; (5) for a range of social, political, these are best provided by agencies other than the and military reasons, the United States cannot execute military, it is sometimes forced to undertake them. The the doctrine; (6) concentrating on counterinsurgency broader strategic issue is whether American security is will cause the U.S. military to lose skills essential best promoted by having the military fill this enduring for conventional warfighting; and (7) the doctrine capability vacuum, or by augmenting nonmilitary undervalues the contributions that technology can make agencies and departments. to counterinsurgency. The United States needs an overarching strategy Dr. Crane also suggested future issues that must and operating principles for counterinsurgency. It be addressed if the United States is to become more requires a whole-of-government approach which does effective at counterinsurgency. First, we need a national not yet exist. Even the military is not fully committed security strategy that explains why counterinsurgency is to transforming for the COIN mission. As the Army important and when the United States should undertake and Marine Corps increase in size, they simply will add it. We need to continue development of joint doctrine more units of the existing types. This may not increase and concepts that reflect the realities of the contemporary overall effectiveness at counterinsurgency. Procurement security environment. We need more effective ways of also continues to follow traditional patterns with only encouraging partner states to undertake serious and small shifts in response to COIN needs. When the sustained reform. And we need to better understand the budget supplementals shrink or end, it is not clear which concept of transnational insurgency. programs will survive. The strategic context of counterinsurgency is vitally PANEL 2: TOO MUCH COIN? BALANCING COIN important. Early intervention or preventative measures WITH OTHER NEEDS offer the best chance of success at an acceptable cost. When considering involvement in counterinsurgency, The afternoon panel included Colonel Robert the United States must decide not only when to intervene Killebrew (USA, Ret.), defense consultant, former but also how. Should it be only with allies or unilaterally Deputy Director of the Army After Next Project and if no allies step up? former U.S. Army War College faculty member; Michele History suggests that outsiders are most effective at Flournoy, President and co-founder of the Center for a providing counterinsurgency support to local partners New American Security and former Deputy Assistant rather than controlling the operation themselves. Local Secretary of Defense; and Lieutenant Colonel Ralph forces are better rooted in society, enjoy more legitimacy, 3 and are more knowledgeable in the local customs and solution can end an insurgency, the bulk of the U.S. effort geography. A counterinsurgency campaign designed in terms of personnel and expense may be military. and led by local forces will often avoid inspiring The seminar participants noted that the emphasis on nationalistic resistance. The problem is, though, that counterinsurgency runs counter to some of the central most insurgencies are components of civil wars, so ideas of defense transformation. It has been based on the local security forces may be seen as oppressors by some assumption that quality and technology can substitute elements of the population. American planners must for quantity. The two are fungible. As a result, the be sensitive to this and aware that U.S. forces may be U.S. military has been reduced in size and the number seen as more unbiased and protective of the rights of of weapons platforms has been cut. While units and the population than local security forces. Planners platforms are, on an individual basis, more capable than must also work with America’s partners to assure that they were 2 decades ago, there are fewer of them. The quest local security forces are representative and respectful of for efficiency has led to a loss of depth in both manpower human rights. and equipment. As Iraq is demonstrating, this makes it The U.S. military is still searching for ways to train difficult to undertake manpower-intensive, protracted and assist partner militaries better, without eroding counterinsurgency operations. And even if quantity and other capabilities. The issue of the optimal in-country quality are fungible in conventional warfighting, they organization for counterinsurgency support matters may not be in counterinsurgency where presence on the greatly. One participant at the seminar argued that ground and sustainment of protracted presence matters military assistance groups under the control of the senior more. Given this, the United States needs to rethink or American civilian (usually the ambassador) should be adjust the transformation process if it intends to become the preferred option. This will assure that the civilian more effective at counterinsurgency. and military components of the U.S. support effort are The panelists and participants were also concerned fully coordinated. But this again indicates the need for that the U.S. military might go too far in its shift toward the Department of State and other civilian agencies to counterinsurgency. Clearly this has tangible and oppor- increase their counterinsurgency capabilities so they can tunity costs. The key is to balance counterinsurgency effec- contribute to the whole-of-government approach. This tiveness with other defense imperatives, make sure that is likely to require an increase in the size of the Foreign force development reflects national strategy, and seek Service and the Agency for International Development the maximum overlap between the capabilities needed (and possibly other agencies as well, such as the for counterinsurgency and other military missions. Department of Justice). The Department of Defense, some argued, should help the State Department in this **** regard, perhaps even by shifting funds to it. There are legislative barriers to some needed reforms The views expressed in this brief are those of the including the transfer of funds and the reallocation of authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or personnel. Congress must address this. Legislative position of the Department of the Army, the Department changes must also include the reform of the personnel of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This colloquium brief management system among both civilians and the is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. military. The current structure does not take full advantage of existing COIN skills. Individuals often do ***** not pursue certain job options which might limit their future career advancement. The Army’s Foreign Area More information on the Strategic Studies Institute’s Officer Program, for example, is not perceived as career programs may be found on the Institute’s homepage at enhancing since it takes those who participate away from www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil. the sort of troop and staff assignments that promotion boards prefer. If the United States is to be more effective at COIN, the personnel management systems must be redesigned to generate the needed skill sets. Speakers and participants challenged many of the underlying assumptions that have shaped the efforts to augment American counterinsurgency capabilities. For instance, one argued that the old mantra that COIN is 20 percent military and 80 percent political can be misleading if it is interpreted to mean that 80 percent of those involved should be civilians. While only a political 4