97-E- 33 ARCHIVE COPY cd I NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLE EXPORT POLICY AND THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY & FOREIGN POLICY “We are not going to turn into a space launch supermarket,” one official sad ’ CORE COURSE 5603 ESSAY LT COL THOMAS D SHEARER COURSE 5603 -- NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY PROCESS SEMINAR D FACULTY SEMINAR LEADER -- DR STEVENSON FACULTY ADVISOR -- COL GIBEAU Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 1997 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1997 to 00-00-1997 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Space Launch Vehicle Export Policy and The Struggle between National 5b. GRANT NUMBER Security Policy & Foreign Policy 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National War College,300 5th Avenue,Fort Lesley J. 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THIS PAGE 14 unclassified unclassified unclassified Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 THE STORY IN BRIEF In the sprmg of 1992 several U S commercial aerospace contractors informed the U S Department of State (DOS) that Italy, Spain, and Australia were independently mltlatmg small space launch vehicle (SLV) programs Furthermore, that these counvles wanted the assistance of U S aerospace contractors to build these SLVs Thus, the contractors desired U S government approval to assist these countries bmld then unrelated mdlgenous SLV programs Over the period from Apnl to December 1992 U S contractors followed up their mqulnes by filing 14 speclflc export license requests with the DOS, Defense Trade Center (DTC) These export license requests were for the sale of hardware, technology, and services, to support the SLV programs m these countries U S contractors subnutted these license requests with the knowledge that existing U S national security and foreign pohcy prohibited U S firms from supportmg the development of foreign SLV programs In accordance with standard procedures, the DTC referred these SLV export requests to a formal interagency workmg group estabhshed to approve or deny all rocket related exports from the Umted States For six months this interagency group struggled to reach a consensus on these export cases but remamed deadlocked One faction led by the Department of Defense (DOD) advocated denial of the export licenses based on exlstmg pohcy and another faction led by DOS argued for a change m pohcy and approval of the licenses By December it was clear that neither side would yield and the issue was rased to the National Security Council (NSC) However, the battle lines were drawn and m the context of the 1990 Gulf War SCUD missile attacks, and the rmsslle prohferatlon threat, the NSC was unable to reach a consensus decision The issue was decided the night of 19 January 1993 by President Bush m the White House pnvate residence * On 20 January 1993, the NSC recorded the approval of the entire slate of export cases for these three specific SLV programs as the last act of the Bush Admmlstratlon In approvmg these exports, the President reversed the long standmg U S pohcy agamst support of SLV programs m foreign countries Exammmg the reason why and how this change m U S SLV pohcy took place provides a case study m the U S interagency bureaucratic pohcy makmg process This essay chronicles an SLV pohcy shift resulting from the struggle to balance two components of the Page 1 pohcy triangle of U S national secunty pohcy, foreign pohcy, and economc pohcy It concludes that the near term polmcal foreign pohcy desire to mamtam good relations with mtematlonal friends and allies will often take precedence over rational but nebulous long term national secunty threats To weave this story I will fu-st review the background of U S pohcy prohlbltmg support of foreign SLV programs, and second, I ~111r eview why and how this pohcy was modified m 1992- 1993 Lastly, the conclusion offers some possible lessons for future bureaucratic pohcy decision makers BACKGROUND Understandmg U S pohcy toward foreign SLV programs and why the DOD objected to a shift m this pohcy, begins with the post WW II prohferatlon of nuclear weapons Second, from this nuclear starting point, and the utility of couplmg these weapons with Intercontmental Ballistic Ml&es (ICBMs), emerged the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) The MTCR exphcltly prohibited the transfer of SLVs and theu- technology, and as the MTCR evolved so did the concept of weapons of mass destructlon (WMD) By the end of the 1990 Gulf War the definition of WMD expanded to include not only nuclear weapons but also chemical and blologlcal weapons (NBC) Third, by 1993 analytical studies showed emerging foreign space launch programs were not commercially viable Thus DOD based its poslhon to retam existing pohcy on a series of analytical arguments dating to 1949 In 1949 the Soviet Umon tested Its first nuclear weapon 3 While this event shook the Trumap Admmlstratlon, the only Soviet means of nuclear delivery were medium range TU-4 bombers on one way msslons ’ The United States, fresh from WW II, was confident m Its ablhty to stop a Soviet nuclear ar attack Through the rmd-1950’s the United States remamed confident m its an- defenses despite Soviet development of long range bombers However, all thus changed m August and October 1957. In August the USSR tested its first 5,000 mile range ICBM In October, this same Soviet ICBM used as an SLV placed Sputnik, the world’s first satellite, mto earth orbit ’ For U S pohcy declslon makers, the launch of Sputnik raised grave national security concerns U S policy makers realized that if the USSR could place a satellite mto earth orbit, Page 2 they could also launch nuclear weapons against the United States While Ww II allied au- superiority prevented any an attacks agamst U S troops after 1944, the same 1s not true for German V-2 rocket attacks The V-2 rocket was unstoppable, and thus the Eisenhower Admmlstratlon took this new missile threat very senously As a result the U S. accelerated its own long range rrusslle programs to deter the Soviet threat Five years later, President Kennedy faced the very real posslblhty of nuclear war m the 1963 Cuban Missile Crisis Followmg the peaceful resolution of the crlsI.s, the United States and USSR engaged m a Cold War nusslle race that covered the spectrum from mlhtary ICBMs to the SLV race to the moon Through the rmd 1960’s nuclear weapons and the capablhty to dehver them was controlled by of the five maJor powers that emerged from WW II Namely, the U S , UK, France, USSR, and China However, all nation-states realized the lmphcatlons of nuclear weapons for national power By the rmd 1960’s, nuclear prohferatlon was a concern for the U S , USSR, and then allies As a result, the 1968 Nuclear Non-Prohferatlon Treaty (NPT) “comrmtted all members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, not already armed with nuclear weapons, to forego theu- manufacture and possession ‘I6 By 1992, most nations of the world had signed the I\‘PT Meanwhile, by the 1980’s many nations also realized the value m obtammg “cheap” rmsslle delivery systems for WMD and some nations began to pursue ballistic rmsslle programs Compllcatmg this was the dual use nature of balhstlc nusslles and their technology. The same technology needed for peaceful SLVs also bmlds offensive nusslles The American SLV experience reflects the dual use nature of rocket technology ’ By 1982 the growing rmsslle prohferatlon threat concerned the Reagan Admmlstratlon Out of this mlsslle threat the Admmlstratlon built the 1987 Msslle Technology Control Regime (MTCR] By the end of the Gulf War, MTCR membership had grown from its orlgmal seven members (the Umted States, United Kmgdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Canada) to 18 countries with four addmonal countnes (Russia, Switzerland, Israel, and China) agreeing to abide by the MTCR Guidelines * These Guldelrnes expressed the objective of the MTCR, to prevent the proliferation of any rmsslle capable of dehvermg a 300 Kg payload a distance of 500 Km 9 Here a Page 3 “n-usslle” 1s any rocket with the above capablhtles, mcludmg SLVs However, the MTCR also states that it 1s “not deslgned to impede national space programs or mtematlonal cooperation m such programs as long as such programs could not contibute to nuclear weapons delivery systems “lo In a 1993 RAND study on Emergmg National Space Launch Programs, the author draws the followmg conclusion on space launch programs “Smce (m light of the MTCR) it 1s difficult to argue that space launch programs ‘could not contribute to nuclear weapons dehvery systems,’ namely balhstlc rmsslles, Should the United States provide techmcal assistance to a space launch program, d the recipient country promises to forgo its balhstlc nusslle program? We don’t think so We also find it Important to Inform top government officials of the direct connection between a space launch program and a ballistic nusslle program Ironically, a sequential strategy -- space launch program first, balhstlc nusslle development later -- nught turn out to be the best tactic (to obtain offensive rmsslles) “I1 With ee Iraq1 Scud attacks durmg the Gulf War the MTCR underwent an additional change. It became apparent that rogue states such as Iraq, were not averse to using chemical weapons” agamst their enenues as they had done m their 1980 war with Iran Further, the Iran-Iraq war included extensive use of SCUD rmsslle by both sides The potentlal couplmg of “poor mans nuts” with long range nusslles posed du-ect national secunty threats to the U S and Its alhes Thus, m 1991 the MTCR expanded to cover rockets capable of dehvermg WMD I3 Concurrent with these MTCR changes was the U S post-Challenger return to unmanned SLVs While this was an Internal U S issue, it reflected a large increase m mtematlonal capacity to meet demand for access to space The DOD, Under Secretary of Defense Pohcy, conumssloned the IWND Emergzng Natzonal Space Launch Programs study to evaluate the vlablhty of foreign SLV programs and safeguards agamst the posslblhty of worsening the rmsslle prohferatlon threat The study concluded that new foreign space launch programs for commercial profit are 111c onceived The high cost of entermg this market and an excess capacity of launch providers by 1993, prohlblts the viable pursuit of space launch for commercial gam lJ The report, Page 4 drafted by 1992, also finds that safeguard regimes are ineffective m stopping “technology transfers from space launchers to balhstlc rmsslle “I5 Lastly, the study also concludes ‘That all major launch supphers are either members or ablders of MTCR provides an un recedented opportumty to form a unified posltlon and refram from provldmg space la Lrn ch assistance to others The United States and other MTCR members should not give up prematurely They should discourage emerging national space launch development Instead of hoping that it can be safeguarded Otherwise, the MTCR members n-ught end up promotmg rmsslle prohferatlon instead of slowmg it “I6 SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES & THE POLICY TRIANGLE Should national security pohcy, foreign pohcy, or economic pohcy dictate control of SLV technology and hardware exports? In 1992-1993 the interagency process struggled with this Issue From the start of the post WW II penod, security concerns dommated the U S government posltlon on controllmg SLVs U S national security concerns to prevent the spread of offensive mrsslles began when Von Eraun and V-2 rocket sclentrsts surrendered to the U S Army m 1945 I’ However, m the new post Cold War world of 1992 the existing pohcy was m question The outcome of this debate was influenced by the MTCR, the filing of 14 export cases, the bureaucratic decision making process wlthm the DOS and DOD, and ultimately an NSC recommendation for a Presidential decision The President’s declslon changed 47 years of pohcy on support for foreign SLV programs and controls on dual use SLV technology It 1s the dual nature of rocket technology that accounts for the vague language m the MTCR descnbmg the regime’s wlllmgness to support “national space programs” of member natlons U S national security and foreign pohcy interpretation of thy language prohibited support of foreign SLV programs The MTCR partners shared this view after five years of diplomacy This pohcy had existed lmphcltly smce the Atlas rocket program began m 1946 and exphcltly since the 1987 MTCR There were three exceptions to the U S (and MTCR) pohcy of international non-support of SLV programs First, the United States (and MTCR) did not oppose rockets for use by NATO Second, it did not object to support of SLVs for the European Space Page 5 Agency. Third, It supported the NASA-Italy sclentlflc Scout SLV program The French tested this pohcy m the late 1980’s when they consldered helpmg Brazil on their mdlgenous SLV program In the face stiff U S pohcy objections and mtense dlplomatlc consultations, the French decided not to support the Brazilian SLV program However, while this pohcy was tested for non-MTCR members it was not tested for trade wlthm the MTCR until 1992 In the spring of 1992 three MTCR partners, Italy, Spam, and Australia, began mdlgenous small SLV programs Italy was Interested m building a space launch vanant of the U S NASA Scout rocket Spam sought U S assistance to build a small SLV it named Capncormo Australia lmtlated a small SLV called the Southern Launch Vehicle These three countries contacted U S commercial contractors, who m-turn subrmtted 14 export licenses to the DOS DTC for the three SLV programs I* This set the stage for a test of U S SLV pohcy, and the balance between the competmg Interests of U S foreign and national secunty pohcy By late 1992 the Interagency comn-uttee responsible for reviewing rocket exports, the lMlsslle Technology Analysis Group (MTAG), had not acted on the cases Furthermore, by this time foreign governments and U S contractors were askmg for status on the cases Inqulrles ranged from the workmg level MTAG to the Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, Ambassador Frank Wlsner For example, m October 1992 the Italian Ambassador met with Ambassador Wlsner and asked about the delay m approval of export licenses for the Italian Scout SLV program l9 The reason for the mdeclslon was the struggle between two elements of the policy mangle of foreign pohcy, national security, and economc interests Speclflcally, the MTAG was deadlocked over pohcy differences between DOD and DOS DOD took the posltlon the cases should be denied m accordance with the exlstmg national security pohcy DOS took the posltlon the export cases should be approved on foreign pohcy grounds STATE “A senior offlclal who 1s prepared to devote substantial energy to a problem can exert influence far beyond his o&nary performance The same 1s often true of aJunIor official who has the confidence of his prmclple . “‘O This was the sltuatlon m the DOS when the director of the Office of Weapons Prohferatlon Pohcy, with the concurrence of the Assistant Secretary for Page 6 Politico-Military Affau-s, determmed the U S should approve the pending DTC export cases m suppose of the Italian, Spanish, and Australian small SLV programs ” The DOS took this posltlon over the objections of vn-tually all other Executive Branch agencies ” By November 1992 this issue had moved up the cham of command to the Under Secretary for International Security Affau-s Ambassador Wlsner, aware of the workmg level interagency SLV export deadlock, and facmg pountmg pressure from both U S exporters and mternatlonal governments for a decision, decided to act Usmg his delegated Presldentlal authority over DTC, Ambassador Wlsner decided to approve all 14 export cases He made hrs decision based on the combmed basis of ratlonal logic, bureaucratic output, and pohtlcal resultant RATIONAL LOGIC The logic of his calculation Included several pomts First, he argued that the MTCR does not cover SLV trade among partners Second, that these were NATO and treaty allies, and members of the MTCR, and thus posed no risk of export diversion or rmsslle prohferatlon Third, was the behef that as the MTCR matured with n-on-clad external prohferatlon controls, it should relax internal controls I3 BUREAUCRATIC OUTPUT- Bureaucratically, the DOS also wanted to approve the export cases Desk officers for U S pohcy toward their respective country supported the desires of these allied natlons Pohtlco-rmhtary affars officers who deal with their MTCR partners on a personal level did not want to fall out of disfavor over this issue 2’ More importantly from their perspective they believed it was Important from a foreign policy-nanonal secunty perspective to keep the MTCR a growing regime To do this some reward was needed for becommg an MTCR member, as a tool to attract new members These officers saw allowmg peaceful SLV programs to members m good standing as Just such an incentive Further, thrs incentive was vlewed as a good way to leverage mternanonal cooperation m the NBC arenas POLITJCAL RESULTANT Anally, pohtlcally, at the highest levels, It was difficult to say no These three countnes are like-mmded allies m foreign, national security, and economc affars Ambassador Wlsner personally beheved the United States should be more open m Its thmkmg on exports and he was eager to remam on friendly terms with these government’s ‘j In Page 7 this respect he was more realist than idealist He did not want to stand m the way of exports to “safe customers” and thus wanted to support the sales If at all possible This more than any other reason was why Ambassador Wlsner decided to approve the cases for export, given the national security threat was abstract and only potential Thus, the Ambassador approved the exports based on his personal cost-risk assessment The high cost to foreign pohcy relations on more important issues by saying no, agamst the perceived low prohferatlon risk from these three MTCR partners and allies DOD did not share Ambassador Wlsner’s view of the cost-nsk calculation DEFENSE When the Honorable James Lllley, AssIstant Secretary of Defense for Intematlonal Security Affau-s, learned that Ambassador Wlsner had made the declslon to approve the 14 pending SLV exports, he immediately appealed to the National Security Council (NSC) On 10 December the NSC Iion-Prohferatlon EXCOM met at the AssIstant Secretary level At this meeting DOD presented its case for denial of the export licenses based on rational logic and bureaucratic output DOD held the posltlon that there was no reason to change existing policy First, the Gulf War showed the danger of rmsslle prohferatlon, particularly if combined with WMD Second, that there were no slgmficant technical differences between offensive rmsslles and SLVs 26 Third, that foreign SLV safeguards would not effectively prevent missile prohferatlon Fourth, that these SLV programs would be m direct competltlon with fledgling U S launch providers such as Orbital Sciences Corporation Fifth, that these SLV programs demand they could not be econormcally viable. Sixth, that this change m pohcy would set a precedent for SLV sales, makmg it difficult to say no to future SLV export requests, not only to the cmted States but other MTCR partners as well Lastly, this precedent was undoing U S diplomacy that successfully prevented, deterred, and defeated numerous new SLV programs around the world ” Yet despite the presentatlon of DOD ratlonale and ensumg dlscusslon, the NSC EXCOM remamed at an Impasse, unable to reach a consensus As a result this issue was bumped up to a 21 December 1992 meeting of the EXCOM at the Under Secretary leve1.28 NSC OUTCOME In preparation for the 21 December EXCOM, Paul Wolfowltz, Under Secretary of Defense for Pohcy, prepared his own posltlon based on strong convlctlons m Page 8