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Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2007 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2007 to 00-00-2007 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Hurricane Katrina. Lessons for Army Planning and Operations 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Rand Corporation,1776 Main Street,PO Box 2138,Santa REPORT NUMBER Monica,CA,90407-2138 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE 107 unclassified unclassified unclassified Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Hurricane Katrina Lessons for Army Planning and Operations Lynn E. Davis, Jill Rough, Gary Cecchine, Agnes Gereben Schaefer, Laurinda L. Zeman Prepared for the United States Army Approved for public release; distribution unlimited ARROYO CENTER The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army under Contract No. W74V8H-06-C-0001. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hurricane Katrina : lessons for army planning and operations / Lynn Davis ... [et al.]. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-8330-4167-8 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Military planning—United States. 2. Armed forces—Civic action—United States. 3. Hurricane Katrina, 2005. 4. Disaster relief—Gulf States. I. Davis, Lynn. U153.H87 2007 363.34'8—dc22 2007017599 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R ® is a registered trademark. © Copyright 2007 RAND Corporation All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2007 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/ To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Preface Hurricane Katrina was a truly catastrophic domestic emergency, both in the number of deaths and the untold damage and destruction caused by the storm. The Army asked the RAND Arroyo Center to assess the Army response to Hurricane Katrina and to raise the critical issues for future Army planning and operations. This book focuses on those problems that most affected the timeliness and robustness of the Army’s response to Hurricane Katrina. It explores steps that the Army, in both its active-duty and National Guard components, can take to improve its responsiveness, within the constraints inevitable in situa- tions involving such catastrophic destruction. This publication will be of interest to anyone concerned with how the nation should prepare to respond to future catastrophic events, not only to severe hurricanes and other natural disasters but also to potential terrorist attacks. This research was sponsored by the Commander of U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). It was conducted within the RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army. The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is DAPRR06017. iii For more information on RAND Arroyo Center, contact the Direc- tor of Operations (telephone 310-393-0411, extension 6419; FAX 310- 451-6952; email [email protected]), or visit Arroyo’s web site at http://www.rand.org/ard/. Contents Preface............................................................................. iii Figures.............................................................................vii Tables .............................................................................. ix Summary.......................................................................... xi Acknowledgments...............................................................xv Abbreviations................................................................... xvii CHAPTER ONE Introduction....................................................................... 1 Background......................................................................... 1 Analytical Approach............................................................... 7 Report Organization............................................................... 9 CHAPTER TWO Background.......................................................................11 How the Nation Is Organized to Respond to Domestic Emergencies......11 Active-Duty Military...........................................................14 The National Guard............................................................15 How the Nation Prepared and Responded to Hurricane Katrina...........15 CHAPTER THREE The Military Response to Hurricane Katrina..............................19 The National Guard Response...................................................19 The Response of Active-Duty Forces.......................................... 28 The Command and Control System........................................... 38 Lessons from Hurricane Katrina................................................45 v vi Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations CHAPTER FOUR Implications for Army Planning and Operations .........................47 Roles and Responsibilities of National Guard and Active Forces...........47 Army Transformation......................................................... 48 National Guard.................................................................49 Department of Defense Post–Hurricance Katrina Initiatives.............51 Should States Do More?..........................................................52 Should There Be a Regional Approach?....................................... 54 Should National Guard or Active-Duty Forces in ARFORGEN Be Designated for HLS? ...................................58 Command and Control Structure ............................................. 60 Alternative 1: Separate Federal and State Task Forces......................63 Alternative 2: Dual-Status Command ...................................... 64 Alternative 3: State Joint Force Headquarters in Lead.................... 66 Alternative 4: NORTHCOM in Lead...................................... 66 Matching the C2 Structure to Disaster Response Characteristics.........67 Choosing a C2 Structure.......................................................70 CHAPTER FIVE Conclusions.......................................................................73 APPENDIX Situational Awareness in Hurricane Katrina.............................. 77 References.........................................................................83 Figures 1.1. Characteristics of Hurricane Andrew and Hurricane Katrina.. 2 1.2. Accomplishments in Response to Hurricane Katrina............ 3 3.1. Army National Guard Buildup in Mississippi ...................21 3.2. Army National Guard Buildup in Louisiana.................... 22 3.3. Types of Army National Guard Personnel (September 9, 2005).................................................25 3.4. Flow of Military Forces to Mississippi and Louisiana.......... 30 3.5. Buildup of Army Active-Duty Units..............................31 3.6. Types of Army Units Deployed....................................35 3.7. Hurricane Katrina Command and Control Structure......... 43 4.1. Army ARFORGEN Process........................................49 4.2. Separate Federal and State Task Forces.......................... 64 4.3. Dual-Status Command.............................................65 4.4. State Joint Force Headquarters in Lead...........................67 4.5. NORTHCOM in Lead............................................ 68 vii