ARCHIVE COPY NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE “LEAD SINGAPORE, IF I CAN’T SERVE IN MALAYSIA” LEE KUAN YEW AND THE SINGAPORE “MODEL” CORE COURSE ESSAY LT COL DARPHAUS L MITCHELL/CLASS OF 1997 COURSE 5601 FUNDAMENTALS OF STATECRAFT SEMINAR G CDR PAUL THOhlPSON FACULTY SEMINAR LEADER COL JOHN GIBEAU FACULTY ADVISER Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 1997 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1997 to 00-00-1997 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER ’Lead Singapore, If I Can’t Serve in Malaysia’. Lee Kuan Yew and the 5b. GRANT NUMBER Singapore ’Model’ 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National War College,300 5th Avenue,Fort Lesley J. REPORT NUMBER McNair,Washington,DC,20319-6000 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT see report 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE 10 unclassified unclassified unclassified Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 “Lead Singapore, If I Can’t Serve in Malaysia” Lee Kuan Yew and the Singapore “Model” Lee Kuan Yew, Smgapore’s Prune Mnnster for the first 31 years following independence from Gr’eat Bntam, led hu city-state through one of the most mcredlble transformauons of the twenueth century In the midst of the Cold War compeuuon between superpowers, retrenchmg colomal powers and tlsmg nationahsm w&m h regon, Lee converted Smgapore from a relatively mmor c8lomal trading port to a global financial and mdustnal gant In the process he bmlt a dynarmc, vibrant nation-state, a model of prospenty and stab&y This paper exammes Lee Kuan Yew’s statecraft. It mvestlgates the events and influences that shaped h= achons and Lee’s assumphons about the mtematlonal and domestic enwonment. It also frames Smgapore’s national secunty interests, goals and objectives followmg mdependence and threats to those interests. Fmally, tis paper analyzes the major pohcles and instruments of statecraft Lee used to satisfy nauonal secunty interests and concludes with an assessment of the quality of Lee’s approach from a Smgaporean and an Amencan perspectil e Followmg mdependence from Great Bntam m 1959, Lee and the leadership of ti polltlcd party. the People s Acuon Party (PAP), campagned to brmg about the Iugzcal merger with I Malayslh Wlzle Lee felt Singapore’s survival depended on this merger, Malayan leaders hesitated for ~anous reasons mcludmg fear of the impact of Smgapore’s Chmese majonty on Malay stctte pohucs From 1943 to 1965, Singapore and lMdaysla expenmented with the merger with dlsappol?ung results m the fmanclal uena, racial and rellglous tension, md communal violence. On 9 August 1965 Malaysld expelled Smgapore from the Federduon.l This event shook Lee and his leddership to the core They had devoted their careers to \+n-tnmg independence for d united Smgapore and -Malaysia; now separation from Malaysia had been thrust upon them. Lee told Smgaporeans m his announcement address, ‘*For me, it is a moment of anguish All my hfe, my whole adult life, I have believed m merger and unity of the two termones.“’ Singapore, a city-state of 2 million people with no natural resources. inadequate water supply and httle m&genous defense capability now found itself alone. Lee faced the daunting challenge of bmldmg a nauon agamst seemmgly nnposslble odds When viewmg the enwonment that framed the task ahead, Lee saw a tenuous structure. Smgapore was a minor city-state 111a world dommated by a balance of power struggle between competing superpower ideologies The region was m transiuon following retreat of former colonid powers and weathermg the storms of rismg nattonahsm. Major actors m the region had different mouvauons Malaysia sought mdependence from Great Brnam and feared the influence of the Chmese malonty m Singapore. Indonesia aspired to estabhshmg a Greater Indonesia that mcluded Borneo and Malaysia 3 Great Brxam sought to reduce commitments abroad and withdraw from the region as quickly as possible Lee believed Singapore was not viable by itself. Even though Smgapore was cutting the umbilical from its recent partners, the new nauon was not completely weaned It depended on Malaysia and the rest of the region for trade and on the Bnnsh for security and economic stabrhty Lee believed Great Bntam would retam ties with Smgdpore dnd MaldySld though with d reduced forward presence. Eat Asia was sure to grow economically The Cold War s ideologlcd competition would conunue md commumsts would continue dttempung to subvert and control regional governments Despite exly apprehension regarding its neighbors, Lee beheved cooper@on would grow to the pomt where reliance on the West would Qmlmsh. He ultimately believed the key to Smgapore’s econormc vlab&ty was mdustnahzatlon, &verslficauon and the removal of its dependence on any one nauon Lee’s grand strategy was bmlt on three fimdamental p&.rs of vital national secunty mteresq (1) physical security, (2) economic welfare and prospenty, and (3) the construction and preservation of Smgaporean values at home As a new natlon, survival and nauon-bmldmg were the key issues, consequently, Lee’s nauonal secunty interests and objecuves flowed from those Imperatives. i; lrst and foremost, Lee had to provide for defense of the nation Smgapore felt the maJor threat to its existence was communist movements m the region and the potential for mtemal unrest. Addluo&+lly, Indonesia was SQDa potermally aggressive, larger naghbor havmg violently opposed the Malaysla/Smgapore merger Malaysia had also proven hostie to Singapore Lee. unurllling to be “left Isolated and fnendless...enclrcled by a hostie sea of communal and obscurant forces,- knew he had to devise strategies and means of deternng aggression This became particularly pressing 1wt.h Great Bntam’s decision to draw down its presence m the region and close military bases on Smgapdre At the brne the Bntlsh were provldmg Smgapore’s sea and an defense; this turn of events could have been disastrous had Lee not taken acuon I Callmg on his diplomatic skzlls, he \+ent to England and convinced Bnush leadership and m public to delay wlthdrawd whle he continued bmldmg the Singaporean mlhtary This typified Lee- / -a mster of turning potenudl adversity to m&ynnum advmtage To create a professlond mrl&uy I force. Lee used to the resources of a country he thought slmlldr to Singapore for its lsolatlon I I among potentId enemies. Because of Israel’s expenence m succcsstuily defending ~tsclf from numendally superior forces, Lee hued Israeli advisors to tram the core of his new army. Acknowledgmg his nation’s weak military capability, Lee declared a policy of neutrality and non- alignment followmg Switzerland’s model (another country he adrmred).’ In the mtenm, Lee effectively sought and gamed security under big power umbrellas Over tune, Singapore developed a “defensive security outlook that emphasized the mamtenance of strong military relations with other nations of ASEAN, the Five-Powers Defense Agreement and other noncommunist states 7’S Concurrently with ensunng the physical security of Smgapore, Lee bud the plans for promo&g economic diversity, mndustnalizat.ion and modernization, the second pillar of his national secunty strategy. The loss of Great Bntam, aside from rockmg Smgapore’s defense capablhty, threatened to wreak havoc on its economy Lee seized the opportumty to capitalize on the withdrawal, first by employmg the substantial, modem mfrastructure left 111p lace and, secondly, by opemng up Smgapore to other foreign mvestors This later minanve addressed another deficiency of Singapore’s economy--the shortage of domestic entrepreneurs Lee attracted foreign investment by providmg access to his country’s highly skilled, disciplmed, and relatively low paid work force. He also offered dttracuve tax advantages to investors m exchange for capital eqmpment, technology marketmg techniques and export markets Unwilling to operate on exclusive free market pnnciples, the government actively pdrmpdted m all facets of industry The government was responsible for pldnmng and budgeting for everything from mternational fmdnce to trah collection. [ItI I owned. controlled, regulated, or tiocdted ldnd, ldbor and cdpital I resources set or influenced many of the pieces on which private investors baed business calculations dnd mvestment decrsrons State intervention m the economy had d positive nnpdct not only on prr\ate business profitability but also on the general welfare of the I population Beyond the lobs created m the pnvatc and pubhc sectors. the government provided subsrdiircd housing sducdtlon. - LcPoer p 12 - Ihd p ‘48 / and health and recreational servxes, as well as pubhc I transportatron ’ I Lee felttsuch trght control and mvolvement necessary to mamtam control of the nauon’s economic engme, but estabhshed long-term pohcles to pnvauze parts of the state-owned enterpnses imnally, Smgapore’s economrc development was threatened by trade wars with its neighbors. notably, Malaysia CM. Turnbull, m A History of Smgapore, portrays an East Asian / tradmg enwomnent characterized by restnctrve policies and competmg, vice complementary, economies Lee looked to countnes outside the region for burldmg econormc bndges Tumbull states, ‘ Smgapore adopted a pohcy of non-ahgnment, itlrmng to wm reco,oIllttlon and to estabhsh fnendly relations and tradmg hnks with all countries. regardless of ideology ” Thus, for pnmanly econormc reasons. Lee saw rt clearly m Smgapore’s interest to promote and preserve a stable mtematlonal envrronment Indeed, Smgapore’s tremendous growth would not have been possrble without 1c ommensurate econormc growth m Europe, the Umted States. Chma and Japan--an enwonment that Lee actively cultivated through trade alhances and br-lateral rmtrdtlves Smgapore’s quest for economrc well-berng occupied the full scope of Lee’s attention and drove some of the most profound changes m the history of the natron since independence. The government of Smgapore knew the first two goals, secunty md economrc prospenty would be unattamable without burldmg d stable domestic enwonment. the thrrd national secunty strategy prllar Systemic problems such as high unemployment. populdtron growth. and mddequdte educatron dnd housmg presented Lee with formidable challenges m orchcstratmg Singapore s economic mrrxle Lee SD opportunmes to modermze not lust the mtrdstructure of Smgapore. but to redefine the structure of his ndtron I p 127 O Ibid . ;Recogmzmg that the key to attractmg foragn mvestment was m offermg polmcal stab&y I and dlsclphned workforce, Lee proceeded to enact measures to preserve social order Capltahzmg on East Asran values of scholarship, hard work, thnft and deferment of present eqloyment for future gam, Lee fashioned a Smgaporean model of soczal controE whch successfully prevented the development of any meamngful challenge to government authonty “’ Three major pohcles dramaucally define the scope of government social control pohcles. k3e cause uncontrolled populatmn growth placed too high a strarn on the economy, the I Smgaporean government restricted farmlies to two children through a full system of incentives and penalties In addmon, the government took an active role ‘provldmg opportunity for matching males and females of the same academic and professional stock.’ The government also implemented a forced relocation program to support the reqmrement for land (a scarce commodity) As a planned consequence of the relocation and public housing pol~cles, Lee obtained land for mdustnallzatlon and, as James Mmchm points out, helped to foster a Smgaporean ldenuty by “bre&mg up natural commumues based on affinity of race, clan, religion, language or dialect ” Mmchm cites the third social control pohcy, streamzng students ealy on m the school system as dn effective method to “pmpomt each person’s place m the talent pyramid and convert the talent pyramid mto the expemse pyramid ready to better serve the needs of d modern mdustnd society. Lee deslgned Smgapore’s education system to produce 3 &ss of ehtes schooled m sclenufic and techmcd dlsclplmes These elites would riSsxstm nanon-bulldmg by virtue of ment, mstllled with 7 The term social control defmer the character of roclal relauonsm Singapore Used in tills context It refers to tile all tzncompawng role ot the state the tntenuonai and etuphclt nature of its regulator) prattices. the percepuons ot Smgdporeanst hrmszl~e~ and tfiz constant threat ot star: wolence ’ ChrIstophcr Trcmew‘m The Polmal Econmm cy ‘hcrnl Cunfrul IH ‘hgapore (lcn York St ~-ltim \ Prc$s Inc 19941p p ’ l-5 the proper values--behef m hard work, thrift, scholarshp and deferment of present enloyment for future gam. LK ee uan Y ew masterfully exercised his statecraft- The results are compellmg--Smgapore today has a lugher per capita GNP than its former colomal master, second to Japan m Asia.. It 1s a maJor center of global manufacturmg and service mdustnes and shares m 80 percent of all ASEAN trade. Lee started the long (m &stance covered) Journey toward this economic mu-acle by recogmzmg Smgapore’s hmltations--natural resources, mfluence and power--and estabhshmg reahstlc, goals to support its mterests--physical security, economic welfare and prospenty, and cultivation and preservation Smgaporean values. Lee accomplished hrs goals m a uniquely Smgaporean way But there were costs of modernization, acceptable to Smgapore. but unpalatable m the Umted States Tumbull aptly notes, Democracy was the first casualty to the mdependent government’s success and soclahsm the second. In order to convert herself mto an mdustnal society, Smgapore had to shed her radical Image, to woo nervous foreign capital and provrde mcentlves to hesitant local capita&s. Thti meant not only ensurmg pohttlcal stab&y but drastically mod-g soclahst prmclples, both m state planmng and m the ownership of economic wealth. Inherent m the ideas of this passage 1s the fundamental disconnect between Lee’s model and the Western perspective. Lee believes the nghts of the m&vldual are subservient to orderly society md that It 1s the role of government to provide economic growth and technological advancement; not hbepy, lustIce and the pursuit of happiness Apart from 1t.se conomic prowess, Smgapore IS also noted for its dutocrauc rule, Intolerance for vle\ss mconslstent with offlclal polrcy and repressive intemti secunty “Class. race. gender. rellglon. A have been used ds tools m Smgdpore’s social cl&s expenment which hti resulted tn the mcrctimg dlsempowcrment ot ethnic mmondes, the creanon of a do&e Chmese workmg-class, the pohucal emasculauon of the professional elite, and one of the highest smclde rates m Asia”” Without passmg d value Judgment on the latter view of Singapore, it IS appropnate to evaluate the nauon in a larger context than per capita GYP, balance of payments and freedom from external coercion This very directly crosses the threshold of how the Singapore model would sell m the Umted States. Practices accepted m Smgapore, e.g , detenuon urlthout tnal, revocation of cltlzenshlp and deportauon of pohucal actlvmsk, government matchmakmg, run counter to the Western hberal democracy Our socleues hold dear different mews on the role of government m society and m&vidual pol~ncal and clvll nghts ks Lee stated, “certam liberties m a developing nation sometunes have to be sacnflced for the sake’ of economic development and secunty.“’ An Amencan foundmg father would not have chosen Lee’s approach but it’s Qfflcult to argue wrth Lee’s economic and secunty results Lee’s statecraft reflects a realist’s approach, first exploltmg balance of power structures to I achieve secunty then mampulatmg alhances for strategic advantage He established achievable obJectIves for hw nauon--freedom from hosule powers, economic prospenty and mtemal stablllty-- then crafted the social strucmre to accomphsh its goals Lee met adversity with purpose, dnve and force of will From a Smgaporean perspecnve, Lee succeeded. He developed polrtxal, economic and secunty ties within the region while expanding relauons with nations outside He created a stable domestic environment that attracted foreign investment and spurred economic prospenty And, perhaps most slgmfic~t, he developed CLn auondl ldentlty wlthrn the mulu-lmgu& mulu-r;lclA. mulu-cultural society that wds Smgapore In short. he built r~n anon I ’ hd. p IF ’ IbId p 190