g(cid:3) DEFENSE WI AND ARM S -- -` F -- A ';_ I. ... S T U D PRO [ 0- MAS SACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED 1993 N/A - 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Massachusetts Institute of Technology Defense & Arms Control Studies 5b. GRANT NUMBER Program 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Security Studies Program Massachusetts Institute of Technology 292 REPORT NUMBER Main Street (E38-600) Cambridge, MA 02139 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE SAR 32 unclassified unclassified unclassified Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL STUDIES PROGRAM he Defense and Arms Control Studies (DACS) Program is a graduate-level, research and training program based at the MIT Center for International Studies. It traces its origins to two initiatives. One was the teaching on international security topics that Profes- sor William Kaufmann began in the 1960s in the MIT Political Science Department. The other was the MIT-wide seminars on nuclear weapons and arms control policy that Profes- sor Jack Ruina and Professor George Rathjens created in the mid 1970s. The program's teaching ties are primarily but not exclusively with the Political Science De- partment at MIT. The DACS faculty, however, includes natural scientists and engineers as well as social scientists. Of particular pride to the program is its ability to integrate techni- cal and political analyses in studies of international security issues. Several of the DACS faculty members have had extensive government experience. They and the other program faculty advise or comment frequently on current policy problems. But the program's prime task is educating those young men and women who will be the next generation of scholars and practitioners in international security policy making. The program's research and public service activities necessarily complement that effort. The Center for International Studies is a major unit of the School of Humanities and Social Science at MIT and seeks to encourage the analysis of issues of continuing public concern. Key components of the Center in addition to DACS are Seminar XXI, which offers training in the analysis of international issues for senior military officers, government officials, and industry executives; and the MIT Japan Program, which conducts research and educational activities to further knowledge about Japanese technology, economic activities, and politics. DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL STUDIES PROGRAM MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 292 MAIN STREET (E38-603) CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02139 (617) 253-8075 FAX (617) 258-7858 COVER PHOTO: SPANISH WAR VETERANS STATUE CONCORD AVENUE, CAMBRIDGE, MA PHOTOGRAPH BY KELLY GREENHILL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR ruth be told, the United States took the Cold War more seriously than did any other of the war's major participants. With great expenditure, much trial and error, and more than occasional innovative analysis, the United States built a military that was by the war's end simply unsurpassable. The American military had the best equipment, the most profes- sional leadership, the most sophisticated training, and most extensive logistical support of any in the world. It had these attributes because it was expected to be able to fight (and often did) far from its home bases in the difficult climates against the difficult opponents. The American military thought it had to be ready to meet the Communist challenge nearly any- where on the globe it might conceivably appear. In contrast our European allies came to view the Cold War as essentially a jobs program. Ex- hausted by the Second World War, they were quick to accept that threat posed by the Soviet Union could only be met by the United States and, with minor exception, organized their de- fense efforts to maximize local employment rather than, as America largely did, military util- ity. Their militaries often expressed preference for American equipment and practices, but were usually required to accept whatever systems national firms alone or in regional consor- tia could develop. The training of West European militaries suffered and their ability to project force at any distance from their borders was quite limited because European politi- cians were unwilling to impose significant burdens on their populations. The Soviet Union, the other half of the Cold War, gradually slid into the same policies, al- lowing its once mighty military to become sclerotic while focusing its attention on expanding employment in a vast network of factories that produced great quantities of often obsolete weapons. Like the West European militaries, the Red Army saw little combat during the Cold War and had little influence in weapon procurement decisions. By the war's end the great ideological struggle between capitalism and communism was basically a jobs program for the Soviets as well. As a result, the economies of surviving republics are now burdened with industrial structures composed largely of arsenals and shipyards thoroughly accustomed to make-work orders. Roles are now being reversed. Many of America's allies and former opponents seek to build capable militaries while America itself is beginning to consider defense as a jobs program. Chaos is growing along the borders and within the former Soviet Union. Ethnic and religious fissures, long paved over by Communist regimes, are reappearing, causing bloody conflicts and waves of refugees. Even when defense budgets are being reduced because of economic pressures, nations in Europe and Asia want the protection of militaries trained and equipped to fight. There is talk about shedding conscription to build professional forces, of acquiring airlift capabilities, and of the need to purchase or de- be said to be in fact post Cold War budgets. There velop high technology weapons like those used by U.S. are substantial changes ahead for the American mili- forces. Delegation after delegation stop by for discus- tary. sions. The second observation to note is how easily wish- At the same time, America's military needs are becom- ful thinking can replace clear thinking in the analy- ing less urgently felt. Bounded by two virtually un- sis of options. The attractive vision often offered in armed neighbors and two very large oceans, America is academic discussions that has nations cooperating to REPORT OF far from most of the post Cold War chaos. The U.S. provide security to threatened peoples ignores much THE DIRECTOR armed services have an abundance of modern weapons, unpleasant reality. Nations do not line up to have much more than their likely force structures will be able their soldiers killed in distant locations unless the to absorb. Politicians worried about the future of local threat that they are meeting is persuasive to the par- shipyards and aircraft plants now make the argument for ents of the soldiers as well as to politicians. The their continuation on employment grounds and rarely troops assigned to these duties will not long tolerate mention any strategic requirements that could justify exposure to mortal danger unless provided the right additional production. to retaliate to attacks with overwhelming force. Forging a coalition of nations that regularly will take Finding a strategic rationale for maintaining large U.S. on the burdens of intervention is likely to exceed the forces and busy weapon production lines will be diffi- capacity of even the most accomplished of diplomats. cult. Without a popularly accepted, overarching prin- ciple like anti-communism, proposed interventions must Among us Barry Posen has taken the lead in outlining be argued individually. The budget deficit and a grow- the strategic alternatives. His paper on U.S. grand ing unwillingness to suffer (or inflict) casualties gives national strategies which was based on testimony ready excuse to delay or not to intervene at all. Bad ex- presented to the House Armed Services Committee periences are certain to occur in even our most humani- is already considered a classic. In it he describes the tarian-oriented ventures. After they do, major foreign premises, arguments, and force requirements for the interventions will likely require a direct attack against three alternative national security policies prominent the United States, just as World War Two did, in order in U.S. public discussions - cooperative security, to achieve sufficient popular support. selective engagement, and isolationism. He has supplemented this work with related analyses of na- The MIT Defense and Arms Control Studies Program tionalism, military formats, and specific scenarios (DACS) has sought to stimulate debate about the secu- such as an intervention in the Bosnian conflict. He rity requirements of a post Cold War world. Two im- is also conducting fundamental research on the rela- pressions stand out from this experience. One is the tionship between nationalism and war. determination on the part of many officials and officers to avoid discussion of options. Their understandable, The intervention theme has also been explored by but unsustainable view is that past policies with only Carl Kaysen and George Rathjens in separate minor modification are sufficient. Thus, the continuing projects based at the American Academy of Arts and assertion that high states of operational readiness are re- Sciences. Kaysen is leading a multi-stage study that quired for U.S. forces and that proportional reductions brings together experts from around the world to ex- among the services are best when cuts cannot be amine the causes and consequences of past interna- avoided. The new world situation, however, demands, tional interventions. Rathjens is involved in a parallel it would seem, a total rethinking of force levels and effort that is reviewing the United Nations' experi- military missions. Moreover, defense budgets that ence in peacekeeping and peacemaking activities. hardly have receded to those of the Carter years cannot 4 D E F E N S E AND ARMS CONTROL STUDIES PROGRAM My contribution to the debate has focused on the casu- While some nations may be seeking nuclear status alty issue. The use of force risks casualties, but is there others are pondering their nuclear legacies. Jack the political will to take and inflict casualties in ven- Ruina has been considering the future nuclear arse- tures where national survival is not threatened? Per- nals of the United Kingdom and France, arsenals haps intervention would be more likely if non-lethal that have grown in relative prominence as those of options were available. In June 1993 with the support the United States and the former Soviet Union have of the Army War College and the Office of Net Assess- declined due to treaties and the attrition of peace. A ment, DACS convened what possibly was the world's related topic, interest in which several of us share, is REPORT OF first conference on the use and consequences of non-le- the future of the laboratory complex that supported THE DIRECTOR thal warfare technologies. Over 70 specialists partici- strategic systems in the United States. There is pated in the sessions which were held in Lexington, within these facilities extraordinary technical talent. Massachusetts and which produced a prescriptive list of What is of concern is how this talent can be effec- uses for such technologies. tively utilized while maintaining the reservoir of skills needed for nuclear deterrence. One conflict we often fear will not only be lethal but also nuclear is that between the Arabs and the Israelis. The annual report provides public occasion to thank As part of his work on nuclear proliferation, Marvin those who have been especially helpful in our work. Miller brought together several dozen U.S. and Israeli Prominent among them must be several of our po- experts in discussion of nuclear weapons in the Middle litical science colleagues - Stephen Van Evera, East. The conference had the sponsorship of the whose theoretical suggestions continue to intrigue Rockefeller Foundation. the many students we share with him; Richard Samuels, chair of the department and a leading expert Weapon technologies are certain to proliferate. on Japanese defense policies; and Ken Oye, Director Theodore Postol has been studying the defenses that of the Center for International Studies and a promi- can be raised against ballistic and cruise missiles carry- nent specialist in international trade and security. ing a variety of warheads. Aiding him in this effort are George Lewis and several visitors from Russia and Is- Also we offer our congratulations and best wishes rael who are members of his Defense Technologies to several MIT affiliates who accepted senior posi- Working Group. A number of important papers have tions in the new Administration. Les Aspin, former resulted including the definitive analysis of the Patriot/ chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Scud engagements that occurred during the Gulf War. a PhD graduate of the MIT Economics Department, and MIT's 1992 Commencement Speaker, is the A frequently expressed concern is that Russia will feed new Secretary of Defense. John Deutch, Professor world instability by exporting either weapons of mass of Chemistry and former Provost of MIT, is the Un- destruction or the knowledge how to make them. der Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Tech- Stephen Meyer examined this and related problems in a nology. Sheila Widnall, Professor of Aeronautics symposium he organized on the status of Russian Mili- and Astronautics and Associate Provost of MIT, is tary R&D that was held at the program in November the Secretary of the Air Force, the first woman ever 1992. The general conclusion of the participants was to head a military department. The Under Secretary that Russian military R&D capabilities are rapidly dete- is the Department of Defense official responsible riorating and that Russia's export temptations are con- for the Defense Production Act, the main mobiliza- strained by its own proximity to conflicts and the need tion authority for the nation, and, delegated though to maintain cooperative ties with the United States. its Secretary, the Air Force manages implementa- tion activity for the Act. With surely what was great foresight, just before either John Deutch or M A S C U E T INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY Sheila Widnall signed up for their jobs, DACS hosted a Finally, we would like to thank Commander Greg meeting on the 1992 Amendments to the Defense Pro- Hoffman, USN, our first Navy Federal Executive Fel- duction Act as part of a series organized by the Federal low, for his many significant contributions to the work Emergency Management Agency and the Army War of the program and that of our students. Greg joined us College. in the fall of 1992 not quite certain what to expect. He leaves a year later having convinced us of the value in In addition to those sponsors mentioned earlier, my col- having military fellows affiliated with the program. leagues and I would like to thank sincerely the He was ever patient as he helped us to understand how REPORT OF Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Ford Founda- the military functions and only occasionally laughed THE DIRECTOR tion, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Founda- openly as we demonstrated to him how university fac- tion, the W. Alton Jones Foundation, the Plowshares ulties muddle through their many roles. Fund, the MIT Lincoln Laboratory, the Department of Energy, the Army Environmental Policy Institute, the MITRE Corporation, and the John Merck Fund for Harvey M. Sapolsky their support of our work. ·(cid:3)· ··.. . :: ` " s· "2;···. .:,· i::· ·I-: ······- :····(cid:3)'·:·· ·-· :(cid:3)i(cid:3)":x:l·:`··s· (cid:3) .·kr(cid:3)C. 9:··i:: Cdr. Hoffman on a prior assignment DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL STUDIES PROGRAM FACULTY HARVEY M. SAPOLSKY is Professor of Public Policy and Organi- zation in the Department of Political Science and Director of both the Defense and Arms Control Studies Program and the MIT Communications Forum. Dr. Sapolsky completed a B.A. at Boston University and earned an M.P.A. and Ph.D. at Harvard University. He has worked in a number of public policy areas, notably health, science, and defense where he examines the ef- fects of institutional structures and bureaucratic politics on policy outcomes. In defense he has served as a consultant to the Commission on Government Procure- ment, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Naval War College, the Office of Naval Research, and the RAND Corporation, and has lectured at all of the service academies. He is currently focusing his re- search on interservice and civil/military relations. In July 1989 he succeeded Professor Ruina as Direc- tor of the MIT Defense and Arms Control Studies Program. Professor Sapolsky's most recent defense-related book is titled Science and the Navy, and is a study of military support of academic re- search. A volume on telecommunications policy he co-edited has just appeared. CARL KAYSEN is David W. Skinner Professor of Political Economy Emeritus in the Program in Science, Technology, and Society and a Senior Lecturer at the MIT Center for Interna- tional Studies. Dr. Kaysen earned his B.A. in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania, and his Ph.D. at Harvard University, where he was an economics professor from 1950-1966. From 1966 until 1976, when he came to MIT, he was Director of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton and from 1961-1963 he was the Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Kennedy. He has served as a consultant to RAND, the Defense Department, and the CIA. A member of the Committee on Security Studies of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Dr. Kaysen is currently engaged in organizing a project under the Committee's auspices on emerging norms of justified international intervention. MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY STEPHEN M. MEYER is Professor of Defense and Arms Control FACULTY Studies and Director of Soviet Security Studies at MIT. Prior to joining the MIT faculty in 1979, he was a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard University's Center for Science and International Af- fairs. He received his Ph.D. at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor in 1978. Dr. Meyer's areas of particular interest are de- fense decision-making, military economics, force planning and analysis, and arms control in the former Soviet Union. His current work examines the rise and fall of Soviet military power and the ways in which domestic organizations and institutions influenced Soviet defense policy. Dr. Meyer serves as an advisor on Soviet security affairs to several U.S. government agencies and has testified numerous times in open and closed hearings before the House Armed Services Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. MARVIN M. MILLER is a Senior Research Scientist in the Depart- ment of Nuclear Engineering and a senior staff member of the MIT Center for International Studies. After undergraduate work at the City College of New York he earned an M.A. in Physics from the University of Rochester and a Ph.D. in Electrical Engi- neering from the Polytechnic Institute of New York. Prior to ioining MIT in 1976. Dr. Miller was an associate professor of I ------- ;1-_ _ electrical engineering at Purdue University working on laser theory and applications. His current research interests are arms control, particularly nuclear prolifera- tion, and the environmental impacts of energy use. He has studied proliferation issues since 1977, in- cluding both country-specific and generic problems. In the former, his main interests are in the Middle East and South Asia, while in the latter he has concentrated on international safeguards and export con- trols for sensitive nuclear technologies. From 1984 to 1986, Dr. Miller was a Foster Fellow with the Nuclear Weapons and Control Bureau of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and is currently a consultant on proliferation issues for ACDA, the International Technology Program of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the Technical Support Organization at the Brookhaven National Laboratory. DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL STUDIES PROGRAM BARRY R. POSEN is Professor of Political Science. His most re- cent book, Inadvertent Escalation, was released from Cornell FACULTY University Press in Fall, 1991. His first book, The Sources of Military Doctrine, won the American Political Science Association's Woodrow Wilson Foundation Book Award for the best book published in political science in 1984, and Ohio State University's Edward J. Furniss Jr. Book Award for the best first book in the field of security studies. Dr. Posen did his undergraduate work at Occidental College and his graduate work at the University of California at Berkeley, where he earned an M.A. and Ph.D. Prior to coming to MIT, Dr. Posen was Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton Uni- versity. He has also held a number of prestigious positions: Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institution; Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard; Council on Foreign Relations In- ternational Affairs Fellow; Rockefeller Foundation International Affairs Fellow and Guest Scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Woodrow Wilson Center Fellow, Smithsonian Institu- tion. Dr. Posen's current activities include work on U.S. military strategy and force structure, regional military balance assessment, and nationalism. THEODORE A. POSTOL is Professor of Science, Technology and National Security Policy in the Program in Science, Technology, and Society at MIT. He did his undergraduate work in Physics and his graduate work in Nuclear Engineering at the Massachu- setts Institute of Technology. After receiving his Ph.D., Dr. Postol joined the staff of Argonne National Laboratory, where he used neutron, x-ray and light scattering, along with computer molecular dynamics techniques, to study the microscopic dynamics and structure of liquids and disor- dered solids. Subsequently he went to the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment to study methods of basing the MX Missile, and later worked as a scientific adviser to the Chief of Naval Opera- tions. After leaving the Pentagon, Dr. Postol helped to build a program at Stanford University to train mid-career scientists to study developments in weapons technology of relevance to defense and arms control policy. In 1990 Dr. Postol was awarded the Leo Szilard Prize from the American Physical Society. MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY