ci7- E-L/ c I ARCHIVE COPY NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE DEMANDS OF OOTW ON GROUND FORCES: IMPLICATIONS FOR RECRUITING AND TRAINING CORE COURSE V PAPER JANET M WEBERKLASS OF 1997 MILITARY STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS FACULTY SEMINAR LEADER COL. GENE WILLIAMS FACULTY ADVISOR DR BARD O’NEILL Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 1997 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1997 to 00-00-1997 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Demands of Ootw on Ground Forces: Implications for Recruiting and 5b. GRANT NUMBER Training 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National War College,300 5th Avenue,Fort Lesley J. REPORT NUMBER McNair,Washington,DC,20319-6000 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT see report 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE 14 unclassified unclassified unclassified Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 In the years since the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, increased participation m Operations Other Than War (OOTW) has been one of the defining characteristics of U S nnhtary life. U S troops have been deployed to Ham, Cuba, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Somalia, Iraq, Guam, Bangladesh, Bosma and Zaire m this relatrvely brief period -- always on nn~~r~n~ well short of the “fight and win” that is therr traditional primary function For the purposes of this paper, OOTW will include nnssrons other than conventional battlefield operations, focusing on disaster relief, humanmumn assrstance, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement Such operations have placed unprecedented demands on both enlisted soldiers and officers in recent years It IS no secret that for many members of the U S nnhtary, OOTW are an unwelcome &straction from their primary mission. It is not surprismg that this new identity sits uneasily with many service members Carl Builder and Theodore Karasik, discussing m 1995 the natural conflicts arising from participation m crises and lesser conflicts (CALCs), predicted “A tension m the purpose and identity of U S. mrhtary between war-fighting and broad rmhtary service or between fume rmssions and open-ended tasking CALCs would drive the armed services toward purposes associated with broad rmhtary service to the natron rather than toward ‘fighting and wmnmg the nation’s wars”’ (Burlder and Karaslk define CALCs as mtematronal and nonroutme operations other than war, particularly those that could lead to combat operations It is thus a subset, albeit the most promment one, of OOTW ) The predommance of OOTW, then, threatens to alter the very identity so rightly cherished by members of the armed forces. This mstnutional discomfort with OOTW m turn led, at least mmally, to a reluctance to tackle the plannmg necessary for operations short of full-scale conflict In The Musks of War, Carl Builder had ’ Builder and Karas~k 1995 earlier hoted that, “secondary (as opposed to dommant) images of war are the stepchildren m service plannmg, always findmg some support from the frmge elements m the mstltution, always clamonng for more attention, but always treated as less attractive obligations by the institutional mamstream.“* As it has become clearer that OOTW will contmue to be a large part of rmhtary life, at least for the foreseeable future, acadermc and professional journals have begun to tackle the chaflenges that charactenze lesser confhcts One of the most useful contributors to the fledgling mquu-y has been Builder himself, who has concluded that CALCs present challenges to the qualztzes designed into U S forces, while major regional conflicts (MRCs) present quarztztatzve problems relating to the size and sufficiency of the forces 3 Whde the literature on preparation for OOTW has grown appreciably thanks to the efforts of Builder and others, most of the avalable matenal deals with large-scale issues such as force structure (e g , the appropriate active/reserve mix) and the level at which trammg for OOTW should be done It appears that there has been httle methodical study of the slulls needed by the zndzvzdzrals oldier as he or she confronts the unique demands of OOTW Co1 David Price takes a tentative stab at It m “Leadership Some Thoughts on the Mlhtary Circa 202Y4, but confines himself to the language and cross-cultural slulls that are the most obvious requirements for successful conduct of OOTW This paper will seek to expand on Pnce’s list of the mdlvldual slulls and attibutes needed m the 2 1s t century rmhtary OOTW: The Realm of the Junior NCO: OOTW places unprecedented demands on the Judgmeht and restramt of enlisted soldiers and non-comssloned officers This fact was recognized well m advance of the flood of low intensity operations that charactenze today’s U S ’ Bmlder1989 3 Builder and Karaslk 1995 ’ Pnce 1996 2 rmhta# environment Michael Hat-bottle, wrmng m 1970 of his particrpation with British forces m U N @acekeeping m Cyprus, noted There is no doubt m my mmd that the success of a peace-keepmg operation depends more than anything else on the vigilance and mental alertness of the most Jumor solder and his young non-comrmssioned leader . It is at their level that most of the problems orrgmate, and unless their reactions and palhatives are unmedlate, the detenoration m an otherwise peaceful srtuatron could have far-reaching and serious results Then mmatrve and reflex actions must be spontaneous if a spontaneous mcxdent is not to become a rmhtary and sometimes a pohtrcal issue. However bnlhant the semor commanders and staff may be, they are wholly dependent upon then most lumor commanders ’ Lt Co1 Michael Dewar, describing the key role of the British Jutnor non-commtssroned officer m Northern Ireland, simply stated, “It IS primarily his war . . “6As the nature of OOTW contmues to demand that companies be broken up and dispersed to cover wide areas, the American experience rrnrrors that of the British In a volatile situation, whether m Mogadishu or Bosnia, a simple nnsstep by a young NC0 m command of a checkpoint can quickly escalate mto a major incident with significant poht~al rannfications A senior USMC officer, speaking recently m a non-attribution environment at the National War College, said that m OOTW, “the mdividual soldier has strategic impact ” This paper will thus focus on the challenges awaitmg enlisted and non-comrrnssioned personnel m the OOTW environment More specifically, it will address the tasks confronting grozmdforces m OOTW Although the Au- Force and Navy clearly have an important role m many lesser confhcts, it has historically been the Army and Marme Corps which have borne the maJor burden m these operations To the extent that naval and aviation forces do participate, moreover, their OOTW responsibilities are less radcally different from the functions they would serve m a full-scale war’ 5 Harbottle 1970 ’ Dewar 1985 ’ GAO/-NSIAD-96-14 1995 How is OOTW Different? There are many areas m which OOTW places unique demands on ground forces The most obvious examples occur when soldiers are required to fulfill functions totally at vanance with their ordinary msslons A 1995 GAO report, for example, described the observation and reportmg functions that had been assigned to a mechanized infantry unit m Bosma -- a taskmg having little if anythmg m common with its normal combat rmsslon of breachmg obstacles and provldmg firepower The resultmg degradation m gunnery and maneuver slulls resulted m record low scores m the dlvlslonwlde Bradley qualification test the unit underwent after redeployment, and it took the unit three months of retrammg to increase its readiness level to satisfactory * Because OOTW/warfightmg differences such as this are most easily ldentlfied, and their results more easily quantified (e g , m terms of retrammg time required after redeployment), they receive most of the attention both m the mass media and acadermc press. There are other, more subtle ways m which OOTW places new demands on soldiers, however Adlustmg from the “fight and win” doctrme of overwhelmmg force to more restncted Rules of Engagement (ROE) One study on Army operations m OOTW concluded, “Stress may be worse for troops m OOTW than m high-tempo combat operations because they may not have full recourse to the use of force and must exercise more restramt than their foes “9 The higher threshold required for use of force m the chaotic, close-quarter environments of OOTW understandably increases the sense of vulnerablhty of the m&vldual soldier whose combat trammg has mstllled the mstmct to react quickly and forcefully to a perceived threat Even when nonlethal weapons are avaJable to U S troops, their use may be severely constrained due to polltlcal ’ GAO/NSIAD-96-14 1995 ’ Taw and Peters 1995 4 conslderatlons The senior Marme officer quoted above commented that only superior combat tram~~g mstllls m the soldier the self-confidence necessary to adjust to lmuted ROE Another USMC officer who commanded troops m Mogadlshu has offered the opmlon that, ironically, only Zessr estrlctlve ROE give the soldier on the ground the confidence to exercise the restraint necessary m OOTW The relaxing of ROE’s m pohtlcally sensltlve sltuatlons IS not a likely prospect, however, and this issue will not be soon resolved Dealing With NGO’s. Another Kmd of Culture Clash While solders and non-comrmssloned officers deploy with an awareness that the country for which they are bound will have customs and mores different from their own, they may not be prepared for the gap which may separate them fi;om Westerners (sometimes their own countrymen) already on the ground with non- governmental orgamzatlons (NGOs) Legltlmate NGO concerns that too-close association with the rmhtary could endanger their own personnel or impen carefully forged ties to the local comm~ruty sometimes combme with visceral anti-rmhtary attitudes to create an uncooperative environment Falmg to achieve a rapport with NGO’s can negatively impact the rmhtary’s msslon, as was the case m Somalia, where “ . antagonism complicated U S operations as Amencan units were deprived of both a potentially lucrative source of mformation about the local populailon as well as cooperation m food dlstrlbutlon and other humamtarlan efforts “” Even when rmhtary-NGO relationships are cordial, the non-hlerarchlcal structure of nongovernmental orgamzatlons can be trying to soldiers accustomed to an established cham of comm+d. U S troops are not alone m their frustration with this aspect of their OOTW msslon A Canadian “lessons learned” paper on Operation Deliverance m Somalia commented, “These agencies appeared to be highly dlsorgamzed and inefficient Had it not been for the daly lo Taw and Peters 1995 supervlslon and advice of Canadian hason officers, relief supplies would not have reached people m need. Units deploying on s~rmlar operations should make every attempt to tram hason officers . . “‘l Finally, the very presence of NGO’s changes the operatmg environment for rmhtary personnel, even under optimum con&fions An article m the September 1996 Murzne Corps Gazette, referrmg to the presence of NGO’s and pnvate volunteer orgamzatlons, counseled, “ tlie small unit leader may be surprised to learn that he does not ‘own’ his area of . . . operations.“12 Raised m a culture where autonomy and self-reliance are key, most Marines surely feel frustrated by the need to coordinate plans with clv&tns who may lack an appreciation or understanding of the rmlltary art A Clear Threat, but a Changmg Enemv. OOTW present a umque set of dangers to the soldier on the groimd It ~111o ften be lmposslble to dlstmgulsh a potentially hostile force m a crowd of unarmed clvlllans at a checkpomt Even more confusmg IS the fact that local forces with whom the mrlitary has forged a workmg relationship (sometimes a grudging one) may unexpectedly revert to an aggressive posture A Cana&an soldier Interviewed about his umt’s experiences m Bosma recalled that his unit had been taken hostage three times by Serb forces The Serbs surrounded us, saymg that everybody had better give them then weapons or they would fire Then they sad that if we weren’t gone m two hours, they would drop mortars on our heads We received orders to move mto the hills As soon as we &d, the Serbs put mines around us and took us hostage The commander came to me and said, “Sorry Mike, but we don’t like the way you’re treating us.” . The Serbs, Muslims and Croats play the same games It’s a crazy country I3 ‘I Service Paper on Canadian Axborne Resment Battle Group Lessons learned from Operation Dehverance 1993 l2 Greenwood 1996 I3 MacLean’s 6/12/95 6 Dealmg: With the Press In OOTW, even the smallest unit and lowest-rankmg soldier IS likely to I have contact with Journalists Because OOTW taskmgs often call for the physical dispersal of small units, Journalists have relatively easy access to younger and less expenenced solhers and leaders While most members of the press corps recognize the value of a good workmg relatiqnship with the m.&tary and seek to protect their own credlblhty by not exploltmg unsophisticated interviewees, there will mevltably be some who are more concerned with pubhshmg an attention-grabbing piece than with producing quality work An unguarded comment by any soldier can have disastrous pohtlcal results reqmrmg damage control An article on OOlTf7 m The Marzne Corps Gazette counsels that media relations should be, “coordmated down to the lowest level since that IS often where the press goes for their stories”” The quoted article includes suggested answers to leading questions such as, “Do you feel like a pohtlcal pawn?” (Answer: “No, I feel like a Marme “) How to Guarantee That Our Military Will Be Able to Meet the OOTW Challenge? The foregoing IS only a partial list of the nontradltlonal skills which OOTW demands of armed forces It 1s qe that the skills needed m combat often overlap with those required m OOTW -- but OOTW places an especially heavy prennum on independent Judgment, restraint, and the ability to deal with ambiguity and the unfanuhar The Army seems to have come the farthest m systematically preparmg its troops for pmclpatlon m OOTW The Combat Maneuver Tramng Center (CMTC) at Hohenfehls, Germapy 1s a center for OOTW trammg A ten-day session for a tank or mechamzed infantry battahon includes the mock creation of a Zone of Separation between two rival groups Soldiers I4 Greenwood 1996 are tramed to escort rehef convoys, deal with media and establish clvll-rmhtaxy workmg groups Heavy emphasis 1s placed on development of Junior leaders In an effort to make the trammg as realistic as posable, units bound for Bosnia have found themselves confronted with a scenmo m which three ethmc groups (and even more factions) vie for power Taskforce commanders were forced to negotiate for even the most basic needs base engineers swltched off utlhties until the commanders could convince the “local authorities” to restore them Civil unrest, evacuation of massive UN casualties, and other challenges round out the trammg Closer to home, all three services partlclpated with the Alaska National Guard m a peacekeeping exercise m 1994 Ground forces were required to create a denuhtmzed zone and implement a mass casualty evacuation Red Cross and other NGO representatives partlclpated m order to make the exercise closer to is reality Trammg IS clearly effective m preparing troops for the challenges of OOTW A subJect for further study, however, 1s whether or not the traditional warfighter (although certamly capable of handling OOTW) IS the m&vldual best suited to handle the challenges of lesser conflicts. The reluctance with which many members of the rmhtary have embraced OOTW would seem to nihcate that then- own preferences would take them elsewhere It 1s NorthwhIle to at least conslde,r that an m&vldual with different preferences and inherent aptitudes rmght be better prepared to cope with OOTW -- possibly with greater efficacy, and probably with less stress Pursuing this thesis would mvolve conslderable research mto reqmred slull sets and mdlvldual preferences (as measured, for example, by the Myers-Bnggs Type Indicator,) and 1s far beyond I5 Morrocco 1994