ARCHIVE COPY \ NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE To Defend the Temple: Innovation in the Israeli Defense Force DR MICHAEL J AHOLAKLASS OF 1999 COMMITTEE 10 FACULTY SPONSOR DR CHARLES A STEVENSON FACULTY ADVISOR DR JAMES LUCAS I 1 I Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 1999 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1999 to 00-00-1999 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER To Defend the Temple: Innovation in the Israeli Defense Force 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National War College,300 5th Avenue,Fort Lesley J. REPORT NUMBER McNair,Washington,DC,20319-6000 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT see report 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE 30 unclassified unclassified unclassified Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 The sight of burned and blackened figures stumbling or crawling from the rums of their homes and workplaces evokes mghtmarxsh memories of another era, one m whxh a pretlous generation of Je\x s was murdered and then nnmolated by their enenxes Some of the wounded, eyes melted from then sockets from’ the blmdmg light and heat of nuclear fire, are led by fellow \lctlms whose skm has been npped from their bodies by the intense heat and blast of the fireball One shambling creature, Just recently a pretty young mother, carries a sodden lump of flesh that had been a child unlucky enough to be m its crib near a large picture window when the sky became filled with the light of a thousand suns and then a thousanQ pieces of flymg glass These vlctlms and dozens hke them-without arms, lklthout eyes, with untreatable bums, and radloactlke death m their cells- slowly and agomzmgly Jam other walkmg corpses m a macabre evacuation out of the remnants of Tel A~lv and toward the waltmg desert To the north, m Halfa, the streets are eerily quiet Hours before, several SCLD mlsslles impacted m the cny and the population m the area immediately began chokmg, vomltmg, and falling to the ground W’lthm mmutes hundreds uere dead or dying Wlthm an hour thousands were dead as chernxal agents prekented their autonomous systems from mamtammg life Bl mghtfall, the city mas httered with the bodies of people, household pets, birds, farm animals, and eken rats Those men and women who for one reason or another did not die m the mltlal contammatlon soon did so because much of the medical expertise residing m the city died wnh the rest of the residents and were thus unable to admmlster antidotes to the contammated vlctlms who appeared m the hospitals In a mghtmansh reprise of hstory, an unseen chemical agent agam brought death to thousands of Jews Takmg advantage of the confuslon and shock spreading throughout Israel by these atrocmes and others hke them, Arab armies swept m from the Sinai, the Golan, and the West Bank The Israeli Defense Force xxeakened by the many deaths m its resen e forces, unable to coordmate operations due to the confusion and damage of the nuclear attack, 1 and distracted by the need to mamtam some semblance of order m Israeli cities and towns, was overcome by Arab forces, but not before launchmg more than a dozen nuclear stnkes of its own whch destroy Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Teheran and some of the mass destruction capabIlitIes of Iraq and Iran Later, m washmgton D C , the Commander of the Israeli Savy, who happened to be m the United States when the attack began was heard to tell the Israeli Ambassador to the Cmted States m a voice qulvenng with emotion “This time, it truly 1s the end of the Third Temple We must begin agam ” The foregoing is, briefly, the current “mghtmare scenario” that haunts the leader&p of the Israeli Defegse Force (IDF) In Its 51 years of official existence, the IDF has faced a number of -mghtmare scenarios” that contemplate the destruction of the State of Israel by its neighbors Yet, from its founding to the present day, the IDF has not only prekented national extmctlon but has even achieved smashmg vlctones over of its adversaries through an extraordmary ability to learn from Its rmstakes, evolve new doctrme, remake its mhtary orgamzatlon, and e\ en develop mnok atlve technologies whenever necessary Israel 1s currently undergoing its o\+n umque Revolution m Mhtary AfTairs @X4) m response to its experiences m the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991, as a result of regional rmhtary developments that give neighboring nations the capability to attack Israel with k~eapons of mass destructlon, and due to a perceived need to keep up with general advances m conventional military technology around the world 1 The Israeli RMA 1s smular m some ways to the RMA being pursued m the Umted States, but the Israeli R.M.4 also displays dlstmctly Israel1 cultural features A brief exammatlon of the Israel1 hstory of military mnovatlon, and the evolution of the current Israeli RMA 1s useful because It prokldes a window on what one natlon 1s doing to cope with its own emerging security challenges and may pro\;lde some mslght to ’ For a dxusslon of n hat constitutes a Re\ olutlon in Mllltaq Affaxs seeA ndre\+ F Krepmc\ lch Cal aln to Computer - Pattern of Mlhtaq Re\ olutlons The National Interest Fall 1994 Pages The 30-12 2 U S planners and pohcymakers on what other nations might accomplish If they attempt to compensate for U S technological superlorlty and work around U S pohcles that attempt to restnct access to advanced rmhtary technology This last statement rmght seem curious to readkrs who \;lew Israel as one of the strongest LY’S allies m the Middle East today However, an exarnmatlon of Israeli history reveals that uhlle the U S has always harbored some sympathy for Israel’s aspirations and the struggles of its Jeblsh population, through much of its history Israel was considered a “rogue state” by much of the mtematlonal commumty and there were penods when the Umted States aitlvely opposed Israeli actions This was certainly the case between 1959 and 1968 The Eisenhower Adrmmstratlon supported US resolutions condemnmg Israel after the 1956 Arab-Israeli war 2 Through the first 2C years of Israel’s history, the Umted States generally retised to sell modern weapons or rmhtary technologies to Israel and often tned to prevent the new Jewish state from acqmrmg older U S equipment although to mamtam something of a balance of power m the region it permitted the French to sell some Lbeapons 3 The fact that tmy Israel mas able to sunlbe, develop an extremely competent rmhtary estabhshment, procure advanced foreign rmlaary equipment when necessary, meet many of its mlhtary requirements through an mdlgenous defense industry, and build and mamtam its oun nuclear deterrent despite the apparent opprobrium of much of the world commurnty and early opposmon from the Lmted States and Great Bntam should be a sobermg lesson for pohcymakers \\ ho must deal with current rogue states The Concept and Process of Military Innovation hfihtary hlstory 1s replete \\lth examples of both technological and orgamzatlonal mno\atlons that revolutlomzed the combat capablhtles of the services involved That same hstory reveals examples of ideas 2 Howard M Sachar,. -I Hlsroc~ of Israel from the Rrse of Zlonwn to Our Tme 2nd EdItIon I>ew York +lfred A Knopf 1996) page 503 ‘Ehud Yonal ,Yo Margm for Error The :daXmg of the Israel1 .?w Force 13213 York Pantheon Books, 1993) page 7 13 Helen Chapm Metz (Ed ) Israel .< Countrv Stuc& (Washmgton D C , Federal Research Dn man LlbraF of Congress 1938) page 320 3 and mventlons that were not accepted by the services and were thus relegated to hlstoncal cunosltles These rmght-have beens rmght also have generated RMAs, but somehow never took off The process by whch mnovatlve ideas or technologies are accepted or rejected mto an orgamzatlon has become a subject of somk interest to both rmhtary leaders and pohcymakers because the pace of mnovatlve change 1s now occurrmg wnh such mcreasmg speed and m so many sclentlfic dlsclphnes that It IS difficult to know which rmght be useful for rmhtary purposes and whch are likely to be dead ends This 1s of more than acadermc Interest because m the area of rmhtary mnovatlon, incorrect declslons regarding the need for mno\atlon or bad declslons about the type of mnobatlon m wlch to invest could not only be expensive m terms of resources, but on the battlefield could be fatal In order to tilly understand the process of military mnovatlon it 1su seful to consider mnovatlon as a concept Several authors on ths subject have noted that mnovatlon can be consldered almost any change m technolo,T or methodolo,T that seems to improve the efficiency or output of an exlstmg process or actlvlty Viewed m this way, almost any improvement m procedure or acqulsmon of an lmprot ed piece of equipment could be an mnovatlon The hrmted scope of mnovatlon m these cases usually, but not always, brings evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, change and constitutes little more than an improvement m the accomphshment of tasks already bang performed 4 This t> pe of lmprotement 1s usually less mterestmg to the student of mnovatlon because it seldom results m transformations m thought or overall conception regardmg the posslblhtles of the technological mno\atlon or of the orgamzatlon as a whole In contrast, IMOL ations that radically alter exlstmg orgamzatlons, create new mstltutlons, or represent a significant departure m expected output are extremely interesting These are the mnovatlons that can rgmte a RMA Revolutions m Mhtary ’ In the Israeh case this tspe of e\ olutlon might be ewmphfied b\ the difference m capabllmes &spla>ed m the 1936 and 1967 Rars Mau-s by their very nature change the “grammar” of con&t and often the conception of what constitutes -‘modem” warfare The elements that can be shown to defimtlvely contnbute to such a transformation remam to be identified Wule there IS a good deal of anecdotal or blo&-aphlcal hterature on specific mndlvlduals mvolved m mnovatlon or on the development of a particular mnovatron, analytlcal literature on how modem rmhtary mnovatlon takes place 1s actually quite sparse and almost all of it relates to major powers of the past or present This IS, perhaps, natural since it 1s usually the major nations that have the scientific, econonuc, and rmhtary wherewithal to&e the major Implementers of global rmhtaxy change Stephen P Rosen, for example, emphasizes the actual n-uhtary requirements m such nations as the Umted States and Great Bntam and argues that these are the basic catalysts for change He also eyammes the role determmed mdlwduals u ho M lsh to change a rmhtary orgamzatlon can play m lmplementmg change WIthout question, Rosen’s work 1s an important study on the process of rmhtary mno\atlon and his basic assertion that m the final analysis security requirements drive rmhtary mnokatlon IS probably correct However, his dlstmctlon between peacetlme and wartrme mnovatlon IS one that may be apphcable only to nations such as the Umted States or Great Britain which have hlstorlcally not felt threatened m peacetime due to their relative geographc lsolatlon Nations whch habe felt threatened even when there IS not an actual state of war due the eustence of a proumate rruhtary adkersaxy might not differentiate between peacetlme and wartime mno\atlon mlth the same clarity as the two %land” nations cited by Rosen ’ Barry Posen’s hypothesis that mnovatlon occurs when there has been or may soon -&+&I be a military failure may also be the most slgmficant explanation for mnovatlon m many nations of the world 6 As Charles Stevenson has pomted out mno\atlon m most ’ StephenP eter Rosen If vv?lng the .Vext Xar Inno\~atlon and the Modern Jizlrta~ (Ithaca Cornell Urn ersin Press 1991 ) 6Barq R Posen The Source\ of LUllttan Doctrrne France, Bntarn, and Gemran> Benteen the 11o rld bureaucracies, especlallj rmhtary bureaucracies, IS unusual because it disrupts norms, dislocates the relatlonshlps among the personnel m the bureaucracy, and creates uncertainty 7 It 1s thus reasonable to suggest that only the prevention of a major transformmg event would Justlfy the creation of a’major preemptive transformation m those nations u?th lmuted resources and facing proxlmate rmhtary threats TIE nught also explam why many, perhaps most, of the RMAs of hstory began m nations surrounded by enermes An evammatlon of the secunty challenges facing a nation such as Israel combmed x+lth an understanding of the local prochvlty for mnovatlon may prokyde clues as to what pre-Regrolutlbnary condltlons rmght be required to generate revolutionary mnovations In nations \\here the need to stay ahead of nearby adversanes 1s obvious, the role of the ’ hardheaded mdlbldual” v, ho undertakes extraordinary professlonal and bureaucratic actions m ~-USqu est to transform ~-UnSa tion’s rmhtary establishment m nations may be less important m the mnovatlon process than m nations such as the U S or Great Bntam This 1s not to suggest that there nught not be mdlclduals that foster an idea nor that there rmght not be mentors who resource the Ideas and move them along Rather, m a climate m whxh It 1s Lxldely recogmzed that change IS required, the “hardheaded mdlvldual” may be pushing on an open door to get change to occur It should also be noted that for most nations of the world, major rnnovatlon often means effectmg smxlar technologxal, doctrinal, and operational concepts as a potential adversary or ally One of the hallmarks of R‘Lz4s 1s that \%hle they may ongmate m one natlon they spread to other nations ultimately transformmg the global nature of war itself Thus \x,lthm each global RMA there are a mynad of national RM4s that mvolve local Jlhrs (Ithaca Cornell Lnnersq Press 1934) pages 5-58 7Char-es A Stevenson DJnamlcs of Alzl~ta~ Innox atIon An Unpubhshed Paper Preparedf or the Bl-enmel Conference on the Inter-l;nners@ Semmar on Armed Forces and Society Baltimore Manland October 24-26, 1997 page 1 6 redefimtlon of military culture, doctrine, orgamzatlonal changes, and perhaps the advent of even more modern technologies designed to defeat the technological mnovatlons of the potential threat Thus for many countries \\lth hrmted resources adoptmg the rmhtary culture, doctrme, orgamzatlonal concept, and technolo=T of another nation, may be a local RMA m itself and an engine for mdlgenous mnovatlon m the titure The Israeli model would seem to bear out this hypothesis as well The Israeli Cultural Environment In order for mnovatlon to occur, an essential prerequlslte 1s a culture suitable for mnovatlon and expenmentatlon or one that can be made so Thus peans not only a wllhngness to develop new ideas and experiment with them, but also a culture m whch the Iconoclast 1s tolerated The Israeli Defense Force (IDF), like the mlhtary estabhshment of any nation, 1s a reflection of the society from w:hlch it emerges and serves Gl\ en Israel’s hstory of expenmentatlon and mnovatlon, the proch\ lty of the IDF to innovate 1sb oth natural and understandable In many ways the State of Israel 1s a product of rebellion, expenmentatlon, and mnovatlon Toward the end of the 19th century, Zlomsm became an organlung ideology for Jews desmng a return to Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state The Zlomsts however deteloped an ideology whch rejected much of what the world belleked it knew about Judaism Throughout the Mddle L4ges and mto the modern era. Jews, particularly m Eastern Europe, had been relegated to suchJobs as tailors, Jewelers, and shoemakers In order to get along m the societies m which they lived, the Jews had m many ways become subsemlent and meek One author has even noted that rabbis and Talmudic scholars subtly began altering Jewish hstory transformmg, for example, the warrior king David mto a scholar and m general de-emphasizing the rmhtary past of Israel and the Jewish people 8 ’ Max-m Van Cre\ eld The .‘%oI rd and the 0111e L Crztlcal HIstop of the Israel1 Defense Forces @-eu York Public Affairs Press 1999‘1p age 10 7 The Zlomsts rejected the tradition of the weak, shfiy Je\+ and instead developed the concept of the strong, robust Je\+ who would transform the desert wxh lx labor and his knowledge In addmon to ths transformmg cultural conce$ of Jewishness, the Zlomst movement was soclahst m its pohtlcal onentatlon In the late 19th and early 2Cth Centunes, Soclahsm and Marxism were ldeologles that appealed to Intellectuals and slulled urban workers These behefs mere touted as “sclentlfic” because they were based not only on theoretlcal constructs, but also observations of actual world condmons of the time whch m turn seemed to “proxe” the vahdlty of the theoretical constructs Jewish culture tradmonally emphasized education and honored scholars and wise rabbis Every farmly mlshed at least one of its sons to go to a umverslty, become a learned rabbi, or some other kmd of knowledge-based professlonal These various cultural and pohtlcal threads came together m the latter part of the 19th Century to bnng many educated and professlonal Jews mto the Zlomst movement, U’estern European Soclahst parties, and even Russian Slaxxst and Soclahst revolutionary orgamzatrons Much of the intellectual dnke of the lefilst pohtlcal \ movements of the era came from its educated JemTshm embers Karl Marx lxmself was Jexx1s.h9 It was not only m polmcal and social thought that JeLylsh mtellectuals were making themselves felt, thefill de rrcle era also mqtnessed a flowermg of Jewish intellectual gifts m the natural sciences In Western Europe, Jewish scientists, engineers, and techtucal speclahsts were transformmg the technological face of the continent Jewish sclentlsts were redefinmg the very paradigms by whxh the cosmos were understood In 1905, Albert Emstem pubhshed his Theory of Relatlvlty whxh transformed the sclentlfic commumty’s mews about the laws of the umverse Simultaneously, Sigmund Freud has 9 For a more e\tensn e stud! of the mtellectual roofs of Zlomsm and leftist ldeologles m Europe see Walter Laquer .; Hrston of Zwws17t( Yen York Holt Rxtehart and Wmston 1971) 8